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Neither communist, nor fascist, the personalist third way was an original attempt to 
remedy the malaise of liberal democracies in 1930s Europe. Personalism puts the emphasis on 
the human person – understood to be an individual in relation to others – as the foundation 
and aim of society. Yet, because of the impossibility of subjecting the human person to a 
systematic definition, personalism remains complex and multifaceted, to the extent that it 
might be best to speak of ‘personalisms’ in the plural. The various personalist movements that 
emerged in France in the 1930s are little known, and the current historiography in English 
misrepresents them. 
!
This dissertation is a study of the various personalist movements based in France in 
the 1930s, examining their spiritual research and political philosophy through the vantage 
point of Swiss writer Denis de Rougemont (1906-1985). In Rougemont lies the key to 
understanding the personalist groupings because he was the only thinker to remain active in 
the two foremost movements (Ordre Nouveau and Esprit) throughout the 1930s. The 
personalism of Ordre Nouveau was the most original, in both senses of the term. It deserves 
particular attention as an important political philosophy and an attempt to justify political and 
economic federalism in 1930s Europe. Whilst an Ordre Nouveau activist, Rougemont can be 
looked upon as the mediator and federator of personalisms in the 1930s. 
!
However, Rougemont’s particular contribution to personalist thought was more 
spiritual and theological than political or economic. Rougemont saw it as his vocation, in a 
strict religious sense, to oppose ‘totalitarian’ regimes. In the final analysis, Rougemont’s 
personalism was best expressed in the minor classic L’Amour et l’Occident (1939). Love, as 
the affirmation of personal freedom and responsibility vis-à-vis other persons, is the closest 





This dissertation is my own work and contains nothing which is the outcome of work done in 
collaboration with others, except as specified in the text and Acknowledgements. !!
The dissertations does not exceed the regulation length of 80,000 words excluding footnotes, 
references, and bibliography. !!
Primary texts have been quoted in the original French, including any inconsistencies in the 
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Introduction!!!!!!
Personalism: the problem of definition !
There are, in the history and geographical diffusion of ideas in modern thought, at least ten 
different schools of personalism. One must distinguish between American idealistic 
personalism, Russian personalism, the various European personalisms of the early twentieth 
century, the later communitarian personalism in Catholic circles (from Latin America to 
Poland), and latterly, African personalist philosophies. Each school has its own understanding 
of the person, and most agree on the impossibility of defining the essence of a person. Perhaps 
one may say that personalism is about resisting the definition of the person. 
!
There has been no overall study of all the various personalisms. Stanley Rudman has 
recently made an attempt at ‘re-situating personhood’ by analysing the Boston school of late 
nineteenth-century personalism, alongside the 1930s and 1940s French personalism of 
Emmanuel Mounier, and also alongside contemporary feminism ‘even when the term 
“person” is not used’.   It is true that feminism remains known for its claim that the personal is 1
political. However, one has to set reasonable limits to what can be called ‘personalist’, and the 
use of the word ‘person’ is one of them. The examples chosen (without contextual awareness) 
led Rudman to the conclusion ‘that there is very little that holds all personalists together 
except their opposition to various forms of materialism’.   But anti-materialism is surely not 2
enough to identify ‘personalism’ and finally Rudman admitted that ‘a fuller history of 
“personalism” waits to be written’.   It would be unnecessary to attempt a history of 3
personalism covering both American and European traditions: they had little in common, save 
the name. 
!  13
!  See his Chapter 6: ‘Resituating personhood: embodiment and contextuality’, in Stanley Rudman, Concepts of 1
personhood and Christian ethics (New studies in Christian ethics. Cambridge, 1997), 103-18.
!  Rudman, Concepts of personhood and Christian ethics, 109.2
!  Rudman, Concepts of personhood and Christian ethics, 109.3
!
American personalism developed in the nineteenth century, as a late development of 
German idealism. Even when it designates philosophical systems in America, the term 
‘personalism’ has myriad uses. Rufus Burrow Jr. has given an account of the various 
American personalist currents.   Two main currents may be distinguished: on the one hand, an 4
individualistic form of personalism, put forth by Walt Whitman, in the 1860s;   on the other 5
hand, American personalistic idealism, founded by Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910).  6
American personalistic idealism, emerged in academic philosophical and Methodist 
theological circles, in Boston and Los Angeles. It holds that only persons (understood as self-
conscious agents) and their characteristics exist; reality consists of a society of interacting 
persons. Typically, an American personalist would also hold that finite persons depend for 
their existence on God, who is the Supreme Person, having intelligence and volition. 
American personalistic idealism was developed by different thinkers in the twentieth century; 
most notably by Martin Luther King Jr.   The European personalisms that occupy us here are 7
altogether different. 
!
The focus of this dissertation is France in the 1930s, where small groups of 
intellectuals chose the notion of person as the rallying cry for a personalist movement with 
political and social ambitions. Originally, their professed aim was to defend the freedom and 
creativity of each human being. This was especially relevant to the situation of 1930s Europe, 
with the increasing influence of communism and fascism, both movements that subordinated 
the individual to the collective. This personalist movement is largely forgotten today, despite 
the fact that it asked important questions and developed into a social movement and a political 
philosophy. Why, then, did it recede into obscurity? 
!  14
!  Rufus Burrow Jr., Personalism: a critical introduction (St Louis, 1999). Burrow mentions the French 4
personalist Charles Renouvier and the German personalist William Stern, but none of the other non-idealistic 
personalisms.
!  Walt Whitman, 'Personalism', The Galaxy, V, 5 (1868). Reissued in a bilingual edition by Bohumil Gacka, 5
Demokracja i personalizm (Lublin, 1994). I owe this information to Christian Roy.
!  Besides the book quoted above, see Borden Parker Bowne, Personalism (Boston, 1908); Paul Deats and Carol 6
Robb (eds), The Boston personalist tradition in philosophy, social ethics, and theology (Louvain, 1986); 
Bogumil Gacka, American personalism (Lublin, 1995).
!  To get an idea of the multiple trends of thought that claimed the title ‘personalist’ in America in the twentieth 7
century, one may refer to Thomas O. Buford and Harold H. Oliver (eds), Personalism revisited. Its proponents 
and critics (New York, 2002).
!
To this question, the standard answer is that personalism did not have the conceptual 
apparatus of the Marxism of Gramsci or Althusser, nor the philosophical precision of the 
existentialism of Merleau-Ponty and perhaps Sartre.   In France, personalism has been 8
presented as an ‘attitude’, a perspective, an aspiration.   The Canadian historian John Hellman 9
once remarked that it was easy to see why a philosophy that was not a philosophy proved as 
ephemeral as Sartre’s existentialism proved marketable.   However, like personalism, 10
existentialism is a style of thinking rather than a definite logical method. And for all his 
philosophical aspirations, Sartre wrote in a literary mode, like most personalists. Despite the 
problem of definition, Sartre’s existentialism became popular and was widely translated. 
Therefore, it is not the lack of a definition or the absence of an obvious philosophical method 
that caused ‘French’ personalists to fall into oblivion. 
!
Several factors contribute to explain why personalism has been largely forgotten. First, 
in the 1940s, Sartre and his friends of Les temps modernes took a philosophical position very 
similar to the ‘French’ personalism of the 1930s, and so French existentialism rendered a 
separate movement, personalism, redundant in the minds of many. The adjectives ‘existential’ 
or ‘existentialist’, and to a lesser extent ‘personal’ and ‘personalist’, became catch-alls for 
many thinkers from the 1930s to the 1960s. Then, with the structuralist attack on subjectivity, 
both ‘French’ personalism and existentialism have been undermined. And lastly, with the 
questioning of the intellectuals’ authority to speak on public and especially moral matters, 
personalism is less likely to meet approval, even though there is more and more discussion 
concerning the person, human dignity, conscience, and the self. 
!
Like the French existentialists (and before them), personalist thinkers had proved very 
‘French’ with respect to political engagement in their writings.   They were confident of the 11
!  15
!  Paul Ricoeur, 'Préface', Emmanuel Mounier: Ecrits sur le personnalisme (Paris, 2000), 7.8
!  Following Emmanuel Mounier, Manifeste au service du personnalisme (Collection Esprit, Paris, 1936).9
!  John Hellman, Emmanuel Mounier and the new Catholic left, 1930-1950 (Toronto, 1981), 4.10
!  Denis de Rougemont, as we shall see, was one of the first writers to call for ‘engagement’. For comparative 11
perspective, see esp. Stefan Collini, 'Intellectuals in Britain and France in the twentieth century: confusions, 
contrasts - and convergence?' in Jeremy Jennings (ed.) Intellectuals in twentieth-century France. Mandarins and 
Samurais (London, 1993), 199-226.
role of the intellectual in society, believing that it was their mission to act in the political 
sphere. They were characteristically French, not only in language, but also in their conception 
of the role of the philosopher or thinker. 
!
To begin to recover a sense of what personalism meant in the 1930s, it is necessary to 
revise a long-lasting cliché. Brian Jenkins – to quote the most recent instance – has noted: 
‘Personnalisme was a doctrine associated above all with Emmanuel Mounier and his social-
Catholic collaborators on the review Esprit’.   However, personalism was neither Emmanuel 12
Mounier’s doctrine originally, nor a social-Catholic movement in the 1930s. Michel Winock’s 
political history of the journal Esprit, which remains the most widely-read study of 
personalism, can be criticised for perpetuating the cliché that personalism was invented by 
Emmanuel Mounier and his collaborators at Esprit.   A prominent historian today, Michel 13
Winock wrote this book as a young man living in the Esprit community in Châtenay-Malabry, 
and did not hide his allegiance to the movement. Similarly, Gérard Lurol’s extensive research 
on the philosophy of Mounier leaves the reader unaware of the international origins of 
personalism.    14
!
The Canadian historian Christian Roy has sought to rectify this bias, with particular 
reference to the key figure of Alexandre Marc (originally Lipiansky), a Russian émigré who 
effectively imported personalism into France, via Germany.   The various personalist theories 15
that had developed in Germany in the 1910s were on the decline in the late 1920s, when the 
term was taken up by Alexandre Marc. He started to develop ‘personnalisme’ in France 
around 1931, as a convenient term for a reflection on concrete human beings, with spiritual as 
well as material concerns. Through Marc, ‘le personnalisme’ became the doctrine of the Ordre 
Nouveau (ON) group, a non-confessional, ‘neither right nor left’ movement. 
!
!  16
!  In Brian Jenkins (ed.) France in the era of fascism: essays on the French authoritarian right (Oxford, 2005), 12
64n136.
!  Michel Winock, "Esprit". Des intellectuels dans la cité, 1930-1950 (2nd edn. Paris, 1996).13
!  Gérard Lurol, Emmanuel Mounier. vol.1, Genèse de la personne; vol.2, Le lieu de la personne (2 vols. Paris, 14
2000). 
!  Christian Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe (1904-1934): L'Ordre Nouveau aux origines du 15
personnalisme (Nice, 1999).
In 1930s France, ‘personnalisme’ proved useful in the call for a spiritual (but not 
necessarily religious) reassessment of society. The spiritual emphasis is to be understood by 
contrast to primarily material interests. ‘Spirituel’, for personalists, included religious as well 
as non-religious and anti-religious ideas. The personalism that emerged in France at the turn 
of the 1930s was a third way in politics and, as I shall argue, in spirituality too. Originally, 
personalism not only aimed at ‘neither right nor left’ politics, but also sought a ‘neither 
religious nor secularist’ line. 
!
Supplementing Christian Roy’s analysis, the German scholar Thomas Keller has 
emphasised the importance of cultural transfer and cultural exchange between Germany and 
France in the shaping of a non-confessional personalism in France.   Far from being invented 16
by a young generation of Catholic thinkers in France at the turn of the 1930s, the so-called 
‘French’ personalism was, to a significant extent, inherited from Russian and German 
philosophers of the older generation. Subsequently, there was a ‘pluralisation of 
personalism’ (to use Keller’s expression): various branches of personalism blossomed in 
France and, after the war, throughout the world.   Keller’s idea will be examined here, with 17
regard to 1930s France. 
!
All personalists agreed on the absolute value of the human person and the importance 
of personal relationships. In reality however, the conviviality of their discourse could be 
replaced by bitter internecine quarrels. Emmanuel Mounier put it euphemistically in his 
Personalist Manifesto of 1936, quoted here in the English translation of 1938: ‘Personalism is 
for us at present a sort of general pass-word. We are using it as an inclusive term for various 
doctrines that in our present historical situation can be made to agree upon the elementary 
physical and metaphysical conditions of a new civilization.’   In 1930s France, there was an 18
!  17
!  Thomas Keller, 'Le personnalisme de l'entre-deux-guerres entre l'Allemagne et la France', Alexandre Marc et 16
la Jeune Europe (Nice, 1999), 455-562.
!  Thomas Keller, Deutsch-französische Dritte-Weg-Diskurse: Personalistische Intellektuellendebatten der 17
Zwischenkriegszeit (Munich, 2001). On modern personalism in France and Germany, see esp. Keller, 'Le 
personnalisme de l'entre-deux-guerres', 489-94.
!  Mounier, Manifeste au service du personnalisme. Transl. as Emmanuel Mounier, A personalist manifesto 18
(Translated by Monks of St John's Abbey London. New York, 1938), 1.
ongoing debate as to what personalism meant;   to the degree that each personalist thinker 19
seemed to have had his (they were mostly men) own definition of it. Hence the need for a 
vantage point to study the various personalist movements that developed in the 1930s. In 
Denis de Rougemont (1906-1885) lies the key to understanding the personalist groupings, 
because this Swiss writer was the only thinker to remain active in the two foremost 
movements – ON and Esprit – throughout the 1930s. 
!
Denis de Rougemont: an unjustly neglected personalist !
There is an excellent biography of Denis de Rougemont by the Swiss writer Bruno 
Ackermann.   While I have been more sceptical about certain points than Ackermann, I 20
acknowledge my indebtedness to him. His work is wholly commendable, and it would not 
have been possible to carry out this study if Ackermann had not prepared the field, classified 
the archives in Neuchâtel, and established a detailed bibliography of Rougemont’s published 
works. There are two main differences between our studies. 
!
Firstly, Ackermann’s initial project was a work of literary criticism. His version of 
Rougemont’s intellectual trajectory emerged as a 800 page-long preamble to the study of his 
‘non-private diaries’ (journaux non-intimes).   In the course of this ‘preamble’, Ackermann 21
has studied personalism as a phase of engagement in Rougemont’s career.   Unlike 22
Ackermann, I am primarily interested in the various personalist movements and ideas, and I 
study Rougemont because he provides a vantage point to recover, as far as possible, the 
personalist thought of the 1930s in its complexity. 
!
!  18
!  Véronique Auzépy-Chavagnac has spoken of a ‘débat autour du sens à donner à la notion de personnalisme’, 19
with particular reference to the debate between Jean de Fabrègues and Emmanuel Mounier. Véronique Auzépy-
Chavagnac, Jean de Fabrègues et la Jeune Droite Catholique. Aux sources de la Révolution nationale 
(Villeneuve d'Ascq, 2002), 322. 
!  A full historical biography of Rougemont remains to be written. The detailed analysis of Ackerman stops in 20
1946. Bruno Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle. De la Révolte à l'engagement; 
Combats pour la liberté, Le Journal d'une époque (2 vols. Geneva, 1996). An oral history has looked at the 
period from 1948 to 1960: Mary-Jo Deering, Combats acharnés: Denis de Rougemont et les fondements de 
l'unité européenne (Lausanne, 1991).
!  Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle (vols. 1 and 2), 59-866.21
!  Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 249-376, 497-522.22
Secondly, our interpretation of intellectual history differs, partly because I am writing 
ten years after him, and partly because I benefit from the important cultural-transfer studies 
quoted above, by Roy and Keller. Ackermann has given an evocative portrait of Rougemont 
within his generation – which was the prevalent tool of the French history of intellectuals 
when he was researching, in the 1980s and early 1990s.   I hope to enlarge and deepen 23
Ackermann’s analysis, by being more critical of Rougemont’s self-presentation as being 
‘above the fray’, and by showing the relevance of cross-border analysis for the study of 
personalism. I seek to put the concern with the human person into the historical context of 
1930s Europe. 
!
I argue that Rougemont stood out as a mediator between personalist movements, not in 
the sense that he was a neutral arbiter, but in so far as he sought to federate the various 
personalist groups. I am not the first to notice that Rougemont played a crucial role as a 
mediator between different personalist movements. In the 1980s, Pascal Balmand published 
two articles asserting that Rougemont mediated between various poles of intellectual debate 
in France.   Rougemont contributed equally to the journals Esprit and L’Ordre Nouveau (of 24
the ON group) throughout the 1930s. Besides, Rougemont’s nationality provided him with 
particular links with Switzerland, and offers a unique opportunity for the study of personalism 
in that country. Thus, there are two dimensions to Rougemont’s mediating role – across 
international boundaries and between personalist movements – both of which are examined in 
Part I.  
!
Historiographical issues: method and interpretation !
For the purpose of studying the social and political dynamics of personalism, Pierre 
Bourdieu’s understanding of the literary field proves helpful.   However, mine is not a 25
!  19
!  Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 21-56.23
!  Pascal Balmand, 'Denis de Rougemont', La Revue des revues, 3 (Spring 1987), 10-11; Pascal Balmand, 'Denis 24
de Rougemont et le courant personnaliste: archéologie d'un engagement intellectuel', France Forum, 250-1 
(1989), 53.
!  See esp. Pierre Bourdieu, Les Règles de l'art, Genèse et structure du champ littéraire (2nd edn. Paris, 1998); 25
Pascale Casanova, The world republic of Letters (Translated by M.B. Debevoise. Harvard, 2005); Gisèle Sapiro, 
La Guerre des écrivains, 1940-1953 (Paris, 1999).
prosopographical study of personalism. I focus on one key thinker, his social role, political 
philosophy and spiritual research. In discussing the role of Denis de Rougemont as a 
mediator, I follow cultural-transfer theorists, who have described a series of transnational 
mediators.   26
!
This dissertation is a study in intellectual history, not the least because personalists, 
like most thinkers in history, largely failed to implement their ideas in the 1930s. In seeking to 
recover an understanding of the intellectual activity of the past, and focussing on ‘ideas in 
context’, I follow the Cambridge School approach. Recently, Melissa Lane has emphasised 
the embedded nature of political philosophy, in the past and present.   My initial interest in 27
the study of personalism was prompted by an apparent contrast: personalism stated the 
inherent freedom of the human person in 1930s Europe, a time and place when freedom was 
so notoriously abused. Personalist writers articulated a dissatisfaction with the political and 
economic systems of the time and a longing for the transcendent, which extended far beyond 
their readership. This makes personalism significant from the intellectual and cultural point of 
view, even though it remained a tiny social movement and a political failure. 
!
In political and cultural history, various aspects of personalism(s) have been studied as 
the doctrine of the eclectic groups successively qualified as: ‘non-conformistes des années 
trente’; ‘nouvelles relèves spiritualistes’; or else proponents of third-way discourses.   The 28
term ‘third way’ is preferable, for reasons developed in Chapter 1. It is widely acknowledged 
that political personalism was a rejection of communism and parliamentary democracy.   The 29
various personalisms were variants of the ‘neither right nor left’ discourses in 1930s Europe. 
Needless to say, the ‘third way’ is a recurring theme in history. In the context of 1930s 
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Europe, it is reminiscent of various generic definitions of fascism. Was personalism, then, a 
proto-fascism? 
!
The problem is complex since both personalism and fascism are notoriously difficult 
to define. Some scholars, including Zeev Sternhell, John Hellman, and Jean Jacob, have 
argued that personalism, without being ‘pure’ fascism, paved the way for it.   Others, such as 30
Michel Winock, Philippe Burrin, and Bernard Comte, have maintained that personalism 
stayed clear of fascism, and even combated fascism in France.   We shall see that personalism 31
is at the centre of what remains controversial in the debate concerning fascisme à la française 
today. On the one hand, personalists claimed to defend personal freedom in 1930s Europe; on 
the other hand, they were a third way in politics, not unlike fascism. 
!
How does this dissertation, considering the main personalist movements in the 1930s 
through the vantage point of the Swiss writer Denis de Rougemont, compare to studies of 
‘non-conformistes des années trente’, ‘nouvelles relèves spiritualistes’, third-way discourses 
as a whole, and ‘proto-fascist’ discourses, in particular? The discussion here offers a general 
picture of the context in which personalism developed as a social movement, it shows how 
personalism diversified, and analyses the strategies of each of the major personalist groups 
(Part I).  
!
Then, the discussion turns to the political and spiritual dimensions of personalism, 
with particular reference to Rougemont (Part II). To date, the philosophical and theological 
questions raised by personalists in the 1930s have not been considered in depth. Thus, I hope 
to make a contribution by the depth and scope of the analysis. Without being a comprehensive 
study of personalism, this dissertation gives a tableau of the various personalist movements 
and doctrines in 1930s France and Switzerland. 
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!
Structure of the dissertation !
It is necessary to begin with a short chapter to clarify the key notions and paradigms 
that have been applied to the personalism of the 1930s. Chapter 1 seeks to explain the 
emergence of a personalist philosophy and movement in France. One important and difficult 
question has been the centre of attention in the historiography: was personalism novel in time 
and space? Three answers have been given, following three paradigms: the concept of 
generation; the distinction between realist and spiritual activists; and the analysis of cultural 
transfer across international boundaries. The first approach tends to present French 
personalism as an invention, the second as a renewal, and the third as a transfer from foreign 
philosophies. I shall argue that each paradigm is overly simplistic, if it is not complemented 
by the two others.  
!
Whether personalism was an innovation depends on whether there was, prior to 
personalist philosophy, a similar conception of personhood as that which personalists 
developed. The various senses of the notion of ‘personne’, in interwar France, are an 
indispensable starting point for the intellectual history of personalism, which has been 
surprisingly bypassed by historians to date. By undertaking semantic discriminations, one 
explains how personalism was the result of innovation and transfer, and why it stands for 
complexity. 
!
Part I then reviews the different personalist movements in the context of 1930s 
Europe, from the vantage point of Denis de Rougemont’s role as a mediator between the 
various personalist groups in France and Switzerland. Personalism also stands for diversity. 
!
Chapter 2 is the most biographical: it assesses the importance of Rougemont’s Swiss 
origins and formation for his entry into literature and politics. Before 1931, Rougemont could 
not be personalist because the term did not exist in French. However, the 1920s remain 
essential as a period of formation. It was then that his literary and belle-lettrist mode of 
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writing developed, and that he became interested in the themes of existence and of the crisis 
of civilisation, which would be the cornerstones of his commitment as a writer. 
!
Chapter 3 takes a chronological approach, in order to show the progressive emergence 
of various personalist groups in France, between 1931 and 1938. It revises the view that 
personalism was primarily a Catholic and leftist ideology. Esprit belatedly recycled the 
proposals of the Ordre Nouveau group, which was a ‘neither right nor left’ personalism. After 
1934, personalism divided into various groups: from the federalist personalism of ON to the 
rightwing corporatist personalism of the ‘Jeune Droite’, through the communitarian 
personalism of Esprit, and the ecological personalism of the Bordeaux Esprit group. The 
various thinkers bitterly disagreed with one another, with the notable exception of 
Rougemont, who allows us to understand how the various groups were related. 
!
Chapter 4 enlarges the question of the different personalist revolutionary movements, 
by emphasising the alternative between a federation of all personalists and their probable 
failure as separate groups. As international tensions grew and the polarisation of European 
societies built up, Rougemont intensified his efforts to federate the revolutionary personalist 
movements. The chief outcome of these efforts was not a more efficient revolutionary 
movement in France, as Rougemont had hoped, but, paradoxically, a force for resistance 
against war and revolution in Switzerland. 
!
Focussing on personalism as a political philosophy, Part II shows how the doctrine of 
federalist personalism (Chapter 5), combined with a theological commitment, allowed 
Rougemont to oppose fascist ideologies with force (Chapter 6) and, strange though it may 
seem, with love (Chapter 7). 
!
Chapter 5 focuses on the personalism of the Ordre Nouveau group (ON), between 
1931 and 1938. This focus is indispensable given the hazy character of personalist 
movements. I concentrate on ON because it developed the most original doctrine of 
personalism in France in both senses of the term: it was not only initiative, but also creative. 
ON is especially important because it was the group that Rougemont actively joined in 1932. 
!  23
Moreover, the focus on the personalism of Esprit and Emmanuel Mounier has resulted in a 
historiographical distortion about the evolution of personalism, which needs to be rectified. 
The federalist personalism of ON was an ambitious attempt at re-thinking the basis of modern 
political theory. 
!
Chapter 6 addresses the controversial question of the relation between personalism and 
fascism as generic phenomena. It shows why the parallel is justified: both personalism and 
fascism were third ways in 1930s Europe. Nevertheless, it argues against any bipolar 
classification. The categories of ‘fascism’ (or ‘proto-fascism) and ‘anti-fascism’ cannot 
account for the complex struggle in which the actors were engaged. The example of Denis de 
Rougemont suggests that the concept of ‘political religion’ helps to recover a sense of the 
personalist fight against fascism.  
!
Finally, Chapter 7 argues that Rougemont’s personalism was best expressed in 
L’Amour et l’Occident (1939). A fresh reading of this minor classic allows us to conclude that 
Rougemont’s works have anthropological and theological foundations, as well as political and 
moral aspirations. This is not particularly original for a Swiss writer. Neither is it unusually 
profound: one might expect a similar remark for most of the spiritual third ways that 
developed in 1930s Europe. Thus, this dissertation is fundamental to our understanding of one 








In 1938, the sociologist Marcel Mauss gave his Huxley Memorial Lecture on the problems of 
interpreting the notion of person in the modern Western world.   He observed that this notion 32
remained ‘imprecise, delicate and fragile’, ‘requiring further elaboration’.   Was Mauss 33
hinting at the much discussed personalism in France at the time? The reasons why it was said 
to be ‘delicate and fragile’ on the eve of the Second World War are clear. But how was it 
‘requiring further elaboration’? Why was it ‘imprecise’? Since the 1930s, the multifaceted, 
complex and contradictory aspects of the person have remained a rich source of confusion for 
analysis of the various personalist doctrines. This chapter aims at clarifying key notions and 
setting the scene for the study of the personalism of Denis de Rougemont that will follow. 
Before making some basic semantic discriminations, it is necessary to start with the different 
paradigms that historians have used to approach the personalism of the 1930s. 
!
!
1. Personalism in 1930s France: invention, renewal and transfer!
!
French personalism became the focus of historical debate through political scientists. 
In 1960, Jean Touchard (who was then general secretary of the Fondation Nationale des 
Sciences Politiques), published a key article on the particular ‘esprit de 1930’, characterised 
by a ‘un front commun de la jeunesse’ transcending the left-right divide in politics.  34
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Following Touchard, the political scientist Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle published a 
pioneering thesis on Les Non-conformistes des années trente (1st edn. 1969).   Loubet del 35
Bayle argued that the ‘non-conformistes des années trente’, between 1930 and 1933, had been 
the most important ideological event of interwar France.    36
!
The ‘non-conformistes’ included the personalist groups of ON and Esprit, and some 
recently formed right-wing movements (often called ‘Jeune Droite’ in Mounier’s expression). 
The main strand of Loubet del Bayle’s interpretation was that they were a young generation of 
intellectuals responding with originality to the famous ‘crisis of civilisation’, at the turn of the 
1930s. While subsequent work has extended or refined Loubet del Bayle’s study, it remains 
central to the historiography. The most significant additions and revisions have concerned the 
generational and novel character of the ‘non-conformistes des années trente’. In this section, 
we shall see that three paradigms have been used: the concept of generation; the distinction 
between realist and spiritual discourses; and finally, the analysis of cultural transfer across 
international boundaries. The first approach tends to present French personalism as an 
invention, the second as a renewal of political discourse, and the third as a transfer from 




It was the personalists’ own claim that they represented the unprecedented concerns of 
a new generation. The concept of generation was debated across Europe in the 1920s and 
1930s. Its systematic use as a tool of analysis dates from this period, following the studies of 
the sociologist Karl Mannheim.   After briefly recapitulating how generational analysis has 37
developed in the 1980s, I shall assess the notion of ‘non-conformisme des années trente’. 
!
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A pioneer in the field, Loubet del Bayle drew on the publications of a few actors. As 
Olivier Dard has noted,   he accepted uncritically Daniel-Rops’ Les années tournantes (1932), 38
which claimed to be the testimony of a movement gathering ‘divers groupes de la jeunesse’ 
on the basis of ‘une certaine camaraderie d’âge’, ‘un accord sentimental’, and ‘un certain 
nombre d’observations critiques’.   Following the actors’ own claims, it became a prerequisite 39
for personalist or ‘nonconformist’ historiography to emphasise generational identity.  
!
In the late 1980s, Pascal Balmand defined the generation of the personalist 
intellectuals of the 1930s by age, of course, and by the consciousness of forming a common 
generation characterized by the idea of community.   Balmand was writing at the time when 40
Jean-François Sirinelli set out an influential model for research on French intellectual 
generations.   According to Sirinelli, identification of a generational identity requires at least 41
three elements: a common age-group; a decisive and formative event; and shared realms of 
sociability. His analysis could be enlarged by reference to Robert Wohl’s The generation of 
1914, which provides an important European dimension, missing in Sirinelli’s approach.   42
!
The personalist groups which are the subject of this study fulfil the three criteria 
defined by Sirinelli, and they fit into the European debate analysed by Wohl. First, for the 
great majority, they were born between 1897 and 1909. Then, most of them were too young to 
have fought the First World War, but did witness subsequent revolutions throughout Europe 
(namely the Russian Revolution of October 1917, the Spartakus revolution in Germany in 
1918-19, the upheavals of 1930-3 and the ‘German Revolution’ of the Nazis in 1933). This 
generation missed serving in the Great War, but, as Wohl put it, ‘was marked forever by its 
passions and the disillusionment and disorder that followed in its wake.’   This is crucial if we 43
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are to understand how engrossed they were with the idea of a revolution. As for Sirinelli’s 
third criterion, their common mode of sociability and action was characterised by meetings in 
study groups and small journals.  
!
There can be no doubt about their strong sense of generational identity. The call for a 
‘Rajeunissement de la politique’ (to quote a book edited by Bertand de Jouvenel in 1932) did 
express a reality.   Oliver Dard has established that, from the sociological point of view, the 44
writers calling for a ‘spiritual’ renewal of politics formed a particularly homogeneous group.  45
They tended to be men from the middle layers of society, whose main activity was writing. 
They were trained in the humanities; philosophical, literary, and theological references would 
be most common in their writings.   The concept of nonconformism suggests elitist 46
intellectuals battling the conformism of mass culture, reminiscent of the Victorian ‘public 
moralists’ studied by Stephan Collini.   This suggests the limits of the ‘nonconformist’ claims 47
of unprecedentedness. 
!
The conflict of generations has been a classical theme in literature and in politics since 
the late nineteenth century at least. Before the First World War, Agathon’s famous survey 
developed the argument that the (vertical) cleavage young vs. old replaced the horizontal 
divide opposing nations, classes and political parties.   By the 1930s, the appropriation of the 48
concept of generation by élite literary culture had achieved the status of a literary genre in 
Europe. The ‘non-conformistes des années trente’ worked under the assumption, characteristic 
of generational portraiture since the nineteenth century, that generations were reflected most 
faithfully in the works of literary intellectuals, and that they, despite being a negligible 
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minority in sociological terms, embodied the concerns of the new generation.   Ironically, 49
emphasis on the discontinuity of generational experience was one of the elements of 
continuity in the genre, together with the sense of being entrusted with a special historical 
mission.   In all respects, the ‘non-conformistes des années trente’ (and personalists in 50
particular) conformed to the rules of the genre. 
!
Finally, whilst claiming to break with the politics and philosophy of the 1920s, the 
‘non-conformistes des années trente’ inherited more than they would admit. The writers’ fight 
for the spirit (l’esprit) in defence of humanity was hardly novel. In the aftermath of the First 
World War, spiritual concerns had been expressed in a series of manifestos.   The starting 51
point of the group Ordre Nouveau (ON) – which was to define personalism in France – may 
be dated back to the joint research of Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, in the late 1920s.  
!
For Robert Aron (the future French Academician), the meeting with Arnaud Dandieu 
was ‘l’événement déterminant de [sa] vie intellectuelle’.   Aron and Dandieu had been linked 52
to surrealist milieux. Whilst rejecting the surrealist and socialist movements they had once 
supported, they shared the anti-dogmatic attitude of the Révolution surréaliste.   In 1927, 53
Aron and Dandieu – disillusioned with post-war society and looking for a doctrinal solution to 
what they saw as a global state of dereliction and disintegration – started to work towards a 
revolutionary political programme.   Like many (former) surrealists, Aron and Dandieu 54
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attempted to promote non-utilitarian practices in industrial countries on the basis of 
ethnology.   Aron and Dandieu published their first joint article in the dissident surrealist 55
journal Bifur in 1929.   It was followed by two essays in the ‘Europe’ series of the Rieder 56
publishing house: Décadence de la nation française (May 1931) and Le Cancer américain 
(October 1931).   These essays criticised the sclerosis in interwar France, whereby patriotism 57
turned into nationalism, democracy into Jacobin centralisation, and French revolutionaries 
into partisan politicians. 
!
To be revolutionary, in Aron’s mind, was to start with reflecting upon the deep roots of 
the crisis of civilisation, in the isolation of the study, without concrete and immediate 
objectives.   This method was already well established in the late 1920s, and it was not 58
unprecedented. In 1905-1910 already, graduates started to meet on a regular basis to discuss 
topical questions (regarding economics and international politics in particular).   More 59
generally, there were important elements of continuity between the 1920s and the 1930s. 
Serge Berstein and others have shown how the ‘immense intellectual effervescence’ of the 
turn of the 1930s was rooted in 1926-7, and could be interpreted as a consequence of the First 
World War.   In short, the ‘non-conformisme des années trente’ must be seen as one phase 60
within a broader attempt to renew politics, the economy, and society as a whole. 
!
Realist vs. spiritual paradigm!
!
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The historian may be reluctant to accept ‘non-conformisme’, not only because it 
overemphasises discontinuity and originality, but also because it draws on the protagonists’ 
own categories. With the ambition of overcoming these limitations, Oliver Dard has called for 
an analysis of the ‘nouvelles relèves des années trente’, a concept he coined himself.   He has 61
distinguished two types of ‘nouvelles relèves’: on the one hand, the ‘réalistes’, who called for 
a rational (technical) running of the state by ‘competent’ people; and on the other hand, the 
‘spiritualistes’, who saw the ‘réaliste’ plans for domestic reform and improvement of 
international relations as opportunistic and illusory.    62
!
Dard’s distinction between the calls for a holistic ‘révolution spirituelle’ and the 
reforms and adjustments of the ‘réalistes’ is an important contrast. However, there were many 
points of contact between ‘réaliste’ and ‘spiritualiste’ groups.   As Dard himself has admitted, 63
a rigid opposition would be simplistic.   Rather than sheer disagreement, theirs was a 64
difference in slogans. For those whom Dard has called ‘spiritualistes’, spiritual values should 
prevail over economic matters (‘primauté du spirituel’). However, the political philosophy of 
personalists was more complex than Dard’s distinction allows. Some rejected economic 
matters as secondary, thus dismissing Marx and Marxism in a rather unsophisticated way. 
Others however gave Marx’s thought careful consideration, and for them emphasis on the 
spiritual included concern for the material (concern being a value, and thus ‘spiritual’ in 
itself).   65
!
Thus, it is important not to draw a strict line between the ‘réaliste’ pole, the spiritual 
trend, and the more conventional milieux. This would be particularly unfortunate in the case 
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of ON, since this group did not fit neatly into a single category. I suggest (and this is a claim 
that will be fully substantiated in Chapter 5) that the ON expressed a primary concern for the 
spiritual, while defending economic and political positions not dissimilar to ‘réalisme’. In 
calling for a European union, as in their attention to economic or ‘technocratic’ issues, future 
ON members were much closer to the ‘réalistes’ of Notre Temps or Les Cahiers bleus than to 
the ‘Jeune Droite’ (with which Dard has classified them). Moreover, ‘réalistes’ and 
‘spiritualistes’ had intertwined trajectories. Future ON theorists were regular contributors to 
the established Revue des Deux Mondes (especially Robert Aron,   and Henri Petiot, alias 66
Daniel-Rops, who also published in Notre Temps, the main paper of the ‘réalistes’). In other 
words, the alleged ‘non-conformisme’ – and marginality – of the future personalists should 
not be exaggerated. 
!
It is perhaps unnecessary to draw a line between ‘réalistes’ and ‘spiritualistes’ in 
interwar France because of further limitations to Dard’s paradigm. Firstly, Dard’s main 
argument for adopting the new expression ‘nouvelles relèves’ is that it does not raise the 
problem the actor’s own categories, since it has been invented specifically by the historian.  67
However, this choice is not as impartial as it may seem. Dard criticises Loubet del Bayle’s use 
of the term of ‘non-conformisme’ on the grounds that it was coined by the actors themselves, 
and then goes on to adopt the concept of ‘réalisme’, equally claimed by contemporaries and 
equally connoted.  
!
Finally, there is a problem when Dard defines ‘réalisme’ through ‘compétence’, 
understood as evidence of an impulse to technocracy and good management. Kevin Passmore 
has shown that competence is in the eye of the beholder: in interwar France the notion of 
‘compétence’ was claimed throughout the political spectrum, from moderate republicans to 
monarchists.   Dard shares with the ‘réalistes’ the idea that what defines ‘compétence’ is an 68
economic approach to social and political problems. His approach is no less embedded 
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historically than that of Loubet del Bayle. While Dard emphasises continuity in the interwar 
period, Loubet del Bayle tended to present personalism as an invention. The study of cultural 
exchange shows it was largely a transfer from foreign philosophies. 
!
Cultural transfer and cultural exchange!
!
While ‘non-conformistes des années trente’ and ‘nouvelles relèves spiritualistes’ are 
not ideal concepts, they designate an actual trend of thought in France – ‘l’esprit des années 
trente’ classically studied by Touchard   – which belonged to a broader wave of third-way 69
discourses in Europe. Among the many movements attempting to renew politics from a 
spiritual point of view, which emerged in the late 1920s and coalesced in the 1930s, French 
personalism was one of those relying most on cultural transfers and cross-cultural exchanges. 
Christian Roy, Thomas Keller and Catherine Baird have proved the value of cross-border 
analysis in the field of personalist studies.    70
!
First and foremost, Roy has confirmed John Hellman’s thesis, in the 1980s, that Esprit 
represented a belated form of personalism, borrowed from Alexandre Markovich Lipiansky, 
better know under his ‘western’ diminutive of Alexandre Marc.   Born in 1904, Lipiansky 71
showed precocious philosophical interests, and during the Russian revolution, he was 
affiliated with the Socialist Revolutionary Party (non-Marxist), and risked his life before 
escaping the country in 1919 in the most hazardous conditions.   In the 1920s, four main 72
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Journal of History, 30 (April 1995), 29-47; Keller, Deutsch-französische Dritte-Weg-Diskurse; Roy, Alexandre 
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Lipiansky until 1931, and to Marc thereafter.
!  Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 53-61, 93.72
sources of inspiration led him to develop a ‘personalist’ thinking: German phenomenology, 
French sociology, non-Thomist Catholic philosophy, and Russian religious thought.    73
!
Russian philosophy – Berdiaev, Frank and Merezhkovskii in particular – played the 
most important part.   It is interesting to note that Frank’s essay ‘The Ethic of 74
Nihilism’ (written in 1909) contained all the essential points Marc would make in the 1930s: 
the need to reconcile absolute values with the reality of human life, the predominance of the 
spiritual, the search for a neither right nor left line in politics, and the critique of ‘conformist’ 
intelligentsia.    75
!
Around 1931, when the Ordre Nouveau group started personalism in France, the 
Christian protagonists of this group met Nikolai Berdiaev regularly in some pioneering 
ecumenical gatherings. One may quote a recollection of these ecumenical discussions of the 
early 1930s, from a letter to Denis de Rougemont:  
Nous nous réunissions, rue de Buci, chez René Gillouin, parpaillot comme toi, 
flanqués de notre inlassable fédérateur Alexandre Marc, qui représentait avec moi le 
catholicisme romain, du père Gillet (non le dominicain, l’orthodoxe) qui portait dans 
sa barbe inculte la soupe de la veille et sentait mauvais, de Berdiaev enfin qui 
entrecoupait ses exposés de tics monstrueux. Il introduisait non son auriculaire mais 
son index dans son oreille droite, qu’il secouait avec une force étonnante et il 
accompagnait ce geste de raclements de gorge puissants, presque insupportables. Cher 
Berdiaev !    76!
Then, Catherine Baird has established that Berdiaev was at the origins of Esprit’s 
policy towards communism (approving the communist diagnosis of capitalist society, whilst 
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rejecting atheism and the communist state).   Before Baird, the French personalist historian 77
and theologian Olivier Clément had claimed that Berdiaev had shaped Emmanuel Mounier’s 
attitude towards communism, his views of history, and his plans to ‘Refaire la Renaissance’ – 
following Berdiaev’s Nouveau Moyen Age (1924).   In the 1930s, Berdiaev made Russian 78
personalism known to French personalists, and vice versa. In the following section, I shall 
seek to show how Berdiaev was already linked with the origins of ‘French’ personalism in the 
1920s. 
!
Finally, German philosophy was also central. According to Roy, Marc borrowed the 
very term ‘personalism’ from Max Scheler, the founder of ‘ethical personalism’ in Germany.  79
In Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik (whose subtitle already bore the 
name ‘personalism’: Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus), Scheler 
held the ‘personalist’ view that it was impossible to analyse the act separately from the 
concrete person, and vice versa.    80
!
Thomas Keller has studied the various transfers between German dialogical 
personalism and the main French personalisms.   German personalism arose from ecumenical 81
milieux, and was marked by biblical inspiration. It is best known through its Jewish 
representatives, Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig, who developed a philosophy of 
dialogue and expressed concerns with human existence. Thus personalism already existed as a 
philosophy in Germany twenty years before it emerged in France as a movement. However, 
the German personalism of the 1910s and 1920s only concerned a small number of 
philosophers (in addition to a few people who would convey the personalist philosophy of 
Eugen Rosenstock to Resistance groups, such as the Kreisau Circle).   The French personalist 82
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movements of the 1930s, by contrast, developed a doctrine aimed at a broad social basis and 
political action.   83
!
Long-lasting clichés in personalist historiography will make it necessary to reconsider 
the sequence of development of the various personalisms in 1930s France.   Before all this 84
however, it is necessary to characterize further the concept of personalism. To assert that the 
personalism that developed in France in the 1930s was borrowed from German philosophy 
and Russian religious thinking, one presupposes that no such understanding of the person 
existed in France prior to the introduction of the term. This requires further examination. 
!
!
2. Senses of the person!
!
Firstly, it must be remembered that he term person has various senses: classic, 
grammatical, and ‘ontological’. In France, personalists particularly developed the third sense, 
whereby personhood has absolute value. Secondly, I show that the emergence of personalism 
in France brought the contrast between ‘personne’ and ‘individu’ into common parlance. I 
submit that this contrast may be seen as the crucial tenet of ‘French’ personalism. In the 
process of appropriating personalism, which was originally a foreign movement, French 
personalists contrasted it with individualism. Thirdly, I suggest that the term ‘personnalisme’ 
was adopted in French to avoid the connotations of ‘humanisme’. Lastly, I consider the extent 





The etymology of the word ‘person’ is complex, and its semantic development 
uncertain. Maurice Nédoncelle, a Catholic philosopher and a personalist himself, has given a 
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detailed etymology.   Suffice here to note that πρóσωπον, the Greek word of which the Latin 85
translation is persona, meant not person but face, and it referred to the mask worn by actors in 
the theatre or to the part they played. These classic roots brought about the modern 
understanding of the ‘person’ as a character, which implies a sense of a guise, a sense that the 
person (or personage) is not the ‘real self’.  
!
The classical languages also created the grammatical sense of the term. 
Grammatically, the ‘person’ designates each of the three classes of personal pronouns, and 
corresponding distinctions in verbs, denoting or indicating respectively the person speaking 
(first person), the person spoken to (second person), and the person or thing spoken of (third 
person). 
!
However, ‘French’ personalism drew principally on a third understanding of the 
‘person’, which is radically different from the classic and grammatical senses of the term. For 
personalists, the person has absolute or ‘ontological’ value. Some twentieth-century 
theologians have traced it back to the idea that the human being is God-sourced (Genesis 
1:27), and more specifically, interpreting the Cappadocian Fathers, that it is the ‘person’ who 
is made in the image and likeness of a personal God.   According to this interpretation, being 86
is traced back not to substance or nature but to person. In a secularised version, the absolute 
value of personhood moves much of modern Western thought.   87
!
In a text written in London during the Second World War, the philosopher and mystic 
Simone Weil objected to the use of ‘la personne’ as a higher moral reference on the grounds 
that it could have derogatory connotations, such as in the expression ‘Il met sa personne en 
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!  Consider the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, which defends ‘the 87
[inherent] dignity and worth of the human person’.
avant’.   She pointed out that in everyday language, the person was a synonym of personality 88
and self, but not necessarily of the whole human being.   She reckoned: ‘Il y a dans chaque 89
homme quelque chose de sacré. Mais ce n’est pas sa personne. Ce n’est pas non plus la 
personne humaine. C’est lui, cet homme tout simplement.’   In reference to a random man in 90
the street, she put forward a strong moral position:  
Ce n’est ni sa personne ni la personne humaine en lui qui m’est sacrée. C’est lui. Lui 
tout entier. Les bras, les yeux, les pensées, tout. Je ne porterais atteinte à rien de tout 
cela sans des scrupules infinis. Si la personne humaine était en lui ce qu’il y a de sacré 
pour moi, je pourrais facilement lui crever les yeux. Une fois aveugle, il sera une 
personne humaine exactement autant qu’avant.    91!
Weil objected to the personalist reference to the person as a moral principle, on the 
ground that: ‘Il est impossible de définir le respect de la personne humaine.’   She expressed 92
her qualms in the form of a rule that is worth remembering: ‘Prendre pour règle de la morale 
publique une notion impossible à définir et à concevoir, c’est donner passage à toute espèce 
de tyrannie.’   This is a fine critique of personalism. There is a sense in which it applies to all 93
political systems based on public morality.    94
!
There is, however, also a sense in which Simone Weil was ignoring the doctrinal 
efforts of the personalists throughout the 1930s. The human person may not be precisely 
definable but he or she is nonetheless conceivable. Weil did not allow that one can conceive 
the person, and yet her defence of the random human in the street recalls the personalist 
emphasis on the concrete, the singular, and the whole human person. The philosopher Maria 
Villela Petit has recently made a convincing case for the misinterpretation of personalists by 
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Weil.   On the one hand, Simone Weil understood ‘person’, ‘individual’ and ‘personality’ as 95
synonyms (as they often remain in common language), and she reflected upon the Classical 
etymology of the person (the person as a role, as acting). On the other hand, personalist 
thinkers referred to the absolute value of the human person, which – sometimes unwittingly 
for thinkers who claimed to follow Nietzsche – could be traced back to the values of 
monotheist religions.   96
!
Long before personalism emerged in France, Russian personalist thinkers emphasised 
freedom, knowledge and creativity as potentials inherent in each human person – potentials 
and not absolutes since the person, as a creature, lacks ontological freedom.   In the 97
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Russian personalists helped enrich the concept of 
personhood from diverse standpoints, whether religious, secular, or atheist. For instance, 
Dostoievsky’s novels expressed the conviction that the person is a mystery and the key to the 
universe.   There were direct connections between Russian and French personalism. 98
!
The Canadian historian Catherine Baird has argued that, in the late 1920s, Russian 
émigrés circles were antecedents of French personalism.   (Some bridges between Russian 99
and French cultures, such as the ‘Studio franco-russe’, are being further researched).   In 100
Russian thought, the contrast between the ‘person’ in (ecclesial) community and the rational 
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‘individual’ being may be traced back to Alexis Khomiakov (1804-1860).   Following the 101
Russian Revolution, Russian émigrés to Western Europe brought with them a concern for the 
person in communion. The audience that Russian émigrés reached varied greatly depending 
upon the countries in which they settled. Among the Russian thinkers who managed to win a 
kind of authority in German-, French- and English-speaking circles, Vladimir Soloviev 
(1853-1900) and Nikolai Berdiaev (1874-1948) were possibly the most successful.   102
!
Nikolai Berdiaev is particularly interesting as a cultural bridge-builder. Having settled 
in the Paris area in 1924, with the support of Stanislas Fumet and his wife, Berdiaev rapidly 
entered the Meudon circle of Jacques Maritain, where he became relatively influential.   The 103
idea of defining the ‘personne’ as the true being went hand in hand with a denigration of the 
abstract, dry, rationalist, selfish ideas of nineteenth century positivism. Let us see how the 
concern with the ‘personne’ as the concrete, altruistic, creative, and finally Christian attitude 
emerged in the wake of Jacques Maritain, Nikolai Berdiaev, and the Franco-Russian 
theologico-philosophical circles which they held at their homes in Meudon (from 1923) and 
Clamart (between 1929 and 1932). 
!
Person / individual!!
The crucial tenet defining ‘personnalisme’ in France is, I shall argue, the contrast 
between ‘personne’ and ‘individu’. On the one hand, the ‘individu’ designates the human 
being in the abstract or in his or her attempt to function independently from others (the 
atomised being). On the other hand, the ‘personne’ is the relational being, in contact or 
communion with others (including God and the angels for believers). Today, this contrast has 
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become common in French. It has been attributed, quite rightly, to the influence of French 
personalist and Catholic philosophy, in particular to the journal Esprit.    104
!
In 1938, the Abbé Jean Plaquevent published a long note in Esprit contrasting the 
history of the ideas of ‘individu’ and ‘personne’.   Plaquevent was not himself a personalist, 105
but he was the confessor of several young personalists. He claimed to give a distanced 
account. Plaquevent rejected ‘individualisme’ as an equivalent of egoism.   He implied that 106
personalism could be the ‘doctrine de l’un et du divers’, which humankind had been longing 
for since Antiquity, and more and more desperately since the sixteenth century. Personalism 
was a call for complexity and altruism. A personalist would recognise that rather than 
attempting to classify people into the theoretical categories of ‘individu’ and ‘personne’, it is 
more fruitful to recognise that ‘individu’ and ‘personne’ constitute two poles within each man 
and woman – Esprit published a special issue stating: ‘La femme aussi est une personne’ [sic.] 
in June 1936. Thus, ‘personnalisme’ sought ways of becoming the person whom one 
ultimately is, rather than the egocentric individual one tends to remain. 
!
In 1938 already, the contrast between ‘personne’ and ‘individu’ was said to be clichéd 
(‘tarte à la crème’).   In those terms, the distinction was quite new however. The first time 107
the distinction between ‘personne’ and ‘individu’ was made in French was in 1925, in Jacques 
Maritain’s polemical essay Trois réformateurs (1925).   Whether Maritain uncovered a 108
theory which was already present in Aquinas – as he maintained – or whether he called on 
Aquinas to develop his own theory has led to debate in the 1940s and 1950s.   Maritain was 109
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at the centre of a neo-Thomist movement, which, interpreted and appropriated Aquinas with 
the aim of promoting an attitude different from the positivism and individualism of the 
nineteenth century. 
!
The Meudon circle, meeting at Maritain’s home since 1923, was one of the most 
important intellectual gatherings of interwar France.   The Meudon circle is famous for 110
having contributed to a wave of conversions of intellectuals to Catholicism around 1925.   Its 111
aim was to bring into play reason and faith, philosophy and theology, metaphysics, poetry, 
politics, at one and the same time.   The Meudon circle was also at the origins of Plon’s 112
‘Roseau d’or’, both a journal and a series designed as ‘une réplique à la NRF’.   Maritain’s 113
Trois réformateurs was its first publication.  
!
In the mid-1920s, the ‘Roseau d’or’ also published Berdiaev’s Un nouveau Moyen Age 
(vol.13); Henri Massis’s Défense de l’Occident (vol.16); and Maritain’s Primauté du spirituel 
(vol.19). Massis was an Action Française militant, Berdiaev a former Marxist and 
unconventional Russian Orthodox thinker, and Maritain motivated his rejection of Action 
Française in Primauté du spirituel (May 1927). While each of these essays had a different 
political stance, they shared the project to ‘refaire la personne humaine’ from a Christian 
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Véronique Auzépy-Chavagnac has claimed that, with his Trois réformateurs, Maritain 
initiated a right-wing and Thomist personalism.   However, we shall see that Maritain was 114
suspicious of ‘le personnalisme’ in the 1930s.   Maritain only used the term ‘personnalisme’ 115
for his own works in the 1940s, after a long journey to American democracy.   When 116
Maritain elaborated Humanisme intégral (1936), dealing with the ‘Problemas espirituales y 
temporales de una nueva Cristiandad’ (the original Spanish title of these lectures given at the 
University of Santander), he apologized that ‘le mot humanisme est un vocable ambigu’.  117





In 1903, the French philosopher Charles Renouvier published a book entitled Le 
Personnalisme. However, Renouvier’s neo-Kantian philosophy has not initiated a school. 
Claims that Renouvier initiated French personalism have either been mislead by the 
homonymy, or were deceptively attempting to give a French pedigree to a movement that was 
originally foreign.   When Renouvier published his Personnalisme, the Nouveau Larousse 118
Illustré, which was arguably the most popular dictionary in France, defined ‘personnalisme’ 
as: ‘action de tout rapporter à soi; vice de celui qui ne s’inquiète que de sa personne’.   One 119
has to wait until the 1930s to see a radical change in the meaning of ‘personnalisme’: 
previously synonym to egoism, it now connotes altruism and humanity. 
!
!  43
!  Auzépy-Chavagnac, Jean de Fabrègues et la Jeune Droite Catholique. Aux sources de la Révolution 114
nationale. The question of right-wing personalism will be considered in Chapter 3.
!  See Chapter 3 in particular.115
!  See esp. Jacques Maritain, La Personne et le bien commun (Paris, 1946), 8-9. 116
!  Jacques Maritain, Humanisme intégral (Paris, 1936), 10.117
!  For instance in André Devaux, 'Personnalisme', Catholicisme hier, aujourd'hui, demain: Encyclopédie (Paris, 118
1986), 22-30. Paul Guilluy’s definition of the ‘Personne (Philosophie et théologie)’ (in the same issue p.30-54) is 
an apology of the communitarian personalism of Esprit, which will be studied in Chapter 3.
!  In Nouveau Larousse Illustré, vol. 6 (Paris, 1903), 806.119
The success of the term ‘personnalisme’ in 1930s France can be explained by the need 
of a new concept to criticize positivism, individualism, and rationalism. The search for a new 
humanism was a chief intellectual concern in 1930s Europe.   However, humanism – in the 120
Feuerbachian sense ‘man is God’ – repelled believers; and romanticism – another option for 
criticizing rationalism – was too closely associated with the nineteenth century.  
!
One may illustrate the search for a new humanism through the example of Denis de 
Rougemont. In 1930, the Protestant journal Foi et vie launched an interdenominational survey 
‘Pour un humanisme nouveau’, which gathered the answers of Jacques Maritain, Léon 
Brunschvicg, the Abbé Henri Brémond (from the Académie française), and others.   Denis de 121
Rougemont, aged twenty-four, was one of the youngest contributors. He condemned the idea 
of a new humanism, following the common assumption that humanism, as the religion of 
Humanity, was incompatible with transcendence.   Bruno Ackermann was right to suggest 122
that ‘cet article constitue sans doute la clé de l’orientation théologique que prendra la pensée 
de Rougemont’.   Rougemont aimed, like many believers, at reconciling the absolute 123
demands of the spiritual world with the realities of human life. However, it was only after his 
encounter with personalist thinkers, in particular Alexandre Marc and Nikolai Berdiaev (in 
1931-2) that Rougemont came to see ‘le personnalisme’ as a means of overcoming the 
opposition between Humanism and Christianity, without confusing the two. 
!
It is significant that Rougemont’s first plea in favour of the ON group, ‘Cause 
commune’ published in the spring of 1932, was disguised as a letter to the Swiss editor of 
Présence, Gilbert Trolliet, who called for a fresh interpretation of humanism.   Reacting to 124
!  44
!  For example, see the debates organised by the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation in Budapest 120
in June 1936: ‘Vers un nouvel humanisme’, esp. the interventions by Thomas Mann, Budapest 8-11 June 1936, 
quoted in Jean-Jacques Renoliet’s thesis ‘L’institut international de coopération intellectuelle 
(1919-1940)’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of Paris I, 1995), 836-7. Published as Jean-Jacques Renoliet, L'UNESCO 
oubliée: la Société des Nations et la coopération intellectuelle, 1919-1946 (Paris, 1999).
!  Survey edited by Paul Arbousse-Bastide, Pour un humanisme nouveau, Cahiers de Foi et vie, Apr. 1930.121
!  ‘Etre véritablement homme, c’est avoir accès au divin. Que sert de parler d’humanisme « chrétien » ? 122
L’humanisme est de l’homme, le christianisme est du nouvel homme. Tout humanisme véritable conduit « au 
seuil » : et qu’irions-nous lui demander de plus, s’il laisse en blanc la place de Dieu.’ Denis de Rougemont, 
'Réponse à l'enquête "Pour un humanisme nouveau"', Cahiers de Foi et vie, special issue (1930), 245.
!  Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 179.123
!  Gilbert Trolliet, 'Autour d'un humanisme en marche', Présence, 1 (Jan. 1932).124
Trolliet’s study, ‘Autour de l’Humanisme en marche’, Rougemont claimed to have found ‘la 
cause commune de la jeunesse européenne’.   The idea of a common cause of European 125
youth came from the ON discussions, which Rougemont had been attending in Paris, since the 
autumn 1931.   His article expressed the idea, developed during ON meetings, that European 126
youth shared the aim of a humane and spiritual revolution. 
!
Thus, Rougemont claimed to answer the dilemma ‘Humanisme, ou Révolution’ on 
behalf of his ‘génération révolutionnaire’.   European youth, according to Rougemont, was 127
both revolutionary and concerned with human existence. It was revolutionary, regardless of 
ideological backgrounds: ‘Les uns viennent de Marx, les autres de Proudhon, de Hegel ou de 
Kierkegaard, de la Raison sous ses formes violentes et créatrices, ou de la Foi.’   This range 128
of sources fitted the non-confessional composition of ON. European youth was also 
concerned with transcending the futility of mechanical existence. Hence the motto: ‘défense 
de l’homme total contre tout ce qui tend à le mécaniser, à le disqualifier, à le châtrer de toute 
violence spirituelle et créatrice.’    129
!
Personalism (still unknown under this name) would combine Humanism and 
Revolution in order defend human beings in all their wholeness. It was necessary, therefore, 
to maintain the identity between thought and action, and to organise society and economy 
according to this principle.   Identity between thought and action (‘Faites ce que vous 130
pensez, pensez ce que vous faites’) contrasted bourgeois hypocrisy (‘Faites comme tout-le-
monde, et pensez ce que vous n’oserez jamais faire’).   Rougemont’s views recalled – 131
!  45
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'Cause commune', Présence, 2 (April-June 1932), 13.125
!  ON organised ‘des séances publiques […] et des séances privées, strictement limitées à l’étude pratique et 126
détaillée des points principaux du programme de l’Ordre Nouveau.’, in ‘Centre d’études de l’Ordre Nouveau’, 
Plans, Nov. 1932, 152.
!  Rougemont, 'Cause commune', 12. See Chapter 4 for futher analysis of the situation in 1932.127
!  Rougemont, 'Cause commune', 13.128
!  Rougemont, 'Cause commune', 13.129
!  Rougemont called for: ‘l’identité nécessaire de la pensée et de l’action’ and ‘l’effort d’instaurer une économie 130
générale de la vie impliquant cette identité’, Rougemont, 'Cause commune', 13.
!  Rougemont, 'Cause commune', 13.131
Marxist sympathies aside – Emmanuel Berl’s Mort de la pensée bourgeoise (1929) and Mort 
de la morale bourgeoise (1930). 
!
In ‘Cause commune,’ Rougemont gave but one concrete example of the manifestation 
of the common front of European youth: ‘Le congrès de Francfort’ (February 1932) was 
supposed to reveal a unity between European revolutionary movements.   The Frankfurt 132
Congress has been the object of several recent historical studies.   The conclusion of these 133
studies was already clear in 1932: the French organisers failed in their objective to foster 
transnational dialogue between European movements open to a federalist perspective.    134
!
Apart from the Frankfurt Congress (which was a failure), Rougemont’s ‘communauté 
d’attitude essentielle’ remained vague – or admittedly limited to his Parisian friends: ‘je ne 
parle ici à peu près que d’amis, parisiens au surplus’.   Rougemont mentioned writers from 135
ON (Arnaud Dandieu, Robert Aron, Alexandre Marc, and René Dupuis); Georges Izard and 
Emmanuel Mounier, who would launch Esprit later in 1932; and Thierry Maulnier, an 
unorthodox Action Française (AF) sympathiser.   In 1932, Maulnier was equally anti-136
!  46
!  ‘Le congrès de Francfort organisé par Plans a révélé cette unité fondamentale que créent en nous non pas des 132
maîtres ni des noms, mais la consternante misère d’une époque où tout ce qu’un homme peut aimer et vouloir se 
trouve coupé de son origine vivante, flétri, dénaturé, inverti, saboté.’ More concretely: ‘Février 1932. Pour la 
constitution d’un front unique des groupements révolutionnaires allemands (tant Nazis que communistes), 
français et belges. Des délégués suisses y assistèrent, ainsi qu’un délégué fasciste.’, in Rougemont, 'Cause 
commune', 13-14. Rougemont would repeat exactly the same formula, from ‘la consternante misère […]’ to ‘[…] 
saboté.’ in the introduction to the ‘Cahier de revendications’, Denis de Rougemont, 'Cahier de Revendications 
(Présentation)', La Nouvelle Revue française, 231 (1 Dec. 1932). See Chapter 4.
!  Rougemont attended, together with a hundred delegates of various ‘third-way movements’ from Germany, 133
Belgium, France and Switzerland (although Marc later remembered that Rougemont had preferred the Frankfurt 
Carnival to the conferences). On the Frankfurt Congress, see Dard, Le Rendez-vous manqué des relèves des 
années 30, 137; Barbara Lambauer, Otto Abetz et les Français ou l'envers de la collaboration (Paris, 2001), 
37-8; Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 301-4. 
!  See Plans, 12 (Feb. 1932), 118-21. To the Germans, European ‘federalism’ was to express the cooperation of 134
ethnically homogeneous nation-states; to the French organizers, by contrast, the European federal state was to be 
an heterogeneous body politic, composed of various independent regions. Thus, there could be no common 
political objective.
!  Rougemont, 'Cause commune', 14.135
!  Jacques Talagrand – alias Thierry Maulnier –, born in 1909, a fellow student of Robert Brasillach at Ecole 136
Normale Supérieure, would become a leading figure of the ‘Jeune Droite’ in the 1930s. See Etienne de Montety, 
Thierry Maulnier (Paris, 1994). In the 1920s, Maulnier’s literary tastes were close to the avant-garde, and like 
Rougemont he studied the NRF, particularly liked Malraux and Marcel Arland. At the turn of the 1930s, 
Maulnier’s concerns remained more literary than political, and his writings bore no trace of the chauvinism or 
anti-semitism of the disciples of Maurras. Kessler, Histoire politique de la Jeune Droite (1929-1942). Une 
révolution conservatrice à la française, 139-41.
communist and anti-fascist, whilst opposing parliamentary democracy.   This list of 137
Rougemont’s Parisian friends constituted the hard core group of ‘non-conformistes des années 
trente’.    138
!
Rougemont’s article had unexpected repercussions in France: after reading Présence, 
Jean Paulhan, the editor of the NRF, asked Rougemont to collect the claims of ‘la jeunesse 
révolutionnaire’ in France.   This is well known since the late 1960s.   Yet Paulhan’s 139 140
reservations, which have been left out, are worth quoting: ‘il me semble que vous entendez 
par « révolution » trop de choses, ou trop peu. Quant à « humanisme »…vous m’accorderez 
bien que c’est surtout ce qui dépasse l’homme qui vous intéresse. Alors pourquoi reprendre 
des mots qui ont tant (et si mal) servi.’   Thereafter, personalism would conveniently replace 141




In the 1920s, German personalists were overtaken by Existenz philosophy. In France 
however, the development of personalism coexisted with the progress of various philosophies 
of existence. All participated in the same philosophical movement, which, from the nineteenth 
to the mid-twentieth century, arose as a backlash against philosophical and scientific systems, 
treating particulars (especially humans) as members of a genus or instances of universal laws. 
Thus, personalist philosophies, whether Russian, German, or French, participated in the 
!  47
!  Maulnier viewed fascism (in the broad sense) as the paroxysm of capitalism or, as he put it, the discipline of 137
the barracks combined with that of the factory. Kessler, Histoire politique de la Jeune Droite (1929-1942). Une 
révolution conservatrice à la française, 204-13. 
!  Maulnier, like all the others, denounced the ‘crisis of civilisation’ from a ‘spiritual’ point of view (spiritual 138
being understood in a broad sense: Maulnier himself was an agnostic). See Loubet del Bayle, Les non-
conformistes des années trente, 347.
!  Paulhan wrote to Rougemont: ‘Ne serait-il pas intéressant de réunir pour un numéro spécial de la NRF toutes 139
sortes de revendications dont il s’agit, de Th. Maulnier à Dandieu ? Accepteriez-vous de vous en charger, de 
présenter les témoignages, de conclure ? Cela pourrait être assez intéressant, je crois, peut-être assez grave.’, 
Paulhan to Rougemont (from Port-Cros), 30 Sept. 1932, Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire de 
Neuchâtel (B.P.U.N.), Rougemont papers, Correspondance.
!  Rougemont reproduced Paulhan’s letter in Denis de Rougemont, Journal d'une époque (Paris, 1968), 96. See 140
also Loubet del Bayle, Les non-conformistes des années trente, 171n1. 
!  Paulhan to Rougemont (from Port-Cros), 30 Sept. 1932, Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire de 141
Neuchâtel (B.P.U.N.), Rougemont papers, Correspondance.
‘existentialist’ turn, whereby one holds that being cannot be grasped in systems (as in German 
idealism or positivism). 
!
It is an ‘existentialist’ and ‘personalist’ contention that all systems, in their 
deterministic cast, conceal from us the highly personal task of trying to achieve self-fulfilment 
in our lives. In this view, the very term personalism (or existentialism for that matter) is 
criticisable: to connect the person with an ‘–ism’, with a system, is to conjoin two terms 
which are contradictory. This criticism is not new. For example, the philosopher of existence 
Gabriel Marcel rejected both ‘existentialisme’ and ‘personnalisme’ on those grounds.   As an 142
alternative, the philosopher Paul Ricœur, who was involved in Esprit since his youth, 
preferred to avoid or bury the term personalism in later years.   Thereby, he aimed at 143
revivifying the reflection on the person as an ‘attitude’.   However, this attitude is of little 144
help to the intellectual historian.  
!
One cannot ignore the fact that there was an important movement which claimed the 
name personalism, and this movement developed a variety of literature in a style which 
‘personalism’ signals. Perhaps personalism can be understood as an oxymoron (an expression 
self-contradictory or absurd in its literal meaning, but involving a point).   In 1934, the 145
French philosopher Maurice Blondel went beyond the denigration of the ‘-isme’ of 
‘personnalisme’, to acknowledge the potential of ‘la personne’ (if defined accurately) for the 
critique of individualism, socialism, and fascism.   Personalism was one ‘–ism’ in 146
competition with others, most of which were loosely structured (humanism, materialism, 
collectivism, fascism, and so on). 
!
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!  See esp. Gabriel Marcel, Existentialisme chrétien: Gabriel Marcel (Paris, 1947), 197-8, 229-31.142
!  ‘Meurt le personnalisme, revient la personne (je pourrais aussi dire : meure le personnalisme, sous entendant : 143
qu’il meure, même si… ; peut-être vaut-il mieux qu’il meure, pour que…).’, in Ricoeur, 'Préface’, in Emmanuel 
Mounier, Ecrits sur le personnalisme, 7.
!  See Ricoeur, 'Préface', in Emmanuel Mounier, Ecrits sur le personnalisme, 7-14.144
!  I thank Christian Roy for suggesting this image.145
!  Maurice Blondel, 'Les équivoques du "personnalisme"', Politique, 3 (Mars 1934), esp. 194-6, 198, 204-5. The 146
emphasis is mine.
In the competition with other ‘–isms’, personalism had both assets and handicaps. 
Both, it appears, originated in the concept of person. Personalists held a difficult position 
philosophically because their definition of the person remained imprecise, partly voluntarily, 
partly because they were not philosophically minded writers. Contemporaries noticed this. In 
1934 already, the philosophers Paul Archambault and Maurice Blondel expressed reservations 
vis-à-vis the new personalist doctrine on the grounds that the slogan ‘Primauté de la personne’ 
was elusive.   Archambault observed that ‘la faiblesse du nouveau “personnalisme” est de 147
manquer d’une philosophie’, for lack of a shared understanding of ‘la personne’.   He made a 148
significant exception for the ON group: ‘Avec La Révolution nécessaire, avec les six numéros 
à cette heure parus de la revue L’Ordre Nouveau, on sait à quoi s’en tenir, on se trouve en face 
d’un ensemble de réactions et d’affirmations qui offrent une prise ferme à l’analyse et à la 
critique’.   The ON group strove for a precise and non-religious political philosophy. 149
!
Nevertheless, ON tended to avoid definition of the person in its doctrinal texts.  150
Some imprecision was residual in the definition of the person. To most personalists, it is more 
likely that the person be grasped in intuition, in works of art, or in divine revelation than in a 
set of concepts, or rational definitions, with the result that personalism finds its most fertile 
expression in art, literature, religion and theology.   ON is an exception. 151
!
The difficulty of defining the person was aggravated for the non-confessional branches 
of personalism, notably the ON group. By avoiding religious references, they avoided making 
the inherent dignity of each person depend on the Bible (the creation of man and woman in 
the image and likeness of God). To avoid making the person depend on a profession of faith 
had important advantages for believers and non-believers alike. The aim was a universal 
!  49
!  Paul Archambault, 'Destin d'un mot', Politique, 2 (Feb. 1934), 155-65; Blondel, 'Les équivoques du 147
"personnalisme"', 193-205.
!  Archambault, 'Destin d'un mot', 163.148
!  Archambault, 'Destin d'un mot', 156.149
!  There is no definition of the person in the special issue ‘Nous voulons… L’Ordre Nouveau’, L’Ordre 150
Nouveau, 9 (March 1934), definitions pages I-IV.
!  The personalist theologian Vladimir Lossky once wrote: ‘quand nous disons « c’est du Mozart » ou « c’est du 151
Rembrandt », nous nous trouvons chaque fois dans un univers personnel qui n’a son équivalent nulle part.’ 
Vladimir Lossky, Essai sur la théologie mystique de l'Eglise d'Orient (Paris, 1990), 52. (Original edn. 1944).
political doctrine and a united Europe. Moreover, for the believers, perhaps either tolerance or 
understanding between Christian confessions with the beginning of the ecumenical movement 
motivated a non-confessional line. 
!
!
In sum, this chapter has sought to show why personalism stands for complexity. It was 
concerned with the whole of the human person – a multifaceted and contradictory concept by 
nature. Personalism addressed the problem of the relationship of the individual with the 
collective. It was a political philosophy reliant on the innovations of a young generation 
partly, but also on renewal and reinterpretation of old concepts, and perhaps most heavily on 
cultural transfers from German and Russian philosophy. The idea of personalism was the 
result of invention, renewal, and transfer. Part I will show how various personalist movements 









The portrait of the writer as a mediator was an image that Denis de Rougemont 
applied to Goethe in 1932.   As often when an author describes the aims of another writer, 152
Rougemont said more about his own concerns than about Goethe. To study Goethe was, for 
Rougemont, to transcend national boundaries and to fight mass nationalism. Rougemont 
concluded: ‘C’est pourquoi notre tâche – que Goethe eût approuvée – reste de fédérer des 
différences authentiques, et non pas d’uniformiser des médiocrités décolorées. L’harmonie 
d’un tableau naît de l’opposition des tons : c’est une harmonie fédérale.’   Federating 153
genuine differences would be at the core of Rougemont’s political and literary endeavours 
throughout his life.    154
!
Looking back upon his youth in 1968, Rougemont explained his position in the 1930s 
as a triple allegiance: a commitment to L’Ordre Nouveau, to Esprit, and to the young Barthian 
journal Hic et Nunc. He asserted: 
Cette triple allégeance m’assurait à la fois la liberté et plusieurs possibilités 
complémentaires de participer, de m’engager, voire d’assurer ces tâches pratiques dont 
j’ai toujours eu le goût et le besoin. Elle m’obligeait à vérifier ou rétablir sans cesse la 
cohérence de mes options théologiques, philosophiques et politiques. Et elle me 
permettait surtout de ne pas me laisser emprisonner dans les « disciplines de vote » qui 
tendent très vite à s’instaurer dans de tels groupes. Du même coup, j’échappais à la 
tendance inverse, le scissionnisme.    155!
This statement is true in the sense that Rougemont did mediate between various poles 
of intellectual debate throughout the 1930s. And this may indeed have encouraged him to 
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!  See Rougemont’s contribution to the ‘Décades de Pontigny’, 8-18 Sept. 1932: Denis de Rougemont, 'Goethe 152
médiateur', Union pour la vérité, 3-4 (Dec. 1932-Jan. 1933). Also in Denis de Rougemont, Les Personnes du 
drame (2nd edn. Neuchâtel, 1945), 41-9.
!  ‘Goethe médiateur’, (Sept. 1932) in Rougemont, Les Personnes du drame, 49.153
!  Rougemont’s federative role, both in the 1930s and in the European federalist movements after 1945, has 154
been pointed out by Balmand, 'Denis de Rougemont'.
!  Rougemont, Journal d'une époque, 98. 155
formulate a particularly coherent personalism, in theological, philosophical, and political 
terms. However, Rougemont’s presentation as being ‘above the fray’ must be read with a 
critical eye. Rougemont’s trajectory was not as impartial as he claimed. In this particular 
instance, Ackermann’s interpretation of Rougemont’s ‘non-private diaries’ (Journaux non-
intimes) may have lacked critical distance.   In Chapters 3 and 4, I argue that Rougemont 156
was a mediator not in the sense of a neutral arbiter between different groups, but as a militant, 
convinced of the necessity to federate personalists in view of the personalist revolution. 




!  See Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 249-581.156
!
Chapter 2. French Swiss connection!!
!
!
Before 1931, Denis de Rougemont could not be personalist: he had never heard of 
personalism. He only joined the ‘French’ personalist movement in 1931-2. One may ask why, 
then, start this study of the personalism of Denis de Rougemont with his Swiss childhood and 
youth? A personalist (or simply biographical) answer may be given: it would be impossible to 
understand his personalism without having an idea of the kind of person he was. Rougemont 
was born into a pastor’s family of the Canton of Neuchâtel. This shaped his life-long concern 
for morals and theology. It is also important to remember that, from a young age, 
Rougemont’s ambition was to be a writer: this explains his literary (rather than philosophical) 
style. Moreover, it is also significant that Rougemont was a Swiss who looked towards Paris 
for literary approval. His ambivalent attitude vis-à-vis Switzerland, defined in the 1920s, 
would not change significantly in the 1930s. Lastly, his moral or ‘existential’ concerns were 
crucial to his role in 1930s literature. He was one of the first writers to introduce Søren 
Kierkegaard and Karl Barth in French, and his theological and ‘existential’ concerns explain 
much of his support for personalism. 
!
Ackermann has given us a detailed biography of Denis de Rougemont up till 1946; 
François Saint-Ouen and others have provided an overview of his entire life.   Therefore, the 157
biographical account remains concise here. Only contentious points in the lattest 
historiography are developed.   Patrick Leuzinger has written a thesis claiming to find the 158
essentials of Rougemont’s political commitment in his essay Les Méfaits de l’instuction 
publique (1929). Leuzinger contradicts Ackermann, for whom Rougemont was not interested 
in politics before he moved to Paris in 1930. This will lead me to insist on the fact that 
Rougemont’s writings – mainly reviews, articles, and the essay mentioned – bear no trace of 
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!  For a brief biography, see 'Denis de Rougemont', Cadmos, 33, Special issue (Spring 1986), 127-36.157
!  Regarding Jacob, Le retour de "L'Ordre Nouveau"; Patrick Leuzinger, 'Denis de Rougemont, la crise de la 158
civilisation et l'engagement antilibéral' (Mémoire pour l'obtention du diplôme de la Faculté de Lettres, 
University of Geneva, Institut européen, 1996). For the question of ‘fascism’ see Chapter 6.
serious political commitment, nor of personalism in the 1920s.   After moving to Paris in 159
1930, Rougemont became involved in politics (like so many writers at the time).  
!
We turn first to Rougemont’s Swiss Protestant background, his formation in 
Switzerland and first publications; next his move to Paris in 1930; and finally, to the 
‘existential’ and theological questions, which were to shape the particularity of Rougemont’s 
personalism. This chapter suggests that Rougemont’s beginnings in the personalist movement 
expressed literary ambitions and moral concerns, more than political or economic projects. 
!
!
1. Swiss and Protestant!
!
The history of the Rougemont family is intertwined with that of the Canton of 
Neuchâtel, which is in turn intertwined in European history. So Denis de Rougemont claimed 
in his Suite neuchâteloise (1948).    Published for the anniversary of the Republic of 160
Neuchâtel, and soon after Rougemont’s father’s death, Suite neuchâteloise fulfils the double 
purpose of reflecting upon the Republic of Neuchâtel in a shattered Europe, and of exploring 
the roots of the Rougemont family.   Towards the end of his life, Rougemont repeatedly 161
emphasised the dual roots of his family, grounded both in Neuchâtel and in the broader 
European scene.   His first biographer, Mary-Jo Deering (who was drawing on her 162
interviews with Rougemont somewhat uncritically) read his family origins as a sign of 
Rougemont’s destiny to fight both for independent regions and European unity.   Reading 163
back Rougemont’s European commitment in his early years is tempting, but the reality was 
quite different. Bruno Ackermann has shown that, before 1930, Rougemont had no political 
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!  In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Rougemont published a few poems in young French Swiss reviews (La 159
Revue de Belles-Lettres, Les Cahiers de l’Anglore and Présence). See esp. Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une 
biographie intellectuelle, 1, 125-35.
!  Denis de Rougemont, Suite neuchâteloise (Neuchâtel, 1948).160
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Deering, Combats acharnés: Denis de Rougemont et les fondements de l'unité européenne, 125-6.
!  Deering, Combats acharnés: Denis de Rougemont et les fondements de l'unité européenne, 125.163
commitment, but the will to be a writer.   To set the scene for what follows, it is necessary to 164




The Rougemont family, ‘une famille parmi d’autres, et qui n’a guère cherché 
d’illustration en dehors des limites de la communauté qu’elle a servie pendant cinq siècles’, 
was rooted in the Neuchâtel region since the fourteenth century.   It received a 165
‘reconnaissance d’ancienne noblesse’ from the Prussian King Frederick II in 1784.   The 166
Rougemonts specialised in civil service, and thus it was Denis’s great-great-grandfather, the 
Attorney-General Georges de Rougemont, who signed the acts of adhesion to the Swiss 
Confederation in 1815.   Then came Denis’s grandfather, a theologian and pastor, and his 167
father Georges-Arthur, a pastor.   To Denis, his father exemplified ‘jusque dans ses fonctions 168
ecclésiastiques, l’idée du serviteur de la Cité’, in whom ‘durait toute une race consacrée à la 
chose publique’.   Ultimately, service of the state and the church would amount to the same 169
in his view: ‘Cela fait, au début et à la fin, pas mal de robes et de rabats, soit de justice, soit 
d’église; et entre temps plus de deux siècles de participation continuelle au gouvernement du 
pays.’   This assimilation may seem curious in a Canton that had strictly kept Calvin’s rule of 170
the separation between church and state.  
!
Returning to the Canton of Neuchâtel in 1905 after four years in a French village, 
George-Arthur de Rougemont served in the small industrial town of Couvet, in the Val-de-
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Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 59-152.
!  Rougemont, Suite neuchâteloise, 35. To know more about the Rougemont family, see Dictionnaire historique 165
et biographique de la Suisse (vol.5, Neuchâtel, 1930); and Jacqueline and Pierre-Arnold Borel, Les Rougemont 
de Saint-Aubin (La Chaux-de-Fonds, 1984)..
!  'Denis de Rougemont', 127.166
!  Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 60.167
!  On Georges de Rougemont, see  Georges de Rougemont, pasteur, textes et témoignages avec un portrait, 168
(Neuchâtel, 1948).
!  Rougemont, Suite neuchâteloise, 42-3.169
!  Rougemont, Suite neuchâteloise, 36-7.170
Travers, on the heights of Neuchâtel. This post implied an austerity, somewhat offset by the 
connections of his wife Alice Sophie, née Bovet, a patrician family from Neuchâtel. In a 
classical gendered interpretation, Denis would call upon his mother’s legacy for creativity and 
romanticism, while he would associate his father with duty and morals.   This cleavage was 171
symbolically reinforced by the geography of the Neuchâtel Canton, divided between bottom 
(Bas) and the top (Haut), the mild climate of the lake and the plain where the Bovet family 
lived, and the austere environment of the Val-de-Travers.  
!
Rougemont was born in the Presbytery of Couvet on 8 September 1906. Couvet 
remains famous for being the birthplace of absinthe, although this reputation was dimmed in 
1908, when the liquor was officially banned from Switzerland.   Alternatively, ‘on pourrait 172
presque dire que Couvet s’est, en un temps, specialisé dans la fourniture des pasteurs’ and this 
gives an indication of the Protestant character of the town.   Couvet was a rural and 173
industrial town. At the time when the Rougemont family lived in Couvet, the town was 
dominated by the Dubied knitting works. Concern for the working-class led Georges de 
Rougemont to develop interest in left-wing Christian politics, in particular Christianisme 
social, a movement that developed in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, in reaction against the dire consequences of industrialisation.   Despite the ban of 174
absinthe, alcoholism remained one of the endemic problems in Couvet. It was a highly 
controversial issue at the time of George de Rougemont’s ministry in Couvet (1905-1919) and 
throughout Rougemont’s youth.    175
!
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!  See interview of Denis de Rougemont by Mary-Jo Deering, 14 Jan. 1978, pages 15-17, quoted by Deering, 171
Combats acharnés: Denis de Rougemont et les fondements de l'unité européenne, 129.
!  In August 1905, Jean Lanfray, a farmer from the Canton of Vaud and known absinthe drinker, shot his family 172
under the influence of absinthe (and a combination of other spirits, as would become known later). Following the 
trial and animated public debate, the vote of 6 July 1908 introduced Article 32 in the Federal constitution to ban 
absinthe.
!  La Vie protestante, 30 mai 1947, quoted by Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 173
1, 63.
!  Klauspeter Blaser, Le Christianisme social, une approche théologique et historique (Débats (Théologie). 174
Paris, 2002).
!  The Rougemont family was committed to the fight against alcoholism, in particular through the Croix-Bleue 175
association, see Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 65. See interview of Denis de 
Rougemont by Mary-Jo Deering,  14 Jan. 1978, pages 19-20, quoted by Deering, Combats acharnés: Denis de 
Rougemont et les fondements de l'unité européenne, 128.
Being the son of the pastor in a small town would have meant feeling great pressure to 
behave in an exemplary way.   At a time when the ministry was still exclusively masculine, a 176
pastor’s son would have faced the question, implicit or explicit, of whether to perpetuate his 
father’s commitment.   Denis de Rougemont kept bad memories of the primary school of 177
Couvet (1913-1918), which he stigmatised in Les Méfaits de l’instruction publique (1929).  178
He spent the summer holidays in a large property in Areuse, on the lake of Neuchâtel, on his 
mother’s side.   The family finally moved to Areuse in 1919.   Denis de Rougemont was 179 180
educated in Neuchâtel from the age of twelve. As a teenager, he was involved in two types of 
youth groups: the Protestant youth movement of Neuchâtel, Unions chrétiennes de jeunes 
gens;   and the Neuchâtel Société d’Etude, for some twenty Gymnase students, which 181
contrasted the Rougemont milieu: it was an explicitly non-religious group.    182
!
In the autumn of 1925, Rougemont started a degree in humanities at the University of 
Neuchâtel, ‘la meilleure du monde parce que la plus petite’, as he would put it later.   It is 183
worth mentioning his classes on modern and medieval literature, both French and German, 
because they would play a lasting influence on his writings.   In particular, the influence of 184
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!  See Pierre Pénisson, 'Fils de pasteur', Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales (June 1986).176
!  Pierre Encrevé, 'Fils de pasteur ou enfants de pasteur(s)', Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales (June 177
1986).
!  Denis de Rougemont, Les Méfaits de l'instruction publique (1st edn. vol. 1. Lausanne, 1929). See below.178
!  See Rougemont’s idyllic memories in Deering, Combats acharnés: Denis de Rougemont et les fondements de 179
l'unité européenne, 129; Rougemont, Suite neuchâteloise, 14. See also Denis de Rougemont, ‘Le Grandchamp 
des Bovet’, 1978, typed manuscript, Neuchâtel, BPUN, Rougemont papers.
!  In this plain near Neuchâtel, which Félix Bovet once called ‘la Bovétie’, was the Grandchamp hospital and 180
charity, founded by the Bovet family in 1956, and which became a spiritual community in 1935 (with Georges 
de Rougemont as the first pastor), see Carlo Robert-Grandpierre, 'Grandchamp et Pierre Bovet', in Jean-Marc 
Barrelet and Anne-Nelly Perret-Clermont (eds), Jean Piaget et Neuchâtel: l'apprenti et le savant (Lausanne, 
1996).
!  See Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 71.181
!  See Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 80.182
!  Interview of Denis de Rougemont by Mary-Jo Deering, 27 Feb. 1978, page 1, quoted by Deering, Combats 183
acharnés: Denis de Rougemont et les fondements de l'unité européenne, 131. There were sixty five regular 
students in humanities in the first semester 1925-6, when Rougemont entered the University, and ninety in 
1929-30, when he graduated.
!  One may refer to Ackermann for the ‘Programme des cours de l’Université de Neuchâtel, 1925-30’, Archives 184
de l’Etat de Neuchâtel, Département de l’instruction publique, série Université 380-390, in Ackermann, Denis de 
Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 74.
Goethe, Schiller and the German romantics would be noticeable.   Besides, it would be 185
impossible to imagine L’Amour et l’Occident (1939) without Arthur Piaget’s classes on 
medieval literature, and his presentation of the legend of Tristan and Iseult.   Rougemont was 186
introduced to psychology by Arthur Piaget’s son, Jean Piaget, famous for his analysis of the 
evolution of knowledge.   Piaget’s teachings (particularly that children’s logic and modes of 187
thinking are initially entirely different from those of adults) would prove essential to 
Rougemont’s 1929 essay on primary school.   Finally, the quasi-systematic etymological 188
approach that Rougemont took throughout his life was probably triggered by his Latin classes, 
taught by the linguist Max Niedermann.    189
!
In Neuchâtel, Rougemont’s student activities were organised around the Société de 
Belles-Lettres.   The various Sociétés de Belles-Lettres of the French speaking cantons 190
published a monthly Revue de Belles-Lettres. It was based in Neuchâtel between December 
1926 and July 1927, and Rougemont took an active part in it. The journal was largely 
concerned with the Neuchâtel students, who easily decoded the references to ‘les dames’, the 
blind drunk evenings, and the pseudonyms of Topinet or Salomon de Crac (for 
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!  See esp.Rougemont, 'Goethe médiateur', 11-21; Denis de Rougemont, Le Paysan du Danube (Les Cahiers 185
romands, 2e série, 1st edn. vol. 9. Lausanne, 1932); Denis de Rougemont, 'Le silence de Goethe', La Nouvelle 
Revue française, 222 (1 March 1932), 480-94.
!  On Arthur Piaget, see Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 76.186
!  Jean Piaget (1896-1980), psychologist from Neuchâtel, founder of the field called cognitive development 187
today. His own term for the discipline was ‘genetic epistemology’, reflecting his philosophical concerns. Among 
Piaget’s most enduring contributions were his robust and surprising observations of children, which Rougemont 
followed as a student. Piaget taught psychology, sociology and history of science at Neuchâtel from 1925 to 
1929. When he took up this post, he had just published Le Language et la pensée chez l’enfant (1923) and Le 
Jugement et le raisonnement chez l’enfant (1924).
!  Rougemont, Les Méfaits de l'instruction publique. See analysis below.188
!  Max Niedermann (1874-1954) had been a student of Antoine Meillet, who succeeded Ferdinand de Saussure 189
at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris. He taught linguistics, Classics, and Latin, in Basel (1911-25) 
and in Neuchâtel (1911-44). Cf. Hommages à Max Niedermann, Collection Latomus (vol.23, Brussels, 1956), 
7-15. 
!  Founded in Lausanne in 1806, this literary institution was the first Swiss student society. In the 1920s, it had 190
headquarters in the main French-speaking universities: Lausanne, Geneva, Neuchâtel and Fribourg. The club 
recruited exclusively male students with a literary inclination, unlike the more politically oriented Société de 
Zofingue, the other main French Swiss student society. Rougemont entered the Belles-Lettres society of 
Neuchâtel in December 1925, in his first semester at the University. Being a member of Belles-Lettres was a 
mark of integration in the Swiss literary field. For his own definition of Belles-Lettres, see Denis de Rougemont, 
'Essence de Belles-Lettres', Revue de Belles-Lettres (Lausanne), 3 (Jan. 1929); Rougemont, Le Paysan du 
Danube, 200.
Rougemont),   Mossoul, Tuty, Fulpius etc. Pseudonyms allowed Rougemont to write about 191
his love life (whether real or imagined), and to express revolt against the family’s values.  192
Analysis of the Revue de Belles-Lettres does not reveal surprising details: it denotes a lifestyle 
characteristic of young male bourgeois students in the interwar period.   Rougemont 193
reckoned, with hindsight: ‘Nous passions des soirées et des nuits que nous imaginions 
orgiaques, qui étaient simplement lyriques.’   It is only a superficial paradox that Bellettriens 194
claimed to be revolutionaries – ‘Il a y des gens qui n’ont pas encore admis que JEUNESSE = 
REVOLUTION.’   This was part of the romantic ideal. 195
!
Romanticism led Rougemont to the University of Vienna in 1927-8. He stated ‘Je vins 
à Vienne pour fuir l’Amérique’ (symbol of modernity) and he tried to write romantic and 
surrealist pieces in Vienna.   Afterwards, Rougemont spent the first semester 1928-9 in 196
Geneva, where he took part in the cosmopolitan circles of La Revue de Genève and La Revue 
européenne.   He then went on to a language course in Calw in Germany in the spring and 197
summer 1929, and having completed his military service in 1929, he took his final 
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!  On Rougemont’s use of pseudonyms, see Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 191
128.
!  His affairs are the subject of Christian Campiche, Denis de Rougemont, Le séducteur de l'Occident (Chêne-192
Bourg, 2001). This book is not a serious historical account, but rather a journalist’s version of what may have 
been Rougemont’s romantic life. For an imaginary dialogue on seduction or ‘petite leçon de métérologie 
sentimentale’, see Salomon de Crac, 'La pluie et le beau temps', Revue de Belles-Lettres (Neuchâtel) (1932), 
56-9. For a surrealist praise of drunkenness (contrasting his father’s commitment in the Swiss anti-alcoholic 
league Croix Bleue), see Denis de Rougemont, 'Dés ou la clef des champs', Neuchâtel 1928 (Neuchâtel, 1927), 
97-104.
!  In an article that can also apply to French Swiss youth, Antoine Prost has shown how class and gender shaped 193
categories of accepted behaviour, in Antoine Prost, 'Jeunesse et société dans la France de l'entre-deux-guerres', 
Vingtième Siècle (Jan.-March 1987).
!  Denis de Rougemont, '(Speech of) 11-12 Nov. 1938', Commémoration de la première académie et centenaire 194
de l'Université (Neuchâtel, 1939), 11.
!  Mossoul, 'Adieu au lecteur', Revue de Belles-Lettres (Neuchâtel), 8 (July 1927), 257.195
!  See esp. the chapter he would later publish in Le Paysan du Danube ‘Un soir à Vienne avec Gérard’ (1928): 196
Rougemont, Le Paysan du Danube, 33-50. (Quote from p.33).
!  On La Revue européenne, see Anne-Lise Delacrétaz and Daniel Maggetti, 'Ecrivains étrangers en Suisse 197
romande', in Roger Francillon (ed.) Histoire de la littérature en Suisse romande, III. (Lausanne, 1998). Robert de 
Traz particularly appreciated Rougemont’s contributions, see Traz to Rougemont, 10 June 1929, Neuchâtel, 
BPUN, Rougemont papers.
!  He graduated from Neuchâtel University (Licence in Latin, French and German literature), see his ‘Licence’, 198
13 Jan. 1930, Neuchâtel, BPUN, Rougemont papers.
examinations in Neuchâtel in January 1930.   Since his teenage years in Neuchâtel, 198




Pierre Bourdieu’s analysis of the literary field helps to understand the stakes that 
Rougemont dealt with when hoping to become a writer.   As a teenager, Rougemont believed 199
that poetry was the purest type of art, in keeping with the nineteenth-century romantic 
assumption.   In the twentieth century however, poetry had become a lesser genre, in terms 200
of prestige and market, compared to the novel.   Rougemont turned to prose when he was not 201
yet eighteen. Writing journal articles and essays suited him more than poetry; and it also 
suited the market better.   In the 1920s and 1930s, Rougemont came to specialise in literary 202
reviews, articles and essays.   These genres traditionally served as a refuge for écrivains 203
ratés, or for writers who did not publish enough to earn a living.   However, the young 204
Rougemont was able to use them to his advantage, as it soon became clear. 
!
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(Paris, 1990); Christophe Charle, 'Situation du champ littéraire', Littératures, L'institution littéraire II (Dec. 
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France et le reste. Importations littéraires et nationalisme culturel en France, 1885-1930' (Doctorat, Paris I, 
2003). For a worldwide analysis, from Madagascar to Croatia, and from Brazil to Switzerland, see the 
impressive book by Pascale Casanova, recently translated into English: Casanova, The world republic of Letters.
!  Rougemont believed that ‘il ne fallait publier que de la poésie’, see the interview of Denis de Rougemont, 14 200
Jan. 1978, pages 29, quoted by Deering, Combats acharnés: Denis de Rougemont et les fondements de l'unité 
européenne, 131. On the struggle for aesthetic rules independent from political stakes (art for art’s sake) in 
France, see Bourdieu, Les Règles de l'art, esp. 178-191, 193-210, 465-509.
!  On the emergence of the novel as the dominant genre, see Rémy Ponton, 'Naissance du roman psychologique. 201
Capital culturel, capital social et stratégie littéraire à la fin du XIXe siècle', Actes de la recherche en sciences 
sociales, 4 (1975).
!  Since the late nineteenth century, the market for poetry (albeit prestigious) has been virtually limited to 202
writers, i.e. to the producers themselves. In the literary field, the economic benefits of a genre tend to decrease as 
the prestige augments (thus journalism is the opposite of poetry: it reaches a wide market, but ‘creative’ writers 
usually despise it). See Bourdieu, Les Règles de l'art, 193, 199.
!  See analysis below and the detailed bibliography established by Bruno Ackermann, in Ackermann, Denis de 203
Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 2, 1158-1211.
!  Christophe Charle, Paris fin de siècle (Paris, 1999), 158.204
From very early on, Rougemont proved aware of both the economic constraints of the 
literary field and the rules of literary creativity. This awareness explains his rapid integration 
in the literary field. When he was nineteen, he refused to publish an essay (Philéas) for fear 
that it might give the clue to the works he planned to write later.   In 1927, he accepted, 205
albeit reluctantly, the idea of making a living out of literature: ‘On m’affirme que je n’y 
échapperai pas plus qu’un autre : et qu’un beau soir il faille écrire pour vivre, possible; mais, 
pour sûr, jamais vivre pour écrire.’   Literature was to be a quest beyond writing; 206
Rougemont, aged twenty, had renounced pure aestheticism definitely. It was clear from his 
article ‘Adieu beau désordre’.   This has been analysed by his biographers.   ‘Adieu beau 207 208
désordre…’ brought him praises of Robert de Traz (editor of the Revue de Genève) and of 
Jean Paulhan (editor of the NRF).   Rougemont followed a line of argument similar to that of 209
the young literary critique Marcel Arland, who, in the NRF, emphasised the importance of 
both literary quality and moral integrity.   210
!
Rougemont’s awareness of the rules of literary creativity, evident from his articles and 
book reviews in the 1920s, is significant because Rougemont would never abandon his 
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!  He wrote: ‘Je crois aussi que je ferais mieux de ne pas publier Philéas, avant d’avoir fait autre chose du 205
moins. Et d’abord pour une raison littéraire: se livrer ainsi au public, c’est lui donner trop beau jeu pour pénétrer 
les œuvres qui suivront. […] il me semble qu’il est bon de maintenir certaine distance entre auteur et public ; et 
Philéas la détruit.’ Rougemont to Traz, Areuse, 7 octobre 1925, Geneva, BPU, Robert de Traz Papers, quoted in 
Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 127-8. See manuscript of Philéas in 
Neuchâtel, BPUN, Rougemont Papers.
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'La Part du feu. Lettres sur le mépris de la littérature', Revue de Belles-Lettres 206
(Neuchâtel), 8 (July 1927), 237.
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'Adieu beau désordre...' Bibliothèque Universelle et Revue de Genève (March 1926), 207
311-19.
!  See Ackermann and Deering for a summary of this article, with the reservation that it is an anachronism to 208
state, with Deering, that in this article ‘Rougemont anticipe le débat qui va s’engager après la publication en 
1927 de l’essai de Julien Benda, La Trahison des clercs’, in Deering, Combats acharnés: Denis de Rougemont et 
les fondements de l'unité européenne, 133 n.1. Rougemont followed the ongoing debate in the French literary 
field, and not the other way round. In 1929, Rougemont acknowledged his position as a novice (about the debate 
on La Trahison des clercs): ‘Ce n’est plus l’heure de venir prendre position dans un débat où les voix les mieux 
écoutées ont dit ce qu’elles avaient à dire’, in Denis de Rougemont, 'Julien Benda: La Fin de l'Eternel', 
Bibliothèque Universelle et Revue de Genève (Nov. 1929), 638-9.
!  Rougemont, 'Adieu beau désordre...' Traz wrote: ‘Je trouve un manuscrit de vous – excellent – et je l’envoie 209
dare dare à l’imprimerie’ (Traz to Rougemont, 17 Feb. 1926, Neuchâtel, BPUN, Rougemont Papers); Paulhan 
wrote: ‘J’ai lu avec un très vif plaisir votre étude « Adieu, beau désordre » qu’a publiée la Revue de Genève. Et 
s’il vous intéressait quelque jour de collaborer à la Nouvelle Revue Française, c’est avec un très grand intérêt 
que je lirais les notes ou les articles que vous voudriez bien nous soumettre.’ Jean Paulhan to Rougemont, Paris, 
3 May 1926, Neuchâtel, BPUN, Rougemont papers.
!  Whilst rejecting dogmatism, Arland (1899-1986) – who had undergone a deep religious experience a few 210
years earlier – maintained the vital role of religion. See Sapiro, La Guerre des écrivains, 1940-1953, 136-8.
concern with style. In 1958, in an unpublished note untitled ‘Faire le point’, he would confess: 
‘Ce qui me ferait le plus plaisir serait d’avoir une grande influence en tant qu’écrivain. Ma 
vanité majeure est là. Preuve : je suis capable de gauchir légèrement une thèse à cause du 
nombre de syllabes dans un mot de telle phrase.’   Thus, Rougemont never abandoned his 211
ambition to be a writer. As a Swiss writing in French, Rougemont faced the question of how 




The problem of a distinctive French Swiss literature (‘littérature romande’) appeared 
in the nineteenth century, with the idea that the French Swiss Cantons form a single entity: ‘la 
Suisse romande’.   Daniel Maggetti has argued that French Swiss literature was invented 212
between 1830 and 1900, as the ‘canons’ of Swiss literature gradually achieved independence 
from Parisian literary rules.   Yet the question of an autonomous Swiss culture was still 213
conflict-ridden in the twentieth century. For example, La Voile latine – a journal with the 
program subtitle ‘Culture suisse’ – created in 1904, was interrupted in 1910 because of 
dissenting interpretations of Swiss cultural identity.   More precisely, the shipwreck of La 214
Voile latine was caused by a conflict over the Protestant influence on French Swiss cultural 
identity.   This would prove an enduring issue in the twentieth century; and given 215
Rougemont’s Swiss and Protestant education, it was doubly important to him. 
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!  Unpublished ms. ‘Faire le point, 10.04.58 à Opio. Sur D Rgt.’, in Neuchâtel, BPUN, Rougemont Papers, File: 211
‘Inédits: Autobiographie’.
!  The editor of a three-volume Histoire de la littérature en Suisse romande, Roger Francillon, continues to 212
wonder at the status of the French Swiss writer: ‘Est-il un écrivain français que le hasard de la génétique a fait 
naître en Suisse romande? Est-ce un écrivain Suisse qui écrit en français?’ Roger Francillon (ed.) Histoire de la 
littérature en Suisse romande, I. Du Moyen Age à 1815 (3 vols. vol. 1. Lausanne, 1996), 7.
!  See Daniel Maggetti, 'L'âge d'or de la "littérature nationale"', in Roger Francillon (ed.) Histoire de la 213
littérature en Suisse romande, 2. De Töpffer à Ramuz (Lausanne, 1997); Maggetti, L'Invention de la littérature 
romande: 1830-1900.
!  See Françoise Fornerod and Roger Francillon, 'La vie culturelle en Suisse romande de la Belle Epoque à 214
1939', in Roger Francillon (ed.) Histoire de la littérature en Suisse romande, 2. De Töpffer à Ramuz (Lausanne, 
1997), esp.234; Roger Francillon, 'La guerre des Burgondes et des Helvètes: disputes autour de la Voile latine et 
des Cahiers vaudois à propos de l'identité suisse', in Guy Marchal and Aram Mattioli (eds), Erfundene Schweiz / 
La Suisse imaginée (Zürich, 1992), 265-74.
!  This is one of the most debated themes in Swiss literary history. I follow the thesis of Pierre-Olivier Walzer, 215
Le Sabordage de "La Voile latine" (Lausanne, 1993).
!
In the interwar period, the majority of French Swiss writers continued to turn to 
France for style, and many supported the view that the French Swiss had to content 
themselves with borrowing a foreign language with respect, and even, in some cases, a sense 
of guilt.   An avant-garde rebelled against submission to Paris. Charles Ferdinand Ramuz 216
(one of the founders of La Voile latine) hoped to shape his style on the very landscape of his 
Canton (Vaud), whilst being universal in his subject-matters.   Ramuz’s plea for a French 217
that would not necessarily be ‘le français de France’ fuelled passionate debates in the 
1920s.   The stakes were not only aesthetic, but also political. This was the context in which 218
Denis de Rougemont, still at the Gymnase, dedicated himself to poetry. 
!
To date, there has been no serious consideration of Rougemont’s position vis-à-vis the 
debate on the independence of the French Swiss literary field from Paris. It shows a rather 
conventional Rougemont: whereas the Swiss avant-garde fought for autonomy vis-à-vis Paris, 
Rougemont was looking towards the French capital for literary approval. Rougemont could 
have taken part in a French Swiss literature autonomous from Paris. Yet he achieved just the 
opposite. In what follows, I argue that Rougemont was a gifted and ambitious writer, 
concerned with Parisian letters more than with Swiss politics. 
!
According to Rougemont’s own interpretation, he would have entered the French 
Swiss literary field in 1924, almost by accident.   The occasion was a review article on ‘M. 219
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!  This was notably the view of  Maurice Milloud, see Pierre-André Rieben, 'L'écrivain romand et la langue, 216
C.F. Ramuz et Edmond Gilliard', in Roger Francillon (ed.) Histoire de la littérature en Suisse romande, 2. De 
Töpffer à Ramuz (Lausanne, 1997), 257-8.
!  In 1914, Ramuz had published his ‘Raison d’être’ in the first issue of the Cahiers vaudois: ‘Mais qu’il existe, 217
une fois, grâce à nous, un livre, un chapitre, une simple phrase qui n’aient pu être écrits qu’ici, parce que copiés 
dans leur inflexion sur telle courbe de colline ou scandés dans leur rythme par le retour du lac sur les galets d’un 
beau rivage, quelque part, si on veut, entre Cully et Saint-Saphorin, – que ce peu de chose voie le jour, et nous 
serons absous.’ C.F. Ramuz, quoted in Fornerod and Francillon, 'La vie culturelle en Suisse romande de la Belle 
Epoque à 1939’, 239. Raison d’être remains the most famous French Swiss literary manifesto up to this day.
!  See notably Pour ou contre C.F. Ramuz, Cahiers de la Quinzaine (Paris, 1926).218
!  See Denis de Rougemont, 'Denis de Rougemont tel qu'en lui-même...' Cadmos, 33, Special issue: Denis de 219
Rougemont (Spring 1986), 8-9. An historian influenced by Bourdieu would not fail to notice that what 
Rougemont gives as coincidences in his interpretation reveal precisely his position as a young French Swiss 
writer: poetry was the style favoured by younger and marginal writers, and Montherlant, whom he commented 
on, happened to be a writer acclaimed by French youth.
de Montherlant, le sport et les jésuites’, published in La Semaine littéraire.   The choice of 220
this journal, possibly the most prestigious French Swiss literary publication at the time, leads 
to question Rougemont’s interpretation: his very first publication cannot have been fortuitous. 
Besides, it epitomizes some enduring features of his literary production. Firstly, Rougemont 
praised violence and partiality in literature, two elements he cultivated himself, throughout his 
life. The writer Jean Starobinsky would recall Rougemont’s ‘bellicose and antagonist style’ 
unto the very last days of his life.   Secondly, Rougemont, aged seventeen, did not hesitate to 221
give his view on morals and religion, with a certain boldness on the part of a Gymnase student 
criticizing an established writer in a major literary journal. Thirdly, it may be worth 
emphasising Rougemont’s call for freedom and his anti-catholic pique: ‘Il me semble bien 
paradoxal de vouloir unir dans une même philosophie la morale jésuite, faite de règles et de 
contraintes imposées dans le but de restreindre la liberté et l’initiative individuelles, et la 
morale des sports anglais, morale qui veut former des hommes maîtres d’eux-mêmes, c’est à 
dire libres.’   An ‘éthique du sport’, conferring virtue, ‘sert mieux la démocratie que l’Eglise 222
romaine’.   The three aspects touched upon in Rougemont’s first article correspond to his 223
lifelong areas of interest: literature, politics and religion. Having said that, in the 1920s, he 
focused on literature, and gave little time to politics and religion. 
!
At the time when he published his first article, Rougemont was called ‘Chauvin, grand 
critique littéraire devant l’Eternel, Chauvin à l’âme multiple et diverse comme l’immoralité 
morale d’André Gide notre Maître’.   Rougemont’s nickname ‘Chauvin’ could be interpreted 224
as a sign of his obsession with Paris, and its literary star André Gide.   Rougemont started his 225
literary career as a student in Neuchâtel, but from the start he kept an eye on Paris. Looking 
!  64
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'M. de Montherlant, le sport et les Jésuites', La semaine littéraire, 1571, (9 Feb. 1924), 220
63-5.
!  Quoted by Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 20.221
!  Rougemont, 'M. de Montherlant, le sport et les Jésuites', 64.222
!  Rougemont, 'M. de Montherlant, le sport et les Jésuites', 64.223
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towards France, whilst striving to assert its own style, was the dilemma of French Swiss 
literature at least until the 1960s.   226
!
Rougemont was well integrated in the French Swiss literary field in the late 1920s, 
both socially and in terms of his publications. He belonged to clubs, the Société de Belles-
Lettres (from the beginning of University in Neuchâtel) and the Brambilla-Club (from the 
time of his student years in Geneva).   These two literary societies, although Swiss-based, 227
were open to European letters. Describing Belles-Lettres as ‘l’esprit romand’, as Henri de 
Ziégler did, should not imply a militant French Swiss identity.   Most Bellelettriens – 228
Rougemont perhaps more than others – displayed ‘les enthousiasmes naïfs pour les formes les 
plus avancées des lettres parisiennes’.    229
!
The journals in which Rougemont published in his student years show the 
development of a promising literary career. Rougemont published fifty book reviews between 
1925 and 1928, and a dozen in 1929-30, all of them in French Swiss journals.   He sent his 230
reviews to Robert de Traz’s Revue de Genève predominantly, which was to incarnate ‘l’esprit 
de Genève’, cosmopolitan and European.   From 1930 onwards, when Traz put a stop to the 231
Revue de Genève, Rougemont started publishing in La Nouvelle Revue française. To publish 
book reviews in the Revue de Genève and the NRF was a significant achievement for the 
young Rougemont: reviewing in these journals tended to remain the privilege of established 
writers and academics.   Reviewing allowed Rougemont to show his critical talents. At the 232
same time, he tried more ‘creative’ genres. In 1926, as he turned twenty, Rougemont was able 
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to publish articles in La Semaine littéraire and in La Revue de Genève, as well as in the 
Parisian Cahiers du mois.   Thus, before 1930, Rougemont was already well-situated in the 233
literary field, in particular in French Switzerland but also already internationally (the Revue de 
Genève was determinedly European). 
!
Rougemont entrusted his first two books to French Swiss publishers, thereby 
confirming his integration in the French Swiss literary field. Les Méfaits de l’instruction 
publique (1929) was the first publication of Les Petites Lettres de Lausanne, which was aimed 
at young French Swiss writers like him.   His second book Le Paysan du Danube (1932) 234
came out in Payot’s new collection Les Cahiers romands.   Both books were printed around 235
five hundred copies, which recalls a famous editorial in Aujourd’hui by Ramuz: ‘Avis aux 
cinq cent lecteurs’.   The French Swiss public was small: it was that of an avant-garde. 236
Hence the attraction of Paris. 
!
At the end of his life, Rougemont stated that in the 1920s his articles ‘étaient tous à la 
gloire des surréalistes et, en général, de la plus extrême avant-garde littéraire et anarchisante 
française’.   This account has been repeated since; it fits in with the image of Rougemont as 237
a révolté and a non-conformiste. However, Rougemont was a more conventional youth than 
has been said so far. Rougemont’s early writings evince a contradiction between the style he 
admired and the morals he kept. He admired the style of the surrealists, but constantly 
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To illustrate Rougemont’s moral concern, one may look at his call upon the literary 
critic and theologian of Swiss birth Alexandre Vinet (1797-1847). The subject is most 
interesting because it could easily have led to a political plea for an autonomous French Swiss 
literature. Instead, Rougemont chose to defend a conventional Protestantism. Thus, when 
reviewing a French book on Vinet (La Revue de Genève, 1925) Rougemont criticized the 
French author for failing to see the theological importance of Vinet.    238
!
It is noteworthy that Rougemont did not pick up on Vinet’s support of French cultural 
centralism (Vinet is notorious for claiming that the French Swiss were ‘éloignés des lieux où 
cette langue est intimement sentie et parlée dans toute sa pureté’, to the extent that ‘le français 
est pour nous, jusqu’à un certain point, une langue étrangère’).   Instead, Rougemont 239
developed Vinet’s conventional image as a father of modern Protestantism (Vinet contributed 
to found ‘l’Eglise libre’ in the Canton of Vaud, in 1847).   This image had been challenged 240
by a literary avant-garde since the early twentieth century, when Protestantism (and Vinet in 
particular) had been made responsible for the alleged Swiss mediocrity.   Although 241
Rougemont may not have been aware of this debate (taking place around 1910), he sought to 
defend, with his editor Robert de Traz, the cultural and political fertility of Protestantism.   242
!
Rougemont’s book review on Vinet came out in the context of a series of the 
conversions to Catholicism of a number of intellectuals starting in the late nineteenth 
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century.   Rougemont attacked the two most influential Catholic intellectuals in the 1920s, 243
perhaps in response to Maritain’s condemnation of Protestantism in his book Trois 
réformateurs (June 1925).   Rougemont claimed that ‘la position purement chrétienne’ of 244
Vinet is ‘infiniment plus forte que celle d’un Maurras ou que celle d’un Maritain’.   In 245
October 1925, when Rougemont wrote his review, the Action Française seemed to have 
managed a skilful combination between tradition (Catholicism and Neo-Classicism) and 
modern science (which claimed to have the monopoly of truth).   Rougemont was aware that 246
those who opposed the Action Française risked being left with the negation of religion or 
truth. He defined his times as an ‘époque déchirée entre un thomisme et un nihilisme 
exaspérés’.   The solution – naively put – was a ‘Pascal Protestant’: Alexandre Vinet.  247 248
Thus, for Rougemont, the religious issue overshadowed the question of an independent 
French Swiss literature.  
!
In 1927, Rougemont also called on Vinet as an antidote to surrealism. Rougemont 
responded to Aragon’s negation of salvation quoting Vinet: ‘le plus irrévocable désespoir 
n’est encore qu’un appel à la foi la plus haute’.   This may have been a weighty critique of 249
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surrealism; yet it was also conventional in Switzerland. Rougemont’s appreciation of the 
surrealist avant-garde remained ambivalent at least until 1930. On the one hand, he admired 
the subversive strategy of the French avant-garde, and particularly praised the styles of 
Aragon and Breton.   On the other hand, he took on board conventional objections against 250
surrealism: ‘Les témoignages ne manquent pas sur la détresse morale de la génération 
surréaliste.’   251
!
The question of morals in literature, which was much debated in Paris at the time, 
provided Rougemont with his first opportunity to publish in Paris. In 1926, Les Cahiers du 
mois launched a survey (following Marcel Arland’s initiative), asking young writers to make 
literary confessions (‘Examens de conscience’).   The survey was supposed to prove the 252
moral concerns of young writers, and their departure from pure aestheticism. And Rougemont 
did so.   He proved disarmingly honest in explaining how he sought to find his vocation as a 253
writer. He stated his aversion for politics explicitly: political ideologies appeared to be ‘une 
dérision complète. Je m’étonne qu’après tant d’expériences ratées on puisse encore se 
persuader de la vérité d’un système, hors la religion.’   Again, there was nothing 254
revolutionary, nothing rebellious in this.  
!
Later, the survey of Les Cahiers du mois came to be regarded as a landmark for ‘la 
génération de l’inquiétude’, characterised by spiritual concerns (as opposed to materialist 
preoccupations).   The spiritual concerns that would characterize personalist writers in the 255
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1930s were already present in the mid-1920s.  However, personalism, as a political cause, 
remained absent until 1930-1. Rougemont, in particular, criticised the encroachment of 
politics on literature in France.  
!
Rougemont identified with the avant-garde, and yet wanted to dissociate the literary 
avant-garde from politics. Although he supported Aragon when he cried ‘A bas le clair génie 
français!’,   he condemned the surrealists’ move towards communism (initiated in 1925):   256 257
Aragon, pourquoi se faire le marchand des oeuvres complètes de Karl Marx? Si vous 
ne dites pas aussi merde pour Marx ou Lénine, je le dirai pour vous. […] Est-ce que 
vraiment vous ne pouvez vous libérer de cette manie française, la politique […] ? […] 
Cette réaction même est ce qu’il y a de plus français; [elle] donne au surréalisme ce 
petit côté jacobin si authentiquement, si déplorablement français.   258
  
Rougemont derided the French surrealists, who, seeking a public role, ‘se tournent 
naturellement vers l’action, c’est-à-dire, – nous sommes en France – vers la politique.’  259
Rougemont was marking his difference as a Swiss when he thus mocked French surrealists 
for only being able to envisage action in political terms. 
!
Les Méfaits de l’instruction publique!
!
In 1929, Rougemont published his first essay, Les Méfaits de l’instruction publique 
(abbreviated as Les Méfaits), which marked the apparition of political questions. How did 
politics, which he hitherto despised, enter Rougemont’s preoccupations? Patrick Leuzinger, 
the author of a thesis on Rougemont’s 1930s ‘engagement antilibéral’, has made Les Méfaits a 
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précis of Rougemont’s pre-war political thought.   Leuzinger’s distortions force me to give 260
more consideration to Les Méfaits than I would otherwise have done (there is no trace of 
personalism in Les Méfaits). Here, I argue that although this polemical essay marks the 
beginning of Rougemont’s concern for politics, Rougemont had little political project other 
than to criticize.  
!
In the Swiss tradition of pedagogical essays, which started with Rousseau’s Emile 
(1762), Les Méfaits has the particularity of combining pedagogy with a rejection of 
democracy.   For Rougemont, education and politics were inseparable: ‘L’instruction 261
publique et la démocratie sont sœurs siamoises’.   Les Méfaits has been misunderstood when 262
authors have focused either on politics or on pedagogy (usually on pedagogy), without 
considering the interrelatedness of Rougemont’s criticism of the state and school. Leuzinger 
focused on the political dimension of Les Méfaits, to counter Ackermann’s quasi-exclusive 
focus on the pedagogical question. Both interpretations have a point, but also a limit: 
Ackermann dismissed the anti-democratic contents of Les Méfaits too quickly; and Leuzinger 
failed to understand the insertion of Les Méfaits in the Swiss education debate of the late 
1920s.  
!
 Ackermann has analysed Les Méfaits with respect to the education debate in 
Neuchâtel.   I would enlarge his analysis by pointing out that Les Méfaits also fits into the 263
attack on academia and intellectualism, launched by various writers at the turn of the 
twentieth century.   It is notorious that, in the Action Française (AF), anti-academism was 264
associated with an anti-democratic stance. The influence of the AF and Charles Maurras, 
!  71
!  Leuzinger, 'Denis de Rougemont, la crise de la civilisation et l'engagement antilibéral’, 24-45.260
!  Pierre-André Rieben, 'L'écrivain et l'école', in Roger Francillon (ed.) Histoire de la littérature en Suisse 261
romande, 2. De Töpffer à Ramuz (Lausanne, 1997), 275.
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'Les méfaits de l'instruction publique', in Pierre-Olivier Walzer (ed.) Trois pamphlets 262
pédagogiques (Lausanne, 1984), 142.
!  See esp. Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 116-22.263
!  See ‘Le savant et le littéraire’, in Sapiro, La Guerre des écrivains, 1940-1953, 108-20.264
across Europe cannot be overemphasised (at least until the Papal condemnation of 1926).  265
With an opposite political agenda, C.F. Ramuz also defined French Swiss literature as anti-
academic: ‘Il faut que ce soit contre-universitaire, contre-intellectuel, c’est à dire vivant.’  266
The anti-academic row was neither restricted to a particular political tendency, nor to a 
particular country.    267
!
Thus, writers of different political tendencies attacked the sclerosis of the education 
system, across Europe. Ironically, they condemned the institutions (schools, universities, 
books and journals) to which they owed much of their training – if not living. In criticising the 
school, they did not depart significantly from the views of educated people at the time: it was 
conventional to contrast the positivist belief in objectivity (which conditioned much of school 
teaching), with the children’s need for creativity and imagination.   Since Rousseau, it has 268
been a cliché to oppose children’s natural independence and spontaneity to the rigid and 
authoritarian social structures into which they are forced. Following the Rousseauan idea that 
education ought to be pursued out of natural curiosity, Les Méfaits criticised primary school 
as a rigid institution and rejected bookish knowledge.   Rougemont contrasted a Rousseauan 269
(or Romantic) conception of nature with the ugliness of primary schools.    270
!
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Thus, Rougemont’s call for creative freedom in schools was far from exceptional, in a 
country of pedagogues.    What was more unusual was his attack on Swiss democracy. Even 271
so, Rougemont did not seek to be original: ‘Bien entendu, tout cela a été dit. (Un peu 
autrement, j’en conviens).’   Nor did he seek to be fair: ‘Ce que je vais dire est sans doute 272
injuste et faux dans un très grand nombre de cas’; and he repeated: ‘Je ne cherche point 
l’équité’.   He claimed: ‘Je demande le droit de démolir. Et me l’accorde aussitôt. Sans 273
conditions. Mon rôle n’est pas de proposer une nouvelle forme politique.’   This suggests 274
that the politics of Les Méfaits should not be taken too seriously.  
!
Subversive claims inevitably entailed exaggerations. However, Rougemont maintained 
that ‘ces exagérations ne sont pas bien graves, parce qu’elles sont comiques précisément’.  275
Do comic or stylistic effects excuse exaggerations? Not always, and Rougemont proves 
particularly off-putting when he insults or threatens rhetorical interlocutors.   Rougemont 276
also made a deplorable comment in calling the principles of public instruction ‘UNE MÉTHODE 
D’ABÂTARDISSEMENT DE LA RACE’ (Rougemont had read Barrès and Maurras).   However, 277
despite this comment, Rougemont was not anti-semitic, and Leuzinger has drawn abusive 
conclusions on anti-semitism, without evidence.   It was not unusual for descriptions of 278
Swiss communities to be tainted by organicist vocabulary, without being anti-semitic.   279
!
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!  For an analysis of organic notions of community in Switzerland in the 1930s, see Olivier Zimmer, ''A unique 279
fusion of the natural and the man-made': the trajectory of Swiss Nationalism, 1933-39', Journal of Contemporary 
History, 39, 1 (2004), 14-15.
Les Méfaits was not democratic: Rougemont opposed en bloc academism, rationalism, 
positivism, and ‘les dogmes démocratiques, qui sont une généralisation de la règle de trois’.  280
Rougemont deplored that Swiss primary schools seemed to favour the mediocre.   The main 281
purpose of primary schools, according to Rougemont, was ‘la fabrication en série de petits 
démocrates conscients et organisés’.   He regretted: ‘On forme nos gosses à ne point se poser 282
de questions dont ils n’aient pas appris par cœur la réponse.’   He criticised the way in which 283
subjects were imposed onto children, hour after hour, in a school day, without time for 
initiative. School discipline had a political aim: ‘La discipline forme des gobeurs et des 
inertes, fournit des moutons aux partis et prédispose les citoyens suisses à prendre au sérieux 
les innombrables défense de, petites crottes noires et blanches qui marquent un peu partout le 
passage de l’Etat…’   It is clear from Les Méfaits that Rougemont loathed both ‘socialisme 284
ou morgue bourgeoise, esprit de parti, arrivisme et parlementarisme’.   This repugnance for 285
parliamentary politics would not change in the 1930s. 
!
Nevertheless, Leuzinger was wrong to read Les Méfaits as a systematic antiliberal 
pamphlet.   Les Méfaits proves self-contradictory politically and socially. The political 286
argumentation is inconsistent, and suggests literary posturing, rather than serious 
consideration.  Rougemont drew from Julien Benda to oppose partisan passion.   His chief 287
political claim was that ‘l’école s’est vendue à des intérêts politiques’.   At the same time, he 288
repeated arguments of the French right: from the diatribe against rationalism – ‘L’instruction 
publique est la forme la plus commune de la peste rationaliste qui sévit dans le monde depuis 
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antilibéral’, 27, 105.
!  Rougemont’s heading ‘La trahison de l’instruction publique’ was borrowed from Julien Benda’s La Trahison 287
des clercs (1927), which famously opposed ‘Justice’ and ‘Vérité’ to partisan passions.
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le XVIIIe (depuis les dernières pestes noires)’;   to the opposition to positivism, which made 289
primary school ‘la plus grande force anti-religieuse de ce temps’.   After this diatribe, 290
emulating the French extreme-right, Rougemont urged anarchists and utopians to manifest 
themselves in the political sphere.   Anarchy and utopia were defined apolitically as ‘un 291
degré d’intensité dans la vie, non pas un parti’; so that the anarchist was ‘un homme libre qui 
a une foi (ou un amour) et qui s’y consacre’; and ‘l’utopiste, c’est l’inventeur’, challenging 
the boundaries of reality and knowledge.    292
!
The conclusion to Les Méfaits called for an awkward combination of Yoga (this 
oriental ‘culture des facultés physiques et mystiques’) and ‘la discipline jésuite et le drill 
militaire’ (which was supposed to be the western equivalent).   Military and Jesuit discipline 293
was in staunch contradiction with his call for maximum individual freedom and for an 
education as diverse as possible.   Rougemont especially drew on the French rightwing 294
writer Montherlant (a reference for him since 1924) for praises of Jesuit and military 
conduct.   Rougemont was aware of the awkwardness of his reference to the military: ‘il n’y 295
a pas là de quoi se tordre’.   Across Europe, the ‘generation of 1914’ ranked elitism, sacrifice 296
and fraternity, as the highest possible values and the solution to the famous crisis of Western 
civilisation.   Rougemont was too young to have fought in the war and in any case came 297
from a neutral state. Even so, he elaborated on his experience of the military service, 
completed a few months before writing Les Méfaits.    298
!
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In short, all that seemed to matter in Les Méfaits was subversion. A polemical style 
and subversive tone are characteristic of writers in a ‘dominated position’, impatient to earn a 
reputation in the literary field.   It is helpful to recall that the two authors whom Rougemont 299
most admired, for their style, were Montherlant (right-wing) and Aragon (extreme-left).  300
They had in common to be fashionable among French youth. Rougemont ended his pamphlet 
on a romantic note:   he dreamt of ‘le temps des mages’ – a mythical anti-rationalist and anti-301
positivist age to come.   A comment that Rougemont once made about Louis Aragon applies 302
to himself: ‘devant cette ostentation de révolte’, he features ‘une folie de la persécution, qui se 
cherche partout des prétextes, et une passion farouche pour la liberté qui font de cet 
ombrageux personnage une manière de Rousseau surréaliste’.   In Les Méfaits, Rougemont 303
was a cross between Rousseau and the surrealists. 
!
 The reception of Les Méfaits by the Swiss public was positive, and the five hundred 
copies that had been printed sold out rapidly.   Official institutions may have been offended, 304
but this was part of the game. Belles-Lettres applauded: ‘M. Denis de Rougemont a 
élégamment saccagé la mare aux grenouilles de l’instruction publique. Les grenouilles sont 
hors d’elles.’   As early as 1930, Rougemont’s political argument was proved unfair. 305
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!  See his praises of Montherlant’s violent style in Denis de Rougemont, 'Les Bestiaires', La semaine littéraire, 300
1697 (10 Jul. 1926), 335; Denis de Rougemont, 'Henri de Montherlant: Les Bestiaires', Bibliothèque Universelle 
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Le Paysan de Paris', Bibliothèque Universelle et Revue de Genève (Jan. 1927), 123-4.; and Rougemont, 'Aragon: 
Traité du Style', 1034.
!  Here, ‘romantic’ is to be understood in reference to Pierre Bénichou, Le Temps des prophètes, Doctrines de 301
l'âge romantique (Paris, 1977).
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Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 123.
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Rougemont had written that there could be no political will to reform the school because 
‘l’école, sous sa forme actuelle, remplit suffisamment son rôle politique et social, qui est de 
fabriquer des électeurs (si possible radicaux, en tout cas démocrates).’   However, in 1930, 306
the Education Department of the Canton of Neuchâtel implemented a pedagogical reform to 
allow more invention and initiative at school.   This reform showed the topicality of 307
Rougemont’s pedagogical comments, and also perhaps the futility of his political 
overstatements. 
!
In the 1930s, Switzerland was particularly challenged by the national(ist) character of 
education in neighbouring countries.   Rougemont congratulated the Swiss for taking the 308
debate with a sense of humour: it conveyed ‘une légèreté nouvelle dans l’atmosphère de ce 
pays de pédagogues’.   The debate on the link between state(s) and school(s) has been open 309
ever since; Rougemont’s interventions were particularly remarked in the 1970s.   It is worth 310
noting that even when Rougemont became a prime defender of Swiss democracy (a change 
that occurred in 1937-8, as we shall see), he continued to denounce levelling down as one of 
the downsides of democracy (not unlike Alexis de Tocqueville): ‘La Suisse n’est pas 
démocratique pour avoir tardivement aboli ce que l’on nomme les privilèges, mais pour les 
avoir étendus, dès l’origine, au plus grand nombre.’   But in the 1920s, Rougemont was still 311
far from such political understanding. He had no political commitment, nor did he seek 
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2. Continuity and rupture!
!
Having graduated from Neuchâtel University in January 1930, Rougemont was 
offered the post of secretary of a Protestant publishing house, Je Sers, to be launched in Paris 
by the Pastor Pierre Maury, whom Rougemont had met in 1929.   Ackermann has given a 313
thorough account of Rougemont’s move to Paris, as a break from his Swiss youth.   One 314
could perhaps emphasise continuity as well as rupture. In particular, two enduring themes in 
Rougemont’s literary production need to be singled out: firstly, the ‘crisis of civilisation’, 
which connects the 1920s with the 1930s, Neuchâtel with Paris, the humanities student with 
the personalist activist; secondly, the fact that Rougemont kept links with the French Swiss 
literary field when he moved to Paris. 
!
The crisis of civilisation!
!
Personalism was the response that Rougemont and others developed in the 1930s, in 
answer to ‘une crise totale de civilisation’ already patent the late 1920s. This has been 
established by Loubet del Bayle already.   It is important to extend his analysis by examining 315
the idea of ‘crisis of civilisation’. To speak of a ‘crisis of civilisation’, one has to pick a set of 
values defining ‘civilisation’, and then prove their undermining. This often involves the 
description of a mythical past, when the chosen values were best embodied. Even if we could 
agree on what constitutes Western Europe, there would be no scientific formula for evaluating 
the undermining of values. Alternatively, to avoid reference to the past, one may define the 
‘crisis of civilisation’ vis-à-vis the future. For instance, there would be ‘crisis’ when the 
civilisation in question would prove incompatible with life on earth in the long term. The 
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second approach has seemed more pertinent since the 1960s and 1970s, and Rougemont was 
instrumental in the debates on sustainable growth.   316
!
In the interwar period, however, the ‘crisis of civilisation’ was defined largely vis-à-vis 
the past, in function of a set of values usually made explicit. The dispute focused on the 
values that (had) made civilisation(s). Unsurprisingly, the categories of debate remained hazy: 
myths of the West (‘Occident’) and East (‘Orient’) were mobilised across Europe; and these 
myths were protean and sometimes contradictory, in the interwar period as today.   The 317
historian must recognise that people in 1930s Europe believed there was a crisis. In the 
aftermath of the First World War, and following the prophecies of Spengler, Keyserling, 
Hermann Hesse, and Ernst Robert Curtius, the ‘decadence’ of Western civilisation became a 
leitmotiv of much of European literature.   There were numerous other works which 318
deplored the ‘crisis of civilisation’ or the ‘decline of Western Europe’.   Rougemont and the 319
future personalists writers were but a part of an ongoing debate. 
!
From the beginning, Rougemont proved particularly drawn to the moral or spiritual 
dimensions of the ‘crisis’. Reviewing Malraux’s La Tentation de l’Occident in 1926, he 
asserted that the crisis of Western civilisation started with atheism, materialism and 
!  79
!  Rougemont, L'Avenir est notre affaire. In the late 1970s, Rougemont founded ECOROPA (ECOLOGIA-316
EUROPA). On this particular point, one may refer to Jean Jacob’s thesis (note that his interpretation of 
personalism and of the ‘non-conformistes des années trente’ is wrong, as I shall argue in Chapters 5 and 6): 
Jacob, Le retour de "L'Ordre Nouveau", 99-171.
!  For this reason, attempts to map out the debate in terms of an East vs. West divide have proved 317
oversimplifying, even within one particular country and literary culture. Gisèle Sapiro who submitted such a 
model, admitted that René Guénon (a radical critic of modern materialism who looked to the East for a perennial 
spirituality long lost in Europe; author of Orient et Occident, 1924, and La crise du monde moderne, 1927), 
cannot fit into her model (P.147-8). Therefore, she limited her demonstration to Massis, Gide, and Malraux for 
the 1920s; see Sapiro, La Guerre des écrivains, 1940-1953, 148-52.
!  See Michel Trebitsch, 'L'image de l'Orient chez les intellectuels français et allemands au lendemain de la 318
Première Guerre mondiale', in Etienne François (ed.) Marianne-Germania. Deustch-Französischer 
Kulturtransfer im europäischen Kontext (1790-1914) (Leipzig, 1998).
!  Among the works available in French at the turn of the 1930s: Norman Angell, Le chaos européen (1920); 319
Albert Demangeon, Déclin de l’Europe (1920); Oswald Spengler, Le déclin de l’Occident (1922); Nicolas 
Berdiaev, Un nouveau Moyen Age (1924); Henri Massis, Défense de l’Occident (1925); Arnold Toynbee, 
L’éclipse de l’Europe (1926); André Malraux, La tentation de l’Occident (1926); René Guénon, La crise du 
monde moderne (1927); Karl Jaspers, Situation spirituelle de notre époque (1930); Daniel Halévy, Le déclin de 
la liberté (1931); Gaston Gaillard, La fin d’un temps (1932); Hermann Keyserling, La révolution mondiale et la 
responsabilité de l’esprit (1933).
positivism.   In 1927, in the Revue de Belles-Lettres, Rougemont described the modern 320
‘crisis’ as a cluster of ‘le triomphe de la Machine’, the Russian Revolution, the First World 
War, and above all ‘la sacro-sainte Raison utilitaire au service des sacro-saints Principes au 
nom desquels tout se ligue aujourd’hui pour anéantir la seule chose qui reste à nos yeux sacro-
sainte: la liberté.’   The young Rougemont echoed the views of French writers such as 321
Emmanuel Berl and Pierre Drieu la Rochelle.    322
!
In 1928, Rougemont published an article on ‘Le péril Ford’, in the Protestant journal 
Foi et Vie.   It was banal to identify modernity with the United States, and the beginnings of 323
the rationalisation of labour in Europe made Ford a common target.   Rougemont’s central 324
argument was that materialism was leading ‘l’Occident’ towards a ‘désastre spirituel’.   His 325
ignorance of economic problems did not prevent him from criticising greed: ‘Le héros de 
l’époque, c’est l’homme qui a réussi. Mais à quoi ?’   It was the intellectuals’ role to 326
denounce the dead-end into which materialism was leading, and this implied that they end ‘le 
divorce de la pensée et de l’action’.   The themes touched upon in ‘Le péril Ford’, from 327
materialism to the divorce between thought and action, would remain at the heart of 
Rougemont’s concerns throughout his life. This is not to say (as Rougemont did in the 1970s) 
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that his article was prophetic.   The divorce between thought and action was already a 328
commonplace for the ‘generation of 1910’ (and many other generations beforehand).   329
!
In short, for Rougemont, there was a crisis of civilisation in the sense that one was 
constantly deterred from one’s own spiritual quest, due to too many materialist 
preoccupations.   Literature was one of the means by which Rougemont sought to transcend 330
his sense of the futility of utilitarian reason (‘la sacro-sainte Raison utilitaire’). In the 1930s, 
Rougemont’s literary reviews looked beyond style for the raison d’être of literature.   331
!
A Swiss writer in Paris!
!
In 1930, , Rougemont moved to Paris, the place he had been looking at throughout his 
student years as the ‘lieu où se déroulait l’Aventure de l’esprit’.   This was not a radical 332
rupture, especially since he continued to publish in Switzerland. 
!
In the 1920s, the book market in French Switzerland was suffering from the increasing 
cost of paper and printing and the near impossibility of exporting Swiss production to 
neighbour countries touched by devaluation.   This climate encouraged several French Swiss 333
publishers to move to Paris.   Therefore, there is nothing surprising in Pierre Maury’s 334
decision to start his Editions Je Sers in Paris. As for Rougemont, securing a job in publishing 
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allowed him to move to Paris, and to remain dedicating to writing whilst avoiding mainstream 
journalism.  
!
The move to Paris – from the provinces or in Rougemont’s case from abroad – did not 
always help literary success. It was tempting to seek fame through polemics. Provincial 
writers were a major recruitment pool for right-wing movements like the Action Française.  335
Robert Brasillach remembered his ignorance of the Parisian literary game when he moved to 
Paris.   Rougemont, by contrast, was already publishing in famous journals. He was well 336
aware of the rules of the NRF, and thus avoided the mistakes that less informed writers were 
prone to make. 
!
From the late 1920s onwards, Rougemont did not write in defence of a particular 
aesthetic, but according to a view that combined attachment to (Protestant) morality with 
admiration for the style of the new literary schools (especially the surrealists and NRF 
writers).   One of Rougemont’s lifelong concern was to keep a safe distance from the various 337
poles of the literary field.   This implied a certain intellectual asceticism. In 1933, when ‘Je 338
Sers’ went bankrupt and he was sacked, he preferred to move away from Paris and remain 
unemployed rather than to ‘give in’ journalism. 
!
Whilst Rougemont moved to Paris, some of his Swiss friends reacted to French 
cultural centralism, and in particular to the imposition of ‘l’esprit français’ as a category of 
debate. In L’Esprit de Genève (1929), Robert de Traz depicted Geneva, and not Paris, as the 
cultural centre of Europe.   The young Swiss writers Pierre Beausire and Daniel Simond 339
proved more rebellious in their polemical essay D’un certain esprit français (1930), published 
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in the same collection as Rougemont’s Méfaits.   Rougemont reviewed their tract in 340
Aujourd’hui, a determinedly French Swiss weekly edited by Ramuz.   He put forth a 341
disillusioned view on the French literary field and the futility of its quarrels ‘où tout le monde 
exagère, à qui mieux mieux dans le sens de la médiocrité française’.   Like Beausire and 342
Simond, he condemned Barrès, Maurras, and the surrealists.   Rougemont delivered sharp 343
criticism: ‘En France, hélas ! une logique verbale et le clair génie que l’on sait se chargent de 
tout réduire à la raison, y compris la Révolution, thème rhétorique, y compris la Religion, 
thème catholique.’   Rougemont echoed these attacks in the NRF, more mildly. 344
!
For instance, Georges Duhamel, an established French essayist, embodied 
‘l’expression traditionnelle de la mauvaise humeur gauloise, héritage d’un classicisme 
nettement pessimiste’.   After his move to Paris, Rougemont kept an activity, albeit limited, 345
in the Swiss avant-garde journals (Les Cahiers de l’Anglore, Aujourd’hui and Les Nouveaux 
Cahiers), which revived a literary and typographic avant-garde based on the model of 
Ramuz’s Cahiers vaudois.   In 1930, Rougemont was instrumental in the launching of Les 346
Cahiers de l’Anglore, with a group of young writers from the Zofingue student society of 
Geneva.   In 1932, he published in Lausanne Le Paysan du Danube, a collection of travel 347
chronicles and a journal written during his stays abroad in Austria, Hungary and Germany in 
!  83
!  Pierre Beausire and Daniel Simond, D’un certain esprit français (Lausanne, Petites Lettres de Lausanne, 340
1930); reviewed in Denis de Rougemont, 'Au sujet d'un certain esprit français', Aujourd'hui, 22 (1 May 1930), 4.
!  Aujourd’hui was financed by Henry-Louis Mermod and directed by Ramuz, with the help of Gustave Roud 341
(Dec. 1929-31), see Fornerod and Francillon, 'La vie culturelle en Suisse romande de la Belle Epoque à 1939’, 
244-5.
!  Rougemont, 'Au sujet d'un certain esprit français', 4.342
!  Rougemont, 'Au sujet d'un certain esprit français', 4.343
!  Rougemont, 'Au sujet d'un certain esprit français', 4.344
!  ‘Sujet de pastiche facile : décrire l’état d’esprit du Français moyen qui brandit son parapluie sous le nez de 345
l’agent, invective les automobilistes, déclame au beau milieu de la chaussée des tirades généreusement 
libertaires, enraye la circulation, « mais traverse dans les clous ».’ Denis de Rougemont, '"Querelles de famille" 
par Georges Duhamel', La Nouvelle Revue française, 224, 914-15.
!  Roth and Vallotton, 'L'édition en Suisse romande de 1920 à 1970’, 27.346
!  The group included: Pierre Ablaret, Paul-Georges Chevalley, Emile Duperrex, René Naville, Ernest Rogivue, 347
Alec Thomas, Max-Marc Thomas, and Denis de Rougemont, see Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une 
biographie intellectuelle, 1, 133. See Fornerod and Francillon, 'La vie culturelle en Suisse romande de la Belle 
Epoque à 1939’, 245. Rougemont published a poem and an article on the dangers of introspection for a writer: 
Denis de Rougemont, 'Miroirs (ou comment on perd Eurydice et soi-même)', Les Cahiers de l'Anglore, 1 
(January 1930).
the late 1920s, and then in Paris from 1930.   Hence, the description of Rougemont as being 348
more Parisian than the French is imbalanced.   349
!
Thus, the most important change was not moving to Paris in 1930. It was the fact that 
the circles in which he moved were no longer interested in literature as such. By 1932, 
Rougemont was embarrassed by his romantic enthusiasm in Le Paysan du Danube. He wrote 
to his editor: ‘je crains que mes amis, tant calvinistes-barthiens que révolutionnaires, ne 
trouvent ce petit recueil bien frivole et réactionnaire...’   Calvinist-Barthian and 350
revolutionary circles had become the centres of Rougemont’s activities. His concerns were 
more and more ‘revolutionary’ and ‘existential’. 
!
!
3. Revolution and existence!
!
Rougemont’s Protestant commitment, already clear in the 1920s, developed from 1930 
onwards, as Rougemont broke with liberal Protestantism, and followed the Barthian 
theological revolution. In the light of unpublished material, this section underlines the 
significance of Rougemont’s contribution to intellectual history at the turn of the 1930s, when 
the French personalists coalesced into identifiable groups. This contribution was both 
theological and philosophical, with the introduction of Barth and of Kierkegaard in France. 
!
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!  Rougemont, Le Paysan du Danube; Denis de Rougemont, 'Un soir à Vienne avec Gérard', La nouvelle 348
semaine artistique et littéraire, 7 (24 March 1928); Denis de Rougemont, 'Voyage en Hongrie I', Bibliothèque 
Universelle et Revue de Genève (October 1930); Denis de Rougemont, 'Voyage en Hongrie II', Bibliothèque 
Universelle et Revue de Genève (November 1930). I refer to Ackermann for an analysis of these literary pieces: 
Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 135-51.
!  E.g. the historian Henri-Irénée Marrou, another personalist, addressed Rougemont in the following terms: 349
‘Nous avons depuis longtemps édifié toute une métaphysique […] sur votre présence savoureuse, à vous Suisses 
Romands, dans la culture française. […] Vous êtes brachycéphale, brun, vous avez tout du celte ; que dis-je, vous 
n’êtes pas seulement le plus français, mais le plus parisien de nous tous. Il n’est pas jusqu’au nom sous lequel 
l’histoire vous a fait naître qui n’ait l’air d’un pseudonyme balzacien, tout à fait dans la tradition du Boulevard 
romantique.’ in Henri Davenson, 'Parler d'amour', Esprit, 79 (Apr. 1939), 71-2. The emphasis is mine.
!  Rougemont to Sven Stelling-Michaud, 11 May 1932, quoted in Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une 350
biographie intellectuelle, 1, 151. 
The Barthian theological revolution!
!
It is crucial, in order to understand Rougemont’s contribution to intellectual and 
cultural history, to give a concise account of the Barthian theological ‘revolution’ in the early 
to mid-1930s. This section anticipates on the chronology, in order to set the scene for the 
study of Rougemont’s personalism that follows. 
!
Rougemont was at the heart of the ‘Barthian revolution’ in France and French 
Switzerland.   Ackermann has described how Rougemont came to be involved in the 351
Calvinist-Barthian circle in France.   What Barth emphasised, following St Paul, was that 352
Christ alone has the fullest knowledge of God, and one participates in His knowledge through 
faith. The object of introducing Karl Barth to French speaking Protestants, theologians and 
philosophers was one of the main reasons for Rougemont’s move to Paris in 1930.  
!
In 1932, Rougemont, Henry Corbin, Roland de Pury, Albert-Marie Schmidt, and 
Roger Jézéquel (alias Roger Breuil), who were in their mid-twenties, launched a small 
Protestant journal, Hic et Nunc, with the support of the Pastor Pierre Maury. Hic et Nunc was 
published irregularly between November 1932 and January 1936,   with a circulation around 353
four hundred copies.   Despite being a small publication, Hic et Nunc has rightly been given 354
importance in the history of Protestant intellectuals as the first offensive of the Barthian 
theological revolution in France, as well as the expression of a Protestant ‘non-conformisme 
des années trente’.   Rougemont, in charge of the practicalities, was the motor of the 355
!  85
!  On Barth in French, see the excellent analysis of Bernard Reymond, Théologien ou prophète. Les 351
francophones et Karl Barth avant 1945 (Lausanne, 1985).
!  See Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 153-88.352
!  There were nine issues in total (or eleven issues in the numbering: issues 3-4 (July 1933) and 9-10 (May 353
1935) were double).
!  This number is based on the bill for the printing of the first issue of Hic et Nunc, by the Imprimerie A. 354
Coueslant in Cahors, in the South-West of France – the biggest business in Cahors, with 150 workers in 1928, 
under the direction of a Huguenot entrepreneur, Auguste Coueslant (1868-1943). See bills in Rougemont’s 
papers, Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, file ‘Hic et Nunc, I’. Reymond gave the number of 
eight hundred copies, in Reymond, Théologien ou prophète. Les francophones et Karl Barth avant 1945, 176.
!  See Arnaud Baubérot, 'La revue Hic et Nunc: Les jeunes-turcs du protestantisme et l'esprit des années trente', 355
Bulletin de la société de l'histoire du protestantisme français, 149 (July-Aug.-Sept.).
project.   From the start, Rougemont saw his contribution to Hic et Nunc as political.   He 356 357
was aware that, strictly speaking, he was not a theologian. For this reason he could never be a 
strict Barthian. He was far too interested in literature, as well as in the moral questions raised 
by militant atheism.  
!
At the turn of the 1930s, Rougemont became concerned with militant atheism, in 
particular the type of anti-religious stance intrinsic to communism. He got involved in a 
Protestant-Orthodox network of discussion on ‘l’athéisme international’, in the Parisian 
suburb of Issy-les-Moulineaux, where he was secretary to the Editions Je Sers. The backer of 
Je Sers, Hubert de Montbrisson, edited the weekly Demain? – subtitled ‘Bulletin mensuel 
d’information non politique concernant: les mouvements religieux, l’athéisme international, 
l’antireligion en URSS, “les forces nouvelles”’.   The editorial board included two Russian 358
Orthodox émigrés (Professor N.N. Alexeiev   and N.A. Klépinine) and four Protestants: 359
Hubert de Montbrisson, Henri Lauga (the managing editor of Je Sers), the future Pastor 
Emmanuel La Gravière, and Denis de Rougemont. This publication, which has never been the 
object of historical scrutiny, is an early ecumenical endeavour to give a religious answer to 
international ‘problems’: 
Le but de nos Bulletins est la défense de la Foi devant l’athéisme militant […]. Sur les 
feuillets de nos bulletins paraîtront côte à côte, les informations concernant l’athéisme 
militant et des renseignements sur tous les efforts créateurs tendant à « transfigurer », 
dans un esprit religieux, une situation du monde qui pose devant nos consciences de 
profonds et tragiques problèmes.   360
  
In 1932, the chief target of the publication was international communism. Russian 
émigrés were instrumental in denouncing religious persecutions in the Soviet Union, as well 
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!  For example, he drafted a prospectus for the launching of Hic et Nunc, which was to be distributed to some 356
2000 subscribers of Foi et Vie and sponsors of the Je Sers publishing house. See manuscript notes and prospectus 
by Rougemont, Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, file ‘Hic et Nunc, I’.
!  His contribution is defined in political terms in the prospectus quoted above.357
!  See Demain?, 12-13 (March-Apr. 1933), 1. Demain was printed in Issy-les-Moulineaux, at the same address 358
as the Editions Je Sers.
!  Russian émigré, Professor of Orthodox Theology at the Saint Sergius Institute.359
!  ‘Avertissement’, Demains, 8-9 (Nov.-Dec. 1932), 3.360
as the intrinsic anti-religious aim of the Communist Manifesto.   Rougemont was convinced, 361
in January 1932, that the opposition between Marxism and Christianity was ‘le dilemme 
urgent de l’heure’.   This sense of urgency  would motivate his unwavering anti-362
communism.    363
!
Rougemont’s first article in Hic et Nunc started with a denunciation of politico-
theological ‘hérésies’.   He argued forcefully that no abstract ‘god’ (whether the ‘Nation’, the 364
‘State’, or the ‘Class’) could ever be invoked to justify the altogether too real deaths of people 
(in war in particular): ‘Le dieu-nation respire la bonne odeur d’onze millions de morts 
sacrifiés en quatre ans à sa gloire. Moins redoutable, en apparence, le dieu-production se 
contente des macérations de 70 millions de chômeurs, et de super-holocaustes annuels de blé, 
de coton et d’obus.’   Rougemont’s conclusion gave ‘la seule attitude politique que puisse 365
adopter le protestant’: ‘la politique du pessimisme actif, – ou si l’on veut de l’activisme sans 
illusions.’   ‘Active pessimism’ would become his lifelong motto.   Rougemont held that 366 367
disillusion as to the value of the result – if not the act itself – was the best incentive to action. 
This position was consistent with Kierkegaard’s conception of faith as subjective self-
commitment maintained in the face of intellectual uncertainty or paradox, and this is why 
Rougemont thought that ‘active pessimism’ was fundamentally a Protestant attitude. 
!
!  87
!  On this, see Gareth Stedman Jones’s recent introduction to Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist 361
Manifesto (London, 2002), 1-187.
!  Denis de Rougemont, '"Les signes parmi nous" par C.F. Ramuz', La Nouvelle Revue française, 220 (Jan. 362
1932), 144.
!  Rougemont’s analysis was enlarged to ‘totalitarian’ regimes in 1934-5, as we shall see in Chapter 6, and it 363
underlies Rougemont’s keen involvement in the Congress for Cultural Freedom, and the significant, if 
controversial, role he played in Cold War politics. See Pierre Grémion, Intelligence de l'anticommunisme. Le 
Congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris 1950-1975 (Paris, 1995).
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'Principe d'une politique du pessimisme actif', Hic et Nunc, 1 (Nov. 1932), 24-8.364
!  Rougemont, 'Principe d'une politique du pessimisme actif', 28.365
!  Rougemont, 'Principe d'une politique du pessimisme actif', 27.366
!  This was also the motto of William of Orange or William the Silent (1533-84): ‘One need not hope in order to 367
undertake; nor succeed in order to persevere’ (‘Point n’est besoin d’espérer pour entreprendre, ni de réussir pour 
persévérer’). 
In the following issues of Hic et Nunc, Rougemont wrote humorous notes, as well as 
serious articles on Barth.   Hic et Nunc was provocative, thereby allowing young authors to 368
gain notoriety rapidly, but also contributing to revitalize the theological scene of French 
Protestantism.   It was through the publicity Hic et Nunc made for it that dialectical theology 369
became known in France. 
!
Rougemont was instrumental in the translation and publication of Karl Barth in 
French, through the Editions Je Sers.   In 1934-5, Rougemont worked on the translation of 370
the first volume of Barth’s Kirchliche Dogmatik, with Pierre Maury. Although Rougemont 
completed the translation of volume I.1, it was never published as such because Maury was 
not satisfied with it.   The German used by Barth is notoriously difficult; one may surmise 371
that Rougemont’s literary inclinations did not do justice to Barth’s theological preciseness. 
Volume I, 1 of the Kirchliche Dogmatik stated that the criterion for dogmatics was the Word 
of God.   This was a radical theological statement, which ruled out the possibility of 372
theologising from a philosophical, or speculative standpoint. Writing in Hic et Nunc at the 
time when he was translating Barth, Rougemont asserted that dialectical theology could be an 
instrument for interpreting Kierkegaard (his main source of inspiration, as I shall argue), and 
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!  For his most ‘Barthian’ article, see Denis de Rougemont, 'Dialectique des fins dernières', Hic et Nunc, 3-4. 368
See also the humorous ‘Vocabulaire’ section, which recalls Flaubert’s Dictionnaire des idées reçues and Léon 
Bloy’s Exégèse des lieux communs. For a brief analysis of Rougemont’s contribution to French Protestant 
thought in Hic et Nunc, see Reymond, Théologien ou prophète. Les francophones et Karl Barth avant 1945, 
70-3. For more quotations, see Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 222-47.
!  On the relative intellectual lethargy of Protestant theology in the 1920s, see Patrick Harismendy, ‘Les 369
intellectuels protestants français dans les années 20’, in Pierre Colin (ed.) Intellectuels chrétiens et esprit des 
années vingt (Paris, 1997), 64-5. See also, on the largest Protestant movement in 1930s France and one of the 
chief targets of Barthians, Jean Baubérot, 'Le Christianisme social français de 1882 à 1940: évolution et 
problèmes (suite et fin)', Revue d'histoire et de philosophie religieuses, LXVII, 2 (Apr.-June 1987), 163-79.
!  Je Sers published Karl Barth, Credo (Translated by Pierre Jundt and Jean Jundt, Ecrivains religieux 370
contemporains. Paris/ Geneva, 1936); Karl Barth, Le Culte raisonnable (Translated by Pierre Maury, Roland de 
Pury, and Jean Bosc, Ecrivains religieux étrangers. Paris, 1934); Karl Barth, Parole de Dieu et Parole humaine 
(Translated by Pierre Maury and Auguste Lavanchy. Paris, 1933). The last book was published with Labor et 
Fides in Geneva, after the bankruptcy of Je Sers.
!  After the war, Rougemont’s work, revised by Maury and F. Ryser, was used for the first two booklets of Karl 371
Barth, Dogmatique (transl. F. Ryser, Genève, 1953). On Rougemont’s translation, see Ackermann, Denis de 
Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 400-1; Karl Barth and Pierre Maury, Nous qui pouvons encore 
parler... Correspondance 1928-1956 (Translated by Bernard Reymond. Lausanne, 1985), 69 (esp. Reymond’s 
notes p.69n.132 and p.201n.487).
!  Although Barth insisted that it can never be the case that the Word of God is confined to the proclamation of 372
the Church, in a famous passage: ‘God may speak to us through Russian Communism, a flute concerto, a 
blossoming shrub, or a dead dog. We do well to listen to Him if He really does.’ Karl Barth, Church dogmatics, I. 
The docrine of the word of God (Translated by G.W. Bromiley. vol. 1. Edinburgh, 1975), 55.
for correcting ‘le mouvement naturel et perverti de nos pensées’.   Barth provided 373
Rougemont with an interpretative framework to read Kierkegaard, and Rougemont was able 
to draw on dialectical theology without being a theologian in the strict sense. 
!
Rougemont debated dialectical theology with the circle of young pastors and 
Protestant writers gathered by Pierre Maury.   Rougemont also worked on the classical texts 374
of Protestantism: he translated Luther’s De servo arbitrio, claiming to use Calvin’s style, 
which he much admired.   The book – particularly topical in Rougemont’s view – was 375
published in 1937, with a preface by André Jundt, the French specialist on Lutheran 
dogmatics.   Throughout the 1930s, Rougemont published in French and French Swiss 376
Protestant journals (Foi et Vie, Le Semeur and Cahiers Protestants), and he gave lectures in 
French and French Swiss Protestant conferences, youth gatherings and round tables. This 
suggests how integrated and active Rougemont was in European Protestantism.   377
!
Most of the sympathisers of Barth in France before 1945 came to dialectical theology 
for pastoral reasons.   Rougemont and Henry Corbin – who were close friends – were the 378
two important exceptions to this rule: they found in Barth the answer to intellectual, if 
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!  Denis de Rougemont, 'Les trois temps de la parole', Hic et Nunc, 9-10 (May 1935), 152-8. Page 153, 373
Rougemont wrote: ‘entre le Christ et nous, il n’y a pas 19 siècles ; mais une éternité ; il n’y a pas une certaine 
quantité de temps et d’histoire, mais l’abîme absolu d’une différence de qualité ; il n’y a pas une distance, mais 
une rupture – notre péché.’ I shall come back to Rougemont’s conception of history in Chapter 7.
!  See esp. Maury’s description of fruitful theological discussions with Rougemont’s friends (Maury to Karl 374
Barth, 23 April 1934), in Barth and Maury, Nous qui pouvons encore parler... Correspondance 1928-1956, 58.
!  See esp. his preface in Martin Luther, Traité du serf arbitre (Translated by Denis de Rougemont. Paris, 375
Genève, 1937).
!  André Jundt (1877-1947) had written his doctoral thesis on Le Développement de la pensée religieuse de 376
Luther jusqu’en 1517 (Paris, 1905), and taught Lutheran dogmatics at the Faculty of Protestant Theology of 
Paris between 1929 and 1943.
!  See the analysis of Rougemont’s Protestant connections and the chapter: ‘L’intellectuel et la chrétienté’, in 377
Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 222-47, 377-405.
!  Reymond, Théologien ou prophète. Les francophones et Karl Barth avant 1945, 75.378
‘existential’, questions.   Corbin was an early translator of Heidegger and of Sufi mystics 379
into French. Together with Rougemont, he played a significant role in making dialectical 
theology known in philosophical circles. Both Corbin and Rougemont developed a selective 
reading of Barth. They grew increasingly critical of the ‘narrow-mindedness’ of Barthians, 
who seemed concerned with theology and nothing else. This is very little known and will 
receive fuller consideration in my final chapter. Suffice it to say here that Rougemont would 
never limit his writings to theological questions; he was never an orthodox Barthian.  
!
It is worth noting that Barth avoided using the term ‘person’ in his dogmatics. Whereas 
Barth explicitly rejected the very term ‘person’ (even in the doctrine of the Trinity), 
Rougemont would come to use Barth as a complement to personalism.   Like Barth, he 380
interpreted and appropriated Kierkegaard’s philosophy of existence. 
!
A philosophy of existence!
!
As early as October 1931, Rougemont called for a philosophy of personal existence: 
‘Si l’existence – le degré d’être – se mesure au pouvoir d’incarner sa vérité, le mal du siècle 
c’est l’impuissance […] c’est d’une philosophie de l’existence personnelle qu’avant tout nous 
avons besoin.’   To incarnate one’s own truth and to develop a philosophy of personal 381
existence, Rougemont called on Søren Kierkegaard, on ‘Karl Barth, génial disciple du 
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!  To illustrate their friendship, see the dedication: ‘Pour mon vieil ami Denis de Rougemont ceci, attestant nos 379
années d' "existence" ensemble ! Très fraternellement, Henry Corbin’, in BPUN, Fonds Rougemont, 21R C33 : 
Martin Heidegger, Qu'est-ce que la métaphysique? Suivi d'extraits sur l'être et le temps et d'une conférence sur 
Hölderlin (Translated by Henry Corbin, Les Essais. vol. VII. Paris, 1938). Also: ‘A Cigogne [nickname of 
Rougemont’s first wife Simone] et Denis de Rougemont leur ami, qui persiste en Suhrawardî, Henry Corbin’, in 
BPUN, Fonds Rougemont, 21R DD2 : Henry Corbin, 'Suhrawardî d’Alep (+ 1191) fondateur de la doctrine 
illuminative (ishrâqî)', Publications de la société des études iraniennes, 16 (1939).
!  For example, Rougemont commented Barth’s article (in Foi et vie, (August-Oct. 1936), 495-6) as follows: 380
‘Ce qu’il dit de l’expression « Fils de Dieu » (unique) permettant les expressions « enfants » et « fils de Dieu » 
particulières et innombrables vaut aussi pour Personne (Incarnation) et personnes (incarnation).’, Manuscript 
note: ‘Personnalisme et christianisme’, Neuchâtel, BPUN, Rougemont papers, File: ‘I. 3, Politique de la 
personne, 1934’.
!  Denis de Rougemont, '"Les éléments de la grandeur humaine", par Rudolf Kassner', La Nouvelle Revue 381
française, 217 (Oct. 1931), 640.
Danois’, as well as on Nietzsche.   Rougemont was one of the first French-speaking writers 382
to mention Kierkegaard’s philosophy of existence. This is one of Rougemont’s little known 
contributions to intellectual history. 
!
In January 1932, Rougemont claimed that a philosophy of existence was incompatible 
with Marxism. Communism may have been a generous idea, but it remained a brutal theory. 
Rougemont explained why in the new French Swiss avant-garde journal Présence.   The 383
discourse about building socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, meant the death of 
independent thought: ‘réaliser une pensée, ce n’est pas la « mettre à exécution », – la 
condamner à mort, autant dire, et l’extirper de son être, fût-ce pour l’introduire dans 
l’Histoire. Mais c’est au contraire devenir cette idée.’   Rougemont’s article, significantly 384
entitled ‘Penser avec les mains’, gave the lineaments of what eventually became a chief 
personalist essay.   385
!
From 1932, Rougemont played a role (which remains unclear) in the translation of 
Kierkegaard by the Franco-Danish Association in Paris.   An acknowledgement of 1942 386
mentions, ‘depuis 1932’, the support of the Rask-Oersted fund and the Franco-Danish 
Association, ‘qui, sous la direction et sur l’initiative de Robert de Traz, André Babelon et 
Denis de Rougemont, avait décidé d’entreprendre une publication collective des œuvres de 
Sören Kierkegaard’.    387
!
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!  Rougemont, '"Les éléments de la grandeur humaine", par Rudolf Kassner', 640-3; Denis de Rougemont, 382
'"Eloge de l'imprudence" par Marcel Jouhandeau', La Nouvelle Revue française, 228 (Sept. 32), 442-4.
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'Penser avec les mains (fragments)', Présence, 1 (Jan. 1932), 37-41. Présence was 383
edited by Gilbert Trolliet, a contemporary of Rougemont, between 1932 and 1936.
!  Rougemont, 'Penser avec les mains (fragments)', 40. The emphasis is Rougemont’s.384
!  Denis de Rougemont, Penser avec les mains (1st edn. Paris, 1936).385
!  The Franco-Danish association had been founded in 1918 by André Honnorat (1868-1950), a French 386
politician famous for passing laws that allowed the reduction of tuberculosis in France (esp. 1914-19). I have not 
been able to locate its archives.
!  Quote from Ou bien…Ou bien… (Paris, 1942), XIX, in Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie 387
intellectuelle, 1, 377.
According to Bruno Ackermann, Rougemont was not primarily concerned with 
Kierkegaard as a philosopher.   Admittedly, Rougemont used Kierkergaard as a guide for 388
Christian action, and this Protestant reading of Kierkegaard is what distinguishes his 
interpretation from those of other French philosophers, such as Jean Wahl for example.   But 389
it is also important to note that Rougemont understood the philosophical significance of 
Kierkegaard. For instance, in his article in Présence, Rougemont referred to Kierkegaard’s 
Concluding unscientific postscript to philosophical fragments, then still unknown in 
French.   His presentation allowed different interpretations: ‘l’incarnation de la pensée’ 390
meant to live by simple principles, whether secular or the words of the Gospel.    391
!
In the following years, Rougemont used Kierkegaard to counteract Hegelian 
philosophy (which was to become central in French philosophy in the 1930s, following 
Alexandre Kojève’s seminar at the Sorbonne between 1933 and 1939) and to promote 
personalism. Rougemont’s Protestant reading of Kierkegaard is an early manifestation of a 
philosophy of existence in France and French Switzerland, which has since been 
overshadowed by subsequent French existentialisms. 
!
!
In short, this chapter has painted the portrait of the young Rougemont as a Swiss 
Protestant writer. Surprisingly well integrated in the Swiss and Parisian literary fields, 
considering his age and lack of family connections, Rougemont stood out as one of the most 
promising young writers with spiritual concerns at the end of the 1930s. His political 
commitment came after literary and moral or ‘existential’ preoccupations. As Rougemont 
himself admitted towards the end of his life: 
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!  See his analysis in Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 377-84.388
!  Jean Wahl (1888-1974), philosopher and poet, professor at the Sorbonne from 1936, became one of the most 389
influential philosophers in France after the war. He was instrumental in establishing Kierkegaard as the father of 
existentialism. See the articles and conferences from the 1930s to the 1960s, published as Jean Wahl, 
Kierkegaard, L'un devant l'autre (1998).
!  In those years, Rougemont read and annotated a compilation of Kierkegaard’s text in German, see his copy of 390
Sören Kierkegaard, Religion der Tat, Sein Werk in Auswahl (Translated by Eduard Geismar. Leipzig, 1930). In 
Bibliothèque Publique et Universtaire de Neuchâtel, 21R C66. Ten years later, Concluding unscientific postscript 
to philosophical fragments would come out in French: Søren Kierkegaard, Post-scriptum aux miettes 
philosophiques (Translated by Paul Petit. Paris, 1941).
!  Rougemont, 'Penser avec les mains (fragments)', 40.391
Au fond de moi-même je me définis avant tout comme un écrivain. [...] C’était tout 
naturel pour moi de passer de l’écriture littéraire à l’écriture littéraire au service d’une 
cause, en restant parfaitement libre. […] J’estime que c’est le devoir absolu d’un 
écrivain de représenter l’esprit critique. Je crois que ce n’est pas du tout trahir ma 
vocation littéraire […] mais c’est simplement la faire servir à l’intérêt général.   392!
In this way, Rougemont went from literature to literature at the service of a 
revolutionary cause. Rougemont may have aspired to philosophy of existence and to political 
theory, but he continued to write in the mode of belles-lettres. His commitment as a mediator 
between the personalist movements and the literary avant-garde followed on from his 




!  Denis de Rougemont, oral interview [early 1980s], in radio broadcast by Nancy Ipsilantis, ‘Profil Perdu, 392
Denis de Rougemont, 1906-1985’, Co-Production France Culture et Radio Suisse Romande Espace 2, second 
part, 25 March 1993, 6.30-7.30 pm. In Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, Ferme de Dorigny, Lausanne.
!
Chapter 3. Pluralisation of personalism!!
!
!
In the 1930s, France was the scene of a permanent ‘pluralisation of personalism’, in Thomas 
Keller’s words.   Personalism began as the ON doctrine, Esprit followed two or three years 393
later, and then some Esprit groups continued the process of diversification of personalism. 
This sequence is still not established firmly. It remains difficult to establish because 
Emmanuel Mounier (and Esprit in general) did not acknowledge his indebtedness to ON. 
After officially breaking from ON in 1934, he let the rumour develop that he was the inventor 
of personalism in France. 
!
The present chapter outlines the stages of development of personalism(s) in France, 
and thereby invalidates definitively the cliché that personalism was invented by a young 
generation of Catholic thinkers in France. At first, personalism coincided with the formation 
of the ON group, up to 1934, when Esprit started to develop a personalism of its own, and 
when other types of personalism also began to emerge in France. The events of February 1934 
mark a turning-point for French personalism (as for French politics in general). Following the 
events, Esprit turned towards the left, while ON kept its ‘neither right nor left’ line. The 
importance of the split of 1934 should not be overestimated, however: there were tensions 
between Esprit and ON before, and contacts were maintained afterwards. The study of 
Rougemont as a mediator allows to understand the complexity and nuances in the relations 
between the various personalist groups. Through Rougemont, it is possible to examine four 
different types of ‘French’ personalism. 
!
!
1. Ordre Nouveau and the origins of personalism!
!
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!  ‘Die Pluralisierung des Personalismus’ in Keller, Deutsch-französische Dritte-Weg-Diskurse, 11, 343-89. 393
Transl. Christian Roy.
The ON group, which took shape between 1931 and 1932, was the first to formulate a 
personalist doctrine in France, in the journal Plans, at a time when Esprit was only a vague 
idea. Focussing on the adhesion of Denis de Rougemont to the ON group, my research shows 
how ON was neither formally organised nor cohesive before 1933. 
!
The shaping of the Ordre Nouveau group (1930-1932)!
!
At the turn of the 1930s, Rougemont and the future personalists were looking for a 
platform to voice spiritual and moral concerns regarding contemporary issues.   Christian 394
Roy has shown that ON was born of Alexandre Marc’s desire to combine two of his activities: 
political activism for European unity and world peace, on the one hand, and ecumenical 
discussions between dedicated Catholic and Orthodox Christians (Protestants would join 
later), on the other.   Some of the most prominent theologians of the time participated to the 395
ecumenical discussions in Paris.    396
!
The core of the ON group consisted of Marc’s personal contacts from Sciences Po 
(where he had been a student) and from the ecumenical discussion group.   Robert Aron and 397
Arnaud Dandieu joined the discussions in February 1931.   The circumstances in which 398
!  95
!  Rougemont, Journal d'une époque, 93.394
!  Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 23-211.395
!  From the Catholic side, regular attendants included the abbé Daniel Lallemant and the philosopher Gabriel 396
Marcel, and it seems that Henri de Lubac, who was to play a key role in Vatican II, also participated. The 
Orthodox were represented by Father Lev Gillet (a former French Benedictine monk who signed ‘Un moine de 
l’Eglise d’Orient’), Eugraphe Kovalevski (who would launch a controversial Eglise Catholique Orthodoxe de 
France after the war), as well as the Russian religious thinkers Sergii Bulgakov and Nikolai Berdiaev. There 
were no Protestants in the first series of meetings. Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 41-3, 103-4.
!  They also included some of the former ‘Amis du Sohlberg’. On the Sohlberg, see above and Rita Thalmann, 397
‘Du cercle du Sohlberg au comité France-Allemagne: une évolution ambiguë de la coopération franco-
allemande’, in Bock, Meyer-Kalkus, and Trebitsch (eds), Entre Locarno et Vichy, 67-8.
!  See esp. Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 48.398
Rougemont first met Marc remain unclear.   Rougemont remembered reading an ON 399
manifesto (written by Marc) in the salon of Charles du Bos at Versailles, and being struck by 
the expression: ‘NI INDIVIDUALISTES NI COLLECTIVISTES, NOUS SOMMES PERSONNALISTES!’  400
Rougemont overemphasised ‘personalism’ in his recollection (it was only one slogan among 
many).   The ON motto already appeared, however: ‘SPIRITUEL D’ABORD, ÉCONOMIQUE 401
ENSUITE, POLITIQUE À LEUR SERVICE’.   402
!
In the Spring of 1931, as Marc circulated the ON manifesto, the ‘Centre d’études de 
l’Ordre Nouveau’ started to organise discussions on topical issues. The discussions were held 
at the home of a participant, and did not imply any form of commitment.   Rougemont’s 403
correspondence allows to trace back the circumstances in which he became acquainted with 
the ON as a group. On 5 June 1931, Rougemont wrote a professional letter to Marc (regarding 
the edition of a French translation of Kierkegaard by the Editions Je Sers) and concluded 
expressing a personal interest in the Ordre Nouveau: ‘Je serais, d’autre part, personnellement 
très content de vous revoir et de reparler de vos projets concernant "L’Ordre Nouveau".’   In 404
a post-scriptum, he added that he had received an invitation to the ON meeting the following 
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!  Rougemont remembered meeting Alexandre Marc for the first time at the literary salon of Charles du Bos in 399
Versailles, where Marc showed him the first manifesto of ON. Rougemont, Journal d'une époque, 93. Marc 
remembered having first met Rougemont in the context of an ecumenical discussion: ‘ayant cherché un jeune 
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Denis de Rougemont.’ Alexandre Marc, 'Rougemont fantassin de l'idée européenne', Le Journal de Genève, (10 
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protestant d’origine ouvrière, André Moosmann, et du pasteur Max Dominicé (alors, en poste à Belleville)’. 
Marc, 'Vers une lumière qui ne s'éteint jamais', 64.
!  Rougemont, Journal d'une époque, 93.400
!  ‘TRADITIONALISTES mais NON CONSERVATEURS, RÉALISTES, mais NON OPPORTUNISTES, RÉVOLUTIONNAIRES, 401
mais NON RÉVOLTÉS, CONSTRUCTEURS, mais NON DESTRUCTEURS, ni BELLICISTES, ni PACIFISTES, PATRIOTES, 
mais NON NATIONALISTES, SOCIALISTES, mais NON MATÉRIALISTES, PERSONNALISTES, mais NON ANARCHISTES, 
HUMAINS, mais NON HUMANITAIRES.’, The manifesto, entitled ‘Ordre Nouveau – Appel’, was dated 31 March 
1931, quoted in Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 45-7. The same series of slogans defining the ON was 
published in 'L'Action. I. "L'Ordre Nouveau"', Plans, 9 (Nov. 1931).
!  ON manifesto, quoted in Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 47. The same series of slogans defining 402
the ON was published in 'L'Action. I. "L'Ordre Nouveau"'. See analysis in Chapter 5.
!  A summary of these early discussions is given by Christian Roy, on the basis of Marc’s diaries, see Roy, 403
Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 195-210.
!  Rougemont to Marc, 5 June 1931, quoted in Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 44.404
Monday (8 June 1931).   Rougemont’s letter dates his first participation in ON discussions 405
from June 1931.  
!
His involvement became concrete a year later, as he gathered contributions for the 
‘Cahier de revendications’ of ‘revolutionary youth’, published by La Nouvelle Revue 
Française (NRF).   Rougemont then acted as a mediator between the famous literary 406
institution and ON writers. 
!
Correspondence regarding the NRF project shows that, in 1932, it was unclear who 
was a full ON member and who was simply attending discussions organised by the ON group. 
The ambience of this embryonic yet decidedly revolutionary grouping was tense, as letters to 
Rougemont suggest. On 9 November 1932, Daniel-Rops wrote to Jacques Naville, who was 
officially president of ON, to complain that he had not been asked to write for NRF as other 
ON members.   His letter points at the lack of trust and communication among the early ON 407
group. Writing again to Rougemont on 13 November, Daniel-Rops emphasised Rougemont’s 
recent involvement in ON (he called Rougemont the ‘dernier venu au groupe’), and blamed 
the other members for not saying a word to him about their articles for NRF.     408
!
Since ON was not a formal structure, Jacques Naville drew a list of the official 
members to Rougemont: ‘Le « groupe de l’Ordre Nouveau », c.à.d. : M.M. Aron, Dandieu, 
Rey, Poncet, Lapie, Naville, Lipiansky, D. de Rougemont, Jardin, Dupuis, Daniel-Rops, 
présents ou excusés le Samedi 15 octobre dans le cabinet de [Maître] Lapie, le Dimanche 23 
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!  This meeting could match with Marc’s memories of a debate at Pierre-Olivier Lapie’s home on 7 June 1931, 405
at which the writer Daniel-Rops discussed part of his Le Monde sans âme (an essay published in 1932). On 
Marc’s memories of the meeting of 7 June 1931, see Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 202.
!  See Chapters 1 and 4.406
!  Moreover, Daniel-Rops found ‘inadmissible qu’une des premières manifestations en public de l’Ordre 407
Nouveau soit laissée à la décision indépendante des membres. Il me paraît en conséquence évident que, dans ce 
témoignage, chacun des membres ne saurait engager que sa responsabilité propre’, Daniel-Rops to Jacques 
Naville, 9 Nov. 1932, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, File: ‘La NRF, Cahier de revendications, 
décembre 1932, 2’.
!  Daniel-Rops to Rougemont, 13 Nov. 1932, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, File: ‘La NRF, Cahier de 408
revendications, décembre 1932, 2’.
octobre à mon domicile, le mardi 25 octobre à mon domicile’.    This list is the only 409
document that gives the core ON group for the autumn 1932.  
!
The ON group was far from cohesive. Alexandre Marc informed Rougemont it was 
not the first time it faced tensions and quarrels.   The violent tone of his letters indicates a 410
revolutionary cell. On 13 November 1932, Rey, Lapie, Naville and Poncet resigned from 
ON.   In the following year, Marc would also come to exclude the leaders of Plans, 411
Mouvements and Esprit, three journals with which ON successively cooperated. Thereafter, 
the official list of ‘founding fathers’ of ON included, by alphabetical order: Dominique 
Ardouint (Jean Jardin’s ON pseudonym), Robert Aron, Claude Chevalley, Arnaud Dandieu, 
Daniel-Rops, René Dupuis, Alexandre Marc and Denis de Rougemont.   This ‘Comité 412
Directeur’ of ON (which was meant to define the doctrine of the movement) only included the 
members that remained after the split of November 1932, plus Claude Chevalley who joined 
ON at the end of 1932.    413
!
If one compares the list of ON members given by Naville in November 1932 with the 
official list of the ‘Comité Directeur’ in 1934, it becomes clear that the core of the ON group 
was formed in November-December 1932. A second wave would join ON in the following 
years, including Pierre Prévost, Eugénia Hélisse, Xavier de Lignac, Albert and Louis Ollivier. 
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Cahier de revendications, décembre 1932, 2’.
!  ‘La « crise » que nous traversons n’est pas la première. Elle ne sera pas la dernière. Considérons donc la 410
situation avec calme & ne nous laissons pas décourager. Malgré l’engagement pris par tous les membres de 
l’O.N., les calomnies ont repris. D.R. [Daniel-Rops], mal informé (par G.R. [Gabriel Rey] & P.-O. L. [Pierre-
Olivier Lapie]) est très monté contre toi & surtout contre moi. Nous avons décidé de déléguer auprès de lui R.D. 
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la gorge de ceux qui les inventent.’, Alexandre Marc to Rougemont, 12 Nov. 1932, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., 
Rougemont Papers, ‘La NRF, Cahier de revendications, décembre 1932, 2’.
!  ‘Après deux années d’expériences consciencieuse et approfondie [sic], nous sommes arrivées [sic] à cette 411
conclusion, au cours de deux récents entretiens, que l’Ordre Nouveau est un mouvement plein d’équivoques et 
de contradictions internes auxquelles il ne nous est plus possible dorénavant de collaborer. Veuillez trouver ici 
notre démission. […] Signé : P.O. Lapie; J. Naville; A. Poncet; G. Rey.’ ‘Lettre destinée aux membres du Groupe 
de l’Ordre Nouveau par laquelle les signataires donnent leur démission de ce groupe’, 13 Nov. 1932, Neuchâtel, 
B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, File: ‘La NRF, Cahier de revendications, décembre 1932, 2’.
!  See ‘Comment est né l’ordre nouveau’, in the special publicity issue ‘Nous voulons…L’Ordre Nouveau’, 412
Ordre Nouveau, 9 (March 1934), 2.
!  This young mathematician – the second Protestant at ON with Rougemont – was a friend of Georges Bataille 413
and Arnaud Dandieu (who were colleagues at the Bibliothèque Nationale).
By gathering contributions for NRF in the Autumn of 1932, Rougemont played a part, albeit 
unwitting, in the crystallization of the ON group.   Having defined the participants to ON, it 414
is important to show that they were the first to call upon personalism as a political philosophy 
and a social movement. 
!
Early statements of Ordre Nouveau personalism (1931-1932)!
!
Initially, ON developed its positions in the journal Plans. Officially aimed at the 
young generation, Plans had been conceived by Philippe Lamour in 1928 (following his 
exclusion from the Faisceau of Georges Valois).   Plans was published between January 415
1931 and February 1933. It had two parts: a theoretical section called ‘idéologique’, and a 
practical part publishing facts and documents.   For a period of about a year, between the 416
summers of 1931 and of 1932, the theoretical section was largely concerned with ON. 
!
It is generally assumed that ON started for the broader public with an article by René 
Dupuis published in the journal Plans in July 1931, calling for a European union to achieve 
peace on the Continent.   Then, in the November issue, Daniel-Rops put forward a Catholic 417
version of ON, while Aron and Dandieu called for ‘violence et révolution’, defending a 
Nietzschean interpretation.   Aron and Dandieu claimed that a revolution was only bloody 418
when ill-prepared, and that the blood shed by a revolution was the sign of its concrete 
imperfection. This ON principle (repeated in Plans by Marc in March 1932, and by 
Rougemont in May of the same year) motivated a fastidious doctrinal preparation of the ON 
revolution: ‘la violence spirituelle ou doctrinale’ – i.e. rigorous doctrinal research and the 
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197-207.
!  Marie-Christine Bouneau-Bouillare, 'Hubert Lagardelle, un bourgeois révolutionnaire et son époque 416
(1874-1958)' (thèse de doctorat, Université de Bordeaux III, 1996), 691-714.
!  René Dupuis, 'Le Problème de l'Europe et la question de l'Etat', Plans, 7 (July 1931), 11-16.417
!  Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, 'Violence et révolution', Plans, 9 (Nov. 1931), 24-8; Daniel-Rops, 418
'Abstraction et spiritualité', Plans, 9 (Nov. 1931), 35-40.
refusal to compromise with other political movements – was supposed to guarantee a well-
prepared revolution and reduce physical violence as much as possible.    419
!
In 1931, Alexandre Marc and Arnaud Dandieu called upon a ‘personnalisme créateur’ 
in conclusion to their joint article ‘Misère et grandeur du spirituel’.   Marc and Dandieu 420
refused to provide the reader with a rational (Cartesian) definition of the person, which would 
reduce the subject – the person – to an object. Marc and Dandieu drew a distinction between 
the ‘Cartesian’ and the ‘concrete’ from Gabriel Marcel’s Journal métaphysique (1927).  421
Although ‘Misère et grandeur du spirituel’ was only published in France in 1974, it may still 
be considered to be the first expression of personalism as a non-idealistic philosophy in 
French.   In Plans in December 1931, Marc made a strong point: ‘Personnalisme: primauté 422
de l’homme sur la Société’.   This was the first presentation of personalism per se.  423
!
Thus personalism appeared as the doctrine whereby the particular human person 
would be given unconditional preference over the general (and therefore theoretical) society. 
It is important to note that when Denis de Rougemont actively joined ON, the lineaments of 
the doctrine that was starting to be called ‘personnalisme’ had already been established (by 
Marc, Dandieu, Aron, and Dupuis especially). It is important to remember that Rougemont 
played little if no role in the cross-cultural transfer of personalism per se.  
!
As the specialist on Franco-German cultural transfers Thomas Keller has put it: ‘in 
Rougemont there are no throwbacks to the classic texts of personalism [i.e. the German or 
Russian sources], even though he is affected by a number of German-speaking authors, such 
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Rougemont, 'Sur la violence bourgeoise', Plans, nouvelle série, 2 (15 May 1932), 8.
!  See detailed analysis in Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 127-32.420
!  Gabriel Marcel, Journal Métaphysique (Paris, 1935), 324-9.421
!  Arnaud Dandieu and Alexandre Marc, 'Misère et grandeur du spirituel, "Documents du C.I.F.E."', L'Europe en 422
formation, 172-173, Special issue, 4 (July-August 1974). This article was initially designed as the first chapter of 
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militant who visited Argentina in 1936. 
!  Roy has established that the anonymous text ‘L’Action – Précisions sur “L’Ordre Nouveau”’, in Plans, 10 423
(Dec. 1931) was drawn up by Marc, see Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 251-4.
as Otto, Kassner, Herrigel’.    German sources came second, both in time and importance, in 424
Rougemont’s thinking. If Rudolf Kassner played a part in Rougemont’s essay-writing, it was 
secondary to the influence of La Nouvelle revue française (NRF), Marcel Arland and Julien 
Benda for instance.   Similarly, Rougemont’s idea of achieving self-knowledge through 425
sports was derived from Montherlant long before he read Eugen Herrigel.   His theory of 426
religious experience, and the influence of Rudolf Otto in particular, will require examination 
in Chapter 7.   In 1932, Rougemont came to develop a particular emphasis on personhood, 427
by way of his contacts with Alexandre Marc. 
!
The two articles that Rougemont wrote for Plans developed the ON concept of 
‘violence spirituelle’, distinct from physical brutality.   The first article ‘Sur la violence 428
bourgeoise’ denounced the hidden violence in bourgeois democracy.   In Rougemont’s 429
words, ‘nous vivons en vérité sous un régime de violence, et tous les bourgeois pacifiques qui 
se prévalent contre nous de leur « humanité » sont en réalité des complices de cette violence 
jamais avouée.’   Bourgeois violence started at primary school (the conformism imposed on 430
children) and justified war and the establishment of colonies, for purely economic 
purposes.   It took the pretext of high and abstract principles: ‘Ainsi la violence bourgeoise 431
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!  Rudolf Otto (1869-1937), an early and leading student of religious experience, was a devout Christian thinker 427
(part theologian, part philosopher, part phenomenologist of religious experience) who was strongly influenced by 
the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. He held that numinous experience – an experience of the uncanny that is 
strongest and most important in cases in which it seems to its subject to be the experience of God – is unique. 
Such experience of God, he held, occurred in both Semitic and South Asian theistic traditions.
!  His analysis of ‘violence créatrice’ bears comparison with Georg Simmel’s analysis of conflict (Kampf) as a 428
sane form of sociation. The sociologist Pierre Bourdieu would speak of the hidden violence and perversions of 
democracy some forty years later, see his Fondements d’une théorie de la violence symbolique (Paris, 1973).
!  Rougemont, 'Sur la violence bourgeoise', esp. 8.429
!  Rougemont, 'Sur la violence bourgeoise', 7. The emphasis is his.430
!  ‘Toute l’astuce de ceux qui gouvernent consiste alors à dissimuler la nécessité purement économique de telles 431
violences, à les attribuer à des facteurs inventés pour les besoins de la cause, et qui paraissent totalement 
étrangers aux buts de notre civilisation capitaliste, et même hostiles à son progrès normal.’, in Rougemont, 'Sur 
la violence bourgeoise', 7. The emphasis is his.
est caractérisée par son hypocrisie, ou encore par son abstraction. Il importe qu’elle ne 
s’avoue jamais, qu’elle invoque toujours un prétexte élevé : maintenir l’ordre, porter au loin la 
civilisation, sauvegarder des « valeurs » que l’on dit être « de culture ».’   This was a fine 432
critique of imperialism. 
!
Rougemont’s second article in Plans criticized ‘l’état d’esprit faussement 
révolutionnaire’ of the bourgeois Marxists. Enthusiasm for Marxist orthodoxy was a form of 
conformity, and thus ‘les petits purs sont tout simplement les petits bourgeois de la 
Révolution.’   By contrast, the ON group called for ‘la violence spirituelle créatrice’, which 433
was said to be concretely based on ‘la personne’ – ‘réelle, imparfaite, mais féconde’.   A 434
revolution would not go wrong, in Rougemont’s view, if only it could perpetually be checked 
with the concrete, ‘cette revendication perpetuelle de l’humain’.    435
!
According to Christian Roy, Marc’s last article for Plans, on 20 April 1932, marked 
the beginning of the stabilisation of the concept of the person, despite a confusion between the 
title of the article ‘Primauté de la personnalité’ and the heading on the cover ‘Primauté de la 
personne humaine’.   This confusion shows that ‘personnalité’ was still a synonym of 436
‘personne’ in the spring of 1932. Thereafter, the ON doctrine was established gradually. 
Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu continued to use ‘personne’ as synonymous with 
‘personnalité’, ‘homme’, ‘personne humaine’ or ‘personnalité humaine’, as late as October 
1933.   The lack of a consistent use was problematic – to say the least – for a movement 437
based on the notion of person.  
!
Thinkers of the ON group undertook to remedy this inconsistency, and give doctrinal 
precision to their movement. As ‘personnalisme’ became clearer, the ON group separated 
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!  See Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu, La Révolution nécessaire (2nd edn. Paris, 1993).
from Plans.   Lamour complained that ON – presumably in the shape of Alexandre Marc – 438
sought to control all doctrinal texts published in Plans in 1931-2. In November 1932, Philippe 
Lamour admitted to Rougemont having had an argument with Marc.   In February 1933, 439
Lamour publicly rejected ‘le spirituel’ and refused any association with personalist 
groupings.   While ON emphasised the ‘spiritual’, Lamour turned towards Marxism. In the 440
early 1930s, ON was not only suspect in the eyes of Marxist revolutionaries, but also in the 
eyes of the Catholics who formed Esprit. 
!
Esprit’s distrust of the personalist revolution (1931-1933)!
!
 It is only in 1933 that Mounier came to adopt personalism from ON, without 
acknowledging it, largely, it seems, because mentioning ON would have put Esprit in a 
difficult situation vis-à-vis the Catholic Church. My research into Rougemont’s papers leads 
to the conclusion that Mounier distrusted personalism when he started Esprit, and his editorial 
board was altogether hostile to ON – the only personalist group in France at the time. This 
section recapitulates the story of the transfer of personalism from ON to Esprit, and further 
clarifies it in the light of Rougemont’s papers. 
!
In December 1931, Emmanuel Mounier visited Marc, to ask his advice for the 
launching of ‘une revue comme Plans, mais catholique’, which would eventually become 
Esprit.   Since December 1929, when he famously stated, ‘A nous autres pianistes de 25 ans, 441
il manque un piano’, Mounier had been looking for an opportunity to start a new journal.  442
This opportunity arose in 1932, under the patronage of Jacques Maritain. And so Esprit was 
founded by Mounier, together with three friends, Georges Izard, André Déléage and Louis-
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Emile Galey.   Esprit is the most famous (and the most studied) of the third-way journals of 443
the 1930s. It was a relatively large publication from the beginning. Between 1932 and 1934, 
Esprit rose from 2000 to 3000 copies. 
!
At its launching in October 1932, Esprit had neither concrete proposals nor precise 
plans for the revolution it heralded.   The manifesto published in the first issue of Esprit 444
lacked a clear policy.   The founders of Esprit shared Charles Péguy   as a tutelary figure 445 446
with the ‘Jeune Droite’ dissidents of Action Française.   It would be wrong to see Esprit as a 447
right-wing movement, however. The journal Esprit was backed by a rather leftist political 
movement called ‘Troisième Force’, launched in November 1932 by Georges Izard, Emile 
Galey and André Déléage.    448
!
In March 1933, Rougemont hoped that the Troisième Force would gather ‘tous les 
éléments révolutionnaires non embrigadés dans les partis, et un nombre croissant de jeunes 
militants « de gauche » et syndicalistes, écœurés par la bureaucratie politique’.   The 449
relations between the political movement and the journal Esprit would rapidly deteriorate, 
however, owing to the discrepancy between the Troisième Force’s push for political 
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propaganda and Mounier’s view of politics as ‘impure’.   Throughout the 1930s, Esprit 450
oscillated between Mounier’s desire to remain above political struggles and his conviction 
that the doctrine of Esprit needed to find concrete expression in political action. Mounier 
went from detestation of revolutionary politics in 1932-4 to calling for a communitarian 
revolution (‘Révolution communautaire’) in January 1935, and from backing the Popular 
Front in 1936 to supporting the National Revolution under the Occupation (1940-1). 
!
Now that Esprit has become seen as the personalist movement in France, it is 
paradoxical to think that Esprit and Emmanuel Mounier were hostile to personalism in 1932. 
Mounier mentioned his dislike of Dandieu’s personalism in his diary (18 October 1932): ‘son 
personnalisme, que tous les autres récitent, est une affirmation fondamentale de la puissance 
de création de la personne humaine, nietzschéenne en un sens’ (unlike many ‘non-
conformistes des années trente’, Mounier did not celebrate Nietzsche as a prophet).   As 451
Rougemont remarked later, Mounier’s emphasis on ‘personnalisme’ shows that it was a new 
and unclear concept for him at the time when he started Esprit.    452
!
Christian Roy has demonstrated that Mounier copied part of the ON programme – 
without acknowledging it – between November 1932 and the winter of 1933.   According to 453
Mounier himself, this period would constitute the doctrinal phase in the history of Esprit.  454
At the launching of Esprit, Alexandre Marc – the founder of ON and the first proponent of 
personalism in France – occupied an office next to Mounier’s at the Desclée De Brouwer 
publishing house, Rue des Saints-Pères. He was meant to look after the international 
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development of ‘Esprit, Revue internationale’.   He thought privately that Esprit would be 455
the literary journal of ON, which already had a political voice in Mouvements.   This did not 456
help the long-term relationships between Marc and Mounier. 
!
In the second issue of Esprit, in November 1932, Marc justified a revolutionary ‘ordre 
nouveau’ in Europe, while Rougemont, under the pseudonym of Jean-Pierre Cartier, also 
called for an ‘ordre nouveau’ and supported Jacques Martin, a conscientious objector judged 
by the French state (and defended by a Protestant lawyer).   The articles of Marc and 457
Rougemont precipitated discord at Esprit. Mounier fell under the reproach of Catholic 
patriots, such as Maritain and Bridoux, who did not believe ‘que l’on peut être à la fois 
catholique intégralement et sincèrement révolutionnaire’.   Thus the tensions between ON 458
and Esprit reflected broader disagreements among Catholics over the issue of revolution. 
!
Obviously, the incompatibility between Catholicism and Revolution had a long and 
sensitive history in France. In many respects, the 1930s were years of revolutionary fervour. 
Esprit did not escape the debate. From the very beginning, the journal was split between 
conventional Catholics and those who supported non-confessional revolutionary action. 
Mounier, who welcomed non-Christian contributions to Esprit, was torn between the two 
attitudes. Jacques Maritain and his followers at the publishing house Desclée de Brouwer, 
(hosting Esprit) were adamant to see Esprit dissociate itself from the revolutionary influence 
of ON.   Mounier gradually moved away from Alexandre Marc, whilst keeping secret the 459
pressure exercised by Maritain and refusing to follow his plans for a great Catholic journal.   460
!
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In the latter part of his life, Rougemont remembered that there had been four or five 
crises between Esprit and ON before 1934, and each time the clash had been avoided thanks 
to Alexandre Marc’s efforts.   This interpretation seems to be confirmed by a letter sent to 461
Rougemont as early as November 1932 in which Alexandre Marc expressed discontent about 
the second issue of Esprit.   The tone of Marc’s letter confirmed, if need be, the inflexible 462
politics of ON, as well as Marc’s desire to control Esprit. He asked Rougemont to influence 
the editorial board of Esprit, where Rougemont stood as an ON member: ‘De ton côté, tu 
pourrais, peut-être, agir sur les membres du Cons[eil] de Réd[action] en leur montrant tout ce 
que leur attitude a d’inadmissible & de maladroit. Que nos articles passent dans 
Confr[ontations] soit. Mais qu’on les espace ou même les refuse, non !’   After this, 463
Rougemont told stories about the united revolutionary front formed by ON and Esprit, albeit 
in ‘gestation doctrinale’, in the ‘Cahier de revendications’ of December 1932.   464
!
On 1 January 1933, Mounier wrote to Rougemont that while the editorial board of 
Esprit expressed the wish to break with ON, he had supported Rougemont’s continued 
presence at Esprit: ‘Certains de mes amis, considérant que notre mésentente s’avérait 
définitive avec l’esprit de L’Ordre Nouveau comme tel, ont soutenu […] que votre présence 
dans nos conseils devenait contradictoire avec son motif premier, qui était la représentation de 
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ce groupe. Je vous ai défendu.’   This letter of January 1933 confirms that there was never a 465
‘common front’ between Esprit and ON as groups.   From a personal point of view however, 466
Mounier made efforts to resolve misunderstandings with Rougemont.   Mounier was 467
shocked by an article in Hic et Nunc, in which Rougemont condemned ‘la politique romaine’ 
for allowing neither ‘foi’ nor ‘vérité’.   Thus one may remark that Rougemont may have 468
been a mediator in literary and political matters, but certainly not in ecclesiastical relations. 
Mounier admitted: ‘Je ne comprends plus dès lors sur quelles bases vous concevez la 
collaboration avec des catholiques, j’entends bien entendu non pas dans un mouvement 
d’action mais dans une revue qui est d’abord Esprit.’   Rougemont was summoned to make 469
his position clear. Besides the personal offence, Mounier must have been urged to write 
because Esprit was under threat of condemnation by the episcopate for mixing Catholicism 
with social revolution.   I would suggest that Rougemont may have seemed less dangerous a 470
revolutionary in the eyes of the French political and ecclesiastic authorities, as he was a 
foreigner and a Protestant. Rougemont chose to continue to represent ON at Esprit, holding 
that the two movements were complementary. 
!
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The aims of Esprit in the 1930s may be summarized in four points: firstly, to 
distinguish the ‘primauté du spirituel’ from ‘spiritualisme’ (understood as cheap religiosity); 
secondly, to set apart the spiritual revolution from the ‘désordre établi’ (see below); thirdly, to 
dissociate the revolution from materialism (that was largely aimed at Soviet communism); 
and lastly, to defeat capitalism, liberalism, fascism, and nationalism.   All of these aims were 471
vital to Rougemont and central to ON. This convergence is not a coincidence, since Esprit 
drew the essential idea of a personalist revolution from ON, after March 1933.  
!
The issue of Esprit on the ‘Rupture entre l’ordre chrétien et le désordre établi’ in 
March 1933 was a defining moment for Mounier’s adoption of personalism. This special issue 
has been analysed by Michel Winock, with regard to Esprit’s approach to the spiritual, and by 
Bruno Ackermann, with special reference to Rougemont.   Ackermann’s analysis of 472
Rougemont’s contribution is excellent and there is no need to repeat it here, save for two 
additional points: Rougemont’s role in the choice of the title, and Marc’s influence in the 
transmission of personalism from ON to Esprit. 
!
The title of the issue, initially planned as ‘Rupture du Christianisme et du Monde 
bourgeois’, was changed to ‘Rupture entre l’ordre chrétien et le désordre établi’ at the last 
minute.   To John Hellman, Mounier borrowed the play on words ‘le désordre 473
établi’ (referring to the status quo) from an article by Marc, published in Esprit in February 
1933, and thereafter ‘“Le désordre établi” was employed in the subsequent issue of Esprit and 
became a cliché at the journal to describe what Esprit stood against. At this writing the term is 
used now and then in Le Monde and, like personalism, attributed to Mounier, never to 
Marc.’   Yet if ‘le désordre établi’ has one author, it should be Rougemont, who first used the 474
expression in his Méfaits de l’Instruction Publique (1929).   However, it may be noted that 475
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the phrase ‘geordnete Unordnung’ was also found in some German ‘third-way discourses’ in 
the mid-1920s.    476
!
In a sense, the special issue ‘Rupture entre l’ordre chrétien et le désordre établi’ 
marked the climax of the cooperation between Esprit and the Christian members of ON. 
Christian Roy has analysed the role of this issue in the transfer of personalism from ON to 
Esprit, from Marc to Mounier.   The transfer was based on an amusing subterfuge, given 477
Mounier’s distrust of the Nietzschean character of ON. Alexandre Marc played a trick on 
Mounier by inventing a German theologian, Otto Neumann, as a pretext to present his own 
religious and political convictions. Under the guise of a review article on Otto Neumann, 
Marc stated the possibility for a revolutionary and Catholic political position, combining two 
options that were hitherto antagonistic in French political culture. He claimed: ‘Otto 
Neumann établit l’identité profonde du christianisme et de l’esprit révolutionnaire’ through a 
novel doctrine, ‘ce personnalisme (qu’il appelle, lui, humanisme catholique ou même 
catholicité tout court)’.   For the first time in France, personalism – initially perceived as 478
Nietzschean – was presented as a form of Catholic humanism, which aimed at restoring the 
revolutionary force of the Revelation.  
!
Pretending to quote Otto Neumann – whose O.N. initials should have been revealing – 
Marc wrote: ‘“Le christianisme seul a fait de l’individu une personne : c’est pourquoi 
l’individu est libéral et la personne catholique. En d’autres termes, c’est pourquoi l’individu 
est réactionnaire et la personne révolutionnaire.” L’individu est d’ailleurs une abstraction, 
tandis que la personne est la réalité.’   In a complete reversal of conventional categories in 479
France, ‘Neumann montre […] que sans le christianisme, l’esprit révolutionnaire n’existerait 
pas.’ Christianity was the wellspring of revolutions, and the movements normally considered 
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revolutionary were the contrary of what they seemed: Marxism was an extreme form of 
materialism: ‘l’idéal marxiste n’est […] que l’expression suprême et la plus conséquente du 
capitalisme’, and fascism was condemned as impotent, as a mere ‘réformisme lyrique’.  480
Both Marxism and Fascism were fake revolutions, compared with Christianity. 
!
Thereafter, Mounier became so enthusiastic about Otto Neumann that Marc no longer 
dared to reveal his identity.   Mounier developed the opposition individual vs. person 481
following O.N. (Otto Neumann / Ordre Nouveau), and Esprit came to contrast the individual 
(self-centred, consumerist and reactionary) with the person (spiritual, humane, and 
revolutionary because Christian). This discourse, characteristic of Esprit from 1934 onwards, 
was a version of the personalism of ON in the guise of a Catholic revolution. 
!
!
2. Esprit and communitarian personalism!
!
In 1934, when Emmanuel Mounier decided to abandon the ‘neither right nor left’ line 
of ON, it was said that Esprit and ON had become irremediably divided. It was a gradual 
process, completed in 1934.   However, the seriousness of the rupture between the 482
personalist movements has been overestimated. The continued participation of Rougemont to 
Esprit calls for more nuance in the interpretation of the break between Esprit and ON in 1934. 
The break was largely the result of the political situation in Europe and in France, and it was 
not definitive. 
!
Esprit turns towards the left in 1934!
!
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Following Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor in January 1933, the international 
situation made the ON plans for a common front with German youth virtually impossible. 
Nevertheless, in Jeune Europe (1933), René Dupuis and Alexandre Marc continued their 
propaganda for a European common front: ‘dans toute l’Europe, au cours de ces quinze 
années, la jeunesse a rompu avec “l’idéal” démocratique parlementaire et libéral – soit qu’elle 
a déjà fait la révolution et fondé un nouveau régime, soit qu’elle se désolidarise entièrement 
du régime existant et se proclame ouvertement “révolutionnaire”’.   Marc and Dupuis 483
condemned National Socialism as a racist form of nationalism. They found all German 
revolutionary movements guilty of nationalism and statolatry, except for the group Gegner, an 
anti-capitalist movement both socialist and national, with which they hoped to cooperate.  484
ON continued to believe in the need for a European common front, even if in practice it came 
to be increasingly centred on the hexagon for lack of interlocutors abroad. In France however, 
the bipolarisation of political life made the ‘neither right nor left’ line increasingly difficult to 
maintain. 
!
In 1934, the French political scene was heated by the Stavisky scandal and the rising 
influence of the extreme-right. In this context, the riots of February 1934 precipitated an 
extreme polarization of political forces.   French intellectuals faced the alternative of 485
partaking in partisan action or becoming inaudible.   ON refused to choose sides, while 486
Esprit shifted towards the left. A letter of Mounier to Berdiaev, written in the aftermath of the 
events of February 1934, marked the opening of yet another conflict between ON and Esprit. 
Mounier wrote to Berdiaev: ‘Je vous expliquerai moi-même, ou Maritain si vous le voyez 
avant, ce conflit avec L’Ordre Nouveau. […] Le mouvement s’oriente nettement vers un 
fascisme anti-ouvrier et une technocratie petite-bourgeoise que nous ne pouvons admettre.’  487
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Jenkins (ed.) France in the era of fascism: essays on the French authoritarian right, 129-50.
!  Trebitsch, 'Le front commun de la jeunesse intellectuelle. Le "Cahier de revendications" de décembre 1932’, 486
221-2.
!  See letter of 15 February 1934, misdated in 1936, Emmanuel Mounier, Oeuvres (vol. IV, Paris, 1956), 580.487
John Hellman remarked that this letter of 15 February 1934 had been strangely misdated in 
‘1936’, in the 1956 edition of Mounier’s complete works.   The dating ‘error’ helped to 488
persuade a generation of historians that Mounier’s public quarrel with the ON group in early 
1934 constituted a definitive rupture between the two personalist movements.  
!
In the April 1934 issue of Esprit, Mounier publicized the ‘divergences essentielles’ 
between Esprit and ON.   He accused ON of a ‘nietzschéisme trop souvent scolaire et un 489
aristocratisme diffus’.   Mounier incriminated the controversial Lettre à Hitler (published in 490
L’Ordre Nouveau, 5, November 1933)   as well as a ‘mépris latent’ for manual work at 491
ON.   Thereafter, Jean-Marie Domenach, in his biography of Mounier, explained that ‘en 492
avril 1934, Esprit rompt avec L’Ordre Nouveau’, and departed from the ambiguous 
‘Troisième voie de L’Ordre nouveau’ definitively.   Let us see how the second proposition 493
has been revised. 
!
John Hellman has questioned the definitive character of the rupture between Esprit 
and ON, whilst emphasising the ambiguous character of the personalist third way.   In 1981, 494
Hellman asserted that the dispute of 1934 ‘lasted only a few months and, according to Denis 
de Rougemont, was probably conducted largely for the benefit of Berdyaev and Jacques 
Maritain.’   I agree with Hellman that the dispute was temporary, but his reference to 495
Rougemont makes excessive claims. While Rougemont suggested that Maritain played a role 
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!  See Emmanuel Mounier, Oeuvres (vol. IV, Paris, 1956), 580 and Hellman, Emmanuel Mounier and the new 488
Catholic left, 1930-1950, 286 n.39. 
!  Emmanuel Mounier, 'Réponse à l'Ordre Nouveau', Esprit, 19 (1 Apr. 1934), 201.489
!  Mounier, 'Réponse à l'Ordre Nouveau', 201-2.490
!  The Lettre à Hitler will be considered in Chapter 6.491
!  On the different conceptions of work at Esprit and at L’Ordre Nouveau, see below and Chapter 5.492
!  Jean-Marie Domenach, Emmanuel Mounier ("Ecrivains de toujours". Paris, 1972), 63.493
!  See in particular his latest work Hellman, The communitarian third way. Chapter 6 will try to show the limits 494
of Hellman’s approach.
!  Hellman, Emmanuel Mounier and the new Catholic left, 1930-1950, 286 n.39. In the early 1980s, when 495
Rougemont read Hellman’s account of the pressure exerted by Maritain, he wrote in the margin: ‘J’ai tout ignoré 
à l’époque!’ B.P.U.N., Fonds DR, ‘Le personnalisme – Esprit, Personnalisme, documents divers’, photocopies of 
Hellman, Emmanuel Mounier and the new Catholic left, 1930-1950.
in the conflict between Mounier and the ON group, he did not go further into conjectures.  496
In view of the scarcity of sources, there can be no definitive answer as to the causes and the 
beneficiaries of the break. It is possible to say however, considering the tensions that existed 
between Esprit and ON from the very beginning, that the Lettre à Hitler was but a pretext for 
the break.    497
!
Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle, Christian Roy and Thomas Keller have emphasised the 
importance of 1934 as a rupture, whilst defending the ON third way as a genuine attempt to 
rethink politics (and not an ambivalent or proto-fascist ideology).   Roy and Keller have 498
convincingly argued that Mounier used the Lettre à Hitler as a pretext to depart from the ON’s 
‘neither right nor left’ line.   In the following months, Esprit underwent a phase in which the 499
journal established its position vis-à-vis revolutionary action independently from ON.   For 500
instance, a Marxism study group was created.   For them, the rupture between ON and Esprit 501
in 1934 was momentous, and ON was the only movement to keep the genuine personalist 
third way. 
!
In what follows, I argue that Esprit did depart from the ‘neither right nor left’ line, but 
since it developed personalism, it actually became closer to ON with regard to doctrine. In the 
aftermath of the events of February 1934, Mounier markedly turned towards the left. After 
condemning ON in his article of April 1934, Mounier reckoned that ‘aujourd’hui à gauche, il 
y a le peuple […] ; à gauche il y a […] le grand courant des réformes sociales’.   But 502
Rougemont’s papers show evidence that the rupture between ON and Esprit in 1934 was 
largely cosmetic. There was significantly more unity than has yet been discerned. 
!
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!  Rougemont, 'Alexandre Marc et l'invention du personnalisme’, 57.496
!  This interpretation had already been suggested by Loubet del Bayle, Les non-conformistes des années trente, 497
153-4.
!  On this, see Chapters 5 and 6.498
!  Keller, 'Le personnalisme de l'entre-deux-guerres’, 517-19; Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 407-9. 499
See also my Chapter 6.
!  Keller is particularly good on this point: Keller, 'Le personnalisme de l'entre-deux-guerres’, 542-3.500
!  See Hellman, Emmanuel Mounier and the new Catholic left, 1930-1950, 102.501
!  Mounier, 'Réponse à l'Ordre Nouveau', 202.502
Rougemont continues representing the ON at Esprit after 1934!
!
It is highly significant that Rougemont continued representing ON at Esprit 
throughout the 1930s. In contradiction with his claims of rupture with ON, Mounier continued 
asking for Rougemont’s contribution to Esprit, until his death in 1950.   This requires the 503
revision of the theory of a sudden and sharp ‘rupture’ between Esprit and ON in 1934. 
 !
Rougemont was the only writer to contribute equally to Esprit and L’Ordre Nouveau 
throughout the 1930s. Admittedly, the painter Jean Labasque was also writing for both ON 
and Esprit on issues such as the art trade.   It is interesting to note that Rougemont and 504
Labasque seemed primarily interested in art – literature and painting respectively – rather than 
in political or economic doctrine. Yet whereas Labasque’s contribution was episodic, 
Rougemont ranked among the ten main contributors to Esprit in the 1930s. Rougemont wrote 
31 articles, notes or reviews for Esprit until the condemnation of the journal by Vichy in 
1941, which makes him the 7th main contributor to the journals in terms of the number of 
articles published.   A similar count places Rougemont in 4th position in L’Ordre Nouveau, 505
with 29 articles under his name, between 1933 and 1938.   Thus Rougemont published 506
approximately the same number of articles at L’Ordre Nouveau and at Esprit in the 1930s.  
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!  After the war, Mounier continued to have ties with Rougemont, sending him all his books with a friendly note 503
[dédicace] each time, cf. in Rougemont’s library, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire de Neuchâtel: 
Emmanuel Mounier, Introduction aux existentialismes (Paris, 1947); Emmanuel Mounier, L'Eveil de l'Afrique 
noire (Collection Esprit "Frontière ouverte". Paris, 1948); Emmanuel Mounier, Liberté sous conditions 
(Collection "Esprit". Paris, 1946); Emmanuel Mounier, Qu'est-ce que le personnalisme? (Collection "Esprit". 
Paris, 1947). See also the correspondance, in which Mounier insisted on having Rougemont’s contributions in 
the postwar Esprit: Mounier to Rougemont, 17 Oct. 1945, 15 Aug. 1946, 4 Sept. 1946, 3 July 1947, Neuchâtel, 
B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, Correspondence. Rougemont wrote a critical note in Esprit (Sept. 1946), which he 
regretted already before it was published (note and regrets mentioned in Mounier to Rougemont, 15 Aug. 1946 
and 4 Sept. 1946). Besides this note, Rougemont’s only post-war article for Esprit called for a cooperation 
between Europe and America towards increasing political freedom. Denis de Rougemont, 'Epilogue', Esprit, 127 
(Nov. 1946). Mounier had insisted that Rougemont send Esprit an extract from his next book published by Plon 
(Mounier to Rougemont, 4 Sept. 1946). See Denis de Rougemont, Vivre en Amérique (Paris, 1947), 168-80. 
Following the death of Mounier, Esprit was split between philosovietism and a moderate branch of personalism, 
supporting reform and democracy. Rougemont’s staunch anti-communism and support of the USA was at odds 
with the radical branch of Esprit, and this explains much of the hostility between Rougemont and the Esprit of 
the 1950s and 1960s.
!  Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 404.504
!  See the Annex: ‘Principaux collaborateurs d’Esprit, 1932-1950’, in Winock, "Esprit". Des intellectuels dans 505
la cité, 1930-1950.
!  After Alexandre Marc (I include his articles under the pseudonym of Michel Glady and some articles signed 506
O.N. which have been identified as his), René Dupuis, and Robert Aron.
!
This quantitative approach should not hide Rougemont’s preference for the 
personalism of ON. Rougemont contributed to Esprit as an ON activist, contrary to what his 
later self-presentation as being ‘above the fray’ allows for.   Ackermann claims that 507
‘Rougemont, sur le plan des idées, n’appartint que marginalement à l’équipe d’Esprit’.   This 508
may be argued, but I disagree when he implies a similar attitude vis-à-vis ON. In 1934, 
Rougemont explained that he preferred ON to Esprit because the ON doctrine was more 
precise and did not have Esprit’s Catholic tone.   In 1935, in the first Bulletin de liaison des 509
groupes “Ordre Nouveau”, Rougemont contrasted the ON’s efforts towards doctrinal rigour 
with Esprit’s ‘sentimentalité’.   He was wary of Esprit’s haziness when it came to 510
revolutionary positions, following the ON principle whereby a revolution is bloody when ill-
prepared: ‘Ce qui pourrait être plus grave au point de vue de la Révolution, c’est la fluidité 
excessive du style des manifestes d’Esprit. Crainte de l’Index ou incertitudes doctrinales ?’ 
He summoned Esprit to follow ON.   511
!
The tensions between the two Parisian personalist groups reached their maximum 
between the winter of 1933-4 and the summer of 1936. This is the exact period when 
Rougemont was away from Paris. This coincidence points to Rougemont’s importance as a 
mediator between personalists. To support this argument further, it is worth looking into the 
nature of Rougemont’s contributions at Esprit. They show how Rougemont took important 
responsibilities at Esprit after 1934, as a member of the ON and a young Barthian. Thereafter, 
Rougemont asserted that ‘la liberté, c’est le droit d’appartenir à plus d’un club’.   To study 512
Rougemont makes it clear that the various third-way movements of the 1930s were not 
mutually exclusive.  
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!  See Rougemont, Journal d'une époque, 98. And following Rougemont’s presentation, Ackermann, Denis de 507
Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 317-20.
!  Quote from Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 361. 508
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'Où sont les jeunes protestants?' Le Christianisme social, 6 (July-Aug. 1934), 55-8.509
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'Les autres et nous. I. Esprit', Bulletin de liaison des groupes Ordre Nouveau, 1 (15 510
April 1935), 3-4.
 Rougemont, 'Les autres et nous. I. Esprit', 4.
!  Rougemont, 'Les autres et nous. I. Esprit', 4.511
!  Rougemont, Journal d'une époque, 98. 512
!
In Esprit, Rougemont called for a break hic et nunc with the establishment, whether 
bourgeois or religious.   Alternatively, he tried to establish a new platform of literary 513
critique;   and translated or reviewed German authors.   Two of his articles (‘Préface à une 514 515
littérature’   and ‘L’Esprit n’a pas son palais’  ) discussed the place of literature and culture 516 517
in general in society. Rougemont played a key role in editing two issues of Esprit (on 
literature and on Switzerland), and he made significant contributions as the editor of the 
literary rubric in 1936-7.   As we shall see in Chapter 5, L’Ordre Nouveau remained almost 518
exclusively concerned with ‘serious’ philosophical, economic, and political doctrine. 
!
In 1934, Rougemont published two essential texts for personalism in France: his 
collection of essays Politique de la personne at the Editions Je Sers, and his ‘Définition de la 
personne’ in Esprit. Each of these texts was fundamental to both Esprit and ON. The two 
movements stood united with reference to the essential personalist thesis, put forth by 
Rougemont in Politique de la personne: ‘Il n’y a pas d’autre cause à la crise présente : 
l’homme moderne a perdu la mesure de l’humain.’   Politique de la personne has been seen 519
as the key reference on French personalism, understood as an attitude and a philosophy.   It 520
was certainly an essential personalist publication in the 1930s, as well as being one of the first 
pleas for anti-Stalinist and anti-fascist engagement in literature.  
!
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!  Denis de Rougemont, 'Comment rompre?' Esprit, 6 (March 1933).513
!  E.g. Denis de Rougemont, 'Préface à une littérature', Esprit, 25 (Oct. 1934). Bruno Ackermann, in his 514
bibliography, provides a list of the book reviews published by Rougemont, see Ackermann, Denis de 
Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 2, 1166-82.
!  E.g. Denis de Rougemont, 'Kasimir Edschmid: Destin allemand', Esprit, 32 (May 1935).515
!  Rougemont, 'Préface à une littérature'.516
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'L'esprit n'a pas son palais', Esprit, 37 (Oct. 1935).517
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'Brève introduction à quelques témoignages littéraires', Esprit, 60 (Sept. 1937).518
!  Denis de Rougemont, Politique de la personne (2nd edn. Paris, 1946), 20. The emphasis is his.519
!  As P. Izard put it, ‘L’ouvrage primordial [du personnalisme, défini comme attitude et philosophie] demeure 520
Politique de la personne, paru en 1934, réunissant des articles et conférences de Denis de Rougemont, 
intéressant cette philosophie et tentant d’en préciser les fondements.’ Pierre Izard, 'Personnalisme et fédéralisme 
à travers l'oeuvre des fondateurs de la revue "L'Ordre Nouveau" (Robert Aron, Claude Chevalley, Arnaud 
Dandieu, Daniel-Rops, Alexandre Marc et Denis de Rougemont)' (Thèse pour le doctorat de 3e cycle, Université 
de Lille III, 1986), 18.
The first line reads: ‘J’ai, pour la politique, une espèce d’aversion naturelle.’  521
Rougemont continued asserting that, in his day, ‘l’intellectuel’ was forced to deal with politics 
because otherwise – when thinkers remained aloof from action – there was no impediment to 
‘la conception brutale d’une politique stalinienne ou fasciste’.   Rougemont believed in the 522
power of ideas. He gave the intellectual a primordial role in society, and there is a sense in 
which his personalism can only be understood as the project of an intellectuel engagé (a term 
which he was among the first to use, with Paul Nizan). 
!
Rougemont set out the following priorities: ‘La première tâche des intellectuels est, 
aujourd’hui, de conduire une critique des mythes collectivistes nés de la maladie de la 
personne. Puis il s’agit de retrouver une définition concrète de la personne. Enfin de la 
traduire en institutions et coutumes. Ou, tout au moins, d’indiquer les limites, la formule et les 
buts de ces institutions.’   The articles in Politique de la personne, tackled the first and last 523
objectives. Rougemont started by attacking all the alleged collectivist myths: determinism, be 
it racist or communist,   Marxism,   political parties,   and fascism, understood in a generic 524 525 526
sense;   he finished with guidelines for a personalist revolution.   The second objective – to 527 528
recover a concrete definition of the person – was not addressed in a formal manner in 
Politique de la personne.   Rougemont dealt with it in Esprit.   529 530
!
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!  Introduction of 1934, in Rougemont, Politique de la personne, 15.521
!  Rougemont, Politique de la personne, 17.522
!  Rougemont, Politique de la personne, 23. The emphasis is his.523
!  ‘Destin du siècle ou vocation personnelle’, in Rougemont, Politique de la personne, 35-52.524
!  See the following chapters: ‘Précédence ou primauté de l’économique dans le marxisme’, ‘Humanisme et 525
christianisme’, ‘Antimarxiste parce que chrétien’, in Rougemont, Politique de la personne, 63-75, 111-117, 
119-28.
!  ‘Ni ange ni bête: ni gauche ni droite’, in Rougemont, Politique de la personne, 79-83.526
!  ‘Fascisme’, in Rougemont, Politique de la personne, 129-139.527
!  See ‘Problèmes de la révolution personnaliste’, in Rougemont, Politique de la personne, 140-90.528
!  Rougemont distinguished the person from the individual in the course of a discussion with a Protestant 529
audience, in Rougemont, Politique de la personne, 53-61.
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'Définition de la personne', Esprit, 27 (1 Dec. 1934), 368-82.530
As the first definition of the person at Esprit – written, significantly, by an ON 
personalist – ‘Définition de la personne’ deserves examination both in its conception stage, 
and final publication. The correspondence leading up to publication is particularly instructive: 
on the one hand, it emphasises the significance of the question of the person for the Christian 
philosophers of existence at the time; on the other hand, it stresses the divergences between 
Mounier and Rougemont. In October 1934, Mounier wrote to Rougemont (who was living in 
Anduze in the Gard) about his draft ‘Définition de la personne’, to be published in 
December.   Three points were made clear. 531
!
Firstly, the rupture of the spring 1934 was not as radical as Esprit later claimed, since 
Mounier admitted that the ON and Esprit were pursuing a common research concerning the 
person. He wrote to Rougemont: ‘Ton papier a été discuté avant-hier soir devant un aréopage 
qui comprenait Gabriel Marcel, [Nikolai] Berdiaeff, le remplaçant de Scheller [sic. – Mounier 
was referring to a former student of Max Scheler, Paul-Ludwig Landsberg], etc… Je crois en 
effet qu’il rapproche beaucoup des nôtres les positions qui peuvent par certains points t’être 
communes avec L’Ordre Nouveau.’   The phrasing is awkward, as it suggests that 532
Rougemont would have expressed reservations vis-à-vis the ON. Even so, Mounier 
continued: ‘Le papier d’ailleurs a été fort apprécié de tout le monde, et il sera sûrement publié 
en décembre.’   Thus, the Christian philosophers of existence, Marcel, Berdiaev, Landsberg, 533
and Mounier, in the Paris of 1934, agreed to the significance of Rougemont’s reflection upon 
the human person.   Rougemont submitted a ‘Définition de la personne’ that sought to avoid 534
the two pitfalls of oversimplification and overrationalisation. 
!
Secondly, the discussion emphasised the specificity of the ON understanding of the 
person, based upon the concept of act. The main critique of Berdiaev, Marcel, Landsberg and 
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!  Rougemont, 'Définition de la personne', 368-82.531
!  Mounier to Rougemont, 12 Oct. 1934, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, Correspondence.532
!  Mounier to Rougemont, 12 Oct. 1934, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, Correspondence.533
!  Berdiaev’s philosophy of existence and of the person is the least known of all, although it was touched upon 534
in Clément, Berdiaev, un philosophe russe en France. Gabriel Marcel was also a philosopher of existence, 
although he would prove critical as to the ‘ism’ of personalism and existentialism, objecting – with reason – that 
a philosophy of the person or of existence cannot ‘devenir un isme sans se trahir’, in Marcel), 197-8, 229-31. 
Marcel criticised Rougemont in Gabriel Marcel, '"Penser avec les mains" par M. Denis de Rougemont', L'Europe 
nouvelle, 995 (1937), 236-7.
Mounier lay in ‘les obscurités qui subsistent sur la notion d’acte.’   This notion of act 535
resulted from Arnaud Dandieu’s attempt to justify the dignity of the human person by 
reference to the transcendent and without calling upon religion.   Rougemont, drawing 536
alternatively upon Dandieu and upon his Protestant faith, defined the person both as ‘act’ and 
as ‘vocation’. It was absurd to Mounier: ‘« L’acte est vocation » n’aurait aucun sens, ce qui 
semble bien marquer un glissement dans le sens que tu donnes au mot « est ».’   Rougemont 537
disagreed with Mounier: 
Je crois au contraire que ni l’acte seul, gratuit et dénué d’intention, et donc d’ordre, 
n’a de sens ; ni la vocation seule, abstraite et non actualisée. Et je ne vois aucune 
difficulté à établir, dans le cercle de mes « implications », une égalité de principe entre 
l’acte et la vocation. Car je ne considère l’acte que dans sa direction, et la vocation que 
dans la réception. Ce sens du mot « est », dans mes implications, c’est « existe que par 
et dans », « exister » étant entendu au sens de Kierk[egaard].   538!
Thus did Rougemont present personalism as a philosophy of existence, following 
Kierkegaard.   He refuted Mounier’s fear that Dandieu’s definition of the person as ‘acte’ 539
risked denying the transcendence of these acts, and turning the person into a ‘personnalité 
fulgurante, toute entière réalisée dans un instant’.   Rougemont maintained his equivalence 540
between person, act, and vocation. This was, for him, a guarantee of transcendence sensu 
stricto. In his own words, ‘Personne = acte, signifie que je ne deviens personne que lorsque je 
manifeste la vocation que Dieu m’adresse. Ce qui est transcendant à cette manifestation, c’est 
l’ordre reçu, la Parole de Dieu, – Dieu lui-même.’   This position sought to combine the 541
‘acte’ according to Dandieu with a Calvinist emphasis on vocation. 
!
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!  Mounier to Rougemont, 12 Oct. 1934, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, Correspondence.535
!  Chapter 5 shows how Dandieu claimed that the act and creation established the dignity of the human person, 536
without having to refer to God.
!  Mounier to Rougemont, 12 Oct. 1934, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, Correspondence.537
!  Rougemont, Manuscript: ‘Réponses aux objections de Mounier’ [Oct.-Nov ? 1934], Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., 538
Rougemont Papers, File: ‘Politique de la personne’.
!  In Penser avec les mains, two years later, he would write: ‘Retour à la personne, tel est le sens de la 539
philosophie « existentielle » sous toutes ses formes, et des mouvements théologiques et politiques qui préfigurent 
dès maintenant L’Ordre Nouveau, communautaire, que nous appelons.’ Rougemont, Penser avec les mains, 234.
!  Mounier to Rougemont, 12 Oct. 1934, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, Correspondence.540
!  Rougemont, Manuscript: ‘Réponses aux objections de Mounier’ [Oct.-Nov ? 1934], Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., 541
Rougemont Papers, File: ‘Politique de la personne’. The emphasis is his.
Thirdly, and finally, Mounier criticized Rougemont because ‘l’idée de communauté a 
beaucoup moins de présence et de puissance dans ton exposé que la personne. J’ai peur que 
cet ébranlement de proche en proche manque par suite de souffle métaphysique et de 
réalité.’   He was right to point out that, in Rougemont’s personalism, the community came 542
after the person. Otherwise, community rights could threaten individual freedom. By contrast, 
Esprit valued equally the community and the person. In order to understand the importance 
and particularity of Rougemont’s definition of the person at Esprit, the communitarian 
emphasis of Esprit must now be examined. 
!
Esprit develops a communitarian personalism from 1934 onwards!
!
As Mounier announced his break with ON in February 1934, he also planned to work 
on a ‘philosophie Personnaliste-communautaire’ with Paul-Ludwig Landsberg.   A former 543
student of the German personalist Max Scheler, Landsberg had fled the persecution of Jews in 
Nazi Germany. Thomas Keller has shown how, in the second half of the 1930s, Landsberg 
became the most innovative philosopher of Esprit, drawing on German personalist 
philosophers and on Spanish mystics for a weighty philosophy of engagement.   Roy and 544
Keller are the only two scholars to have studied the beginning of Esprit’s communitarian 
personalism with historical accuracy.   Since they were adamant to establish that Esprit took 545
personalism from ON without acknowledging it, they overlooked the continued cooperation, 
albeit limited, between Esprit and the ON. It is all the more important for me to establish a 
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!  Mounier to Rougemont, 12 Oct. 1934, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, Correspondence.542
!  In his letter to Berdiaev announcing the rupture with the ON, quoted above, Mounier wrote: ‘Je vais organiser 543
des groupes d’études, notamment, avec un élève de Sheler [sic], exilé à Paris, un groupe pour définir la 
philosophie Personnaliste-communautaire de notre mouvement.’, in Emmanuel Mounier, Oeuvres (vol. IV, Paris, 
1956), 580.
!  On the role of Landsberg at Esprit, in transferring German personalist concepts especially, see Keller, 544
'Discours parallèles et transferts culturels, Scheler, Landsberg et Mounier'); Thomas Keller, 'Médiateurs 
personnalistes entre générations non-conformistes en Allemagne et en Frence: Alexandre Marc et Paul L. 
Landsberg', in Gilbert Merlio (ed.) Ni gauche, ni droite: Les chassés-croisés idéologiques des intellectuels 
français et allemands dans l'entre-deux-guerres (Talence, 1995); Keller, 'Le personnalisme de l'entre-deux-
guerres’, 447-9. See also my final Chapter.
!  See in particular the research on the theme ‘Personne et communauté’ launched by Esprit in the Spring of 545
1934, which was reported in the Journal intérieur des Amis d’Esprit in July 1934, analysed in Roy, Alexandre 
Marc et la Jeune Europe, 418-19. And the section ‘Comment le personnalisme devint communautaire’, in Roy, 
'Emmanuel Mounier, Alexandre Marc et les origines du personnalisme’, 36-42.
balanced account of the relations between the two personalist groups as it was Denis de 
Rougemont who embodied the continued cooperation between Esprit and ON.  
!
Rougemont’s ‘Définition de la personne’ represented both Esprit and the ON: it fitted 
into the development of personalism at Esprit, made public in December 1934; at the same 
time, following ON, Rougemont warned Esprit against the risks of of drifting into 
collectivism in the name of community. This double purpose makes ‘Définition de la 
personne’ the key text to understand the pluralisation of personalism(s) in 1934. 
!
 To introduce his ‘Définition de la personne’ in Esprit (December 1934), Rougemont 
indicated that he was an editor of L’Ordre Nouveau and of Hic et Nunc.   This set him as a 546
personalist young Barthian. He hoped his definition of the person would be a contribution to 
‘le bien commun de sa génération.’   Analysis of the article shows that he had not conceded a 547
single point to Mounier, Landsberg, Berdiaev, and Marcel – and his self-confidence in front of 
eminent philosophers is an interesting feature for the biographer.  
!
Rougemont played on the etymology of persona – as the mask worn by actors in 
ancient drama – to bring in the image of a theatre, representing life, in which walk-ons and 
actors had to play, or rather to invent, their own drama. Rougemont suggested that one could 
only identify the faces of the actors, the true dramatis personae, who really acted (but this 
brings us back to the ambivalence of the notion of person as a mask: in Ancient drama one 
could not see the actual faces). That the act expressed the person ‘et nous sculpte un visage 
lisible’ was the leitmotiv of Russian personalism (because ‘person’ and ‘face’ are the same 
word in Russian: ‘litso’).  
!
Pursuing the theatrical image, Rougemont emphasised two types of performers: ‘de 
l’individu à la personne, la différence est celle du figurant anonyme à l’acteur, de celui qui fait 
nombre à celui qui fait loi, de celui qui regarde à celui qui s’engage.’   It was up to each 548
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performer to decide whether he wanted to act or not. The person was essentially in 
communication, provoking or responding to others, unlike the walk-on character who carried 
on ignoring his neighbours. 
!
 In much of modern political thought, Rougemont argued, ‘l’individu n’est conçu qu’à 
partir de l’ensemble du corps social, comme un élément numérique, indifférencié, objectif. On 
l’obtient par un processus d’isolation.’   Personalism put this political theory upside down. 549
One had to start not from the social body, but from the real persons: ‘la personne est par 
excellence le terme premier, dont dépend toute réalité collective.’    Rougemont continued 550
with an ‘anti-utilitarian’ statement: ‘le bien de tous n’est ni concevable ni réalisable aux 
dépens du bien de chacun’.   First and foremost there was each concrete person, the 551
‘fondement nécessaire et suffisant de toute communauté’.   Rougemont questioned the point 552
of any further achievements – whether ‘l’honneur d’un pays’, ‘l’ordre de l’état’, or even 
‘l’humanité’ – if they crushed concrete persons.   553
!
In December 1934, Esprit published Rougemont’s ‘Définition de la personne’ together 
with its own research on the person and the community. Landsberg and Mounier set a 
Catholic personalism against the non-confessional approach of ON. Thus Landsberg provided 
‘Quelques réflexions sur l’idée chrétienne de la personne’, and presented his vision of saints 
as the culmination of personhood.   Following this paradigm, Mounier distinguished two 554
paths (‘deux chemins’):  
L’un aboutit à l’apothéose de la ‘personnalité’, à des valeurs qui vont, du plus bas 
degré au plus haut, de l’agressivité à la tension héroïque. Le héros en est 
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l’aboutissement suprême. On pourrait distinguer plusieurs embranchements, stoïciens, 
nietzschéen, fasciste. L’autre aboutit aux abîmes de la personne authentique, qui ne se 
trouve qu’en se donnant, et qui nous conduit aux mystères de l’être. Le saint est l’issue 
de cette voie comme le héros est l’issue de la première.    555!
The implicit inclusion of the ‘Nietzschean’ ON in the first category – among stoic and 
fascist branches – shows how much Mounier was eager to distinguish Esprit from the ON. 
The opposition between the paradigm of the hero (at ON) and the paradigm of the saint (at 
Esprit) was not totally ungrounded. While ON focused on the affirmation of personal 
existence through the act and heroic behaviour, Esprit trusted in the aspiration to sanctity and 
the role of the community in turning an individual into a person. These contrasts were more 
than mere nuances for movements seeking to trigger a revolution based on the notion of 
person. 
!
Theology was, I argue, the prime source of discord between Rougemont and Esprit 
personalists. This claim will be fully substantiated in Chapter 7. Suffice it to note here that 
Jacques Maritain admitted that Rougemont’s work on the person was useful, but, as a Thomist 
philosopher, he scorned the theological underpinnings – ‘C’est du plus faible néo-
calvinisme’.   Esprit was forced to publish a note in the following issue: ‘nous laissions à 556
l’auteur la responsabilité de son langage théologique.’   Reviewing Rougemont’s Politique 557
de la personne in 1935, Mounier wrote that his criticism resulted from two ‘théologies 
différentes du péché originel’.   This reservation aside, Mounier emphasised a shared source 558
of inspiration (‘l’inspiration voisine de la nôtre’), acknowledging thereby the kinship between 
ON and Esprit.   559
!
 Marc also acknowledged this kinship (for which he was largely responsible with his 
invention of Otto Neumann) but he thought that the expression of ‘personnalisme 
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communautaire’ was a pleonasm.   Therefore, John Hellman, in his latest book on Alexandre 560
Marc, was wrong to confuse the personalism of the ON with the communitarian personalism 
developed at Esprit from 1934 onwards.   The ON suspected that the communitarian 561
overemphasis risked valuing the cohesion of the community more than personal freedom.  
!
The communitarian emphasis was a particularity of Mounier’s personalism.  562
Landsberg, who introduced Mounier to the personalism of Scheler, was cautious to avoid 
personification of a community. As Keller has shown, by translating Scheler’s concepts of 
‘Gesamtperson’ as ‘personne de personnes’ and of ‘Lebensgemeinschaft’ as ‘personne 
collective’, and then applying these concepts to all cohesive communities, Mounier falsified 
Scheler’s initial terms.   To consider the collective person in the same way as the human 563
person may already be seen as contravening the principle of the original personalism. 
Thereafter, there is a risk that the collective person may be treated with more attention than a 
single human person. The slide toward communitarian – and possibly collectivist – ideologies 
is near, as soon as one applies the concept of person to anything but a human being. This leads 
us to consider the controversial question of a right-wing communitarian personalism. 
!
!
3. The diversification of personalism(s)!
!
It has now been established that after personalism was launched in France by the ON 
group, it was taken up by Esprit, which added the adjective ‘communitarian’ to the personalist 
revolution of ON. There were other developments of personalism in France in the mid-1930s, 
which remain either controversial (a right-wing communitarian personalism) or little known 
(the environmental personalism of the South-West of France). 
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!
A right-wing communitarian personalism!
!
The question of a right-wing personalism has been addressed recently by two 
specialists, who came out with different conclusions.   According to Véronique Auzépy-564
Chavagnac, Jean de Fabrègues was a right-wing personalist. According to Nicolas Kessler, he 
was an extreme-right thinker who spoke on themes similar to the personalists. Kessler 
assumes there cannot be a right-wing personalism. I suggest that if there is a ‘neither right nor 
left’ personalism (Ordre Nouveau) and a left-wing personalism (Esprit), there may also be a 
right-wing personalism. 
!
Jean de Fabrègues had been the secretary of Charles Maurras before taking his 
distance from the AF in 1930. He launched Réaction (1931-2) and the Revue du siècle 
(1933-4) with the motto of a ‘spiritual’ revolution. Nicolas Kessler has argued that the Revue 
du siècle (1933-4) was merely an extreme-right journal, based on a doctrine adapting Maurras 
in politics, Massis in literature, as well as the Thomists Henri Carteron and Garrigou-
Lagrange in philosophy.   Alexandre Marc and other ON members regularly published in the 565
Revue du siècle, despite the anti-revolutionary and nationalist overtones of the review.  566
There was a convergence on the question of a spiritual revolution, whatever this concept 
meant. There can be no doubt that Fabrègues was anti-revolutionary, monarchist, and 
nationalist.   Yet Fabrègues also emphasised the concept of the person, much like the ON 567
personalists. In his view, the ideal ‘personne’ was the king; he wondered: ‘n’incarne-t-il pas la 
personne opposée à l’individu, par cette fonction royale qui dépasse l’homme et n’est-il pas le 
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seul à pouvoir ainsi symboliser la continuité de la nation’?   If the distinction between person 568
and individual suffices to define personalism, Fabrègues was a right-wing personalist. 
!
In 1935, Albert Ollivier, an ON militant, was able to grasp the difference between ON 
and the right-wing press (whether personalist or not). He assessed the Revue du XXe siècle 
(gathering contributors of the late Réaction and Revue du siècle) in the following terms: 
Ce qui l’éloigne [de l’O.N.], c’est moins son monarchisme que sa haine de toute 
doctrine précise. Cette phobie engendre inévitablement un certain flottement dans leur 
position, notamment dans leur nationalisme. Car le fait national pose un authentique 
dilemme. […] Pour nous cela nous conduit au fédéralisme […], tandis que nos amis 
[…] se retranchent sur la position traditionnelle de la France grande et forte, 
« impériale et coloniale ».   569!
Thus, the disagreement between ON and young right-wing writers was neither the 
revolution, nor the restoration of French monarchy. The bone of contention was the question 
of national sovereignty.    570
!
In 1936, Fabrègues gave a definitive answer to the question of right-wing 
personalism.   Fabrègues thought that personalism did not apply to the majority of people: ‘il 571
y a surtout des hommes « communs ». Sont-ils « libres », sont-ils « conscients », sont-ils des 
« personnes » […] c’est là tout le nœud de ce qui nous sépare de M. de Rougemont et de M. 
Mounier’.   Unlike Rougemont (ON) and Mounier (Esprit), he thought that it was impossible 572
to organise society on the principle of personal responsibility solely: there was a need for 
more guarantees against anarchy.   For the time being, Fabrègues doubted that the ‘average’ 573
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people had the capacity to act freely and consciously.   Following Esprit, Fabrègues called 574
for a communitarian and personalist revolution: ‘On fait une révolution communautaire pour 
que l’individu soit mieux gardé, et même de lui-même, la personne est à l’autre bout : elle est 
ce qui doit être tenté, non ce qui existe au départ.’   Thus Fabrègues was a right-wing and 575
pessimist personalist, who doubted that the majority of the people had enough self-discipline 
or maîtrise de soi to act as persons. 
!
 Unlike ON and Esprit, Fabrègues did not create a personalist group among his peers. 
There was no constituted group of personalist right-wing writers. This particularly contrasts 
with the success of the Esprit groups, which formed personalist networks in the French 
province and abroad. 
!
The Esprit groups diversifies personalism(s)!
!
It is indispensable to close this study of the diversification of personalism(s) with the 
various Esprit groups that were created across France and Europe, from 1934 onwards. Esprit 
drew from the contributions of sympathisers – or ‘Amis d’Esprit’ as they were called from 
July 1933 onwards – from all over France, as well as the French-speaking parts of Belgium 
and Switzerland.   It lies far beyond the purpose of this study to detail all the groups of 576
‘Amis d’ Esprit’, which listed fifty correspondents in metropolitan France and over thirty 
correspondents abroad.   One may refer to Michel Winock for an account of the atmosphere 577
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at the Parisian journal Esprit and of the main groups that were formed in the province.   In 578
the 1930s, the personalism of Esprit remained largely limited to a French-speaking audience 
in France (with its the colonies and protectorates), Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland. The 
Esprit groups of Spain and German Switzerland did not represent more than half a dozen 
committed people, and it seems difficult to speak of groups for Britain, Holland, and Poland, 
which also counted a few ‘Amis d’Esprit’. 
!
There is one group, in the South West of France, which deserves particular attention: 
the ‘Groupe de Bordeaux des amis d’Esprit’, created at the beginning of 1934, was a model 
for the local personalist cells established by Esprit all over France, until the main 
protagonists, Bernard Charbonneau and Jacques Ellul, resigned from Esprit in early 1938. 
This group developed a third branch of French personalism, distinct from the ON and from 
Esprit, which remains little known despite its tremendous interest as one of the early 
manifestations of political ecology.   579
!
‘Le groupe des gascons’ – in Henri-Irénée Marrou’s mischievous expression – 
consisted in all the personalist groups in the South-West of France (Bordeaux, Pau, Toulouse 
and Bayonne).   The impulse came from the Bordeaux group, animated by Bernard 580
Charbonneau and Jacques Ellul,   but also the Alsatian Protestant and physicist Alfred 581
Kastler (a future Nobel Prize of Physics who would renounce atom physics after Hiroshima) 
and André Bazin (who became one of the most influential film critics in the 1940s-60s). The 
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Pau group included Jacques Thérond, the Catholic priest Jean Plaquevent,   Maurice Soutou 582
(better known under the name of Jean-Marie – under which he made it to the General 
Secretariat of the Quai d’Orsay without any degree or family connections), and the pastor 
Roger Jézéquel (who edited Hic et Nunc with Rougemont until 1936, while writing under the 
pseudonym of Roger Breuil in Esprit).  
!
In the South-West, the distinction between Parisian personalist groupings had little 
significance, and the ‘Amis d’Esprit’ were often ON sympathisers as well.   Although they 583
were closer to ON than Esprit in terms of their anti-communitarian approach, Jacques Ellul 
and Bernard Charbonneau preferred to be affiliated with Esprit because it was less Parisian 
and had a larger audience. However, in 1937-8, they accused Mounier of authoritarian and 
centralist tendencies (namely of trying to control their activities and debates from Paris), 
while at the same time being reluctant to shape a coherent revolutionary doctrine.   When 584
Mounier died however, Ellul also invoked theological reasons for his disagreement with 
Mounier,   and Charbonneau also became very critical of the religious personalism of 585
Esprit.   586
!
Ordre Nouveau emphasised federalism and Esprit stressed community, while 
Charbonneau and Ellul called attention to the necessity for a selective appropriation of 
technique. Their personalist manifesto, published recently, shows how Ellul and Charbonneau 
were able to give a new development to the ON’s personalist revolution. In 1935-6, Ellul and 
Chabonneau drew up some ‘Directives pour un manifeste personnaliste’ and distributed them 
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to the Esprit groups of the South-West of France.   The main thesis – which would make 587
Ellul famous thirty years later   – was that politics were powerless in the face of 588
technological supremacy, which controlled capitalist, fascist and communist regimes in the 
same way.   This thesis was unique at the time, although the concern with technology was 589
shared by other personalists, such as Berdiaev and Dandieu.   The latter defined technology 590
as a process of rationalisation governed by a principle of economy (technology was not to be 
mistaken with mechanisation).   Technology was an opportunity for Aron and Dandieu in La 591
Révolution nécessaire (they thought it would allow the end of the proletarian condition), 
whereas Ellul had a more pessimistic approach, as Loubet del Bayle has shown.    592
!
In all probability, Ellul and Charbonneau’s draft personalist manifesto inspired 
Mounier to write his Manifeste au service du personnalisme in 1936.   Both manifestos 593
advocated a third way and a ‘Révolution personnaliste’.   They borrowed from the 594
personalism of ON without mentioning it. Ellul and Charbonneau implicitly used the ON 
economic model – which will be studied further in Chapter 5 – and thus the economy was 
divided into the private sector (under the laws of the market) and the collective sector 
supplying the products necessary to the ‘minimum vital gratuit’ and covering, as far as 
possible, ‘le travail indifférencié […] effectué par un service civil’.   Similarly, Mounier’s 595
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Manifeste au service du personnalisme held that in the personalist society, the sector of vital 
needs would be provided for by a public service.    596
!
Following the ON idea of a federation, Mounier also suggested that economics and 
politics would be based on local communities and ‘patries’, united in a federation. Mounier’s 
personal input, in praise of labour and community life, distinguished him from the ON and 
from the Gascon personalists. Mounier shared with liberal-conservatives an understanding of 
labour as morally beneficial for the working classes; at the same time he condemned 
‘aristocratic’ leisure.   Mounier’s view of labour as moral discipline was foreign to the 597
original personalism of ON.   Thus, the ‘aristocratic’ character of ON has been opposed to 598
the ‘communitarian’ emphasis of Esprit.   599
!
As early as 1935, Ellul and Charbonneau criticised the ideology of productivity from 
an ecological point of view, which was neither idealising the land (unlike the ‘retour à la terre’ 
of right-wing movements), nor glorifying the past. They did not appeal to a mythical Golden 
Age (usually Mediaeval in character), unlike Berdiaev, Maritain, and their followers. In their 
own view, personalism was grounded in ‘le sentiment de la nature, force révolutionnaire’.  600
Ellul and Charbonneau attacked advertising and marketing as early as 1935.   They wrote 601
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!  See Mounier, Manifeste au service du personnalisme.596
!  Mounier idealized labour: ‘tout travail, même le plus ingrat, est par ailleurs un remarquable instrument de 597
discipline ; il arrache l’individu à lui-même, et développe la camaraderie dans l’œuvre et la communion dans le 
service rendu, qui préparent des communautés plus profondes’ and furthermore ‘le travail est une obligation 
universelle. Qui ne travaille pas, et le peut, ne mange pas. Ne sont exclus de cette loi, sauf vocations spéciales à 
déterminer, que les physiquement incapables de toutes catégories.’ Mounier, Manifeste au service du 
personnalisme, 169. 
!  See Chapter 5.598
!  See esp. Pascal Balmand, 'Intellectuel(s) dans l'Ordre Nouveau (1933-1938): une aristocratie de prophètes', in 599
D. Bonnaud-Lamotte and J.-L. Rispail (eds), Intellectuel(s) des années trente. Entre le rêve et l'action (Paris, 
1989); Keller, Deutsch-französische Dritte-Weg-Diskurse, 231-47, 289-95.
!  Quoted by Roy, 'Aux sources de l'écologie politique: Le personnalisme "gascon" de Bernard Charbonneau et 600
Jacques Ellul', 71. See also Troude-Chastenet, 'Jacques Ellul: une jeunesse personnaliste', 63.
!  See Bulletin du groupe de Bordeaux & [sic] des Amis d’Esprit, 2 (Dec. 1935), quoted by Roy, 'Aux sources 601
de l'écologie politique: Le personnalisme "gascon" de Bernard Charbonneau et Jacques Ellul', 81.
witty critiques of advertisements in the ON Bulletin de liaison, which would constitute the 
premise for Ellul’s Nouvelle exégèse des lieux communs.    602
!
Thus, the Bordeaux group was characterized by a radical critique of technology and 
industrial society. It was also distinctively ‘Protestant’, although Charbonneau himself was an 
agnostic. Ellul’s intellectual formation included Marx, Kierkegaard, and Karl Barth.  603
Despite similar approaches with Ellul, resulting from the influence of Kierkegaard and Barth 
in particular, Rougemont’s contacts with the Bordeaux Esprit group seem to have been 
limited in the 1930s. I have not been able to trace any correspondence, for example. However, 
Rougemont cooperated with Charbonneau in the Esprit congress of 1937, as Charbonneau 
took part in Rougemont’s workshop against ‘totalitarian’ regimes. Turning to ecology in the 
1960s and 1970s, Rougemont would meet their concerns again.    604
!
!
In sum, Rougemont was the most active figure in building bridges between the 
personalism of ON and Esprit. Even after the official break, the doctrines of ON and Esprit 
remained interrelated. The two main French personalist movements, ON and Esprit, were 
most distant between the Winter 1933-4 and the summer of 1936, at the very period when 
Rougemont was away from Paris. This gives an indication of the effectiveness of 
Rougemont’s mediating role. It is not to idealize the role of Rougemont to say that he was a 
mediator, as he may have held the position of a mediator at the expense of originality. As 
Abbé Jean Plaquevent once told Marc: ‘votre Rougemont est un exprimeur, et non un 
créateur’.   This position of mediator and expresser would be actively sought by Rougemont 605
in the post-war period, when he acted as an intermediary between the militants for a European 
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!  See Ellul ‘Exégèse des lieux communs: personnalité partout’, Bulletin de liaison, 2nd year, 12 (1 June 1936), 602
4; Charbonneau, ‘Exégèse des lieux communs: du prestige moral’, Bulletin de liaison, 2nd year, 13 (1 July 1936), 
2.
!  Troude-Chastenet, 'Jacques Ellul: une jeunesse personnaliste', 55-75.603
!  Later in life, Rougemont would develop many of the themes of the environmental personalism of Ellul and 604
Charbonneau. Whereas the ‘Gascons’ showed environmental concern from the 1930s, it was only in the 1960s 
that Rougemont came to study the ecological implications of personalism, joining them in the ECOROPA group. 
For a synthesis of Rougemont’s personalism emphasising ecology and regionalism, see Rougemont, L'Avenir est 
notre affaire.
!  Alexandre Marc, ‘Vers une lumière qui ne s’éteint jamais’, 'Denis de Rougemont. De Neuchâtel à l'Europe', 605
Nouvelle Revue Neuchâteloise, 47 (Autumn 1995), 64.
federation and more established milieux, whether political or cultural.   In 1930s Europe, 606





!  In particular, see his role as founder and president of the ‘Centre Européen de la Culture’ (1950-85) and in the 606
various ‘Congrès pour la liberté de la culture’ (1950-75), in Deering, Combats acharnés: Denis de Rougemont et 
les fondements de l'unité européenne; Grémion, Intelligence de l'anticommunisme. Le Congrès pour la liberté de 
la culture à Paris 1950-1975. 
!
Chapter 4. Federation or failure of personalism(s)!!
!
!
From 1932 onwards, Rougemont stood out as a mediator between the different personalist 
movements, not in the sense that he was a neutral arbiter, but in so far as he sought to federate 
them. Mounier wrote in his diary: ‘De Rougemont me le disait hier : « C’est son caractère 
collectif qui caractérise surtout notre mouvement : pas de génie, mais un faisceau de foi et de 
travail ! »’   Not being a genius, Rougemont may have sought to play a role as mediator 607
because he was not of the highest calibre as a writer and a philosopher. But Rougemont also 
had faith in personalism as a united, or rather federated, movement. How could personalists 
convince of the necessity of personal relationships if they themselves stood divided by bitter 
quarrels? As international tensions grew and the polarisation of European societies built up, 
Rougemont intensified his efforts to federate the various personalist movements.  
!
Three stages may be distinguished in Rougemont’s efforts to federate the personalist 
movements. The episode of the ‘Cahier de revendications’ in 1932, and the debate that 
followed in 1933, mark the first stage of Rougemont’s engagement for a common front of 
personalist writers. In the second stage, between 1934 and 1936, Rougemont stood isolated in 
his attempts to radicalise and confederate the French and Swiss personalist movements. The 
very repetition of his attempts emphasises the failure of the personalist revolution in the 
1930s. These attempts were not entirely in vain, however, since they represented a defence of 
a certain European culture. Finally, after 1936, Rougemont’s endeavours to federate 
personalists in France and in Switzerland illustrate his ‘active pessimism’ in politics, drawn 
from the motto of William the Silent: ‘One need not hope in order to undertake; nor succeed 
in order to persevere’. Thus, Rougemont’s role as a mediator oscillates between the desired 




!  Mounier, Mounier et sa génération, Lettres, carnets et inédits, 100.607
1. The episode of the ‘Cahier de revendications’ (1932-3)!
!
In 1932, a common cause of revolutionary youth appeared under the following 
slogans: ‘ni droite ni gauche’, ‘jeunesse révolutionnaire’, and ‘primauté du spirituel’. The 
common cause was presented in the ‘Cahier de revendications’, which Rougemont edited at 
the NRF in December 1932.   The importance of the ‘Cahier de revendications’ for 608
establishing the idea of a common front of revolutionary youth is well known since Loubet 
del Bayle’s classic study of Les Non-conformistes des années trente.   The cultural historian 609
Michel Trebitsch has given us a revised analysis of the ‘Cahier de revendications’: he has 
shown that it suited ON to uphold a common front, and that Rougemont promoted the ON 
political tactic instead of being an impartial editor.   Thus, the common front of 610
revolutionary youth presented in the ‘Cahier de revendications’ has been proved to be a 
political device.   For its political agenda, Rougemont’s ‘Cahier de revendications’ occupied 611
a central place in French intellectual life. 
!
One question remains unanswered: how did a young and relatively obscure Swiss 
writer manage to edit some fifty pages – mostly signed by unknown writers – at the most 
prestigious literary journal of the time? Bruno Ackermann has given elements of an answer 
with his research on Rougemont’s moves in 1932, and once again, I acknowledge my 
indebtedness to him.   In this section, I emphasise two crucial points, which have been 612
overlooked thus far, without which it is impossible to answer the above question. Firstly, the 
international dimension of the ‘Cahier’ has been neglected. It is significant that the project at 
the NRF followed on from Rougemont’s article ‘Cause commune’, published in the Swiss 
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!  See esp. Rougemont, 'Cahier de Revendications (Présentation)', 801.608
!  The analysis of Loubet del Bayle is a classic of the history of political thought in France. Loubet del Bayle, 609
Les non-conformistes des années trente, 170-6. Republished in 2001.
!  See Trebitsch, 'Le front commun de la jeunesse intellectuelle. Le "Cahier de revendications" de décembre 610
1932’, esp. 211-12. On the federative role of ON, see also Loubet del Bayle’s Chapter 2: ‘Le rôle de 
“conciliateur” de l’Ordre Nouveau’, Loubet del Bayle, Les non-conformistes des années trente.
!  For a recent re-evaluation of the ‘common front’, see ‘Les nouvelles relèves à l’heure du “non-611
conformisme” (1932-1933)’, Dard, Le Rendez-vous manqué des relèves des années 30, 151-78.
!  Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 208-22.612
journal Présence.   It is my contention that his role in French cultural life and in the 613
European personalist movement cannot be understood without taking into account his Swiss 
Protestant background.   Secondly, Rougemont’s literary approach (overlooked by political 614
historians so far) explains much of the controversy subsequent to the publication of the 
‘Cahier’. Finally, I conclude that Rougemont articulated the first significant manifestation of 




 When Jean Paulhan invited young revolutionaries (most of them unknown) to 
publish their claims in the NRF, he was responding to a move towards the politicisation of 
literature. He had a gift for titles: ‘A la réflexion, Revendications ou Cahier de revendications 
me semble un titre parfait’ – suggesting the ‘Cahiers de doléances’ and the French 
Revolution.   The ‘Cahier de revendications’ took up forty-five pages of the December 1932 615
issue of NRF.    Rougemont’s role as an editor was ambivalent. ‘En [sa] qualité de 616
« compère-introducteur »’, as Georges Izard put it, he introduced the contributors, but he was 
also their accomplice.   On the one hand, Rougemont acted as a go-between young 617
revolutionary writers and the prestigious literary institution of the NRF (he asked for 
contributions and edited the texts). On the other hand, Rougemont proved to be an active 
participant rather than an impartial editor. 
!
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!  Rougemont, 'Cause commune'.613
!  He would make an interesting case-study for a research on the politico-literary relations between France and 614
French Switzerland. The ambivalence of his attitude vis-à-vis Switerzland, at once showed as a model for the 
world and summoned to give up its prejudices and pettiness, is expressed for instance in Denis de Rougemont, 
Mission ou démission de la Suisse (Neuchâtel, 1940); Rougemont, La Suisse ou l'histoire d'un peuple heureux. 
See also the works of a collaborator of Rougemont at the European Centre for Culture, obviously influenced by 
Rougemont, André Reszler, Mythes et identité de la Suisse (Geneva, 1986).
!  Paulhan to Rougemont, 28 Oct. 1932, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont papers, Correspondance.615
!  For a summary, see Dard, Le Rendez-vous manqué des relèves des années 30, 156-7.616
!  Georges Izard to Rougemont, non dated (Oct. or Nov. 1932), Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, File: 617
‘La NRF, Cahier de revendications, décembre 1932, 2’.
 Nicolas Kessler is mistaken when he writes that Rougemont’s presentation was 
apolitical and ‘ne procède […] d’aucune arrière pensée idéologique’.   Kessler takes for 618
granted that there is no political force behind the NRF’s ‘Cahier’: ‘Les tendances les plus 
diverses s’y côtoient, sans qu’aucune ne tente jamais de tirer la couverture à elle. […] On ne 
saurait mieux souligner l’étonnante neutralité de la « communauté d’attitudes essentielles » 
célébrée par Rougemont.’   Far from being neutral, Rougemont’s presentation was a piece of 619
personalist propaganda. Michel Trebitsch has given us an insightful presentation of the 
‘Cahier’ by underlining the ‘bizarreries du sommaire’, and showing that the awkward 
selection of contributors boosted the importance of ON as a revolutionary group.   However, 620
it is surprising that, so far, no study of the ‘Cahier de revendications’ has sought to explain 
how a relatively obscure French Swiss writer could be responsible for putting together the 
claims of French revolutionary youth in the prestigious NRF. 
!
Several factors contribute to explain Rougemont’s responsibilities in 1932. He was not 
a stranger to Paulhan.   When he was entrusted with editing the ‘Cahier de revendications’, 621
Rougemont had already published six book reviews and a study on Goethe in the NRF.   It 622
was a favour on Paulhan’s part that a young writer would get to publish several book reviews 
in the NRF: such reviews were remunerated and usually set aside for renowned writers. 
Besides literary tastes, Rougemont shared with Paulhan the ideal of transcending political 
cleavages, the categorical exclusion of Action Française, and the search for a non-communist 
doctrine of action.   A last factor may have encouraged Paulhan to delegate the edition of the 623
‘Cahier de revendications’ to Rougemont: the very fact that Rougemont was an outsider vis-à-
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!  Kessler, Histoire politique de la Jeune Droite (1929-1942). Une révolution conservatrice à la française, 217.618
!  Kessler, Histoire politique de la Jeune Droite (1929-1942). Une révolution conservatrice à la française, 619
217-18.
!  Michel Trebitsch spoke of the ‘bizarreries du sommaire’, in Trebitsch, 'Le front commun de la jeunesse 620
intellectuelle. Le "Cahier de revendications" de décembre 1932’, 212.
!  See their correspondence in August 1932, quoted in Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie 621
intellectuelle, 1, 315.
!  Rougemont, 'Le silence de Goethe', 480-94. (Also in Rougemont, Les Personnes du drame, 23-40.) In March 622
1932, Jean Paulhan wrote to Marcel Jouhandeau ‘A propos de Goethe, lisez le Silence de G. par Denis de 
Rougemont, que j’ai trouvé beau’, quoted in Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 
206-7. See Rougemont’s contribution to the ‘Décades de Pontigny’, 8-18 Sept. 1932: Rougemont, 'Goethe 
médiateur', 11-21. Also in Rougemont, Les Personnes du drame, 41-9.
!  Rougemont largely followed the line that Paulhan tried to give to NRF. On this line see esp. Sapiro, La 623
Guerre des écrivains, 1940-1953, 136.
vis the French political debate, as a Swiss and a Protestant. Rougemont was not to be caught 
in the political cleavage laïcité v. Catholicism that deeply marked the Third Republic. For an 
impartial presentation however, Paulhan made a poor choice in Rougemont. 
!
The aim of the ‘Cahier de revendication’, as Rougemont admitted to Paul Nizan, was 
revolutionary: ‘Il s’agit purement et simplement, dans mon esprit, de propagande 
révolutionnaire, et non pas d’une enquête destinée à renseigner le public bourgeois.’  624
Thereafter, he had no qualms in providing NRF readers with a biased presentation. 
Rougemont started by suggesting that the contributions represented groupings,   whereas in 625
fact they were individual. Then, Rougemont discriminated against the two Marxist authors 
(Henri Lefebvre   and Paul Nizan  ), by not introducing Marxism along with the other 626 627
movements, and expressing strong reservations vis-à-vis a possible cooperation with 
communism.   Rougemont had managed to secure the contribution of communists by 628
emphasising revolutionary tactic, whilst claiming to respect doctrinal differences between 
Marxists and non-Marxist movements.   629
!
Jean Paulhan made no claims to control Rougemont’s choice of contributors, although 
he gave his opinion on the various articles submitted, and strongly advised Rougemont to 
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!  Rougemont to Nizan, Draft letter non dated (Autumn 1932), Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, File: 624
‘La NRF, Cahier de revendications, décembre 1932, 2’.
!  ‘Des groupes tels quel l’Ordre Nouveau, Combat, Esprit, Plans, Réaction, par leur volonté proclamée de 625
rupture, et plus encore par leurs revendications constructives, révèlent peut-être, dans leur diversité, les 
premières lignes de force d’une nouvelle révolution française.’ The reference to 1789 shed light on the title 
suggested by Paulhan. Rougemont, 'Cahier de Revendications (Présentation)', 801.
!  Henri Lefebvre (1901-91), philosopher and sociologist. Member of the Communist Party between 1927 and 626
1958. Since 1929, Lefebvre was one of the main contributors to the Revue marxiste and a defender of the 
Association des Ecrivains et Artistes révolutionnaires (AEAR), founded in January 1932 and directed by Paul 
Vaillant-Couturier under the control of the Communist Party.
!  Paul Nizan (1905-1940) remains one of the most famous Communist writer of the 1930s. A former 627
contributor to the Revue Marxiste, he became a permanent member of the Communist Party in 1932 and one of 
the most active member of the Association des Ecrivains et Artistes révolutionnaires (AEAR). See the special 
issue on 'Paul Nizan et les années trente', Aden, 2 (Oct. 2003).
!  Marxism was presented with great reservations: ‘Il se peut qu’il y trouve quelques appuis occasionnels; et 628
certains de leurs objectifs respectifs sont communs…’ Rougemont, 'Cahier de Revendications (Présentation)', 
801.
!  See the letter from Rougemont to Nizan quoted above. Rougemont added: ‘Sans vouloir en aucune façon 629
masquer les oppositions irréductibles qui séparent ces divers groupes, je pense qu’il serait de bonne tactique que 
l’accent fût mis, de tous côtés, sur le refus de dissocier la pensée et l’action, qui nous oppose à l’anarchie du 
monde capitaliste.’ See Rougemont to Nizan, Draft letter non dated (Autumn 1932), Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., 
Rougemont Papers, File: ‘La NRF, Cahier de revendications, décembre 1932, 2’. 
abandon the papers of Marc and Sylveire.   Rougemont did not follow Paulhan’s advice, nor 630
did he give in to pressure from those at ON who were disappointed not to participate. Indeed, 
it has been mentioned already that a crisis had erupted within the ON group on 9 November 
1934, when Daniel-Rops complained that he had been left out of Rougemont’s project for the 
NRF.    Unable to extend the survey, Rougemont may have suggested that the names of ON 631
members be added to one of the articles already written. This suggestion – or rather the 
rumour of it – infuriated two early ON members, Pierre-Olivier Lapie and Gabriel Rey.   As 632
president of ON, Jacques Naville insisted that the contributions should not be made in the 
name of the ON group, but only as individual opinions.   The crisis worsened rapidly. 633
!
 Before the publication of the ‘Cahier’, ON lost Lapie, Naville, Poncet, and Rey (i.e. a 
third of the official members of ON).   While the ‘Cahier’ was the alleged reason, one can 634
doubt that it was ‘la cause déterminante’ of this crisis.   It seemed to result from a clash of 635
personalities (Alexandre Marc, the founder of ON, was not the only difficult character), as 
well as a conflict over the meaning of the ‘spiritual’ revolution. The actual reason for the 
dispute was made public the following year, when Lapie attacked the Catholic allegiances of 
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!  Paulhan wrote to Rougemont: ‘Lefebvre me semble excellent […] ; Nizan, un peu sommaire, mais amusant 630
[…] ; Lamour, acceptable ; Maulnier tout à fait excellent de pensée […] ; Dandieu, fort maladroit […] Mounier, 
pas du tout déplaisant […]. Je me passerais fort bien de René Dupuis : mais il est vrai qu’il représente quelque 
chose qui a droit à l’existence.’ By contrast, Paulhan strongly advised Rougemont to leave aside the 
contributions of Sylveire and Marc, the former seeming ‘purement verbal, insignifiant et criard’ and the latter 
‘banal, plat et tout à fait creux.’, see Paulhan’s letter to Rougemont, 15 Nov. 1932, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., 
Rougemont papers, Correspondance.
!  Daniel-Rops to Jacques Naville, 9 Nov. 1932; and Daniel-Rops to Rougemont, 13 Nov. 1932, Neuchâtel, 631
B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, File: ‘La NRF, Cahier de revendications, décembre 1932, 2’.
!  P.O. Lapie to Rougemont, 9 Nov. 1932; Gabriel Rey to Rougemont, 13 Nov. 1932, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., 632
Rougemont Papers, File: ‘La NRF, Cahier de revendications, décembre 1932, 2’.
!  Jacques Naville to Rougemont, 10 Nov. 1932, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, File: ‘La NRF, 633
Cahier de revendications, décembre 1932, 2’.
!  ‘Après deux années d’expériences consciencieuse et approfondie [sic], nous sommes arrivées [sic] à cette 634
conclusion, au cours de deux récents entretiens, que l’Ordre Nouveau est un mouvement plein d’équivoques et 
de contradictions internes auxquelles il ne nous est plus possible dorénavant de collaborer. Veuillez trouver ici 
notre démission. […] Signé : P.O. Lapie; J. Naville; A. Poncet; G. Rey.’ ‘Lettre destinée aux membres du Groupe 
de l’Ordre Nouveau par laquelle les signataires donnent leur démission de ce groupe’, 13 Nov. 1932, Neuchâtel, 
B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, File: ‘La NRF, Cahier de revendications, décembre 1932, 2’.
!  Loubet del Bayle wrote: ‘La cause déterminante fut peut-être même d’ordre purement anecdotique : les 635
« dissidents » avaient été ulcérés, en décembre 1932, de n’avoir pas été invités à collaborer au « Cahier de 
Revendications » préparé pour La nouvelle revue française par Denis de Rougemont.’ Loubet del Bayle, Les 
non-conformistes des années trente, 103 n.20.
Daniel-Rops and Alexandre Marc, under the guise of a ‘Polémique cordiale’ with ON.  636
Lapie insinuated that ON had rallied the Catholic ecclesiastical authorities.   When Lapie and 637
Poncet – who edited Mouvements, Bulletin d’information sur les tendances nouvelles – 
resigned, ON lost a supporting review. Thereafter, it launched its own journal (first issue in 
May 1933), ‘que l’on imprime à Ligugé, à l’ombre du monastère bénédictin’, Lapie 
reproached.   Besides this long term consequence, the incident of the resignation reveals the 638
frailty of the ON group, and emphasises the significance the ‘Cahier de revendications’ as the 
first public manifestation of ON. 
!
Not only did the NRF provide young writers with a significant remuneration,   it also 639
represented an exceptional opportunity to reach a wide audience. Until the Autumn of 1932, 
ON remained voluntarily restricted to limited circles. At the beginning of November 1932, 
Robert Aron started investigating the possibilities for ON to expand, ‘par un groupement des 
« Amis des Consultations de Paris », qui participerait aux manifestations et/ou à la 
propagande de l’ON.’   In December 1932, the ‘Cahier de revendications’ in the NRF was an 640
unprecedented opportunity for ON to enlarge its public. In this way, Rougemont’s connections 
in the literary world served the ON revolutionary cause. 
!
The predominance of ON in the ‘Cahier’ was unmistakable: six out of thirteen 
contributors were ON members.   Marc and Dupuis claimed to write for the group ‘Combat’, 641
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!  This suspicion, albeit exaggerated, was justified by the close ties that Marc developed with the Dominican 637
monastery of Juvisy and the Abbé Plaquevent (who informally acted as a mediator between the Catholic 
personalists and the ecclesiastical authorities in France). See Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 381-3. In 
1933, Lapie shifted to the left, while Marc joined the Roman Catholic Church. On the role of Dandieu’s death, 
the Abbé Plaquevent, and Denis de Rougemont in Marc’s decision to be baptised, see Roy, Alexandre Marc et la 
Jeune Europe, 132-4.
!  N.D.L.R. ‘Polémique cordiale – L’Ordre Nouveau’, Mouvements, 9 (June 1933), 1.638
!  A letter from Georges Izard to Rougemont mentioned a sum of 7000 to 8000 Francs per article. See Georges 639
Izard to Rougemont, non dated (Oct. or Nov. 1932), Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, File: ‘La NRF, 
Cahier de revendications, décembre 1932, 2’.
!  Robert Aron to the O.N. members, 1 Nov. 1932, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, File: ‘La NRF, 640
Cahier de revendications, décembre 1932, 2, Correspondance, Cahier de revendications, Articles – coupures de 
journaux.’
!  Besides Rougemont, the contributors were, by order of appearance: Henri Lefebvre, Paul Nizan, Philippe 641
Lamour, Jean Sylveire, Thierry Maulnier, Arnaud Dandieu, Claude Chevalley, Emmanuel Mounier, Georges 
Izard, Alexandre Marc, René Dupuis, and Robert Aron. The ON contributors were: Dandieu, Chevalley, Marc, 
Dupuis, Aron, plus Rougemont.
invented for the occasion, so as to artificially boost ON presence in the ‘Cahier’.    Esprit 642
was represented by Emmanuel Mounier, Georges Izard and Jean Sylveire. Thierry Maulnier 
was the only right-wing writer. Strangely enough, Maulnier was introduced as a member of 
the group Réaction (launched by Jean de Fabrègues in 1930, whose journal had been 
interrupted in July 1932), whereas he actually belonged to the team of the Revue française 
around Jean-Pierre Maxence.   Did Rougemont try to undermine the appeal of the extreme-643
right in 1932?   In his presentation of Maulnier, Rougemont drew a parallel – which was 644
‘curieux’ indeed – between Nizan and Maulnier.   This strange parallel justifies Michel 645
Trebitsch’s suspicion that the ‘Cahier’ had been ordered ‘comme si les “extrêmes” de gauche 
et de droite étaient, sinon des otages, du moins des cautions à ce bel œcuménisme’.   The 646
common cause presented by Rougemont served ON purposes well. 
!
From 1931, ON developed a ‘common front’ strategy, defined by a triple negation: 
rejection of the parliamentary system, rejection of political theories based on class-struggle, 
and rejection of nationalism.   The context, both in France and in Europe, favoured the 647
formation of a common front. International cooperation seemed necessary to face the 
increasing hostility of Germany, linked to the dramatic increase of the NSDAP, and the 
incipient Great Depression (which spared France until the end of 1931). The French political 
scene showed the discredit of traditional political forces: the Socialist Party was split by the 
debates that would lead to the exclusion of the ‘Neos’ in the Autumn of 1933;   the Radical 648
!  142
!  Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 356.642
!  The Revue française, founded in 1905 by Antoine Rédier and run by Maxence since 1930, represented a 643
relatively large audience (up to 7000 subscribers). On the Revue française, Jean-Pierre Maxence, Robert 
Brasillach and Thierry Maulnier, see Kessler, Histoire politique de la Jeune Droite (1929-1942). Une révolution 
conservatrice à la française, 137-73. 
!  In 1932, Maulnier had published a collection of articles claiming that La crise est dans l’homme, which had 644
been unanimously praised in the extreme-right press as well as in NRF. Kessler, Histoire politique de la Jeune 
Droite (1929-1942). Une révolution conservatrice à la française, 211-13.
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écrivain communiste, Nizan, et d’un écrivain « d’extrème droite », Maulnier (collaborateur de l’Action française 
et de Réactions).’, in ‘Cahier de revendications’, NRF, 231 (Dec. 1932), 817.
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212.
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!  In November 1933, the group of the Neo-socialists (including Marcel Déat, Renaudel and Marquet), which 648
was influenced by the planism of Henri de Man, was expelled from the Section Française de l’Internationale 
Ouvrière (SFIO) and created the Parti Socialiste Français (PSF).
Party was similarly loosing its young militants; and the right-wing was overwhelmed by the 
progression of the leagues (the Action Française, but also new leagues such as Solidarité 
Française, created in July 1933).   The discrediting of political parties and the (apparent) 649
demise of capitalism seemed to justify the search for an alternative. 
!
As we shall see in Chapter 5, ON political project was a European federation based not 
on nation-states but on regions (defined roughly by the sentimental attachment to the native 
landscape).   Esprit copied ON with respect to political theory and personalism. It is worth 650
noting an explicit statement that Esprit’s source of inspiration was ON in 1932: Rougemont 
remarked, in his introduction to Georges Izard’s article, that the distinction between ‘petite 
patrie’ and ‘nation culturelle’ was ‘le principe du régionalisme que le groupe Esprit (reprenant 
le vocabulaire de L’Ordre Nouveau) utilise comme base d’action.’   Both ON and Esprit, 651
defined the region as the appropriate scale for political action. The region (or ‘la petite patrie’) 
was said to be natural, as opposed to the artificial construct of states. A group of regions 
formed a broader cultural unit, ‘la nation culturelle’, which was necessarily open to the world. 
In this way, ON and Esprit meant to oppose nationalism and idolatry of the state. 
!
The choice and presentation of testimonies fitted Rougemont’s preference for ON, its 
‘common front’ strategy, but also the NRF in 1932. It suited the NRF policy that Rougemont 
marginalized the Marxists and seemed to count the Action Française as obsolete.   The 652
‘Cahier de revendications’ followed in the line of the spiritual concerns expressed in the NRF 
since the 1920s.   Rougemont managed to make the ON ‘common front’ strategy fit the 653
contents of debate at the NRF. This achievement shows his skills as a mediator. Let us now 
turn to his argument. 
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Rougemont hoped that the ‘Cahier de revendications’ would ‘déconcerter tous ceux 
qui n’imaginent de choix possible qu’entre un capitalisme plus ou moins fascistisé, et le 
communisme (plus ou moins fordisé).’   In his conclusion, Rougemont laid down the 654
principles that would motivate his lifelong opposition to Marxism: ‘L’opposition de Proudhon 
et de Marx, sur le terrain économique, traduit exactement l’opposition de Kierkegaard et de 
Hegel dans le domaine religieux. Elle traduira demain l’opposition des nations collectivistes 
et des patries personnalistes.’   Reducing Hegel and Marx to a deterministic view of history, 655
Rougemont claimed that only personalism, and not any communist revolution, could allow 
the human person to be free and responsible.   Following Proudhon, Rougemont argued that 656
the couples ‘individu-société, petite patrie-nation culturelle, initiative privée-plan’ must co-
exist in a healthy tension, and not be negated in a synthesis oppressing individual freedom.  657
The tension between two opposites defined the personalist third way: personalism was an 
attempt to find harmonious relations between the individual and the community. 
!
In Rougemont’s eyes, the alternative was simple. One had to choose between ‘deux 
positions révolutionnaires malaisément comparables : l’une matérialiste, l’autre 
personnaliste ; la première en voie de réalisation en U.R.S.S., la seconde encore mal dégagée 
de sa période de gestation docrinale.’   Rougemont did not convey the multiplicity of third-658
way discourses, nor did he express the divergences between ON and Esprit, even though he 
knew about them.   There was a sense of emergency, in view of the political situation in 659
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Europe: ‘Ce n’est plus pour quelque « idéal » que nous avons à lutter hic et nunc, mais pour 
que les hommes vivent et demeurent des hommes.’   Thus for Rougemont, unlike other ON 660
members, nuances of doctrine were secondary to the urgency of the revolution. 
!
Rougemont presented personalism as spearheading the protest movement within 
Western democracies. He also claimed: ‘L’Ordre Nouveau, Combat, Esprit, travaillent dans la 
ligne des forces révolutionnaires profondes de la France. Cette révolte de la personne, c’est la 
révolte jacobine, c’est la révolte de 89, dans ce qu’elle garde de valable et de dynamique ; 
c’est dès à présent le ressort de la nouvelle Révolution Française.’   Rougemont’s praise of 661
the French Revolution (which he had mocked in Switzerland) may be a sign of his desire for 
integration among revolutionaries in Paris. Alternatively, it may be an attempt to give the 
‘Cahier de revendications’ more weight. As the French revolutionary tradition was both 
national(ist) and universal, so the French personalist revolution was potentially universal. 
Rougemont emphasised worldwide connections: ‘En Allemagne, un groupe en croissance 
rapide, le Gegner, s’efforce de créer une unité révolutionnaire au-dessus des partis existants. 
En Angleterre (New Europe Group de A.R. Orage ; New English Weekly), en Belgique 
(plusieurs journaux), en Suisse (Eveil, Présence), en Espagne, en Hollande, en Irlande et dans 
les pays latins de l’Amérique, cette “troisième force” anticapitaliste et non-marxiste surgit, 
s’affirme.’   Rougemont also quoted an article by T.S. Eliot in The Criterion, ‘où 662
s’exprimaient des vues parfois proches de celles d’Esprit ou de Combat’.   The European 663
potential of personalism was doubtless overestimated, even though ON had established some 
contacts with revolutionary groupings in all the countries listed by Rougemont.   664
!
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Rougemont ended the ‘Cahier’ with a statement of his personal(ist) convictions: ‘Ce 
qu’il faut pour légitimer un système d’idées en elles-mêmes justes et opportunes (comme 
celles, je le crois, de l’Ordre Nouveau, de Combat ou d’Esprit) c’est une violence spirituelle 
qui existe déjà au-delà des bouleversements nécessaires ; une substance, une exigence 
impossible et qui est la seule chose que les hommes éprouvent dans le fond de leur être.’  665
This suggested a philosophy of existence. Rougemont continued: ‘Je parle de la foi chrétienne 
où je veux être, de ce suprême « choix » qui ne vient pas de moi, mais qui soudain me choisit, 
me saisit.’   This was undoubtedly a reference to a Christian understanding of vocation. This 666
particular statement, as well as Rougemont’s presentation of personalism in general, were 
unacceptable for the Marxists he had invited to contribute. The ‘Cahier de revendications’, 




A piece of personalist propaganda, it is not surprising that Rougemont’s ‘front unique, 
fût-il provisoire’ provoked dissensions among the various contributors involved. In January 
1933, Paul Nizan published a review in Europe with the intention of discrediting 
Rougemont’s presentation of the ‘Cahier’ as a ‘manoeuvre’.   As a communist, Nizan 667
repudiated any solidarity with the participants to Rougemont’s survey. Nizan accused 
Rougemont of contriving to create such a misleading impression and claimed: ‘Nous ne 
ferons pas le front unique avec n’importe qui, nous ne conclurons pas d’accords, fussent-ils 
provisoires, avec nos plus authentiques ennemis.’   He mocked those who emphasised the 668
spiritual dimension of existence: ‘Il y a l’Esprit, le Saint-Esprit, qu’ils désignent avec pudeur 
par périphrase, il y a l’Etre, les Notions Spirituelles, l’Ame, la Possession de toute la Vie, la 
Contemplation, l’Intelligence-Epée : une flotte d’Idées s’avance, toutes voiles dehors, une 
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!  Nizan, 'Sur un certain front unique', 137-8.668
flotte de majuscules.’   For Nizan, personalism was either a crypto-Christian movement or a 669
form of philosophical idealism. 
!
In January 1933, the spiritual third way of ON and Esprit remained imprecise. This 
paved the way for insinuations that the spiritual revolution may be the forerunner of fascist 
ideas in France.   Nizan quoted Jean Guéhenno, the editor of Europe, who, in August 1932, 670
warned that spiritual third-way groupings may form a future ‘mouvement national socialiste 
français’.   Nizan suggested that since National Socialism had developed in relation to 671
phenomenology in Germany, from Kierkegaard through Heidegger to the ‘doctrine fasciste’, a 
similar phenomenon might be under way in France, with the introduction of Kierkegaard by 
Jean Wahl and Rougemont.   Slipping from an unquestionable point (the opposition of 672
Kierkegaard to Hegel and by extension to Marxism) to the cheap discrediting of a doctrine 
(assimilating Kierkegaard with the first lineaments of a fascist doctrine) was a common 
feature of the fascist/anti-fascist debate. 
!
Paradoxically, Rougemont proved more offended by the accusation of 
‘manœuvre’ (which was not ungrounded) than by the charge of fascism (which was wrong, as 
we shall see in Chapter 6).   To Rougemont, it was banal that a communist should call him 673
fascist: ‘Je ne répondrai pas ici à votre accusation de fascisme, je sais trop bien que, sous la 
plume d’un stalinien de Paris, elle exprime le désir de déconsidérer à peu de frais l’adversaire, 
plutôt que de porter un jugement objectif sur ses doctrines.’   Seeking to justify his editorial 674
role, Rougemont explained that Nizan had contributed in full awareness of the other 
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participants.   A letter from Rougemont to Paulhan confirms this, and Nizan did not deny 675
it.    676
!
From the literary point of view, Rougemont and Nizan were relatively close. 
Rougemont had felt sympathy for Nizan’s Aden Arabie   and Les Chiens de garde.   Both 677 678
Nizan and Rougemont argued for the necessity of uniting thought and action. They were 
among the first to use the military concept of engagement for literature.   However, it was 679
clear in 1933, that their political choices drove a wedge between them. In June 1933, 
Rougemont mocked Nizan (and Gide when he became a Communist) in ‘La légion étrangère 
soviétique’ – ‘Elle est formée d’intellectuels français.’   Rougemont felt that: ‘L’adhésion au 680
soviétisme d’un certain nombre d’« hommes de pensée » résulte […] d’une psychose de 
démission. […] A [l’] engagement personnel, nos révoltés préfèrent l’engagement dans un 
parti.’   More than fifty years later, Rougemont was still offended by Nizan’s partisan 681
attitude.   682
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!  ‘Le mensonge était énorme, total, totalitaire. Et je me suis vu contraint de mesurer, ce jour-là, pour la 682
première fois si durement, le degré d’abaissement moral auquel la discipline partisane, totalitaire, peut réduire un 
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!
 Like Nizan, Philippe Lamour insisted that he was not aware that his contribution to the 
‘Cahier de revendications’ would be placed within a ‘front commun’ between the Association 
des Ecrivains et Artistes Révolutionnaires and ‘ce spiritualisme aussi vague qu’abstrait’ that 
Mounier embodied.   Before the publication of the ‘Cahier’, he had admitted to Rougemont: 683
‘je me suis engueulé avec Alexandre [Marc]’.   In 1933, he chose communism and rejected 684
personalism.   In his objection to personalism, ‘cette nouvelle école spiritualiste qui se 685
proclame bizarrement révolutionnaire et antimarxiste’, the adverb emphasised the originality 




Following the publication of the ‘Cahier de revendications’, Jean Paulhan wrote to 
Denis de Rougemont : ‘Il se dégage des nouvelles lettres que je reçois à peu près la réaction 
suivante : « Ce que dit Denis de Rougemont est très bien mais cela pourrait sembler dans un 
an tout à fait ridicule. Qu’est-il disposé à faire dès maintenant ? »’   The opportunity and 687
feasibility of the personalist revolution had to be proved rapidly. Rougemont’s plan was to 
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convince ‘les intellectuels’.   In particular Rougemont targeted those who saw Marxism as 688
the only consistent revolutionary force, and yet agreed its premises were false. Personalism 
would become the revolutionary alternative to Marxism, provided intellectuals became 
interested, debated, and developed personalist ideas. Rougemont stongly believed in the 
power of ideas to change the world. 
!
Reviews of the ‘Cahier de revendications’ emphasised that the personalist revolution 
seemed impractical, if not dangerously ambiguous.   A reviewer pointed out (rightly) that ‘au 689
point de vue positif et constructif, ces révolutionnaires ne s’entendent sur rien d’autre que sur 
l’emploi du terme [révolutionnaire]’.   Rougemont admitted that the ‘Cahier de 690
revendications’ was not constructive as such. He intended to develop plans for action in a 
second publication by the NRF.   This second episode never came to completion because 691
Rougemont was discouraged by endless talks and disputes in revolutionary groupings.   The 692
anti-Marxist revolution outlined in the ‘Cahier’ was amply debated in 1933, without much 
practical outcome. 
!
Paul Desjardins, who hosted discussions of topical issues in the context of his ‘Union 
pour la vérité’ founded in the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair,   and during his ‘Décades de 693
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Pontigny’ each summer, organised debates on the non-Marxist revolutionary positions 
expounded in the ‘Cahier de revendications’. On 18 February 1933, he arranged for a 
conference at the ‘Union pour la vérité’.   Daniel-Rops was the keynote speaker. He 694
addressed the question of ‘positions révolutionnaires non-marxistes’ with particular reference 
to Mounier, Maxence, Rougemont, Aron, and Dandieu.   An animated debate followed 695
between Dandieu, Mounier, Georges Izard, Thierry Maulnier and André Chamson, among 
others.   Since the work of Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle, the fact that all these non-marxist 696
revolutionaries shared the same stage has been widely seen a proof of the common front of 
the ‘non-conformistes des années trente’.    697
!
Paul Desjardins had also been organising ten-day sessions at the Abbey of Pontigny, 
since 1905, to debate literary, philosophical, social or political issues.   Between 3-13 698
September 1933, the ‘Décades de Pontigny’ focused on ‘le caractère révolutionnaire des 
événements actuels’. Rougemont was invited on account of his ‘Cahier de revendications’ and 
his ‘initiative dans une réunion rue Visconti 21’ on non-Marxist revolutionary positions.  699
Desjardins asked Rougemont to designate those who would be competent among his 
contemporaries: Alexandre Marc would thus be invited through Rougemont.   Then, as when 700
he edited the ‘Cahier de revendications’ at the NRF, Rougemont acted as a mediator between 
established literary milieux and personalist groupings. 
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the invitation of Marc through Rougemont, see the note from Marc asking Rougemont to check that he is really 
invited, Neuchâtel, B.P.U.N., Rougemont Papers, Dossier Ordre Nouveau.
!
Unsurprisingly, the idea of an anti-Marxist spiritual revolution found a better echo on 
the right than on the left. The anti-Marxist strategy of the common front of revolutionary 
youth was attacked en bloc in the left-wing press (Commune and Europe).   The right-wing 701
might have welcomed it as an anti-Marxist device, had it not been for the idea of revolution. 
Robert Garric, in La Revue des jeunes, thought there was no need for a ‘révolution 
spirituelle’.   The youth was overreacting: ‘On n’envoie un tel S.O.S. au monde que si tout 702
semble actuellement déshonoré et perdu.’   It is interesting to quote Rougemont’s reaction 703
(in the margins of Garric’s text) because it shows the sense of the emergency he felt: 
‘précisément, ce qui se passe prépare une catastrophe. Nous n’attendrons pas que tout croule 
pour lancer un S.O.S. ridicule, au moment où il ne restera plus qu’à prier.’   It was the 704
perception of an imminent global crisis that prompted the personalists to call for a spiritual 
revolution. 
!
Some young right-wing writers shared this sense of urgency. In particular, there were 
two right-wing reviews, run by young writers, which promoted a non-Marxist revolutionary 
policy similar to Rougemont’s: the Revue française edited by Jean-Pierre Maxence, and the 
Revue du siècle edited by Jean de Fabrègues.   Maxence supported ON, although he voiced 705
reservations about Rougemont’s ‘volonté d’une révolution personnaliste et non-marxiste’ in 
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!  From 1930, the editor Jean-Pierre Maxence had transformed this conservative weekly into one of the main 705
platforms of the ‘Jeune Droite’, with Thierry Maulnier and Robert Brasillach. The Revue française became 
monthly in June 1932. It was more moderate than the extreme right press (L’Action française, Gringoire, 
Candide, and Je suis partout). See Kessler, Histoire politique de la Jeune Droite (1929-1942). Une révolution 
conservatrice à la française, 197-204.
January 1933.   He refused to associate the Revue française with Marxists and with Esprit.  706 707
In April 1933, the Revue française published a special issue combining the testimonies of 
‘Jeune Droite’ writers (Jean-Pierre Maxence, Robert Francis, Maurice Blanchot, Jean de 
Fabrègues, and Thierry Maulnier) and ON members (Daniel-Rops, Robert Aron, Arnaud 
Dandieu, René Dupuis, Jean Jardin, and Alexandre Marc).    708
!
Thierry Maulnier proved particularly close to Rougemont. He rejected at once 
‘national-socialisme’, ‘fascisme’, and ‘le collectivisme russe’, with a severity unparalleled on 
the right at this time.   Although Maulnier was not Nietzschean (he remained, after all, a 709
disciple of Maurras), he drew on Nietzsche to justify his contempt for the state and for the 
‘règne des masses’.   To that extent, ON shared Maulnier’s idea of a ‘révolution 710
aristocratique’,   and in October 1933, Maulnier was invited to participate to the review 711
L’Ordre Nouveau.   Thus Maulnier was very close to ON, and as Chapter 3 has argued, 712
Fabrègues was a right-wing personalist. They were the two right-wing writers with whom the 
ON common front was possible. 
!
To conclude on the episode of the ‘Cahier de revendications’: Rougemont did not 
succeed in initiating the broad debate he had in mind. Nevertheless, the ‘Cahier de 
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revendications’ acquired a mythical status for the ‘non-conformistes des années trente’.   But 713
the common front remained largely inconsistent.   Besides common slogans, there was no 714
agreement as to the practical course of action. The episode of the ‘Cahier de revendication’ 
illustrates the polysemic nature of political discourse – in this case of a spiritual revolution. 




2. The personalist call for action (1934-1936)!
!
The need to overcome the separation of thought and action was a popular slogan in 
1930s literature. Philosophically speaking, this slogan is empty, if thought is understood as an 
act of its own kind. But the point was political and literary: it was a call for engagement. In 
the French literary field, the need to ‘overcome the separation of thought and action’ was 
diametrically opposed to the ‘art for art’s sake’ motto of many writers born in the nineteenth 
century.   In that sense, it was a clash of generations. As we have seen, Paul Nizan and Denis 715
de Rougemont, born in 1905 and 1906 respectively, were among the first to develop a theory 
of engagement in France. Among the personalists, Rougemont was the most convincing 
advocate of littérature engagée. He drew his inspiration partly from the French literary field 
(in which he opposed ‘escapist’ intellectuals), partly from his Christian understanding of 
incarnation (the Word made flesh). 
!
Paradoxically, the very repetition of the personalist discourse on the need to link 
thought with action manifested their failure to instigate a revolution. Had revolutionary action 
been taken, there would have been no need to constantly underline the interconnections of 
doctrine and action. On the basis of unpublished material, I emphasise the gap between the 
personalists’ militant publications and their sense of political impotence. 
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Rougemont explained in January 1934 (in the special ‘Ordre Nouveau’ issue of the 
Belgian journal L’Avant-Poste) that personalism was meant to be immediately relevant, 
without the need for political parties to interpret it: ‘Ce que nous combattons de toute notre 
violence, c’est la fameuse séparation de la doctrine et de l’action – fondement de l’esprit 
bourgeois sur le plan éthique et culturel, fondement sur le plan politique des partis, considérés 
comme les organes indispensables de toute “réalisation pratique”.’   Personalism was to be 716
viable without delay. Its revolution was twofold: primarily a revolution within consciences, it 
was also to be a political revolution. There was to be no distinction between private and 
public revolution. 
!
In reality however, it was increasingly clear, to ON members as to contemporary 
observers, that the political revolution would not happen immediately. This undermined the 
entire edifice of revolutionary personalism. Rougemont held two different discourses, 
depending on whether he was speaking publicly or privately. In his published works, 
Rougemont emphasised the primacy of the revolution within the conscience, and undermined 
the importance of the social revolutionary movement: ‘Mieux vaut un convaincu sans 
influence sociale, que mille sympathisants prisonniers du désordre établi. (Car cet homme 
convaincu sera l’impondérable dont dépendra la décision’).   In his private correspondence 717
however, Rougemont proved concerned with the lack of social and political influence of ON. 
!
In the summer of 1934, Rougemont wrote to Robert Aron and to the ON group 
deploring the fact that their doctrine was abstract and would never be realised if action was 
not taken immediately.   Rougemont suggested that ON unite with other similar movements, 718
following the ‘common front’ strategy of 1932. Alexandre Marc responded by refusing 
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alliances (which he saw as compromising) with other movements: ‘Je crois que l’O.N. se 
trouve évidemment dans une situation délicate du fait que ce qu’on appelle sa « doctrine » a 
devancé ce qu’on appelle l’« action ». […] Nous contenter de q[uel]q[ue]s mots d’ordre 
vagues p[ou]r faire de l’agitation : mais le Front Commun, les Croix de Feu, La [Flèche], La 
Revue du Siècle, Esprit, etc… suffisent à cette tâche. Alors ? Non, je crois que nous devons 
continuer notre travail constructif avec une rigueur toujours accrue.’   ON had the particular 719
role of deepening the personalist political philosophy. Marc was right to point out that its 
doctrinal emphasis was unparalleled by any other third-way movement in France. 
!
An ON league had been created, but it had little practical result beyond publishing yet 
another paper. The ‘Ligue d’Action pour un ordre nouveau’ –  ‘un mouvement d’action qui se 
propose de répandre les thèmes de L’Ordre Nouveau’ – was led by Pierre Hazebroucq, and 
published a bi-monthly periodical Nous Voulons from 14 April 1934.   Marc reckoned: ‘La 720
Ligue d’Action ne f… rien. Le Club est un peu plus actif, m[ai]s il tâtonne.’   Rougemont 721
had suggested propaganda leaflets to boost ON social support. Marc backed the idea: ‘Ton 
idée de préparer des tracts est excellente. Nous t’envoyons notre bénédiction & attendons son 
projet élaboré…’   This is a good reason to think that Rougemont was instrumental in issuing 722
the leaflets ‘POUR UN ORDRE NOUVEAU POUR UNE FRANCE LIBRE’ calling for ‘une ACTION 
IMMEDIATE’ and the creation of a ‘Centre de propagande’ in 1937.   Between 1934 and 1937 723
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For all his privately expressed doubts, Rougemont proved a faithful activist in his 
Politique de la personne (1934). He reasserted the ON theory that the most consistent and 
radical doctrine would win in the end: ‘c’est au groupement le plus ferme en doctrine, si petit 
qu’il soit, que revient la décision finale.’   Hence the importance of doctrinal research: ‘La 724
force véritable d’un groupe numériquement restreint réside tout entière dans sa bonne 
conscience doctrinale, c’est-à-dire dans la cohésion, la lucidité et l’intransigeance de ses 
constructions, de ses buts.’   As Alexandre Marc had made clear, the ON was not to 725
compromise with other revolutionary groupings. 
!
The revolutionary character of ON sometimes plunged into empty lyricism. The main 
ON doctrinal book, La Révolution nécessaire (1933), ended with the following lines: ‘Le long 
des côtes de la Méditerranée et de la mer du Nord, remontant le Danube ou le Rhin, s’avance 
l’antique ennemi de l’homme. On l’appellera Etat, matérialisme, racisme ou tyrannie […]. Il 
ne s’agit pas de défendre une cité ou une idée. Il ne s’agit pas de défense. Mais de choix, 
d’affirmation, de création, de Révolution. Nous sommes sur la terre décisive. L’heure est 
venue. Allons-y.’   This martial tone was counterproductive. In 1934, Roger Martin du Gard 726
wrote to André Gide that he was wary of the ON: ‘Leur doctrinarisme abstrait, leur suffisance, 
m’irritent depuis des mois,’ in spite of unmistakable qualities, such as ‘une indiscutable 
élévation de pensée et […] pureté d’intentions.’   In a 1934 review of La Révolution 727
nécessaire, which remained unpublished until the 1980s, Simone Weil deplored ‘un certain 
ton de prophète, un style pédant et prétentieux, au reste inévitable quand on se croit tout 
spécialement désigné pour sauver l’humanité, comme c’est le cas des auteurs ; par malheur, 
un pareil ton est tout à fait incompatible avec une véritable probité intellectuelle dans 
l’analyse.’   The ON’s revolutionary and peremptory manner proved a hindrance to its 728
success among intellectuals. 
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As Olivier Dard has remarked recently, the emphasis that the revolution was 
necessary, vital and urgent in La Révolution nécessaire, contrasted with the lack of clues as to 
how to conduct it.   The revolution was a neither-nor policy: ‘Ni communisme, ni 729
capitalisme’; ‘ni droite, ni gauche’; ‘ni libéralisme, ni fascisme’.   One of the ways in which 730
a spiritual revolution could have been understood was within a Christian tradition. The 
prominent literary critic Ramon Fernandez wrote: ‘leur personnalité n’a de sens que si on 
l’éclaire par l’idée chrétienne de l’âme. Si nous avons une âme, la révolution spirituelle se 
comprend et s’impose ; sinon ce n’est qu’un mythe.’   However the ON refused a plain 731
Christian interpretation of the term. Rougemont tried to disarm Fernandez in his own review 
of La Révolution nécessaire; only to reinforce it when he explained: ‘Une personne peut être 
définie comme le prochain de l’Evangile.’   Caught between his personal beliefs and the 732
non-confessional line at the ON, Rougemont was not the most convincing advocate for a non-
Christian personalism. He tried to promote the ON revolution nonetheless. 
!
In January 1935, Rougemont published an article on revolutionary tactics, which was 
meant to appease qualms about the lack of political influence at ON.   The article reasserted 733
the prospect of an ON revolution, by comparing ON to the Bolsheviks at the turn of the 
century. Like ON, they were a small avant-garde group, focusing on revolutionary theory, 
refusing to compromise with other political movements, and aiming at all classes.  734
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Rougemont based his allegations on Lenin’s What is to be done? (1902).   To the objection 735
that ‘cette tactique léniniste a conduit 160 millions d’hommes à l’esclavage du travail 
étatique’, Rougemont answered that ‘les méthodes de Lénine ont été manifestement trahies 
par le fascisme stalinien’.   It was up to ON to carry out the true revolution: ‘nos fondements 736
spirituels, personnalistes, nous permettront, nous obligeront même à corriger les déviations 
que son mépris de l’homme concret devait imprimer à la tactique de Lénine.’   The 737
personalist revolution had to be accomplished first in the attitude, in the way of living of the 
ON members, who would increasingly come to form ‘une communauté de personnes qui ont 
fait la révolution dans leur vie, qui souffrent à cause de cela du désordre établi’, and 
subsequently pushed to change the institutions.   Political and economic changes were seen 738




In October 1936, the leader of the French Communist Party, Paul Vaillant-Couturier, 
published a pamphlet Au service de l’Esprit, in which he wrote that ‘au dessus-de tout, les 
communistes placent l’homme’, against fascists, defined as the worse enemies of ‘la personne 
humaine, cette grande force spirituelle’.   Rougemont remarked that it was a sign of the 739
success of personalism that the Communist Party should use their slogans: ‘primauté du 
spirituel ; primauté de l’homme sur l’économique ; affirmation de la personne comme valeur 
spirituelle absolue, par suite rejet du capitalisme et du fascisme, liberté nécessaire de la 
culture ; enfin, subordination du machinisme, perfectionné, aux besoins humains.’    740
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The broad success of personalist slogans made a strict definition of words all the more 
urgent, as a starting point for intellectual integrity in politics.   Rougemont noted bitterly that 741
the pamphlet of the French Communist Party ‘ne touche pas un traître-mot (sans calembour) 
des problèmes que pose le marxisme : étatisme, dictature, déterminisme économique et pas un 
mot de l’oppression stalinienne.’   The way in which political parties corrupted the daily 742
language was a chief concern for Rougemont. He agreed with Simone Weil (with whom he 
would work at the Nouveaux Cahiers in 1937-8) that clarifying concepts was a weapon 
against ‘totalitarian’ ideological escalation.   To clarify the use of words was one of the chief 743
aims of Rougemont’s essay Penser avec les mains (1936), in order to fight against 
‘totalitarian’ propaganda.    744
!
One may refer to Ackermann’s biography for the conception and reception of this 
essay.   Ackermann’s presentation is clear and thorough, there is no need to repeat it here. As 745
he noted, to think in acts (‘penser en actes’) was a central theme in Rougemont’s writings 
since 1932.   Rougemont worked on Penser avec les mains between 1932 and 1936. The 746
distinctive feature of Penser avec les mains was to set forth the need for every society to be 
oriented by a ‘commune mesure’, a common set of principles towards a shared objective. The 
conviction that a properly functioning society depends on a common culture was a 
widespread contention in interwar France.   One must say a word about Rougemont’s 747
conception of culture in the context of 1930s Europe. 
!
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While Rougemont proposed the ‘commune mesure’ as a tool to evaluate the strength 
of any given civilisation with respect to its ultimate (metaphysical) ends, his targets were 
specific. He perceived the decadence of Western civilisation in that ‘la propagande et la 
publicité […] ne nous ordonnent qu’à des fins provisoires ou dégradantes : l’état totalitaire, et 
la richesse matérielle’.   Besides familiar references to religion as an organising force in 748
biblical Israel and in the Middle Ages, Rougemont gave two examples of ‘communes 
mesures’ in the 1930s: the Plan in the Soviet Russia, to which all human activities were 
artificially subordinated;   and the Nation in Nazi Germany, embodied by the Party, itself 749
incarnate in the Führer.   Rougemont was adamant that the Soviet and the Nazi regimes were 750
bound to fail in the long run and to be harmful, because the ‘common mesures’ they sought to 
impose crushed concrete persons.    751
!
The weakness of parliamentary democracies lay in their incapacity to oppose 
‘totalitarian’ regimes with a ‘commune mesure’ or moral that would make the people 
impervious to nationalist ideologies.   To overcome this deficit, Rougemont appealed to the 752
free and responsible person, defined as the crucial tenet of Western civilisation.   Whether or 753
not Penser avec les mains was just another piece of intellectual moralism, or whether it was 
an action in its own right, it nonetheless remained an important attempt to restore a sense of 
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3. Towards a federation of personalist movements (1936-8)!
!
To make an impact on society, Rougemont was aware that the personalist movements 
had to stand united. After 1934, he was relatively isolated in his endeavours to federate the 
various personalist groups. Other ON mediators, such as Alexandre Marc and Jean Jardin, had 
given up the idea of a common front of personalists. Marc, who had initiated French 
personalism directly or indirectly, was estranged from Esprit after 1934. Jardin gradually 
became detached from ON after Dandieu’s death. His subsequent political trajectory has been 
interpreted as a fidelity to certain personalities, rather than to personalist ideas.   Although he 754
had been active in liaising ON with the Jeune Droite until 1934, little came of it.   Thereafter, 755
Jardin’s traditionalist and elitist political views inclined him more and more towards the 
right.   Rougemont, by contrast, intensified his efforts to federate personalism(s). From 1936 756
onwards, he insisted on a simple alternative for the personalist movement(s): federation or 
failure. 
!
Rapprochement between ON and Esprit!
!
In the summer of 1936, returning from a year in Nazi Germany, Rougemont made 
plans for the future of the personalist movement: his aims, according to a draft note, were to 
‘Radicaliser et confédérer le mouvement’.   To confederate the personalist movement 757
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required that ON and the Esprit groups change their attitude to one another. The atmosphere 
of the Esprit groups, which Rougemont and other witnesses described as friendly and cordial, 
contrasted with the doctrinaire and dry ‘cellules ON’. At the same time, the personalism of the 
Esprit groups seemed ill-defined. Therefore, ON and Esprit were complementary. Following 
this diagnostic, Rougemont drafted a fourfold plan: 
!
1. Radicaliser Esprit aux journées de sept. [Congress of Esprit] et lui faire concevoir son 
absence de doctrine construct[ive]. 
2. Prendre conscience à l’O.N. de notre absence de forces numériques et d’atmosphère. 
3. Obtenir d’Esprit l’acceptation de la doctrine O.N., et de l’O.N. l’acceptation de 
l’atmosphère et des groupes Esprit. 
Pour cela : 
A. Ouvrage commun (Traité des [Libertés]) 
B. Cit[er] O.N. dans Esprit. Changement de ton. […] 
4. Confédérer tous les groupuscules anticap[italistes] et anti-Staliniens, Bureau 
fédéral.   758!
This unpublished document is one of the essential plans for federating anti-capitalist 
and anti-Stalinist third-way movements on the basis of a personalist doctrine.   Rougemont’s 759
project was discussed at the Esprit congress at Plessis-Robinson in September 1936. 
According to Michel Winock, thirty-two personalist groups attended.   Denis de Rougemont 760
and Robert Aron were there on behalf of ON. Three out of four founding fathers of Esprit 
were present (Mounier, Louis-Emile Galey and André Déléage), as well as longstanding 
contributors to the journal (Pierre-Aimé Touchard and the historian Henri-Irénée Marrou) and 
more atypical recruits, such as the Socialist-inclined Protestant Roger Leenhardt, the former 
Marxist Brice Parain who had joined the team in 1935, and the young philosopher Merleau-
Ponty.   Bernard Charbonneau was a delegate for Bayonne, Jacques Ellul for Bordeaux, Jean 761
Lacroix for Dijon, Jean-Marie Soutou for Pau, Georges Lefranc and Paulette Mounier for 
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Brussels, and C.G. Paulding for Geneva. The project of a federation of various third-way 
groupings was discussed, with particular reference to ON.    762
!
In the following months, Rougemont multiplied his endeavours towards 
rapprochement between the various personalists groups. In October 1936, following the 
publication of Mounier’s Manifeste au service du personnalisme, Rougemont made another 
attempt at bringing together ON and Esprit, in L’Ordre Nouveau this time. He called for an 
action ‘engagée’ common to the various personalists – ‘après quelques années de recherches 
“pluralistes”’.   Rougemont did not pretend to ignore the enduring discrepancies between the 763
doctrine of ON and that of Esprit. He expressed three main reservations about Mounier’s 
personalism. Firstly, Mounier’s conception of labour  as an ‘obligation universelle’ was 
unacceptable.   Secondly, Rougemont thought Mounier’s idea that the state should guarantee 764
the status of the human person was absurd.   It contradicted Mounier’s earlier statement that 765
‘une personne est un être spirituel constitué comme tel par une manière de subsistance et 
d’indépendance dans son être’.  Thirdly, Rougemont disapproved of Mounier’s use of the 
terms ‘décentralisation’ or ‘région’ – Mounier was not following ON definitions on these 
points.    766
!
Nevertheless, Rougemont thought that these were minor differences, ‘de simples 
inconséquences, si nous comprenons le contexte’.   What was significant was the reassertion 767
of key ON notions by Mounier: ‘les notions de minimum vital intérieur et européen, de 
service civil (appelé ici service public), d’entreprise (et non pas de corporation), de Conseil 
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suprême enfin, et la distinction entre autorité et pouvoir’.   A somewhat patronizing 768
Rougemont was pleased to see Mounier follow the personalism of ON; he trusted in ‘des 
promesses d’accord aussi solides’.   Thereafter, the relations between ON and Esprit would 769
be cordial – no mean achievement. 
!
At the beginning of 1937, Rougemont, Mounier and Jean Maze (the editor of La 
Flèche, the newspaper of Bergery’s movement) formed ‘Clubs de presse’ to debate the 
information available in the press. In May 1937, Mounier welcomed the new personalist 
weekly A nous la liberté: ‘Nos camarades de L’Ordre Nouveau viennent de lancer le premier 
« hebdomadaire personnaliste ».’   In September, the Esprit Congress gathered 154 770
participants for a critical assessment: ‘Où en sommes-nous de la doctrine personnaliste ?’  771
Rougemont answered on behalf of ON. His ‘MOTION PRÉSENTÉE AU MOUVEMENT 
PERSONNALISTE PAR L’ORDRE NOUVEAU’ summarised the fundamental principles of 
personalism, according to ON and in his clear style.   To start with, Rougemont spoke of ‘le 772
mouvement personnaliste’ in the singular: he underplayed the divisions between ON, Esprit, 
and the local Esprit groups (especially the Bordeaux group). His text conveys the hope that 
personalists unite, in the face of international threats of war and encroachments on personal 
liberties. It is worth quoting at length because this texts gives a concise account of 
Rougemont’s personalism, and a clear articulation of the ON doctrine. 
!
First of all, Rougemont reaffirmed the spiritual foundations (‘Fondements spirituels’) 
of the personalist movement(s). Historically, personalism had emerged to defend personal 
freedom, and it was a third way (or force): ‘Le mouvement personnaliste est né d’un refus de 
la Société présente, bourgeoise et capitaliste et d’un refus du dilemme « communisme ou 
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fascisme » qu’on lui propose pour en sortir. En face de ces deux solutions dictatoriales, le 
personnalisme représente une troisième force dont l’objectif capital est d’assumer la libre 
activité des personnes dans la société.’   Rougemont’s definition of the person had strong 773
moral overtones. It emphasised the notions of vocation, responsibility and community: ‘La 
personne, c’est l’homme qui accomplit librement sa vocation, dans la conscience des 
responsabilités dont elle le charge vis-à-vis de la communauté.’ The person, as the individual 
in relation to others, was implicitly defined in reference to Christian thought and thus could be 
presented as the ‘principe central de la civilisation occidentale’. Personalism was the adequate 
expression of Western civilisation, ‘l’individualisme et le collectivisme ne sont que des 
déviations dans le sens de l’anarchie ou de la tyrannie.’   This brought Rougemont to his 774
main political point. 
!
Politically, the personalist movement(s) radically opposed the hegemony of the state: 
‘Contre l’étatisme, vice commun à tous les systèmes (capitalistes, communistes, fascistes) qui 
règnent aujourd’hui. L’hégémonie de l’Etat traduit une perte de sens civique et une oppression 
des personnes.’   From an economic and social point of view, the opposition to the capitalist 775
system led to be ‘contre les trusts, principaux instruments de l’oppression capitaliste’ ; and 
also ‘contre les sociétés anonymes et le système bancaire, fondé sur le principe – que nous 
rejetons – de la productivité de l’argent.’ This was not to say that personalism was anywhere 
near socialism and communism. Opposing socialist and communist plans for nationalisation, 
the personalist movement was ‘contre l’étatisation des grandes entreprises, des trusts, des 
banques et de l’enseignement. Cette opération ne pouvant que renforcer la puissance abusive 
de l’Etat, sans supprimer les vices inhérents aux organismes étatisés.’ Rougemont was not an 
anarchist, however. He acknowledged that there was a need for a state: ‘L’Etat ne doit pas être 
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au-dessus des personnes, mais à leur service ; il doit être fort dans son domaine limité.’  776
Thus, he insisted that the power of the state had to be limited to purely administrative 
functions. 
!
The triple condemnation of the centralized state, capitalist economy, and collectivist 
plans was balanced by a series of ‘Affirmations constructives’. Personalists were ‘pour la 
libération réelle des travailleurs par la suppression de la condition prolétarienne et du salariat, 
formes modernes de servage.’ Personalists believed in the possibility and urgency of 
eradicating poverty. Chapter 5 will show that ON hoped that its scheme for civilian service, 
combined with improved mechanisation, would end the poletarian condition. Wage labour 
(‘salariat’) would be replaced by free associations of workers. Rougemont continued on the 
theme of international relations: ‘A l’étatisme totalitaire, nous opposons le fédéralisme 
politique et économique, seul régime capable de sauvegarder les libertés et de prévenir les 
guerres totales.’ In political terms, ‘le fédéralisme ne peut se constituer que sur la base des 
communes autonomes et des communautés locales’; and political federalism had an economic 
counterpart: ‘le fédéralisme ne peut se constituer que sur la base des entreprises autonomes, 
librement constituées par les producteurs associés et responsables.’ Social welfare would be 
guaranteed by ‘l’institution d’un minimum vital assuré gratuitement à tous les membres de la 
fédération.’   Rougemont concluded that respect for persons was the fundamental axiom. 777
This ideal description of the personalist society contrasted with the scant success it had 
translating into reality. 
!
Failure of the personalist revolution!
!
By 1937, the personalists of ON had no illusions as to the failure of the revolution they 
had been planning for years. Alexandre Marc was fully aware that ‘la carence des non-
conformistes’ was to stand divided, and therefore the only alternative for them was ‘l’union 
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ou la mort’.   Following Marc’s article, Jean Coutrot, a polytechnicien and business manager 778
convinced of his prophetic insights, organised a conference on 12 July 1938 to try and foster a 
new common front of ‘non-conformistes’.   Coutrot had participated in ON in 1935-6. 779
However, the main journals to which Rougemont contributed (Les Nouveaux Cahiers, Esprit 
and L’Ordre Nouveau) refused the invitation to Coutrot’s conference.   Rougemont 780
supported the federation of personalist movements, but not the union of all third-way 
groupings. 
!
In the winter of 1938, Marc worked with Coutrot towards a union of ‘non-
conformistes’ groupings. Marc’s journal Agir, ‘instrument de la fédération indispensable’, 
launched in February 1939, attempted to gather the contributions of the main ‘non-
conformistes’. His movement ‘Agir-Fédérer les Forces Françaises’ attempted to federate a 
large spectrum of third-way movements, from technocrats such as Jean Coutrot to the 
Christian-Democrats of Jeune République, through Georges Valois’s L’Homme Nouveau.  781
However, Marc remained lucid as to the lack of visibility of the ‘non-conformistes’ in 
France.   The context was not encouraging a third way. 782
!
By 1938, all the intellectuals in France seemed to be engagé, on one side or the other. 
Rougemont, who had been one of the first to call for engagement, exclaimed: ‘Trop 
d’irresponsables s’engagent!’   I quote the first paragraph at length, to preserve the comic 783
effect of the play on words (‘moutons enragés’ / engagés): 
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Chose étrange, le 6 février 1934 est une date de l’histoire littéraire : elle inaugure le 
temps des moutons enragés. Fatigués de leur innocence, voyant que l’herbe se faisait 
rare sous leurs pieds et qu’ils n’avaient plus de berger, aux éclairs de chaleur d’une 
révolution encore lointaine, ils se sont jetés dans le premier parc venu, à gauche ou à 
droite, et depuis lors y bêlent d’une voix aigre et anxieuse, tout en signant une quantité 
de manifestes. Ils ont signé […] des deux mains, des quatre pattes, les yeux fermés, 
d’une croix, d’une faucille et d’un marteau […]. Bref il n’est pas un acte commis dans 
le monde, depuis quatre ans, qui n’ait été vertement dénoncé par des “intellectuels” 
français. Mais si le monde ne s’en porte pas mieux, l’intelligence n’y gagne guère.   784!
Rougemont called for responsibility in the political engagement of the intellectual. ‘Un 
libéral qui se soumet aux directives d’un parti ne devient pas pour si peu un penseur 
engagé.’    785
!
Denis de Rougemont, like ON as a whole, was aware of the contradiction between the 
claim that thought and action must never be separated, and the reality of personalist thought, 
which was followed by little or no political action in the 1930s. This contradiction grew less 
and less tolerable at ON, especially since ON, unlike Esprit perhaps, did not constitute in 
itself the kind of community personalists were calling for. The painful awareness of their 
failure would lead Marc and Rougemont, as soon as 1937, to take action (and seek 
compromise) in European federalist movements. In 1936-7, Rougemont started by going back 




4. Switzerland: a concrete example of federalism!
!
To study personalism in Switzerland is fascinating for two reasons: it allows us to 
measure the personalist claims against the reality of their social impact, and it leads us to 
revise Rougemont’s self-portrait as a ‘non-conformiste’. Indeed, for all his claims of ‘non-
conformisme’ and revolution, Rougemont’s personalism did not fit in with the concerns of the 
Swiss literary avant-garde; quite the opposite, it came to suit the ‘défense spirituelle’ launched 
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by the Swiss state against the menace of a Second World War. And so we shall see that, 
ironically, far from being convincing the Swiss as to the necessity of a political revolution, 
Rougemont managed to develop personalism into a relatively mainstream cultural movement 
in 1937-8. 
!
The development of personalism in Switzerland has been presented as a ‘federalist 
dynamic’, whereby Esprit set up Esprit groups in the French province and beyond 
(Switzerland and Belgium especially, for obvious linguistic reasons), and in return asked these 
groups to contribute to the Parisian journal.   This interplay between centre and periphery 786
was ambivalent in Switzerland, where some intellectuals were eager to assert Swiss 
independence from Paris. Rougemont exemplifies the ambivalence of the development of 
(seemingly) French personalism in Switzerland. 
!
At first, Rougemont’s personal convictions and the arrogant style of ON proved 
counterproductive among the French Swiss avant-garde. This ought to be contrasted with the 
open and federalist dynamic at Esprit. In the second half of the 1930s however, Rougemont’s 
attitude markedly changed, and he was able to play a positive role for the furtherance of 
personalism and federalism in Switzerland. In 1937, Esprit published a special issue on ‘Le 
problème suisse: personne et fédéralisme’, edited by Denis de Rougemont.   In keeping with 787
the title of this special issue, I shall consider first ‘the Swiss problem’, that is the issues raised 
by the introduction of personalism in Switzerland; and then turn to the question of the ‘person 
and federalism’ in the Switzerland of the late 1930s. The first section tends to emphasise the 
ambiguities of Rougemont’s role as a mediator between Switzerland and France, while the 
second section illustrates the significance of the personalist movements in calling Switzerland 
to play a positive role in Europe on the eve of the Second World War. 
!
The Swiss problem: centre and periphery!
!
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The development of French personalism(s) was all the more sensitive in Switzerland 
as it was perceived as a French doctrine, at a time when (some) French Swiss writers were 
asserting their autonomy vis-à-vis Paris.   Although Rougemont was the first to introduce 788
French personalists to the Swiss with his ‘Cause commune’ in 1932, he did not facilitate the 
transfer of personalism to his own country.   His public letter to Gilbert Trolliet (a leader of 789
the French Swiss avant-guarde as we have seen), only spoke of his ‘amis, parisiens au surplus’ 
and ended peremptorily: ‘nous connaissons la vérité’.   To put forth the most Parisian and 790
doctrinal sides of personalism was tactless, especially when one knew (as Rougemont did) 
how eager the review Présence was to assert French Swiss autonomy from Paris.    791
!
The Parisian origins of personalism (albeit largely apparent as we have seen), 
highlighted in Rougemont’s presentation, help explain the ambivalence of the French Swiss 
literary avant-garde vis-à-vis personalism. For instance, Trolliet remained critical of 
personalism in Présence, while he let some Swiss personalists write in his review.  792
Rougemont’s peremptory tone – which he shared with other ON writers – must be contrasted 
with Esprit’s openness. 
!
Looking at Switzerland, it is clear that Esprit was never the French Catholic journal 
Maritain had wanted it to be. At the outset, in 1933, a quarter of the 500 subscribers were 
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Swiss, most of them Protestants from the main French Swiss cities.   Francis Python has 793
established that personalism started as a social movement in Switzerland following Mounier’s 
series of lectures in Swiss universities in November 1933.   In the summer of 1933, Mounier 794
had asked Rougemont to help him organise the ‘conférences de novembre’ in Lausanne, 
Fribourg, Basle, and Zurich.   Thereafter, one may assume that Rougemont played a role in 795
the launching of Esprit in Switzerland, although there is no further archival evidence. In the 
early 1930s, however, the success of Esprit in Switzerland (such as it was) should be 
attributed to Mounier, not to Rougemont.  
!
Mounier managed to keep Esprit open in social, confessional, and doctrinal terms. 
Esprit contrasted with the other Parisian reviews at the time in two significant respects: it 
functioned with a federalist dynamic, whereby the local Esprit groups were asked to 
contribute to the review; furthermore, Mounier did not present personalism as a dogma, but 
allowed for a variety of opinions and religious beliefs to coexist in Esprit.   ON never 796
achieved federalist cooperation on a scale comparable to Esprit. Furthermore, Francis Python 
has argued forcefully that the non-confessional character of personalism was a considerable 
asset, in contrast to the rigidity of Maritain’s neo-Thomism and of Maurras's Action 
Française.   He has shown that, between 1933 and 1939, Esprit was read mostly by 797
Protestant students (Zofingue and Belles-Lettres societies) in the three cities of Lausanne, 
Neuchâtel, and Geneva.   These were also home to the main Esprit groups in Switzerland. In 798
1939, in the French Swiss journal Cahiers protestants, Mounier emphasised the plurality of 
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‘personnalismes, parents certes, mais que nous ne chercherons jamais à réduire à un commun 
dénominateur.’   799
!
As Francis Python has concluded, if Switzerland was one of the first countries to be 
touched by ‘French’ personalism, the personalist groups remained small (unfortunately, he 
does not give figures).   In addition, I have suggested that, in the first half of the 1930s, 800
Rougemont played a counter-productive role in the transfer of ‘French’ personalism. A 
reversal was initiated in 1936: Rougemont started to take the development of personalism in 
Switzerland more seriously. Mounier, who put Rougemont in charge of a special issue on 
Switzerland, may be credited for his involvement in Swiss federalism and personalism. 
!
French personalism, Swiss federalism, and Europe!
!
In 1936 Rougemont was called to play a major role in the edition of the special issue 
of Esprit on Switzerland. He was not the first choice for the project, which was initially meant 
to come from militants based in Switzerland.   At the end of 1935, Mounier had first asked 801
André Bonnard and Elie Gagnebin of the Lausanne Esprit group to come up with a 
‘Recherche de la Suisse’. In March 1936, Mounier proved to be disappointed with the result, 
which he described as a mere ‘annuaire de société de gymnastique’, and he rejected the first 
project for being too far from French preoccupations and too ‘bourgeois’ to suit Esprit.   At 802
least the issue directed by Rougemont a couple of months later would not fall prey to these 
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accusations. In March 1936, Rougemont wrote to Albert Béguin from Frankfurt, where he 
was a French lecturer that year: ‘A propos de Suisse, Mounier m’a parlé en mars du projet de 
N° spécial d’Esprit, et m’a montré le projet élaboré par les Lausannois. Une bouillabaisse. A 
présent, il paraît que tout est renvoyé.’   Mounier put Rougemont in charge of the Swiss 803
project. Rougemont saw it as a means to mobilize the Swiss, rather than a Swiss contribution 
to French personalism: 
A mon avis, il faudrait 5 à 6 articles au maximum, et une communauté sinon de ton, du 
moins de but manifeste. C’à.d. pas d’articles sur la Nelle Sté helvétique et autres 
archéologies sentimentales, mais : une déclaration d’ensemble sur le rôle de la Suisse 
et sa raison d’être ; une étude sur le fédéralisme, une sur la culture, une sur 
l’enseignement, une sur la politique intérieure, et des notes sur des points plus 
particuliers et sensibles. Objectif : orienter les partis et les jeunes gens vers une 
création commune, dégager ce qui est valable de ce qui périmé dans nos débats 
actuels, enfin : agir sur les Suisses et non pas présenter aux Français un prospectus 
plus ou moins alléchant de nos spécialités locales. C’est ce que Lausanne ne paraît pas 
avoir compris.   804
  
Whereas the Lausanne Esprit group had sought to put forth an objective research,  805
Rougemont simplified the situation for the sake of action.   And unlike the Lausanne project, 806
his project made ‘French’ personalism relevant to a French Swiss readership. Rougemont 
acted a contrario, but perhaps not to the detriment of the French Swiss literary field. 
!
In his presentation, Rougemont explained how several articles emphasised ‘la mission 
européenne de la Suisse’ and ‘sa mystique fédérale’, in order to compensate a certain 
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parochial tendency in Switzerland.   The debate was opened by a provocative letter from C. 807
F. Ramuz to Rougemont, which questioned the very existence of Switzerland as an entity, and 
castigated the Swiss for lacking any sense of grandeur.   For a sense of balance, Rougemont 808
also published a praise of Switzerland by the Swiss German writer Max E. Liehburg.  809
Unsurprisingly, this special issue of Esprit has become famous in Swiss literary history: 
Ramuz’s letter to Rougemont triggered a heated discussion on the existence of a Swiss 
identity, at a time when the Federal authorities were seeking to foster national unity.   Ramuz 810
and Liehburg were not personalists, as Python rightly pointed out: ‘les apports de ces deux 
écrivains extérieurs aux groupes Esprit, avaient été sollicités par Denis de Rougemont pour 
mettre ce numéro sous tension.’   Thus Rougemont meant to provoke debates among the 811
Swiss first, and eventually activate personalist networks in Switzerland. 
!
‘Le Problème Suisse: personne et fédéralisme’ gathered contributions by all the 
committed personalists in Switzerland, with the exception of the Neuchâtelois philosophers 
Pierre Thévenaz and Philippe Muller (all the more surprising as the latter was the general 
secretary of the Esprit groups in Switzerland). It included heads of the main cantonal groups 
(save for Lausanne, disqualified in the first project): Xavier Schorderet (Berne), Arnold 
Kohler (Geneva), and Emile-Albert Niklaus (Neuchâtel). Three further contributors may be 
mentioned to illustrate the variety of Esprit’s contacts in Switzerland: the trade-unionist Pierre 
Reymond, who was instrumental in developing a working-class personalist grouping in 
Neuchâtel;   André Rivier, the president of the Zofingue student society of Vaud and a 812
longtime militant of Esprit (he would edit the Cahiers suisses d’Esprit between 1945 and 
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1951);   and Aldo Dami from Geneva, who was close to the League of Nations and the 813
International Labour Organisation.   814
!
The global mission of Switzerland – as Liehburg put it, in Rougemont’s translation – 
was double: ‘La mission politique qui lui incombe est celle-ci : garder le « milieu » de 
l’Europe. Sa mission humaine : incarner et illustrer d’une manière toujours plus pure l’idée 
fédérale.’   Rougemont translated Liehburg’s political argument into personalist language, in 815
his article ‘Neutralité oblige’:  
La mission essentielle de la Suisse est une mission personnaliste au premier chef: 
sauvegarder une Weltanschauung où les droits du particulier et les devoirs envers le 
général se fécondent mutuellement […– e.g.] les droits des communes et ceux du 
canton ; les droits des cantons et ceux de la Confédération ; les droits de la Suisse et 
ceux de l’Europe ; images et conséquences à la fois de l’équilibre fondamental entre 
les droits de la personne et ceux de la communauté.   816!
Rougemont held that if Switzerland was to remain neutral in the coming conflagration, 
it was in order to carry on an ‘expérience témoin, l’annonciatrice d’une Europe fédérée dont 
elle prouve la réalité en assemblant dans un état nos trois plus grandes civilisations, la 
germanique, la latine et la française.’   From 1937 onwards, Rougemont would not cease to 817
emphasise the interdependence between Switzerland and the rest of Europe. Since Les Méfaits 
(1929) and the early 1930s, his attitude had fundamentally changed vis-à-vis Switzerland. 
Was this change the result of personalist thinking? Was it a reaction to the international 
situation? Was it simply maturity? 
!
The change in Rougemont’s attitude is patent if one compares his claims in Présence 
in 1932 with his affirmations in Suisse romande in 1938. The comparison is justified since 
Suisse romande (1937-9) succeeded Présence (1932-6): both reviews gathered the same team 
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of avant-garde French Swiss writers.   In Suisse romande, as in Présence, the development 818
of personalism was hindered by its (apparent) French and Christian origins. And so in 
December 1937, the French Swiss writer Pierre Beausire reacted to the special issue of Esprit 
on Switzerland.   He agreed that Switzerland needed a vigorous debate, yet he suspected 819
personalism might be ‘un christianisme camouflé’ and that Esprit wanted to found ‘une 
société sur le modèle de la société chrétienne’ – a programme he rejected as both harmful and 
illusory.   In turn, Albert Béguin (a French Swiss convert to Catholicism and future editor of 820
Esprit after Mounier’s death in 1950) condemned Beausire’s ‘dogmatisme nietzschéen’ in Les 
Cahiers du Sud.   Rougemont, however, argued that there was more to personalism than 821
parochiality. He explained the particularity of his position, as a Protestant personalist, but he 
insisted that this was compatible with a non-religious approach to European history and 
politics: 
En tant que protestant personnaliste, je tiens que seule la foi réelle – celle qui agit, et 
non celle qui endort – donne à notre attitude son sens dernier. Beaucoup de mes 
camarades, la majorité même, ne partagent pas cette certitude. Ils en ont d’autres, que 
je crois insuffisantes, et je le leur dis en toute franchise. Du moins ne tiennent-ils pas 
le christianisme dont je parle pour une niaiserie sentimentale. A défaut de la foi, ils 
connaissent l’Histoire, et savent de quoi l’Europe est faite.   822!
Rougemont’s response to Beausire in Suisse romande in January 1938 leads us to 
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Rougemont’s response to Beausire defines three main elements of personalist 
philosophy, to be examined in Part II. Firstly, Rougemont combined Eurocentrism with 
pluralism (departing from an inward-looking Switzerland in both respects): ‘Comme 
l’Europe, le personnalisme est essentiellement pluraliste, c’est-à-dire: fédéraliste. Il exalte les 
différences en ce qu’elles ont de créateur.’   Chapter 5 will show how the personalism of 823
Denis de Rougemont, drawn from Ordre Nouveau, sought to promote a pluralist and federalist 
state. 
!
Secondly, federalist personalism (the doctrine of ON) was presented as the European 
third way. In Rougemont’s view, personalism embodied  ‘la tradition centrale de l’Occident 
[…] et l’individualisme et le collectivisme ne sont que des déviations complémentaires et 
périodiques de cette ligne de plus grande efficacité.’   Personalists claimed to represent the 824
genuine ‘neither right nor left’ line and to defend unity in diversity, in accordance with 
Western European thought. Chapter 6 will examine how, on the ‘neither right nor left’ front, 
they competed with fascism (in a generic sense). 
!
Finally, in moral terms, Rougemont defined personalism as the concrete love of real 
human beings and a force of resistance against tyranny: ‘Le personnalisme, c’est l’amour 
concret des hommes réels […] c’est […] la volonté d’agir dans le sens de ce qui libère en 
l’homme les forces de résistance et de création, systématiquement déprimées par les tyrannies 
que l’on sait.’   Personalism as concrete ‘love’ and as a force of resistance will be studied in 825
Chapter 7.  
!
The aim – particularly important in 1938 – was to maintain ‘la possibilité de vivre et 
de créer sa vérité – bonne ou mauvaise – contre les fous totalitaires de droite ou de gauche, 
leurs guerres et leurs cultes d’Etat.’   If it is not yet entirely clear why Rougemont thought 826
that personalism was the embodiment of Western European culture, it is already possible to 
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close this Part I on how he militated for personalism and federalism, in Switzerland as in 
Europe as a whole.  
!
Throughout the 1930s, Rougemont sought to federate the various personalist 
movements and to promote them to the larger public. On the eve of the Second World War, 
seeing that debates at Esprit and L’Ordre Nouveau were not leading to any practical move (he 
diagnosed ‘l’espèce de paralysie dont souffre le mouvement personnaliste’), Rougemont 
refused to blame the overly academic or intellectual complexion of the movement.   Their 827
tendency to rationalize and ponder was not at fault; ‘Je crains bien qu’au contraire le 
mouvement ait péché par défaut de radicalisme dans sa critique négative.’   Rougemont’s 828
experience of personalist discussions, in small groups and large congresses, led him to the 
conclusion: ‘C’est l’impuissance à « sortir du plan des vieux partis » qui paralyse l’action’.  829
The personalist movement had fallen short because of its moderation: ‘La critique des partis 
n’est stérile que dans la mesure où elle n’est pas radicale.’   Thus Rougemont had no illusion 830
as to the political and social failure of the personalist revolution in the 1930s; but he still 
believed in the revolutionary character of personalism.  
!
Ironically, it is his ‘idée suisse’ – which had nothing revolutionary in it – that 
constitutes one of the most significant contributions of personalism to European history. To 
give a noble sense to Swiss neutrality – an implicit reference in Rougemont’s article 
‘Neutralité oblige’ in Esprit (October 1938) – was a vital contribution to Swiss intellectual 
history.   Rougemont managed to develop an ‘idée suisse’ that was neither parochial nor 831
nationalist, nor even national.   And here lies the irony of Rougemont’s personalist activism 832
in the 1930s: originally supposed to provoke a revolution (at once spiritual, cultural and 
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political), it met the needs of the Swiss state, arguably the least revolutionary of all states, as 
the Second World War drew near.    833
!
Rougemont failed to convince youth to form of the ‘common front’ of European third 
ways, he also failed to federate personalist movements and to provoke a revolution. But to 
give a noble sense to neutrality, to promote a sense of pride in one’s country that would be 
neither parochial nor national, and to encourage personal and political freedom were three of 
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PART II. PERSONALISM AS A POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY!!
!
!
‘L’Ordre Nouveau a été […] le grand mouvement d’idées de notre jeunesse. Il y a peut-être 
eu, dans ces années, des mouvements plus entraînants ou plus importants, mais aucun n’a 
remué autant d’idées sur l’économie, l’organisation de l’Etat, la suppression du prolétariat, les 
relations entre les nations.’   In 1930s France, there was a multiplicity of movements calling 834
for the reform of the parliamentary system, but as Nicolas Roussellier has remarked, ‘la 
plupart des projets révisionnistes n’opèrent pas le lien entre réforme de l’Etat et nouvelle 
pensée économique.’   Ordre Nouveau (ON) not only made the link between state reform 835
and new economic thought, but also made philosophy and anthropology the basis for political 
and economic theory. Starting from an understanding of the human person, through social and 
economic relations, to the political system, ON developed global plans for a ‘révolution’. 
!
The political doctrine of ON has been the subject of three doctoral dissertations 
already. Firstly, we have seen that, in 1969, Jean-Louis Loubet del Bayle presented ON as the 
most original ‘mouvement de jeunes dans les années 1930-1934’.   One of the limitations of 836
his study, mentioned in Chapter 1, is that it takes for granted the actors’ self-presentation as 
‘non-conformistes’. It is necessary to take more critical distance vis-à-vis their claims to 
represent an avant-garde. Later, in 1986, Pierre Izard analysed the federalism of ON in a 
voluminous doctoral dissertation, unfortunately unpublished and somewhat dated, not least 
because Izard’s aim was to show that this doctrine was ‘toujours actuelle’.   Lastly, in 2000, 837
Jean Jacob has contradicted Izard’s sympathetic account of ON, by suggesting that ON was a 
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Nouveau" (Robert Aron, Claude Chevalley, Arnaud Dandieu, Daniel-Rops, Alexandre Marc et Denis de 
Rougemont)' (Thèse pour le doctorat de 3e cycle, Université de Lille III, 1986), 7. This thesis is over 700 pages 
long.
proto-fascist movement – a (mis)interpretation that will require careful examination in 
Chapter 6. Both Izard and Jacob express strong political preferences; yet where Izard is 
laudatory, Jacob is disapproving.    838
!
Thus, my assessment of the federalist personalism of ON in Chapter 5 comes after 
three French doctorates in political sciences. From a historical point of view, these studies fall 
short on two important points. On the one hand, it is not enough to account for federalist 
personalism from a political standpoint. If one does not start with the meaning of the slogan 
‘primauté du spirituel’, one fails to understand the economic and political theories that 
depended on spiritual tenets. On the other hand, all three political scientists assess ON in 
terms of modern/anti-modern dichotomies. Central to their analysis is the question whether 
the ON’s critique of the nation-state is modern (Loubet del Bayle and Izard) or anti-modern 
(Jacob). Kevin Passmore has showed the limits inherent in judging French history against the 
expected outcome of modernisation (the stalemate society thesis).   Regardless of whether it 839
was modern or not, Chapter 5 argues that ON was a most ambitious spiritual, political, and 
economic thought. Given the scope of the personalist project, it should not be surprising that 
it did not succeed in every respect. 
!
Following logically on from Chapter 5, Chapter 6 will address the most controversial 
issue in the historiography: was the personalist third way akin the fascist third way? In 
attempting to answer this question, the limits of the polarity fascism vs. anti-fascism, which 
organises much of 1930s narrative, will become clear. The case study of Denis de Rougemont 
will show how, for contemporaries, the question of fascism went beyond the political plane. 
Finally, by focussing on L’Amour et l’Occident (1939), Chapter 7 will reflect upon the moral 
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Chapter 5. The federalist personalism of Ordre Nouveau!!
!
!
The federalist personalism of Ordre Nouveau originated in the thought of Marc and Dandieu. 
Robert Aron, Daniel-Rops, Rougemont, Jean Jardin, René Dupuis, Claude Chevalley and later 
contributors, including the polytechnicians Robert Gibrat, Robert Loustau, Pierre Prévost, the 
Ollivier brothers, Xavier de Lignac and Jean Coutrot,   also played a part in the elaboration 840
of the doctrine. In his thesis, Pierre Izard focused exclusively on the ‘founding fathers’ who 
pursued federalist personalism after the Second World War (Robert Aron, Claude Chevalley, 
Daniel-Rops, Alexandre Marc and Denis de Rougemont), and he added a recognition of the 
influence of Dandieu.   However, in studying ON, there is no reason why one should leave 841
aside the members of ON who did not pursue federalism after the war, namely Jean Jardin, 
Robert Loustau, Robert Gibrat, whose involvement with Vichy would discredit the whole 
movement; but also Xavier de Lignac, who would become a prominent associate of General 
de Gaulle under the pseudonym Jean Chauveau; and Albert Ollivier, who specialized in the 
media like Lignac, and would serve both under Vichy and in De Gaulle’s Rassemblement 
Pour la France (RPF).   In this chapter, ON members are considered regardless of their 842
subsequent trajectory. 
!
The main source for this chapter is the journal L’Ordre Nouveau, which ON started 
publishing in May 1933.   Forty-five issues were printed between May 1933 and September 843
1938, a time-span that allowed a broad scope of research and depth in analysis. There were 
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approximately a thousand subscribers to L’Ordre Nouveau and its circulation never went 
beyond two thousand copies.   L’Ordre Nouveau rejected any affiliation with political parties 844
and emphasised doctrinal reflection. The degree of abstraction of the articles contrasts with 
other political journals, which gave more space to domestic and international news. Although 
ON insisted on the need to translate doctrine into action, as we have seen in Chapter 4, 
L’Ordre Nouveau had analytical purposes.  
!
L’Ordre Nouveau was entirely reissued in five thick volumes in 1997.   To date, 845
L’Ordre Nouveau has only been studied in detail by sympathisers of the cause of integral 
federalism. Thomas Keller – who is one of these sympathisers – has distinguished three 
phases in the history of the journal.   In the initial phase, up to January 1934, ON established 846
a doctrine of its own, through cultural transfer and adaptation of personalism. In the second 
phase, ON launched an appeal to technocrats – following L’Ordre Nouveau, 7 (15 Jan. 1934) 
entitled ‘Appel aux techniciens’– so as to translate its personalist doctrine into action. The last 
phase, from 1936 to 1938, was largely a return to the doctrinal research of the early years, 
symbolized by the re-publication of articles by Arnaud Dandieu in the last two issues.   847
!
Only the distinctive contributions of Alexandre Marc and Arnaud Dandieu have been 
the object of historical scrutiny: Marc was the inventor of personalism in France, Dandieu the 
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thinker of economic reorganisation.   The essential contribution of René Dupuis has been 848
overlooked by historians to date. This chapter shows how Dupuis’s reassessment of political 
sovereignty was decisive for ON. Otherwise, the ‘réelle unité de la doctrine’, as Izard put it, 
largely justifies a presentation of federalist personalism that does not distinguish between 
personal contributions.   Frequent references to Rougemont in this chapter should not 849
suggest authorship; the aim is merely to express in his own words the general views of the 
ON group.  
!
ON members worked in teams. As far as possible, they tried to sign books and articles 
in pairs, and at any rate they debated their ideas before putting them down on paper. This 
implies that the claim of authorship of particular concepts proves pointless in most cases. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, Marc and Rougemont squabbled about historical details, such as who 
had first coined the expression ‘Une politique à hauteur d’homme’ (a rough French equivalent 
of ‘small is beautiful’).   One must read Rougemont’s postwar reconstructions of the 1930s 850
with critical distance; this is all the difficulty of interpreting Rougemont’s ‘journaux non-
intimes’, as Ackermann did.   By giving an overview of the doctrine of federalist 851
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personalism, this chapter shows the extent to which Denis de Rougemont repeated the 
political and economic principles of ON. We shall see that Rougemont contributed very little 
to ON economic research, a little more to political thought, and significantly more to spiritual 
reflection. 
!
Following the ON motto – ‘Spirituel d’abord, économique ensuite, politique à leur 
service’   – the first section explores the meanings of the spiritual emphasis, the second 852
section treats the economic aspects, and the third turns to the political critiques and 
constructive proposals of federalist personalism. 
!
!
1. ‘The spiritual first’  !853
!
Ordre Nouveau proved open to the trends of thought that were revolutionizing 
philosophy, political theory and theology, from Nietzsche to Karl Barth, through Marx and 
Kierkegaard. In terms of the history of philosophy, it is possible to situate ON among the 
second ‘generation’ of phenomenologists: they thought that Husserl never fulfilled his 
promise to return to concrete things. As Thomas Keller has noted, this ‘generation’ of thinkers 
undertook a concrete analysis of historical existence (Hans Jonas), of the zoon politikon 
(Hannah Arendt), of empathy and human sciences (Edith Stein), of the existant, the self and 
alterity (Emmanuel Levinas), of the body (Maurice Merleau-Ponty), and of incarnate 
existence (Paul-Ludwig Landsberg, Denis de Rougemont, and Alexandre Marc).   The depth 854
of philosophical research at ON contrasts with most contemporary revolutionary groupings. 
Among those who called upon spirituality against the ambient materialism, ON personalists 
made the most serious attempt to define the ‘révolution spirituelle’ in non-confessional terms. 
!
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The call for a spiritual revolution!
!
It has been remarked that, up to 1934 at least, the ‘révolution spirituelle’ was elusive 
compared to the concrete plans of the so-called ‘réalistes’.   For instance, the ‘Positions 855
d’attaque pour l’Ordre Nouveau’, published in December 1933, do not give a clear political 
theory.   Instead, they offer a non-systematic definition of the human person. ‘Positions 856
d’attaque pour l’Ordre Nouveau’ is a key text for understanding the personalism of ON 
because it gives a definition of the person signed by all the ON members: ‘Nous définissons la 
personne comme un acte et non pas comme un donné physique ou moral, matériel ou abstrait. 
La personne, c’est l’individu engagé dans le conflit créateur’.   To define the person as an act 857
is to emphasise that the person freely affirms his or her being, his identity, by means of ‘un 
choix permanent, donc un risque permanent, c’est-à-dire une tension permanente, qui mesure 
la valeur même de l’homme.’   Thus, for ON, ‘tension, risque, choix, acte, tels sont les 858
éléments de toute liberté réelle et créatrice, partant, de toute dignité humaine.’   Freedom, 859
expressed in tension, risk, choice, and act, is the central tenet of human dignity. 
!
The emphasis on act and creativity has been (mis)interpreted as meaning that ON only 
regarded human dignity as the attribute of the very few who struggled to live in permanent 
tension, taking risks and making choices, acting out their life rather than undergoing 
circumstances.   However the understanding of personhood as a way of being – ‘la personne 860
c’est l’individu engagé dans le conflit créateur’, a definition already provided by Rougemont 
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and Daniel-Rops in July 1933  – does suggest another interpretation. The person was not 861
opposed to the individual, for it was a specific individual: all human beings had within them 
an inherent dignity that allowed them to seek inner freedom. In any circumstances, each 
human being would be facing ‘creative tensions’ before the risks to be taken and the choices 
to be made. These conflicts were potentially creative, and solving conflicts shaped the 
character of a person. Thus, in the philosophy of ON, it was the act which best expressed 
personal choices (and freedom). Witnessing a personal act was as close as an outsider would 
come to understanding the person. 
!
 Rougemont and Dandieu emphasised the act as the starting point of the spiritual 
revolution: ‘Si l’on ne part pas tout de suite de l’acte, on ne partira jamais’.   There was no 862
distinction between the private and the public act of revolution. And so, the call for a personal 
act, asserting personal freedom, was combined with the call for political action and anti-
parliamentarism, ‘car la Révolution commence par ce qui fait mourir un parlement : par une 
décision, par un acte’.   Rougemont and Jardin continued, in the special ON issue of 863
L’Avant-Poste (a Belgian third-way journal): ‘Commencer la Révolution c’est comprendre, 
mais jusqu’aux moelles, que le monde n’est pas un parlement, qu’il ne s’agit pas pour nous 
d’aller nous asseoir quelque part, mais bien de marcher, de vivre, de créer et d’abattre, à 
droite, à gauche, au centre, peu importe, – partout où une résistance avare, inerte, ou 
platement cynique, donne prise à notre acte, donne lieu de manifester ce qu’il y a d’humain en 
nous-même : la personne.’   This assertion helps explain why, in their view, parliamentary 864
institutions, as the expression of bourgeois individualism, were radically opposed to the 
person, understood to be a decision and an act. 
!
 Dandieu was the philosopher of the act. He was the key thinker of ON revolution. His 
accidental death on 6 August 1933, following a general infection after a minor operation, has 
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been considered as the gravest blow to the spiritual revolution planned by ON – ‘Est-il perte 
plus irréparable pour notre génération ?’ asked Robert Aron on the morrow of Dandieu’s 
death.   Aron described his last hours to Rougemont (who was away from Paris at the time): 865
‘Il est longtemps resté lucide, discutant philosophie et invoquant le Dieu de son enfance… 
[…] il est entré dans le coma parlant jusqu’au bout, dans son délire, de l’Ordre Nouveau.’  866
Marc was deeply impressed.   He immediately voiced his determination to continue fighting 867
for the ON revolution, as if it had already had a martyr.   For decades to come, Rougemont 868
would bewail the death of Dandieu as a prophet for modern times.   Both Marc and 869
Rougemont lived their life faithfully dedicated to the purpose of a spiritual revolution.   On 870
the day of Dandieu’s funeral, the ON group met again, as Dandieu had asked on his death-
bed.   It is important to see ON as an enterprise of serious and dedicated men (plus a few 871
women), who genuinely perceived themselves as an avant-garde revolutionary unit. 
!
Following Dandieu, the revolutionary act was seen as an affirmation of being, a 
guarantee of human dignity. With reference to Dandieu, Rougemont explained that the person 
– and personalism of course – was necessarily revolutionary: 
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Révolutionnaire non point par engouement généreux et superficiel, démagogie, 
volonté de puissance ou de brutalité, mauvaise humeur contre la vie ou haine contre la 
moitié des hommes : mais parce qu’il avait reconnu que l’acte révolutionnaire est 
l’origine en même temps que la garantie unique de la dignité humaine. L’action n’est 
pas q[uel]q[ue] chose à quoi la personne se décide un beau matin, pour des raisons. 
L’action, l’acte, c’est la personne même ; c’est aussi ce qu’il y a en l’homme de 
spécifiquement humain, [c’est-à-dire] de créateur.   872!
Thus the revolutionary act founded the dignity of the human person because it 
expressed creativity. Whereas Jewish and Christian personalists had to call upon the Bible to 
say what constitutes the dignity of all men and women (that all were made in the image of 
God), Dandieu was able to say where the inalienable dignity of the human person comes from 
without referring to God: the personal act as creation was the origin and the sole guarantee of 
human dignity. 
!
Agnostic, atheist, and religious understandings of ‘spiritual’!
!
Within ON, agnostic or atheist views contrasted with Jewish or Christian 
interpretations of what made each human person infinitely precious. The ON members chose 
a non-confessional line, fully aware that this was an uncomfortable position at a time when 
the religious and the secular were polarizing French society.   A non-confessional approach 873
was important in two ways. First, it was the clue to the universal claims of the movement. ON 
was concerned with all human persons, whatever their beliefs, race, nationality. Secondly, and 
this is obviously related to the first reason, the political endeavours of ON towards European 
unity could not be sustained without a non-confessional approach, including both religious 
and secular understandings of human dignity. 
!
A non-confessional approach was particularly dear to the founder, Alexandre Marc, 
who struggled to reconcile the Nietzschean views of Arnaud Dandieu, with the traditionalist 
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Catholicism of Jean Jardin and Daniel-Rops, on the one hand, and the militant Protestantism 
of Denis de Rougemont, on the other. To quote Rougemont in 1974:  
Du point de vue religieux, qui est capital, en dépit de ce que pense un vain peuple 
d’intellectuels parisiens, voici l’état du groupe O.N. en 1933 : Rops et Jardin (et peut-
être Dupuis) sont catholiques déclarés ; moi protestant d’école barthienne. Arnaud 
Dandieu d’origine catholique, Claude Chevalley d’origine protestante, Robert Aron 
d’origine juive, se disent à l’époque nietzschéens (tous les trois rejoindront plus tard 
leur « foi »). Enfin, Marc va devenir Catholique, en 1933. La résultante de ces 
diversités est une neutralité religieuse totale pour l’ensemble du groupe O.N., tandis 
que l’obédience confessionnelle d’Esprit ne fait aucun doute.   874!
Thus ON drew on Nietzsche as well as on Péguy, for example.   Arnaud Dandieu 875
strove to reconcile ‘la pensée de Nietzsche et de Jésus’, drawing a parallel between the 
‘notion chrétienne de charité’ and the ‘plaisir nietzschéen de donner’.   L’Ordre Nouveau 876
managed to combine religious and atheist sources, albeit with important discrepancies 
depending on the authors.  
!
Since ON has often been presented as Nietzschean, it is interesting to see how the ON 
group appropriated and adapted Nietzsche for its own purposes. His opposition to the state 
(‘the coldest of all cold monsters’) was often quoted.   The ‘Textes de doctrine et d’action’ 877
on the inside back cover of L’Ordre Nouveau referred to Nietzsche twice (Genealogy of 
Morals, II, 2,   and Thus spoke Zarathustra  ). ON managed to explain that Nietzsche 878 879
claimed ‘le primat de ce que nous appelons la personne. (Ce que Nietzsche appelle individu 
souverain, car il écrivait à une époque où les distinctions nécessaires n’étaient pas encore 
apparues inéluctables.)’.   Nietzsche was used as a reference to justify the primacy of the 880
human person from an atheist standpoint: in the extract quoted, Nietzsche argued that the aim 
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of society and morality was the ‘individu souverain’, free and responsible, controlling himself 
and his destiny according to his conscience – and this, in the vocabulary of ON, was the 
‘personne’.   881
!
Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu drew on new research in anthropology and 
ethnology to prove that human beings had a spiritual faculty besides rational and instinctive 
acts. Following the philosopher of science Emile Meyerson, and the phenomenological 
physician Eugène Minkowski, who related scientific theories with ethnological research, 
Dandieu emphasised that non-intellectual and non-quantifiable activity was vital.   Drawing 882
some political and social consequences of Marcel Mauss’s ‘Essai sur le don’, Dandieu 
developed the distinction between mechanical labour and creative work and called for a 
system in which each person could freely give him/herself in creative work.   That the 883
economy was to be built on the ‘gift’ could either be interpreted in the line of Marcel Mauss’s 
anthropology (viewing the gift as a sign of power and prestige), or in a Christian sense (as a 
form of self-surrender). 
!
The personalism of ON was ambivalent vis-à-vis religion, not only because the 
doctrine could be interpreted either in secular or in religious terms, but also because most of 
its proponents had a dual attitude. In 1933, Rougemont wrote: ‘Il n’y a de rupture possible 
qu’au nom de l’Evangile.’   Like Rougemont, Alexandre Marc had come to envisage 884
Christianity and revolution as proceeding from one and the same source, and this could only 
be suspect for both Catholic authorities and non-Christian revolutionaries.   Marc was aware 885
of the difficulty of reconciling Nietzschean philosophy with his defence of the Catholic 
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Church, from 1933 onwards.   To reconcile religion and revolution was ground-breaking at 886
the time, especially in France. 
!
Rougemont and Daniel-Rops are good examples of a dual attitude. When writing in 
the name of ON, they insisted on the non-confessional character of personalism; but at the 
same time, in their own writings, they suggested that only a (particular) Christian approach 
was valid. In July 1933, Daniel-Rops and Rougemont officially defended the non-
confessional character of ON.   Against allegations that ON was actually defending Christian 887
values under the guise of its motto ‘spirituel d’abord’, they emphasised that ON had a secular 
understanding of ‘spirituel’: ‘cet adjectif qualifie l’acte personnel’.   They were adamant in 888
distinguishing ON from any confusion with Christian thought: ‘aucune confusion non plus, 
entre le spirituel chrétien et notre personnalisme. Le spirituel de l’Ordre Nouveau veut être 
humain et rien qu’humain.’   Thus, even though some of the ON members were Christian, 889
the motto ‘spirituel d’abord’ did not refer to the Holy Spirit (as P.O. Lapie had written in 
Mouvements), but to human politics: ‘C’est donc faire le plus grand tort au christianisme de 
certains membres de l’Ordre Nouveau que de leur attribuer une confession entre le spirituel, 
tel que nous venons de le définir, et le Saint-Esprit dont parle la théologie, réalité qui, pour le 
chrétien, reste d’un ordre radicalement hétérogène à tout ordre terrestre.’    890
!
The spiritual revolution of ON was defined without reference to the transcendent, and 
thus, ‘il ne s’agit pas ici de transcender le plan humain, la condition humaine.’   The subtle 891
reference to Malraux’s Condition humaine (1933) shows Rougemont’s concern with 
engagement in literature.   Like Malraux, Rougemont supported a literature at the service of 892
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revolution.   When he wrote for ON, he was serving the personalist revolution, which was 893
necessarily non-confessional. Personally however, Rougemont affirmed his difference from 
non-religious personalists: ‘Je ne saurais croire pourtant à l’efficacité d’une foi en l’homme 
fondée sur l’homme seul’.   Rougemont professed: ‘L’Esprit auquel je crois est justement 894
celui que l’homme ne peut connaître, sinon en lui obéissant. C’est l’Esprit qu’il ne peut 
connaître que lorsqu’il en reçoit un ordre, une vocation, et qu’il exécute cet ordre.’  895
Rougemont accepted a non-confessional understanding of ‘spirituel’, but ‘l’Esprit’ was a 
radically different reality.   Unlike Esprit, ON personalists made a clear difference between 896
‘spirituel’ and ‘Esprit’. ON was more coherent than Esprit in referring to ‘spirituel’ as the 
opposite of ‘matériel’ (whilst ‘l’Esprit’ was reserved strictly for theological purposes). 
!
Religious and non-religious approaches to ‘vocation’!
!
Ordre Nouveau argued that each human being had a vocation in the broad sense, or, 
according to Rougemont, in a strict religious sense. Understood in a secular sense, vocation 
was an equivalent of personal destiny: ‘Nous croyons que la vocation de l’homme ne peut se 
réaliser que dans la famille, la région, le métier, la nation, la communauté, la conscience d’un 
destin personnel.’   ON shared these views on the roots of the person with most of the 897
French right. Yet unlike the right, ON emphasised the inherent freedom of each human being: 
‘Chaque être humain a sa vocation propre dont il est le seul juge.     898
!
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The philosophical and psychological understanding of vocation at ON was partly 
drawn from German philosopher William Stern,   who developed a theory of ‘critical 899
personalism’, calling for a holistic approach to the person.   Alexandre Marc acknowledged 900
the link between the personalism that he developed in France and Stern’s personalism: ‘le 
personnalisme français et le "personnalisme" de William Stern se rencontrent et se croisent 
dans un accord complet’.   The understanding of the person as vocation (not as a given) was 901
a point of convergence between French and German personalists. 
!
Unsurprisingly, with his Calvinist background, Rougemont particularly developed the 
appreciation of the person as vocation. In his own works (unlike in L’Ordre Nouveau), he 
expressed a religious understanding of vocation. In Politique de la personne, Rougemont put 
forth a strict Calvinist interpretation of vocation: ‘La vocation est un appel, une mission 
confiée à un homme, – une parole que Dieu lui adresse.’   To the objection that this made no 902
sense for the non-believer, Rougemont responded that each and everyone was called by God, 
and that there were many secular people who believed in their mission, only ‘ils l’appellent 
leur dignité.’   Consistent with ON principles, Rougemont stated that Christian and atheist 903
interpretations of ‘vocation’ were compatible. 
!
In Rougemont’s view, having a concrete vocation liberated one from economic and 
social determinism. Rougemont contrasted personalism with other political theories, which he 
despised for their (alleged) belief in fate, be it economic or historical determinism, or simply 
state governance: ‘Le banquier croit aux fatalités du Capital. Le bourgeois croit aux fatalités 
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de l’Opinion Publique. Le communiste croit aux fatalités de l’Histoire. Et tous croient, 
comme le fasciste, aux fatalités de l’Etat. Nous croyons à la liberté de la Personne.’  904
Rougemont wrote: ‘Avoir un destin propre, une vocation, c’est la seule manière que les 
hommes aient jamais pu concevoir d’être libres. Tel est le sens de notre personnalisme. […] 
Toute la doctrine de l’Ordre Nouveau tient dans ces quelques mots : le destin particulier de 
chaque homme est plus grand que tous les « destins du siècle » inventés par nos lâchetés.’  905
Here, Rougemont was particularly aiming at Destin du siècle, an essay by the Socialist writer 
Jean-Richard Bloch.   More generally however, Rougemont used the concept of vocation to 906
affirm the inherent dignity and freedom of each human being.  
!
The spiritual revolution of ON – ‘spirituel d’abord’ – opposed the ‘précédence ou 
primauté de l’économique dans le marxisme’ (to quote the title of a chapter from Politique de 
la personne).   This was a restrictive interpretation of Marxism. ‘Quand nous disons spirituel 907
d’abord, ce d’abord n’a pas le même sens temporel, historique, que dans l’économique 
d’abord des marxistes. [Rougemont is referring to the transitory period in Marxist thought.] Il 
a un sens de primauté non pas chronologique et transitoire, mais absolue. Primauté éternelle et 
non pas temporelle.’   It was a personalist contention that both capitalism and Marxism dealt 908
exclusively with materialist constraints and objectives. However, whilst rejecting materialism, 
ON remained wary of a duality between mind and matter: ‘L’esprit ne saurait désigner que la 
totalité créatrice de l’homme, corps et intelligence, indissolublement, en acte.’   This brings 909
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2. ‘Then the economic’!
!
Ordre Nouveau proposed the replacement of the capitalist and parliamentary 
democratic nation-state with a socio-economic and political federalism, aimed at restoring 
human scale to communities. The ON economic approach combined emphasis on the spiritual 
with reference to technology, thanks to the participation of ‘techniciens’ from the Ecole 
Polytechnique, from January 1934 onwards. The combination of the spiritual and precise 
economic devises means that ON transcended the cleavage drawn by Oliver Dard, between 
‘nouvelles relèves spiritualistes’ and ‘réalistes’.   Unlike Esprit and the ‘Jeune Droite’, ON 910
had concrete proposals for the social-reorganisation of labour.  
!
A necessary economic revolution?!
!
The economic theory of ON can be found in three main sources: La Révolution 
nécessaire, the last joint book of Aron and Dandieu; the journal L’Ordre Nouveau; and the 
newsletter, Bulletin de liaison des groupes ‘Ordre Nouveau’, published between 1935 and 
1937.   A central tenet of ON economic theory was that capitalism was a source of disorder 911
and an obstacle to personal freedom. The damages of capitalism were manifest in the 
proletarian condition (defined as the modern form of slavery following Marx and Proudhon) 
and in productivism (the view that the finality of gains in productivity is to produce more, 
without regard for the workers – and one could add: for the environment, although this was 
the concern of the Gascon personalists and not of ON in the 1930s).   Productivism was the 912
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common ideology of liberal capitalism and Soviet communism.   It was against productivism 913
and to end the proletarian condition that ON developed its economic and social doctrine.  
!
In La Révolution nécessaire, Aron and Dandieu put forth three main motives for a 
revolution: callous neglect of the person in modern society (people were reduced to economic 
agents whose goal was to produce and to consume); the deceit of ideologies (Marxism led to 
obsessive organisation of industry and, instead of suppressing the state, orchestrated 
statolatry); and finally, the alienation of manual work (the obsession with productivity: ‘Il n’y 
a pas de pire ennemi de la joie au travail que la religion du travail’).   Their economic 914
theory was based on a ‘fonction dichotomique’, which Aron later defined as a double-sided 
understanding of human activity: 
Toute activité humaine, tout travail humain, individuel ou social, comporte deux parts 
[…]. D’abord la part mécanisée, devenue automatique, où sont enregistrés les résultats 
de toutes les recherches antérieures, constituant l’acquis de la civilisation. Ensuite, les 
activités neuves et libres, qui s’exercent dans le sens de la recherche, de la découverte, 
de l’aventure, de la création. […] L’équilibre entre les deux parts de l’activité 
humaine, évitant les confusions, n’empêche pas une hiérarchie d’exister entre les deux 
zones, celle de l’automatisme et celle de la liberté. La seconde constitue 
l’aboutissement, la raison d’être de la première, qui ne doit lui servir que de point 
d’appui.   915!
The last sentence explains why Mounier and Esprit could accuse ON of a latent 
contempt for manual work.   However, I argue that the point of the dichotomic function was 916
to give an innovative answer to the proletarian condition. 
!
In La Révolution nécessaire, Aron and Dandieu were adamant that the proletarian 
condition could be abolished thanks to a new distribution of labour through a ‘civilian 
service’, the maximum development of mechanisation to cover unskilled tasks, and the 
organisation of producers’ cooperatives.   Arnaud Dandieu distinguished two types of labour, 917
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which in turn divided the economy into two sectors. As defined by ON in March 1934: ‘Deux 
sortes de travail : Le travail automatique, machinal, quantitatif ou disqualifié, qui ne comporte 
aucune initiative et aucun engagement personnel. Il est essentiellement prolétarien. Le travail 
d’artisan, de technicien ou d’artiste, humain, qualifié et créateur qui procure à l’homme une 
satisfaction directe. Aux deux sortes de travail correspondent deux sortes de production, l’une 
planée, l’autre libre.’   Alexandre Marc aimed at the replacement of wage labour (i.e. selling 918
one’s work randomly on the market) by free associations of skilled workers. He devoted 
lengthy analysis to the theory of the participative enterprise from the mid-1930s onwards.   919
!
From 1934 onwards, the ON team (with the notable exception of Rougemont, as we 
shall see below) developed the socio-economic dimensions of personalism.   ON imagined a 920
complete set of socio-economic arrangements: the free sector of the economy would be based 
on the participative enterprise, a free association of skilled workers (whether entrepreneurs, 
technicians or artisans); in the planned sector of the economy, largely producing goods of 
primary necessity, unskilled labour would be left to be performed by contingents of a ‘service 
civil’.   This civilian service was a form of conscription aimed at abolishing the proletarian 921
condition by relieving any single class from repetitive tasks, perceived as dehumanising. The 
progress of automation, far from being the cause of structural unemployment, would allow a 
steady decrease in the amount of unskilled work. The residual unskilled work would be 
carried out evenly by all citizens through the scheme of the civilian service. I submit that 
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Dandieu’s theory of the ‘service civil’ is likely to go down as the most original contribution of 
ON to the history of ideas. 
!
A counterpart to the civilian service was the ‘vital minimum’ guaranteed to all by the 
state (‘Minimum Social Garanti’ or MSG). This basic income would satisfy primary needs in 
food, clothing and accommodation. The planned sector of the economy would produce these 
basic goods to ensure their availability to all. The aim was to dissociate reward (or salary) 
from the satisfaction of basic needs. One could object that since needs are relative, the plan 
for a basic income (‘minimum vital’) would remain arbitrary, no matter how carefully 
planned. However, ON economics were fundamentally optimistic: ‘Les moyens de production 
actuels permettent facilement d’arracher tout le monde à la misère. Il ne s’agit pas de faire 
bénéficier quelques uns d’une aumône humiliante, d’un secours de chômage philanthropique 
et démoralisant : il s’agit de faire que tous bénéficient des avantages du machinisme.’   Such 922
confidence in economic progress was shared by many ‘technocrats’ in the 1930s.   The idea 923
of a ‘minimum vital’ was popularised by Daniel-Rops in Ce qui meurt et ce qui naît (1937), 
for a largely Catholic readership. And after the Second World War, Alexandre Marc and 
Robert Aron were particularly active in developing the concept of MSG and the ideal of self-
management of the enterprise.    924
!
From January 1934, following the ON ‘Appel aux techniciens’, some alumni of the 
Ecole Polytechnique (from the group X-Crise, after the nickname of the school: ‘L’X’) 
developed the technicalities of the civilian service in L’Ordre Nouveau.   In a dry note, 925
Robert Gibrat stated that the proletarian condition could be abolished if each citizen 
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accomplished twelve months of ‘travail servile’ in his life.   Robert Loustau illustrated this 926
theory with the example of the mining industry.   In 1935, a ‘Bureau d’Etudes pour le 927
Service Civil’ at ON worked out the practicalities of the implementation of a civilian service 
and contacted entrepreneurs for a two-week long experiment.   The aim was to allow the 928
replacement of unskilled workers in factories, so as to grant them paid holidays – this was 
before the Popular Front instituted them – and prove that the condition of the proletariat could 
be changed.  
!
A prototype of the civilian service was implemented in the summer of 1935.  929
Approximately forty students and ON volunteers ‘took the place, but not the pay’, in the 
words of Christian Roy, of as many unskilled workers in four factories of Beauvais and Paris 
(paper, car, brush and carpet industries).   The experience was a success: many of the 930
workers took the first vacation in their working life; and the volunteers managed to keep up 
the same output for the firms.   A tract entitled ‘La relève du travail’ claimed: ‘Au cours de 931
l’été 1935, une première expérience a été tentée avec succès dans quelques usines situées dans 
la région parisienne et dans la banlieue de Beauvais. « La France est un des seuls pays ou 
l’ouvrier et l’ouvrière n’ont pas de vacances payées. Sacrifiez quelques jours de vos vacances 
pour en donner à ceux qui n’en ont jamais. »’   Plans were made to repeat the experience in 932
the summer of 1936. 
!
In June 1936, massive strikes demanding the implementation of the Popular Front 
social laws succeeded in making two weeks of paid vacations mandatory, thus removing 
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much of the impetus for taking over workers’ tasks (beyond testing out the civilian service’s 
premise that any citizen could learn them on the job). Although everything was ready for the 
summer of 1936, ON gave up the project.   The single experience of civilian service, in the 933
summer of 1935, remained the only concrete public manifestation of the ON revolution. 
!
Rougemont and the economic revolution!
!
 As noted above, Rougemont contributed little to the socio-economic research of ON. 
Admittedly, he wrote the first article of L’Ordre Nouveau on an economic question: ‘Liberté 
ou chômage?’     and he published a book on the condition of an ‘intellectuel en chômage’, 934
which he experienced from 1933 to 1935, following the liquidation of the ‘Editions Je 
Sers’.   In an article published in Esprit in July 1933, Rougemont also expanded on the 935
theme of ‘Loisir ou temps vide?’.   Rougemont disagreed with the common opposition of 936
work defined as ‘forcé’ and leisure defined as free time.   Thomas Keller has showed that 937
this paralleled the conception of free and creative time of Werfel and Rosenstock, even though 
Rougemont was only aware of their research through the interpretation of Alexandre Marc.  938
Rougemont argued that both work and leisure should aim at creation.   With unemployment 939
– forced free time, as it were, the contrast between work as forced and leisure as free time was 
made obsolete. 
!
 Nevertheless, Rougemont was more interested by cultural and moral issues than by 
economic and social matters. His Journal d’un intellectuel en chômage is more about culture 
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and the role of the writer than about unemployment and the economy.   It is based on the 940
following paradox: an intellectual has to be unemployed for an ‘existential’ analysis of 
unemployment, and yet, technically, the intellectual, whose activity is to reflect and speak out 
on public issues, can never be out of work.   The Journal d’un intellectuel en chômage was 941
part of a general trend whereby ‘unemployed persons became the heirs of the moral economy 
and thereby challenged fundamental values’ of capitalism.   Rougemont repeated the ON 942
economic slogans, and emphasised that the economic revolution had a moral purpose.  943
Wealth was but a means (to be free to respond to a particular calling), and Rougemont 
celebrated frugality: ‘POUR VIVRE DE PEU. – (Avoir peu)’.   The Journal offered a 944
picturesque account of the life of an unemployed writer; it did not seek to solve the problem 
of unemployment. 
!
Besides his ‘Liberté ou chômage?’, Rougemont published only one article on an 
economic subject in L’Ordre Nouveau: ‘Historique du mal capitaliste’ with René Dupuis (for 
the January 1937 issue on ‘Capital et Capitalisme’).   The approach in terms of civilisation 945
led Dupuis and Rougemont to draw a conventional indictment against the social consequences 
of capitalism.   Except for those two relatively minor articles, Rougemont abstained from 946
socio-economic debate in L’Ordre Nouveau. In June 1934, Marc reproached him with not 
contributing to their research on ‘Corporation’ (the ON economic system).   It is not because 947
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he was away from Paris between the summer of 1933 and the Autumn of 1936, when 
‘technical’ issues were extensively discussed, that Rougemont abstained. He did publish in 
L’Ordre Nouveau during this period, but his attention focussed on political or cultural matters. 
!
The list of themes of all the articles that Rougemont published in L’Ordre Nouveau 
between 1933 and 1938 proves his disinterest in economic issues.   After his ‘Liberté ou 948
chômage?’, Rougemont wrote articles against communism (particularly targeting communist 
intellectuals);   against the French Socialist Party and socialism in general;   against the 949 950
French parliament;   against determinism and for personal responsibilities;   on French 951 952
politics both current and past;   on revolution, with particular reference to the French 953
Revolution, the Soviet Revolution and Nazi Germany;   on the Nazi celebration of war and 954
the international policy of non-intervention;   on political theory (especially with regard to 955
authority and legitimacy);   and on the themes of culture, literature and the responsibility of 956
intellectuals.    957
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Rougemont’s identification with the literary world, his quest for political commitment, 
and his relative neglect for economic issues were normal among intellectuals in the 1930s. It 
was the ON group which showed an unusual concern for economics. ON put economic and 
social reforms before political change. Following Marxists and ‘technocrates’, ON made 
politics depend on social and economic structures. 
  
!
3. ‘The political at its service’!
!
The ON political theory was an endeavour to renew French political thought, a task 
which had European-wide ambitions from the beginning. Against the model of the centralised 
nation-state – considered too small for contemporary challenges and too large for the personal 
commitment of each – ON promoted a European federation based on regions. Federalism, for 
ON, was the type of government in which several regions (not states) constitute a political 
unity, while remaining relatively independent with regard to their internal affairs. The region 
or ‘la petite patrie’ was roughly defined by the sentimental attachment to one’s native 
landscape; it was said to be natural, as opposed to the artificial construct of states. A group of 
regions formed a broader cultural unit, ‘la nation culturelle’, which was necessarily open to 
the universal. Thus, ON sought to oppose nationalism, although paradoxically, as I shall 
emphasise, the universal ‘nation culturelle’ may be looked upon as a variation of French 
nationalism. This section seeks to show why and how ON thought that a federalist state, 
limited to administrative functions, provided the best conditions for the person to be 
politically free and responsible. 
!
The ON federalism has been the subject of articles and militant reports, besides the 
three doctoral dissertations cited already. John Loughlin, in an article in English, has 
attempted a critical assessment of ‘French personalist and federalist movements in the 
interwar period’, suggesting that their ‘critique of the liberal nation-state is no more than a 
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regurgitation of traditional conservatism with a dose of Proudhonian anarchism thrown in’.  958
This remains to be argued, and Loughlin does not draw on a single primary source for the 
period preceding 1945.   Referring to primary sources has been made easy since the 959
complete reprint of L’Ordre Nouveau in 1997. Obviously, to recover a sense of the ON efforts 
towards a coherent doctrine in the 1930s, one has to focus on history rather than the possible 
contemporary applications of federalist personalism. And in this perspective, Marc Heim’s 
preface to the reprint of L’Ordre Nouveau is disappointing.   European federalists regularly 960
organise colloquia on the federalism of ON, with a view to nourishing a coherent federalist 
policy in our day.   For all their insights on Proudhonian and Hamiltonian traditions of 961
federalism, they fail to grasp the key to the political theory of ON in the 1930s. 
!
At the heart of the ON political theory, I submit, lays an endeavour to rethink the bases 
of political sovereignty. Against the notion of national sovereignty, embodied in the 
parliamentary regime of the Third Republic, ON appealed to the sovereignty of the person. 
Refusing any legitimacy to the national parliament and government led ON to reject all 
national political parties, and to repudiate international diplomacy. By examining successively 
the negative and positive reappraisal of sovereignty according to ON, I seek to show how ON 
was as much innovative as it was derivative of a French political tradition. 
!
A triple negation of political thought!
!
In 1932, Robert Aron depicted the position of ON with a touch of irony: ‘Nous ne 
sommes ni droite, ni gauche, mais s’il faut absolument nous situer en termes parlementaires, 
nous répéterons que nous sommes à mi-chemin entre l’extrême droite, et l’extrême gauche, 
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par derrière le président, tournant le dos à l’assemblée.’   L’Ordre Nouveau passed quickly 962
over the scandals and affairs of the Republic – themes amply developed in the contemporary 
press – and focused on doctrine. It criticized parliamentarism, political parties, and the 
electoral system at the same time.  
!
Criticizing the parliamentary system was nothing exceptional in interwar France, but 
Michel Trebitsch has argued that ON innovated in three ways.   Firstly, ON hoped to foster a 963
‘common front’ that would transcend the class struggle: ON was presented as an initiative of 
youth regardless of social conditions. Secondly, ON departed from the concept of political 
party: it could not convey the will of the people. Thirdly, it rejected the framework of the 
nation-state. Each negation requires closer examination: the transversal condemnation of 
French politics; the rejection of the principle of national sovereignty; and – as a corollary of 
the negation of national sovereignty – the critique of the nation-state and of the international 
principle of minority rights, as established by the peace settlements following the First World 
War. 
!
1. Transversal condemnation of French politics 
!
The transversal condemnation of politics, expressed in the ‘neither right nor left’ 
motto, has been famous in French political history since Loubet del Bayle’s study of Les Non-
conformistes des années trente.   The ‘Ni droite ni gauche’ issue of L’Ordre Nouveau, in 964
October 1933, developed the theme of the uselessness of parliament and political parties: ‘ce 
ne sont pas seulement les différents partis qui sont condamnables, c’est le parti en tant que 
forme d’organisation politique.’   There is no need to insist: ON generalised the critique of 965
all political parties to the condemnation of the very concept of a political party. 
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Despite increasing polarization of politics both on the domestic and the international 
scenes, ON claimed to keep the ‘neither right, nor left’ line throughout the 1930s. Thus, ON 
refused the anti-fascist front, although well aware of the fascist threat.   Refusal to 966
compromise led ON to reject the Popular Front: L’Ordre Nouveau called for abstention in the 
parliamentary elections of 1936.   ON members abstained on principle: they sought to 967
rethink the bases of modern political thought from without. 
!
2. Doctrinal questioning of parliamentary democracy 
!
The structured character of ON attacks on the parliamentary system was largely the 
work of the former students of the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques: Alexandre Marc, Jean 
Jardin, and René Dupuis (who was the son of one of the directors of the school). Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon was their key reference for condemning abuses of political sovereignty in 
centralised states.   ON also referred to Marx, Sorel and Maurras for condemnation of the 968
parliamentary system.   ON federalism has been called Proudhonian. It is certain that the 969
French anti-Jacobin tradition of federalism prevailed at ON, to the detriment of other 
traditions, such as American federalism.   The general critique of the parliamentary system 970
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should be considered first; before looking at the more precise attacks on the French Third 
Republic; and finally showing that, strange though it may seem today, ON criticised 
parliamentary democracies for fear they may turn into ‘totalitarian’ dictatorships. 
!
Unlike the great majority of political theorists since the Renaissance and the 
Reformation, the ON group did not seek to assess the means of representation of the people 
by the state. ON contrasted the reformists (or ‘réalistes’), who argued that an improvement of 
the electoral system, particularly a better calculation of the constituencies, would allow an 
accurate representation of the people. It held: ‘Plus le droit électoral est étendu, plus sont 
nombreuses les volontés personnelles, communales ou corporatives escamotées au profit du 
pouvoir central. Ce qui importe dans le pouvoir central ce n’est pas tant la façon dont il est 
recruté que la manière dont il exerce son pouvoir.’   This statement was written on the eve of 971
the legislative elections of 26 April and 3 May 1936, which led to the historic victory of the 
Popular Front in France. The 15 April issue of L’Ordre Nouveau sought to take a distance 
from the events: Alexandre Marc explained why elections had little importance in the final 
analysis, while René Dupuis reflected upon various forms of sovereignty. 
!
The main reason for personalists to reject parliamentary elections was that they tended 
to treat human questions in quantitative terms. In April 1936, Alexandre Marc (under his ON 
pseudonym Michel Glady) put forth his strongest argument against parliamentary democracy: 
adding up votes was not a recipe for a true statement of the people’s will.   Moreover, as 972
political action was largely limited to voting in elections in Western democracies, the citizen 
ran the risk of imagining that dropping a piece of paper into a ballot box was enough to fulfil 
his personal responsibility in the running of public affairs.   In this way, citizens surrendered 973
their personal rights and duties to the state, to a bureaucracy. The people had no means to 
control the parliament, which inevitably abused the concentration of power and lack of 
supervision. Marc concluded that Proudhon had been right: ‘la loi du nombre aboutit 
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inéluctablement au règne de l’incompétence.’   The notion of ‘compétence’ was common in 974
the antiparliamentarian discourse of the 1930s, and it owed much to theories of rationalised 
management during the Great War.   We shall see that for ON, ‘competence’ had to remain 975
local, as much as possible. This was the basis for the principle of subsidiarity, underpinning 
federalism. 
!
Quentin Skinner has established that modern political thought was founded on the 
opposition between two distinct theories of sovereignty in the Renaissance and the 
Reformation: the sovereignty of the state vs. the sovereignty of the people.   This had been 976
understood by René Dupuis in 1936 already.   Dupuis regretted that the sovereignty of the 977
people had been confused with that of the nation-state: ‘rois et légistes sont parvenus, à la fin 
du XVe siècle, après trois cents ans de travail souterrain, à ériger en dogme, en postulat, en 
tabou, le principe suivant lequel toute souveraineté politique réside dans l’Etat-Nation et là 
seulement.’   Yet Dupuis’s article was polemical, not historical. He attacked the theory of the 978
sovereignty of the nation-state because he rejected its manifestations: centralisation, a 
compact territory, and cultural uniformity.  
!
Dupuis distinguished two types of political sovereignty. On the one hand, Dupuis 
called ‘matérialiste’ sovereignty understood as the supreme dominion, authority, or rule over 
others and over things. This first type of sovereignty consisted in ‘aller jusqu’à l’extrême 
limite, jusqu’à l’épuisement des forces tant matérielles que psychiques’, which the individual, 
institution, or state possessed.   On the other hand, sovereignty could also be defined as pre-979
eminence in respect of excellence or efficacy. In this second and broader sense, sovereignty 
was ‘la volonté de réaliser entièrement la vocation à laquelle on s’est senti appeler, le but que 
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l’on s’est assigné ou, s’il s’agit d’une institution, qui lui a été assigné’.   This second type of 980
sovereignty emphasised power over oneself, rather than domination over others. It had a 
‘caractère concret, humain’; it was a personalist understanding of sovereignty.   Thereafter, 981
the contrast between the power over others and the power over oneself would be at the heart 
of political personalism. 
!
When the state concentrated in itself all political sovereignty, its power was only 
limited by the resistance of people within the state and the power of neighbouring states. 
There was great temptation, for the leaders of the state, to extend their power by encroaching 
on the people’s freedoms within the borders and to extend the borders by waging war with 
neighbouring countries. Thus, when understood as supreme dominion with respect to power 
and authority over others, sovereignty led to civil war and the end of polity. Dupuis argued 
that the first type of sovereignty is ‘par essence et par nécessité profonde, irréductiblement 
unitaire et conduit […] aux équations Nation = Etat, Etat = domination impérialiste et 
centralisation (que la souveraineté soit démocratique ou monarchique)’.   By contrast, the 982
second conception of sovereignty could not be unitary, since each person and each local 
institution of the federalist state would be responsible for its own goals: it was ‘par essence, 
pluraliste’.   Plurality of sovereignties would characterise the ON federal state. 983
!
Dupuis followed Rousseau and Proudhon in the hope that absolute personal 
independence could be reconciled with the social condition. In other words, one could belong 
to a social order and yet ‘obey only oneself’ – at least in the sense of obeying one’s own 
reason or vocation. Like Proudhon (and unlike Rousseau), ON held that personal 
independence would be best achieved in civil society, not in the state. Free ‘associations de 
personnes’ were supposed to express strong civil societies.   These associations had an 984
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economic equivalent: reciprocity was to be established among groups of producers 
characterized by mutual respect and complementary interests. 
!
When attacking parliamentary democracy, ON targeted the French theory of national 
sovereignty in particular. Although the Third Republic did not have a Constitution per se, it 
was a parliamentary regime that functioned on the principles of national sovereignty, set forth 
since the French Revolution.   The French theory of national sovereignty holds that 985
sovereignty belongs to the people constituted in a body politic, the nation. The collective and 
indivisible body of the nation is distinct from the individuals that compose it. In practice, the 
nation is represented by the parliament. National sovereignty is indivisible and inalienable in 
theory, unlike popular sovereignty. Until the constitution of 1958, national sovereignty was 
opposed to popular sovereignty in France.  
!
In 1935, Rougemont wondered: ‘Nous demandons ce que peut bien signifier 
l’opposition du peuple et de la nation ? Par quel grossier abus du mot nation a-t-on pu venir à 
cette alternative ?’   Thereafter, Rougemont refused to take sides ‘dans la lutte qui met aux 986
prises un Front dit « national » et un Front dit « populaire »’.   He was adamant that ‘la lutte 987
des « nationaux » contre les « populaires » ne fait que prolonger dans la rue l’opposition 
stérile et périmée de la droite et de la gauche parlementaires.’   There was a single adversary: 988
‘le capitalisme centralisateur, anonyme aujourd’hui – à droite, étatiste demain – à gauche, 
dans l’un et l’autre cas destructeur de la liberté des personnes’.   The actual oppression of 989
human persons did not depend on whether sovereignty belonged to the people or to the nation 
(defined as the sum of the people). And so, because they failed to act upon economic 
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structures (not to speak of spiritual matters), French politics remained vain, whatever the 
policies advocated. 
!
It was not because of political circumstances that ON rejected parliamentary 
democracy and national sovereignty. Personalists disagreed with the postulates: ‘Au fond, les 
partisans de ce système postulent que la société est faite d’une poussière d’individus.’   In 990
reality, there was no unitary and indivisible nation; there were people, who all thought 
differently, who were not rational and interchangeable. Rather than protecting personal, 
family, and community bonds, the theory of national sovereignty contributed to crush them. In 
this way, ‘le parlementarisme mène normalement à la dictature.’    991
!
In Rougemont’s words: ‘C’est de la poussière d’individus que le totalitarisme fait son 
ciment’; the atomised society, in which individuals were but isolated particles, was a powerful 
image to illustrate the vulnerability and deficiency of parliamentary democracies in the 
mid-1930s.   History would show that parliamentary democracies were not particularly liable 992
to veering towards fascism. Yet the flaws of parliamentary democracies were not redeemed by 
the Second World War, in the eyes of ON members. As Izard remarked, after the war, ‘pas 
plus Denis de Rougemont et Alexandre Marc, que Robert Aron et Daniel-Rops, ne 
renoncèrent à leurs attaques virulentes à l’égard de la démocratie parlementaire. Bien au 
contraire, à notre avis, la critique des institutions démocratiques fut une constante de la 
philosophie personnaliste entre les deux guerres mondiales et demeure depuis lors, l’un des 
traits permanents de la doctrine du fédéralisme personnaliste.’   Their criticism of 993
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parliamentary democracy was directly linked with their rejection of the nation-state and the 
theory of national sovereignty. 
!
3. Critique of the nation-state and of the international system 
!
In the 1930s, an important concern of ON members was to refute jurists in the Third 
Reich, who manipulated the principle of national sovereignty to argue that ‘the nation comes 
before humanity’.   When ON condemned the confusion between the state, the nation, and 994
the people, they targeted at once the Third Republic, the Third Reich, and the model of the 
nation-state in general. From 1933 onwards, Alexandre Marc contributed to spreading the 
terms ‘état-nation’ (most of the time without capital letters) and ‘supranational’ in French.  995
Both were the object of criticism in L’Ordre Nouveau, for related reasons which now need to 
be examined. 
!
According to ON, the nation-state was doomed because it was an entity both too large 
and too small: it was too large for self-government and sentimental attachment to the land, 
and too small for cultural and economic exchanges. Arnaud Dandieu already argued as much 
in a 1931 lecture.   Alexandre Marc emphasised the personalist dimension of the argument in 996
1934: ‘L’homme n’est pas fait à l’échelle de ces immenses conglomérats politiques que l’on 
essaie de lui faire prendre pour « sa patrie » : ils sont beaucoup trop grands […] ou trop petits 
pour lui. Trop petits si l’on prétend borner son horizon spirituel aux frontières de l’état-
nation ; trop grands si l’on tente d’en faire le lieu de ce contact direct avec la chair et la terre 
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qui est nécessaire à l’homme.’   Since then, the deficiency of the nation-state from within 997
and from without has become a leitmotiv of European federalism.    998
!
The nation-state could not be the basis of healthy community feeling, according to 
ON. The nation, as a glorification of the ancestors’ land, was a glorification of the dead, 
which justified more and more deaths in wars. This was a vicious circle, which ON sought to 
break. As early as May 1932, René Dupuis denounced the enslavement, since the French 
Revolution, of real human beings to the principle of nationalities and the glorification of ‘la 
Terre des Ancêtres’; this was particularly topical, ‘au moment où certaines formations 
révolutionnaires, d’un extrême intérêt par ailleurs, semblent, à l’étranger, commettre les 
erreurs que nous dénonçons ici ; sans parler de l’Hitlérisme dont la trahison n’est plus à 
démontrer, un mouvement tel que le Vorkämpfer, par exemple, risque de faire enliser la 
Révolution dans les confusions entre Nation et Révolution.’   A year later, Hitler was in 999
power. 
!
 Turning to the international and supranational question, ON rejected the principle of 
minority rights, as established by the peace settlements that followed the First World War and 
assured by the League of Nations.   ON remarked that the idea of minority rights was 1000
potentially collectivist and oppressive of personal freedom, like the idea of national 
sovereignty. Jurists in the Third Reich pushed the collectivism inherent in the idea of minority 
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rights to an extreme.   This confirmed ON suspicion that that minority rights could be 1001
abused for nationalist and collectivist purposes. It was clear by the mid-1930s that ‘sur le plan 
politique, l’expérience faite en Europe centrale a montré de façon décisive que la fameuse 
« question des nationalités » n’était pas plus résolue par l’identification – au moins théorique 
– de la « nationalité » et de l’Etat (selon le principe, parfaitement inapplicable d’ailleurs : à 
chaque nationalité un Etat), que par la réunion au sein d’un grand « empire » de peuples 
multiples.’   Instead of minority rights and the Wilsonian principle of nationalities, ON 1002
promoted personal rights.  
!
Personal rights differed from human rights in so far as personalists emphasised that 
persons were anchored in the various ‘sociétés naturelles dans lesquelles l’homme naît, vit et 
exerce son activité quotidienne’, as well as in ‘communautés, libres groupes d’hommes unis 
par un idéal commun’.   Examples of ‘sociétés naturelles’ – meaning necessary – were the 1003
commune and the firm, while Dupuis mentioned as freely created ‘communautés’ the regions 
of Alsace and Brittany, or else confessional groups. Dupuis sought to emphasise tangible 
bonds in people’s lives by contrast with the groups created by lawyers and rulers, from 
national minorities to empires. Through ON, Rougemont benefited from his analysis. 
Dupuis’s ability to criticise the international system from both theoretical and empirical 
standpoints makes him an important – and overlooked – political analyst in the 1930s.  
!
Thus, ON argued that nation-states had been constructed for warfare and could only 
aim at encroaching upon each other. Therefore, any inter-national system was bound to fail, 
not just the League of Nations. It follows from this that a European union of nation-states 
would only lead to quarrels as to who would dominate and benefit from the union. Radical 
distrust of the nation-state marks the distinctiveness of ON among other movements aiming at 
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a peaceful and united Europe in the 1930s.   Having shown the manifold negations of 1004
federalist personalism, it is now time to turn to practical plans for an ‘ordre nouveau’.  
!
Practical aims of the personalist-federalist revolution!
!
Federalist personalism was to start with a revolution, before the appropriate 
institutions could be established to form the ON federation. The revolution, institutions, and 
federation will be considered successively. 
!
1. The revolution: freedom and conflicts 
!
The underlying principle of the personalist revolution, like most revolutions, was a cry 
for freedom: ‘Si le principe de toute liberté humaine ne se trouve pas à l’origine d’un système, 
il ne se trouvera pas non plus dans ses conséquences pratiques.’   Reference to the 1005
Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 and to the French Revolution seemed to be a must 
for revolutionary movements in France. ON criticized the theoretical citizen of 1789, and 
claimed a deeper understanding of people, resulting from modern sociology and 
anthropology. As Rougemont put it: ‘Considérer l’homme en tant qu’individu abstrait 
(Principe de 89) et fonder sur cet individu toutes les institutions, et la morale, c’est 
méconnaître la nature concrète de l’homme, qui comporte le conflit.’   Conversely, 1006
‘Considérer l’homme en tant que personne et fonder sur cette personne toutes les institutions, 
c’est reconnaître la nature concrète de l’homme, qui comporte le conflit.’   ON departed 1007
from idealistic visions of human nature in emphasising that society was the realm of conflicts. 
!
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The idea that the human being is inherently conflictual is reminiscent of Georg 
Simmel’s analysis of life as tension and conflict.   The question of the influence of Simmel 1008
upon ON is an aspect that has been overlooked so far. Alexandre Marc was aware of Simmel’s 
sociology.   Simmel’s philosophy of life had a major impact in the early decades of the 1009
twentieth century, both among academics and within the cultural and artistic spheres. 
Although Simmel is not quoted in L’Ordre Nouveau, it is a possible conjecture that his views 
on conflict influenced the ON. 
!
The parallel may be only apparent: both ON and Simmel drid draw extensively on 
Pierre Joseph Proudhon for their analysis of conflict. Proudhon believed that the universe was 
based on a ‘scientific’ law of antagonism and complementarity.   This principle may be seen 1010
as an adaptation of Heraclitus (conflict as the principle of all things). Proudhon dreamt of 
realizing peace and justice on earth on the basis of this ‘scientific’ law of complementarity. At 
the same time, he was critical of all attempts to construct a system based a ‘scientific’ law 
(particularly positivism). In his Principe fédératif, he called on the spirit (‘esprit’) against 
nature, and on freedom against authority.   Let us see how ON institutions sought to canalise 1011
this aspiration to freedom. 
!
2. The institutions: checks and balances 
!
Given the conflictual nature of society, the aim of ON institutions was to ‘rendre les 
antagonismes féconds pour l’ensemble du corps social’, ‘orienter ces tensions créatrices, sur 
le plan économique et sur le plan politique’.   The influence of Proudhon was patent. Each 1012
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person’s freedom and responsibility within particular communities (family, commune-region, 
enterprise-trade) had to be encouraged – or at least permitted – by the economic and political 
institutions. The laws drafted by ON would aim at respecting personal differences first, then 
local and regional diversities, and general principles would be as few and limited as possible.  
!
Ordre Nouveau personalists acknowledged the need for a state on the condition that 
the primary units of government would be small communities, constrained by immediate 
responsibility for their decisions. They were indebted to Proudhon’s radical anti-
centralization. This term is preferable to ‘decentralisation’, which implies that the decisions 
still depend on the central administration. As Aron put it in 1934: ‘le fédéralisme n’est pas la 
décentralisation […]. Pour le fédéralisme, les impulsions et les initiatives viennent des 
organismes locaux’.   The people were to take political initiatives, while the state was only 1013
to let the persons and the local communities free to take responsibilities. ON members 
believed in the ability of small groups to manage concrete affairs which they could 
understand, but had no trust in the political discernment of the masses.   1014
!
In his Politique de la personne (1934), Rougemont opposed any ‘utilitarian’ morals in 
politics: ‘le bien de l’ensemble ne peut exister qu’à partir du bien de chaque personne. Le 
bien de l’ensemble est comme une extension normale du bien particulier. La personne est 
première ou n’est pas.’   This personalist principle implied a demystification of the state as 1015
no more than a dull administration: ‘Cela revient à dire, sur le plan politique, que l’Etat n’est 
rien d’autre qu’une machine destinée à subvenir à l’entretien des personnes. Privé de toute 
dignité mystique, il doit devenir un simple organe d’économie et de distribution des tâches 
serviles et mécaniques, ou bien encore, une administration, dotée d’une police minime.’  1016
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Thus, ON called for a state limited to administering the four regalian functions (justice, 
police, army and diplomacy) plus – and this is a significant addition – running a limited sector 
of the economy.   Thus, ON personalists sought to have both a minimal state and a welfare 1017
state.  
!
State planning of primary economic goods, according to Dandieu’s dichotomic 
principle, made the ON state different from a minimalist state. In practice, it is difficult to see 
how the state would draw a plan of primary goods without becoming more than an 
administration with a minimal police and diplomacy. Apparently unaware of this difficulty, 
Rougemont emphasised that the state could not take decisions for the general good of persons: 
Une autre conséquence politique du personnalisme, qui marque bien l’opposition de ce 
système à ceux qu’on a fondé sur l’individu libéral, c’est le fédéralisme. L’individu 
étant conçu par les juristes à partir de l’ensemble, ses droits dépendent, en pratique, du 
bon plaisir de l’Etat. Tout au contraire, des lois fondées sur la personne sont obligées 
de tenir compte en premier lieu des diversités personnelles, puis locales, puis 
régionales… On pourrait dire, d’une manière un peu paradoxale, que ces lois perdent 
en puissance à mesure qu’elles gagnent en généralité. […] Mais de la sorte, le centre 
de l’autorité n’est pas dans les bureaux de l’Etat, il reste dans l’activité réelle de 
chaque personne, au sein de groupes d’autant plus forts qu’ils sont moins étendus.   1018!
Thus, Rougemont’s Politique de la personne was very much a subjectivist objection to 
central regulation. But even for those who do not share his anti-objectivist approach, 
Rougemont’s appeal to diversity has a point. The question of how to reconcile personal, local, 
and regional diversity with a welfare state remains open. 
!
It is a recurring theme of Politique de la personne that the human person is his or her 
own judge and the measure of all things. While fascism will be studied in the following 
chapter, it is important to note that Rougemont defined personalism as the anti-fascist device 
in 1934:  
Le personnalisme […] est le véritable antifascisme politique. La personne n’est jamais 
« au pas ». Elle est aux ordres de sa vocation, elle est seule responsable de son risque ; 
surtout, elle se sait plus réelle que toute réalité collective. Elle ne croit pas à la valeur 
d’une unité obtenue aux dépens des unités concrètes et de leur nécessaire diversité. 
Elle veut que l’Etat soit une émanation de l’homme, et non l’inverse. Elle veut qu’il y 
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ait d’abord des hommes humains, ensuite l’Etat au service de ces hommes. Là où 
l’homme veut être total, l’Etat ne sera jamais totalitaire.   1019!
ON repeated the motto ‘Là où l’homme est total, l’état ne peut être totalitaire’, and 
this implied a separation of powers.   The future personalist ‘New Order’ was to have a 1020
system of checks and balances to limit the wrongful uses of political, economic, and 
administrative powers: ‘L’administration locale est confiée à la Commune qui, dans les 
limites de sa compétence, organise la justice, les finances, les travaux publics, l’enseignement. 
Toutes les questions qui dépassent la compétence locale, incombent au Conseil Administratif 
Fédéral dont les membres sont 1) élus en partie par les Communes ; 2) choisis en partie par 
cooptation ; 3) nommés en partie par le Conseil suprême.’  Plans for a ‘Conseil suprême’ 
intensified contemporary suspicion about ON (Jacques Maritain, for example, suspected ON 
of being a masonic plot).    1021
!
There is a more straightforward explanation for the ‘Conseil suprême’. The works of 
Eugenia Hélisse – one of the only active women at ON, together with Yvonne Serruys, 
Henriette Cahen and Jacqueline Chevalley – suggest inspiration from American federalism. 
The tempering her writings brought to the French anti-liberal strand in ON politics has been 
overlooked to date. In 1935-6, Eugénia Hélisse – who hid her gender under the signature E. 
Hélisse – pleaded for a court similar to the Supreme Court of the United States of America, 
which would control the conformity of all laws with the constitution and with the principles 
of federalism.   She argued that a supreme court should defend the spirit (rather than the 1022
text) of the constitution and guarantee that the laws remained faithful to the principles on 
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Maritain’s suspicions of Marc as a Communist revolutionary and a freemason see also Keller, 'Le personnalisme 
de l'entre-deux-guerres’, 441.
!  Eugénia Hélisse, 'La Cour Suprême des Etats-Unis', Bulletin de liaison des groupes Ordre Nouveau, 3 (15 1022
June 1935). and Eugénia Hélisse, 'La Cour Suprême des Etats-Unis', L'Ordre Nouveau, 31 (15 May 1936).
which the federal state was based.   Modelled on these principles, the ‘Conseil 1023
Suprême’ (the capital S is hers) would be ‘composé d’hommes intègres, ayant une fois pour 
toutes renoncé à tous les avantages du pouvoir’.   The legitimacy of the ‘Conseil Suprême’ 1024
was contrasted with the legality of the economic and administrative bodies: ‘le Conseil 
Suprême qui – au dessus des Conseils Economiques et Administratifs qui représentent le 
pouvoir proprement dit – incarne l’autorité, se renouvelle par cooptation pour pouvoir 
contrôler en toute indépendance tous les organismes étatiques et économiques.’   Thus, ON 1025
reiterated the classic distinction between the legitimacy of authority and the legality of power. 
!
Both the system of checks and balances and the reference to the supreme court suggest 
that ON copied part of the American federal system. This is somewhat surprising: ON was 
famously anti-American. Le Cancer américain, by Aron and Dandieu, remained on the list of 
recommended texts in L’Ordre Nouveau (as did everything Dandieu wrote) throughout the 
1930s.   The blatant anti-Americanism of Le Cancer américain was not unparalleled,  1026 1027
even if Pascal Ory has shown recently that anti-Americanism did not concern the majority of 
French people.   The America that Aron and Dandieu called cancerous was both an 1028
economic model and a symbol for an attitude, combining the goal of productivity with 
utilitarian morals. That the federal political institutions imagined by ON drew on American 
parliamentary democracy (with Eugénia Hélisse in particular) suggests fissures in the model 
of ON. Furthermore, there seem to be discrepancies as to the readiness of various members of 
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!  With particular reference to cinema and Jazz music, Schor, 'Les Etats-Unis vus de droite. La crise américaine 1028
de 1929 à travers la presse française de droite', 65-6.
ON to think about the wider world. At this point, an assessment of the limitations of ON 
federalism is needed. 
!
3. The federation: borders and limitations 
!
The ON vision of federation sought to modify, but not to abolish borders. Claude 
Chevalley expressed a common view in the milieux favourable to a European union when he 
wrote: ‘les frontières jouent dans l’état des choses actuel un rôle à la fois excessif et 
inefficace.’   Borders remained necessary between different administrative and economic 1029
entities, yet they seemed excessive because they constituted an ‘obsession’ for nationalists, 
reinforced centralisation (especially in France), and hindered economic and intellectual 
exchanges. The ON revolution, while potentially universal, would first occur within the 
‘limites de la Fédération Ordre Nouveau’.   Unsurprisingly, this federation was France first 1030
and foremost: ‘la terre décisive’.     1031
!
In a statement at once Eurocentric and nationalistic, Aron and Dandieu claimed that 
‘pour sauver l’Occident et l’Europe, nous devons d’abord, aujourd’hui, nous appuyer sur la 
France.’   The mission of France seemed but an adaptation of the myth of a universal and 1032
civilising mission of France, characteristic of much of French nationalism since the eighteenth 
century at least. In itself, it was nothing unusual: many pro-European movements called for a 
European union, while hoping their nation of origin would lead.   Yet for a movement which 1033
claimed to be antinationalistic, it was paradoxical, to say the least. It is significant that the 
first article of L’Ordre Nouveau was entitled ‘Mission ou démission de la France’ and evoked 
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the idea of a civilizing mission.   ON personalists remained dependent on common views of 1034
the nation at the time. 
!
 A number of ON sympathisers, including Marc and Jardin, believed in national(ist) 
‘Valeurs françaises’ – this was the title of the issue number 8, dedicated to the dead of the 
February 1934 riots.   ON insisted that there was a good sense of pride in one’s country, but 1035
it was urgent to distinguish it from the national state. In the winter 1933-4, ON members 
established a distinction between ‘nation’ – the artificial construct of ideology (inculcated 
through the state and schools), and ‘patrie’ – the attachment to one’s origins.   This 1036
distinction was not devoid of ambiguities, especially when ON tried to explain how ‘la nation’ 
– France – should be universal. The contrast between public life and the real life of the 
country was drawn from the extreme-right thinker Charles Maurras. It is ironic that Alexandre 
Marc, a Russian émigré with Jewish origins and who had all the characteristics of a rootless 
intellectual, could have adhered nostalgically to Maurras’s idea of the motherland.  
!
Rougemont, the only non-French ON member besides Marc, also adhered to the ON 
distinction, repeating all his life that nationalism was a mystification of the patriotic fact.  1037
For instance he stated in 1935: ‘Le nationalisme existe parce qu’on l’enseigne ; c’est une 
mystique, un idéal abstrait, un orgueil. Il existe dans la mesure où on l’exalte. Le patriotisme, 
c’est le contraire’.   This led him into contradictory views about France, and about the 1038
nation. For example, in an attempt to clarify ‘la distinction entre patrie et nation, que nos 
adversaires jugent subtile’ (and rightly so), Rougemont praised the ‘nation spirituelle’ and 
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denounced ‘la patrie, réalité concrète, et souvent servitude concrète’ – contradicting thereby 
the doctrinal distinction established by ON and indeed in many of his other works.    1039
!
In this article, Rougemont held a revolutionary – that is ‘positive’ in his view – 
definition of the nation: ‘La nation étant l’idéal spirituel commun à plusieurs petites patries, 
représente le pôle révolutionnaire de tout effort humain. Il est grotesque de voir la fête 
« nationale », donc révolutionnaire, du 14 juillet, transformée en fête « patriotique » et 
réactionnaire.’   Rougemont proposed to replace Bastille day with a celebration of 1 May, 1040
both universal and French:  
Contre le 14 juillet trahi par la réaction bourgeoise, contre le 1er mai trahi par 
l’impérialisme stalinien, célébrons un 1er mai révolutionnaire, universel, dans lequel 
puissent communier toutes les nations qui veulent la révolution nécessaire, celle de la 
liberté et de l’ordre humain. Cette fête sera française dans la mesure où la France 
représente aujourd’hui le solide espoir de la liberté contre toutes les dictatures. Il ne 
dépend que de nous que la France redevienne, comme en 93, la nation de la 
révolution !   1041
  
This sudden enthusiasm for the Revolution of 1793 contradicts Rougemont’s repeated 
condemnation of Jacobinism. Of course, an article of half a page, published in a newspaper 
for ON sympathisers (A nous la liberté was edited by Robert Aron and René Dupuis), should 
not be overestimated. One may suggest that the article shows Rougemont’s determination to 
be revolutionary: it seems as if he was bidding against those who claimed the inheritance of 
1789 and of 1917. 
!
For all their ambivalent attitude vis-à-vis France, Marc and Rougemont (the two non-
French ON members) may have been more consistent in their practical endeavours to extend 
the ON revolution to Europe, if not to the world. Marc drew on Eugen Rosenstock to argue 
that all nations had a specific revolutionary mission to accomplish, which in turn brought their 
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universal concert to a more global level each time.   Marc was extremely active in 1042
networking between the European ‘third-way movements’ in the 1930s.    1043
!
Following Hitler’s coming to power in 1933, his activities tended to focus more on 
France, without abandoning a European perspective however, except perhaps at times in the 
1930s.   For instance, in June 1934, Marc still hoped that ON would be able to establish 1044
connections between the European ‘third-way movements’ similar to ON. He wrote to 
Rougemont that the group was planning a special issue of L’Ordre Nouveau ‘en novembre 
« Par dessus les frontières » (différents mouvements O.N. ou simili O.N. en Allemagne – 
n[ou]s avons des nouvelles récentes d’HSB [Harro Schulze-Boysen] que Chevalley a vu à 
Berlin – Angleterre, Suisse, Belgique, Espagne etc)’.   This indicates the importance Marc 1045
attached to the European character of the third way and the energy he put into it. Marc called 
for a ‘fédéralisme européen réel’ as early as 1933.   The federalist personalism of ON 1046
reached a larger audience in the Resistance during the Second World War and in the 




To conclude, the federalist personalism of ON was a deeply serious attempt to rethink 
social, economic and political issues as a whole and on the basis of a non-confessional 
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!  Alexandre Marc and René Dupuis, Jeune Europe (Paris, 1933). On the continuity of Marc’s federalist views, 1046
see Izard, 'Personnalisme et fédéralisme à travers l'oeuvre des fondateurs de la revue "L'Ordre Nouveau" (Robert 
Aron, Claude Chevalley, Arnaud Dandieu, Daniel-Rops, Alexandre Marc et Denis de Rougemont)’, 448-9.
understanding of the human person. Independently of its political influence (or lack thereof), 
ON is important for three main reasons. Firstly, ON personalists sought to displace the terms 
of the secularist vs. religious conflicts in 1930s France. Their call upon the spiritual 
dimension of the person could be interpreted in atheist, agnostic, or religious terms. The 
conflict between revolution and religion was to be overcome in the ‘révolution spirituelle’. 
Secondly, in a society where religious and secularist ideas influenced the very manner in 
which ‘the economic’ was defined (as Kevin Passmore has argued),   ON attempted to unite 1047
people around a non-confessional understanding of the human person. Anthropology and a 
union of state planning with a market economy was to be the basis of the ON economy, which 
would put an end to the proletarian condition and satisfy the primary needs of all. Thirdly, the 
federalism of ON was also an attempt to overcome the framework of the nation-state and 
stereotypes of the unitary nation. However, we have seen that all for its claims to rise above 
nationalism, ON remained dependent on French ‘universalism’: the idea that France had a 
unique revolutionary mission to save the world. 
!
An essential part of Rougemont’s role in ON was to act as an interpreter, not in the 
sense of a cultural transfer from foreign cultures, but in conveying the ideas of other 
personalists, such as Alexandre Marc, Arnaud Dandieu, and René Dupuis, and linking them to 
the contents of intellectual and moral debate at the time. Rougemont had a gift for catch-
phrases, such as ‘le désordre établi’ and ‘là où l’homme veut être total, l’état ne sera jamais 
totalitaire’. His independent contributions to personalism will be the subject of Chapter 7. Yet 
Chapter 6 now proceeds to show that his personalism would not have taken the form that it 




!  This is one of the main contentions of Kevin Passmore, From liberalism to fascism: The right in a French 1047
province, 1928–1939 (Cambridge, 1997).
!




Both personalism and fascism – treated as generic phenomena in this chapter – shared the 
quest for a third-way solution to the famous ‘crisis’ of capitalism and parliamentary 
democracy in interwar Europe. Zeev Sternhell’s definition of fascism as ‘la troisième voie 
dans sa pureté la plus extrême’ implies that personalism, as a third way, was related to 
fascism.   What was the relation between personalism and fascism? Is Sternhell right to 1048
suggest personalism was a French proto-fascism? If it is so, how could Rougemont call upon 
personalism as a weapon against fascism? 
!
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a better understanding of French personalism 
by comparison with fascism. We are still far from having reached an agreement on an all-
encompassing definition of fascism.   As Stanley Payne has put it, ‘Fascism is notoriously 1049
slippery and resistant to interpretation, and even to basic definition’.   Under these 1050
conditions, seeking to define personalism vis-à-vis fascism may seem like doubling up the 
difficulty. And yet it is not only legitimate to compare fascism and personalism – they were 
two third-way movements of the 1930s – but also necessary, since serious confusions have 
occurred between the two. The very first articulation of personalism in France was 
condemned by French communists and Soviet observers (Izvestia) as an attempt to foment a 
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fascist revolution.   And the debate on the relations between fascism and personalism has 1051
been going on ever since.  
!
The polemic has reached a peak in the 1980s, with the ‘Sternhell controversy’.   In 1052
his Ni droite ni gauche, L’idéologie fasciste en France (first published in 1983), Zeev 
Sternhell has argued that the quest for a ‘third way’ between liberal capitalism and 
communism was the sign of an insidious kinship with fascist ideology.   The neither right 1053
nor left line (challenged by Sternhell) characterises many political movements in French 
history, some of which are highly regarded, such as the Gaullist ‘Rassemblement national’.  1054
In the 1930s, a large spectrum of political groups claimed to belong neither to the right nor to 
the left, from the conservative Croix-de-Feu league, through the small fascist party of Jacques 
Doriot (PPF), to the left-wing dissident ‘Frontisme’ of Gaston Bergery and the ‘non-
conformistes des années trente’ studied by Loubet del Bayle.   Because it seemed to put 1055
those very diverse groups in the same (deeply sensitive) category, Ni droite ni gauche led to 
bitter polemics in France. 
!
In a recent mise au point, Brian Jenkins has underlined that it was ‘when Sternhell 
turned his attention to the interwar period that the alarm bells began to ring’.   What was 1056
disturbing was not so much Sternhell’s consideration of ‘the “usual suspects” […] but [also] 
the antimaterialist revisionists of Marxism from Georges Sorel to Henri de Man and Marcel 
Déat, along with the personnalistes like Emmanuel Mounier and the “spiritual” nationalists 
around Thierry Maulnier.’   This is to say that the personalist case is sensitive and 1057
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enormously significant. It is sensitive because some personalists were indeed very close to 
fascism, in particular in Vichy France, and at the same time they laid down much of the 
foundations of post-war France.   It is enormously significant because it shows how the 1058
polarity between liberal democracy on the one hand, and the various third ways (including 
fascism), on the other, can be inappropriate. This chapter argues that personalism is at the 
centre of what remains highly controversial in the debate concerning French fascism today. 
!
With respect to personalism, the ‘Sternhell controversy’ raised two distinct sets of 
issues: whether personalism was a proto-fascism, and whether the ‘neither right, nor left’ line 
had any consistency. Both questions are considered in a first section, before proposing some 
guidelines for the comparison between personalism and fascism, and finally showing how 
Rougemont may allow us to overcome the twofold classification that has dogged the debate 
on fascism in France. 
!
!
1. The ‘Sternhell controversy’ then and now!
!
In the 1980s and 1990s, the ‘Sternhell controversy’ led to decisive steps in the 
historiography of fascism as a generic phenomenon. Ni droite ni gauche has been the subject 
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of numerous articles,   interviews,   polemics,   political debates,   a trial,   and 1059 1060 1061 1062 1063
lastly a Master’s thesis.   Sternhell created a ‘choc salutaire’ in the words of Francesco 1064
Germinario.   This debate is somewhat dated after the important research on fascism in 1065
France by William Irvine and Robert Soucy,   followed by various French and non-French 1066
scholars.   And yet, the field remains far from consensual: on the one hand, some French 1067
historians continue to downplay the existence of fascism in France;   on the other hand, 1068
revisionist historians of French fascism often directly criticize each other.   And so the 1069
‘Sternhell controversy’ is still contentious and instructive. After a brief summary of 
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Sternhell’s argument, I submit that what remains controversial in the ‘Sternhell controversy’ is 
directly linked with personalism. 
!
Fascisme à la française: a debate concerning personalism !
!
In 1983, Ni droite, ni gauche initiated the debate on a fascisme à la française, playing 
a role not dissimilar to Robert Paxton’s work regarding collaboration under Vichy.  1070
Sternhell’s definition of fascism was, admittedly, extremely broad.   He described the 1071
‘essence of fascism’ as ‘a synthesis of organic nationalism and anti-Marxist socialism, a 
revolutionary ideology based on a simultaneous rejection of liberalism, Marxism, and 
democracy’.   ‘In its essential character, Sternhell continued, the fascist ideology was a 1072
rejection of “materialism” and it aimed at bringing about a total spiritual revolution.’   This 1073
statement implied two audacious conclusions, and a series of implications. Firstly, Sternhell 
asserted that fascism developed in France ‘a good twenty years before similar ideologies 
appeared elsewhere in Europe, particularly in Italy’.   Secondly, he described French fascist 1074
ideology as ‘closest to the ideal, the “idea” of fascism in the Weberian sense of the term’.    1075
!
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!  Zeev Sternhell, Ni droite ni gauche, l’idéologie fasciste en France (Paris, Editions du Seuil, first edn. 1983), 1070
translated by David Maisel: Neither right nor left, Fascist ideology in France (Berkeley, 1986). Robert Paxton, 
Vichy France, Old guard and new order, 1940-1944 (New York, 1972), translated as La France de Vichy 
(1940-1944) (Paris, Seuil, 1973); Robert Paxton and Michael Marrus, Vichy et les juifs (Paris, Calman Lévy, 
1981). For an early revisionist article on French fascism: Raoul Girardet, ‘Notes sur l’esprit d’un fascisme 
français’, Revue française de science politique (July-September 1955), 529-546. 
!  Sternhell wrote: ‘My definition of fascism is a broad one, even broader, in many respects, than Nolte’s. It 1071
lays the main emphasis on the rejection of ‘materialism’, while Nolte insists on the character of fascism as a 
“resistance to transcendence”’, in Sternhell, Neither right, nor left: fascist ideology in France, 309n4. Cf. Ernst 
Nolte’s ‘fascist minimum’ in Ernst Nolte, Three faces of fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National 
Socialism (New York, 1966), 9, 429-34.
!  Sternhell, Neither right, nor left: fascist ideology in France, 27.1072
!  Zeev Sternhell, 'Sur le fascisme et sa variante française', Le Débat, 32 (Nov. 1984), 29.1073
!  Sternhell, Neither right, nor left: fascist ideology in France, 27. Page 29, he added ‘where the history of 1074
ideas is concerned, the First World War was not the major break it was in so many other spheres.’
!  Sternhell, Neither right, nor left: fascist ideology in France, 26-7.1075
Sternhell’s method – to look for an ‘ideal-type’ fascism – has been violently attacked 
in the 1980s, challenged in the 1990s, and is perhaps now best avoided.   However, the 1076
question of method, important though it may be, does not encompass all the considerations 
involved in the ‘Sternhell controversy’. Sternhell’s fascism has been called ‘imaginary’ and 
‘nowhere to be found’ because it did not take any notice of social history.   Today, it is clear 1077
that this critique aimed at discrediting Sternhell’s subject (and discipline) by suggesting that 
social and institutional history is the only worthwhile history. Yet, there remains the question 
of a French immunity to fascism. The ‘immunity thesis’ (famously developed by René 
Rémond and refined by another generation of historians) alleged that France remained 
immune to the appeal of fascism between the wars.   It has been repeatedly proved to be a 1078
myth: France was not more immune than any other European country.   1079
!
Sternhell has responded by radicalising his argument. The final edition of his Ni droite 
ni gauche makes vindicatory claims: not only were anti-democratic values common in 1930s 
France, but they underpinned one of the ‘purest’ fascist ideologies (i.e. intellectually), a 
genuine fascist mass movement (the Croix de Feu), and an authentic fascist regime 
(Vichy).   As far as personalism is concerned, only the first issue matters: the intellectual 1080
underpinnings of fascism. The ‘Sternhell controversy’ raised a final question: how are we to 
!  233
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Zeev Sternhell'; Philippe Burrin, 'La France dans le champ magnétique des fascismes', Le Débat, 32 (Nov. 1984); 
Winock, 'Fascisme à la française ou fascisme introuvable?' Since the publication of Michel Dobry’s 1989 article 
(see following note), the term of ‘allergie’ has been avoided. In the 1990s, see Germinario, 'Fascisme et idéologie 
fasciste: Problèmes historiographiques et méthodologiques dans le modèle de Zeev Sternhell'.
!  See esp. Burrin, 'La France dans le champ magnétique des fascismes', 54-5, 72; Julliard, 'Sur un fascisme 1077
imaginaire, à propos d’un livre de Zeev Sternhell'; Sand, 'L'idéologie fasciste en France'; 'Sternhell, Zeev: 
Socialisme n'égale pas fascisme'; Winock, 'Fascisme à la française ou fascisme introuvable?' For a similar 
criticism of a later book by Sternhell, Naissance de l’idéologie fasciste (Paris, Fayard, 1989), see Jean-Luc 
Pouthier, 'Zeev Sternhell II', Esprit, 6 (June 1989).
!  The term ‘thèse immunitaire’ was first used by Michel Dobry in an article ‘Février 1934 et la découverte de 1078
l’allergie de la société française à la “Révolution fasciste”’, Revue française de sociologie, XXX, 3-4, July-
December 1989, 511-33; now in English: Jenkins (ed.) France in the era of fascism: essays on the French 
authoritarian right, 129-50. Michel Dobry has explained the contexts and contents of his argumentation, over 
fifteen years of debate: see his ‘Avant-Propos’ and ‘La thèse immunitaire face aux fascismes. Pour une critique 
de la logique classificatoire’, in Dobry (ed.) Le mythe de l'allergie française au fascisme, 7-67.
!  Brian Jenkins has given a recent general introduction to the critique of the ‘immunity thesis’ in historical 1079
context, in Jenkins (ed.) France in the era of fascism: essays on the French authoritarian right, 1-21. This book 
is a collection of old (1989) and new articles featuring the big names of revisionist historians of fascism: Zeev 
Sternhell, Robert Soucy, Robert Paxton, Michel Dobry, and Kevin Passmore. The latter gives a new sociological 
approach to the question, by criticizing the stalemate society thesis.
!  Sternhell, Ni droite ni gauche. Also in Jenkins (ed.) France in the era of fascism: essays on the French 1080
authoritarian right, esp.35-56.
interpret the status of the anti-parliamentary third way? I submit guidelines for an answer in 
the following section. 
!
Ten years ago, Michel Trebitsch put forth a socio-historical interpretation of the 
‘Sternhell controversy’, which contributes to explains why personalism is crucial to the 
debate.   According to him, Sternhell aimed his criticism at the ‘Sciences Po-Le Seuil-1081
Esprit’ configuration (namely René Rémond, Jean-François Sirinelli, and Michel Winock), 
which dominated French political history in the 1980s, following the decline of the Annales 
School. Sternhell has indirectly approved Trebitsch’s interpretation in his new introduction to 
Ni droite ni gauche.   If this interpretation is correct, the indignation following Sternhell’s 1082
book was not so much a national reaction to a perceived foreign attack (as in the case of 
Paxton’s Vichy France), but rather a reluctance to admit the cloudiness of Emmanuel 
Mounier’s attitude, among others. Mounier remains a tutelary figure in France, and in the 
Catholic world more generally. The case for Mounier’s beatification is currently being 
considered in Rome. At the same time, there have been attempts to discredit him: Mounier has 
been called a ‘Heidegger français’.   This is to say that the position of French personalists 1083
vis-à-vis fascism is an important and controversial issue in France.  
!
For all the polemic, Sternhell has not been disarmed. The last chapter of Ni droite ni 
gauche (2nd edn.) was entirely devoted to the ‘Tentation fasciste’ of the personalists.   And 1084
one of his latest articles gives the ‘Lettre à Hitler’ and Mounier’s attitude under Vichy as 
‘deux exemples particulièrement édifiants aussi bien de la tentation fasciste et nazie que de la 
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!  Trebitsch, 'Le front commun de la jeunesse intellectuelle. Le "Cahier de revendications" de décembre 1932’, 1081
222. 
!  See English translation in Jenkins (ed.) France in the era of fascism: essays on the French authoritarian 1082
right, 22-64, esp. note 56. Magali Balent has confirmed that French historians functioned as a ‘corporation’ (in 
Sirinelli’s own expression), determined to preserve its legitimacy, see Balent, 'La réception des thèses de Zeev 
Sternhell par les historiens français’, 130.
!  Fumaroli called Mounier the ‘Heidegger français’ and falsely accused of being ‘ministre de la Culture de 1083
Vichy’. In Marc Fumaroli, L’Etat culturel. Essai sur une religion moderne (Paris, 1991), 91-113. In the same 
genre, and even less historically sound: Bernard-Henry Lévy’s L’idéologie française (Paris, 1981).
!  Zeev Sternhell, ‘La tentation fasciste. 1. Emmanuel Mounier et la contestation de la démocratie libérale. 2. 1084
Les personnalistes de l’Ordre Nouveau face au phénomène nazi’, Sternhell, Ni droite ni gauche. L'idéologie 
fasciste en France, 304-42. Sternhell mentions Rougemont only once to say that Mounier visited him in 
Frankfurt.
puissance du réflexe de refoulement […] par les personnalistes.’   Let us consider the case 1085




‘Lettre à Hitler’, published in L’Ordre Nouveau in November 1933, is an equivocal 
text indeed.   It is divided into three parts. It starts with a list of the ‘Victoires national-1086
socialistes’, finding ‘une grandeur authentique’ in Hitler’s critique of liberal democracy and 
capitalism.   The authors congratulated Hitler for having swept away the Weimar Republic, 1087
and stated: ‘Vous avez mis fin à un mensonge. Celui de la démocratie libérale.’   It has been 1088
argued that the first part was only meant to allow the journal to pass Nazi censorship (which it 
failed to do). One may admit that the point of the letter lay in the two latter parts. The second 
part criticized the ‘Défaites national-socialistes’ (namely the idolization of the Nation, the 
Party, the Masses, and Work).   Racism was rejected: ‘cette idole pseudo-scientifique qui 1089
éveille à la fois l’horreur et le rire: la race, telle que la conçoivent et l’adorent vos sous-
Gobineau en chemises brunes.’   The third part presented ON as the incarnation of French 1090
youth and summoned Hitler to listen to revolutionary France. One day, ON threatened, ‘vous 
serez obligé ou bien de renoncer à votre rêve d’autarchie, ou bien de laisser éclater le conflit 
sanglant dont le choc en retour vous balaierait.’   It is all too easy to condemn this 1091
publication as anti-democratic and anti-materialist, therefore deeply penetrated by fascism.  1092
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!  Zeev Sternhell, 'Le fascisme, ce "mal du siècle"...' in Michel Dobry (ed.) Le mythe de l'allergie française au 1085
fascisme (Paris, 2003), 394.
!  'Lettre à Hitler', L'Ordre Nouveau, 5 (15 Nov. 1933), 3-32. Also extracts as Annex 1 (to support Sternhell’s 1086
argumentation), in Dobry (ed.) Le mythe de l'allergie française au fascisme, 407-15.
!  'Lettre à Hitler', 8-14.1087
!  'Lettre à Hitler', 8.1088
!  'Lettre à Hitler', 15-22.1089
!  'Lettre à Hitler', 20.1090
!  'Lettre à Hitler', 23-32.1091
!  Sternhell also quotes the reservations (‘Un abîme nous sépare.’) expressed in the ‘Lettre à Hitler’, but they 1092
remain superficial for him : ‘on apprécie la profondeur de la pénétration fasciste’; and ‘finalement, il est clair 
que l’objection essentielle que ces hommes opposent à Hitler se réduit à déplorer que son mouvement n’ait pas 
su traduire en actes ses idées et n’ait pas été capable de tirer toutes les conclusions de sa grande révolte contre le 
matérialisme.’, in Sternhell, 'Le fascisme, ce "mal du siècle"...’, 396.
But such an approach does not allow us to understand what the actual purpose of the ‘Lettre’ 
was. 
!
To put the ‘Lettre à Hitler’ in perspective, we may first note the sheer presumption of 
the author(s).   The authorship itself has been contested, but not as one might have thought. 1093
In the 1980s, Marc wrote to Rougemont: ‘je crois avoir été à l’origine de l’idée même de cette 
Lettre et que – l’idée initiale une fois acceptée par t[ou]s (semble-t-il), j’en ai assuré 
l’exécution, dans la proportion d’au moins 50%. Responsabilité que je n’assume pas 
seulement, mais que je revendique, car j’en suis fier.’   Marc was shocked by accusations of 1094
‘philo-fascisme’, which he thought completely missed the point.   Whether it was a proto-1095
fascist publication or not, and whether Rougemont was involved or not,   it is most fruitful 1096
to recognise that the author(s) attempted to compete with fascists and nazis on their own 
territory.   The ‘Lettre à Hitler’ remains astonishing for the self-confidence of the author(s): 1097
they seemed to think that Hitler (as anyone else in Germany) ought to listen, and to follow the 
ON revolution. 
!
After nearly ten years of research, Roy and Keller both came to the conclusion that the 
ON attempted to export its personalist revolution to Germany (in particular through contacts 
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!  Page two indicates: ‘Ce numéro a été rédigé par: Robert Aron, Claude Chevalley, Daniel-Rops, René 1093
Dupuis, Jean Jardin et Denis de Rougemont.’ 'Lettre à Hitler', 2.
!  Marc to Rougemont, 11 Feb. 1981, Neuchâtel, BPUN, Rougemont Papers, Correspondence. 1094
!  Marc to Rougemont, 11 Feb. 1981, Neuchâtel, BPUN, Rougemont Papers, Correspondence.1095
!  Despite indication to the contrary, Rougemont may not have been involved in the publication, because he 1096
was away from Paris that year (staying on Ré island) and was only informed of ON’s decisions in writing and 
with a certain delay (as his correspondence shows). In this respect, I think, like Ackermann, that the letter to 
Hitler was a joint work which probably did not involve Rougemont. Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une 
biographie intellectuelle, 1, 262-3, 266. Jacob cannot be taken seriously on this point because he has done no 
research on Rougemont’s activities in the 1930s Jacob, Le retour de "L'Ordre Nouveau", 116-17. Mary-Jo 
Deering and Christian Campiche, probably on the basis of Marc’s letter to Rougemont (quoted above), held that 
the ‘Lettre à Hitler’ had been written by Marc alone. Christian Campiche, Denis de Rougemont, Le séducteur de 
l'Occident (Chêne-Bourg, 2001), 26-7; Mary-Jo Deering, Combats acharnés: Denis de Rougemont et les 
fondements de l'unité européenne (Lausanne, 1991), 181. While Marc claimed Daniel-Rops was the other author, 
Daniel-Rops denied Marc's involvement in a letter to Gabriel Marcel at the time. Roy, Alexandre Marc et la 
Jeune Europe, 407.
!  The case for an analysis in terms of competitive relations rather than logique classificatoire has been 1097
particularly well argued by Michel Dobry, esp. in his section on ‘the autonomisation of the non-parliamentary 
Right’, in Jenkins (ed.) France in the era of fascism: essays on the French authoritarian right, 141-3.
with Harro Schulze-Boysen, the leader of Gegner), and not the other way round.   Roy has 1098
shown that an unpublished Gegner manifesto, written by Harro Schulze-Boysen in May 1932, 
copied much of the programme of the ON.   It is also worth noting, in passing, that 1099
according to Denis de Rougemont, the term ‘new order’ used by Nazi propaganda might have 
been borrowed from L’Ordre Nouveau by Abetz and Ribbentrop, who were regular readers of 
the French journal.   But this may also be an example of the sense of self-importance of ON 1100
members. Let it suffice to mention here that some of the ON texts were, to say the least, 
confusing. 
!
To quote Rougemont’s most ambiguous text on Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and 
Communist Russia, published in May 1933 (note the early date): 
En face de deux pays gouvernés par des hommes de quarante ans, c’est-à-dire par les 
chefs de la jeunesse révolutionnaire, en face d’une Russie dont le dynamisme juvénile 
est assez puissant pour animer la plus sclérosée des doctrines étatiques, la France offre 
le spectacle de sa gérontocratie bavarde, de ses petites niaiseries parlementaires, de 
son ballet désuet : droite-gauche, gauche-droite… En face des jeunesses bottées, nu-
tête, chemise ouverte dont notre presse aime à railler les uniformes, qu’avons nous à 
aligner ? Un attirail de faux-cols durs, de rosettes, de gros ventres et de chapeaux 
melons. La France n’est plus contemporaine des nations qui l’entourent et qui la 
menacent. Tel est le fait.   1101!
Rougemont’s provocative style is unmistakable. However, the ‘fact’ of the stalemate 
society was one of the most common assumptions in interwar France, in all political 
tendencies and social groups, as Kevin Passmore has recently argued.   And the myth of the 1102
rejuvenation of ‘totalitarian’ regimes was present across the political spectrum. As Raymond 
Aron – whose liberal-democratic allegiance is indisputable – put it in a speech in Berlin in 
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!  Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe. And Keller, Deutsch-französische Dritte-Weg-Diskurse; Thomas 1098
Keller, 'Discours parallèles et transferts culturels, Scheler, Landsberg et Mounier', in Guy Coq (ed.) Emmanuel 
Mounier, L'actualité d'un grand témoin. Actes du colloque tenu à l'UNESCO (Paris, 2003); Keller, 'Le 
personnalisme de l'entre-deux-guerres’, esp. 470. 
!  This is a key point for Hellman, who draws on the research of his former student Roy. Hellman, The 1099
communitarian third way, 46-8, esp. acknowledgement of Roy’s contribution 46n90. Roy, Alexandre Marc et la 
Jeune Europe, 263-340.
!  Rougemont, Politique de la personne, 8.1100
!  Rougemont was answering a survey by Jean de Fabrègues on ‘La jeunesse française devant l’Allemagne 1101
nouvelle’, together with six members of the ON, three Jeune Droite writers, and one philo-communist writer. 
Denis de Rougemont, 'La jeunesse française devant l’Allemagne', La Revue du siècle, 2 (May 1933), 7. (The 
‘rosettes’ refer to the Légion d’Honneur)
!  Passmore, 'The construction of crisis in interwar France’, 151-99.1102
1933: the ‘totalitarian regimes are authentically revolutionary, [while] the democracies are 
essentially conservative’.   In 1933, political opponents of fascism, such as Aron (and I shall 1103
argue Rougemont), accepted their rivals as genuine political adversaries.    1104
!
Rougemont was answering a survey on ‘La Jeunesse française devant l’Allemagne 
nouvelle’, conducted by Jean de Fabrègues, who had partly fixed the terms of the debate for 
his right-wing Revue du siècle.   In an article published in 2003, the American historian 1105
Samuel Kalman misread the above quotation from Rougemont as a ‘Valoissian note’ (he also 
misspelled ‘Denis de Rougement’ and got the source wrong).   Kalman’s work is part of the 1106
‘origins’ studies focusing on the prehistory of Vichy in the 1930s and earlier, as evident from 
the conclusion that inter-war French youth groups ‘prefigured a turn against republican 
orthodoxy’ and ‘presaged a complete transformation in France’.   The notion of ‘prehistory’ 1107
in intellectual history is highly conducive to biased interpretations. 
!
Even further of the mark is John Hellman’s latest book, The communitarian third way: 
Alexandre Marc’s Ordre Nouveau.   In 1981, before the publication of Ni droite ni gauche, 1108
Hellman had pointed at Mounier’s ambivalence vis-à-vis fascism.   Now turning to ON, 1109
Hellman presents Marc as an oxymoronic ‘Nietzschean anti-Hitler national socialist’, with the 
crooked logic that condemnation of communism came before ‘sophisticated critical analyses 
of the Nazis or the fascists’ and ‘so the enemies of their enemies became their 
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!  Quoted in Orlow, 'Fascists among themselves: some observations on West European politics in the 1930s', 1103
247.
!  See for example Rougemont’s answer to the survey on ‘La jeunesse française devant l’Allemagne nouvelle’, 1104
quoted above. Rougemont, 'La jeunesse française devant l’Allemagne', 7. 
!  La revue du siècle, 2 (May 1933). For an analysis of this survey, see Nicolas Kessler, Histoire politique de la 1105
Jeune Droite (1929-1942). Une révolution conservatrice à la française (Paris, 2001), 270-83.
!  Samuel Kalman, 'Faisceau visions of physical and moral transformation and the cult of youth in inter-war 1106
France', European History Quarterly, XXXIII, 3 (2003). The quotation is from La revue du siècle, 2 (May 1933), 
and not from ‘the journal of the group Ordre Nouveau’ as Kalman wrote.
!  Kalman, 'Faisceau visions of physical and moral transformation and the cult of youth in inter-war France', 1107
362-3. The emphasis is mine.
!  Hellman, The communitarian third way.1108
!  Hellman, Emmanuel Mounier and the new Catholic left, 1930-1950, esp. 71-95. For the Vichy period 1109
Hellman, The knight-monks of Vichy France.
friends.’  ‘Personalist communitarianism’ – note the emphasis on ‘communitarianism’ – had 1110
been ‘originally intended to help engender a “New Middle Ages” in which the French and 
other Europeans could husband aspects of their spiritual heritage in a German-dominated New 
Order’.   Confusion, oversimplification, and utter falsehood invalidate what could otherwise 1111
have been an interesting analysis of personalism through the trajectory of Alexandre Marc, 
from 1930 to 2000. 
!
The category of ‘non-conformism’ is infinitely elastic for Hellman. It includes: 
‘Rougemont, Marc and [Jacques] Delors as builders of a united Europe’; Hubert Beuve-Méry 
(leader of the Uriage school under Vichy and founder of the newspaper Le Monde after the 
war); François Mitterrand (a ‘right-wing non-conformist’); and Charles de Gaulle.   The 1112
book has a clear polemical purpose, as evident from his Chapter 8 which attacks: the 
‘communitarian’ cast at the ‘Editions du Seuil’; the newspaper Le Monde; the ‘discreetly 
politicized French academic establishment’; and last but not least the pontificate of John Paul 
II, ‘personalist philosopher … and benevolent authoritarian’.   A reviewer has suggested that 1113
the fundamental goal of the book is ideological:   to denounce how ‘modern Catholicism 1114
was altered by the invention of fascism’   (the consequences of which Hellman claims, 1115
incidentally, to have witnessed in Quebec).   1116
!
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exile, Germanophile Jewish convert to Catholicism, Marc would come to embarrass his old comrades by 
steadfastly maintaining that the non-confomism which he would be instrumental in maintaining had… German 
origins. This Nietzschean anti-Hitler national socialist would claim that Europe owed far more to the 
conservative revolution than had been admitted. Evoking “pure”, “original”, national socialism – a generational 
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national-socialism had deeply and permanently influenced a European elite.’ To put things right, one should refer 
to Roy, Alexandre Marc et la Jeune Europe, 408-9 n.60.
!  Hellman, The communitarian third way, 3.1111
!  Hellman, The communitarian third way, 9.1112
!  Hellman, The communitarian third way, 190-2.1113
!  Kathryn E. Amdur, in The American Historical Review , vol .108, 5 , avai lable on 1114
www.historicalcooperative.org/journals/ahr/108.5/br_131.html. Last viewed 5 Feb. 2004.
!  Hellman, The communitarian third way, 190.1115
!  A footnote explains his views on Quebec nationalism: ‘Canadian non-conformism, like that of Vichy France, 1116
assumed French Catholic cultural pre-eminence in a multicultural, pluralist society’, in Hellman, The 
communitarian third way, 208n8.
In a recent conference, Hellman expressed his historiographical (as opposed to 
polemical) target more clearly than I have found in the book: he denounced how ‘French 
scholars were stirring around taboos’.   This statement is intended as an attack on the 1117
‘Rémond school thesis’ of France’s virtual immunity from fascism, as if it had not been 
revised since the 1960s.   As Julian Jackson has shown, studies of Vichy France, French 1118
fascism, and anti-semitism, have grown exponentially since the 1980s.   Jackson suggests at 1119
least three problems with the idea that the French are still unwilling to ‘face up’ to their past: 
the comment is clichéd, condescending, and simply false.   There is no ‘Hellman 1120





Since the ‘immunity thesis’ has been proved to be exceedingly biased, the political 
history of Esprit by Michel Winock (reissued in 1996) is out of date: Winock sticks to his old 
benevolent view that Mounier went from pacifism – until 1936 – to unwavering fight against 
the fascist threat following the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.   Esprit, like the rest of 1121
France, was no more immune to fascism than it was to communism.   However, following 1122
Michel Dobry, one must resist binary classification.   To say that Esprit was not immune to 1123
fascism is not to say that Esprit was fascist. 
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!  Consider esp. Hellman, The communitarian third way, 189-90. 1118
!  Julian Jackson, France, The dark years, 1940-1944 (Oxford, 2001), esp. 1-20.1119
!  Jackson, France, The dark years, esp. vii.1120
!  Michel Winock, "Esprit". Des intellectuels dans la cité, 1930-1950 (2nd edn. Paris, 1996), esp. 130-4.1121
!  On the postwar period, see Pierre Grémion, 'Mounier et Esprit dans l'après-guerre', in Guy Coq (ed.) 1122
Emmanuel Mounier, L'actualité d'un grand témoin. Actes du colloque tenu à l'UNESCO (Paris, 2003), 93-109. 
The thesis of Goulven Boudic (forthcoming) should explain further the political tensions that existed at Esprit. 
Already published: Goulven Boudic, 'La tension réforme-révolution : à propos d'Esprit', Esprit, III-IV, 251 
(March 1999), 146-54. See also his notes in the edition of the diaries of Jean-Marie Domenach (editor of Esprit, 
1957-77), Goulven Boudic and Nicole Domenach (eds), Jean-Marie Domenach, Beaucoup de gueule et peu 
d'or : journal d'un réfractaire : 1944-1977 (Paris, 2001).
!  See Dobry (ed.) Le mythe de l'allergie française au fascisme, esp.44-50.1123
!
Thinking in terms of a competitive logic, one can grasp better the character of 
Mounier’s ambivalent statements towards fascism. In the mid-1930s, Mounier denounced 
fascism as ‘la plus dangereuse démission qui nous soit aujourd’hui proposée’;   at the same 1124
time, he found seductive elements in fascism by comparison with ‘disorderly’ liberal 
democracies.   With regard to Mounier and some other personalists, the historian of French 1125
fascism, Philippe Burrin, was right to describe a ‘fascination’ towards fascism until 1936 at 
least (and indeed ‘fascistization’ in the early years of Vichy).    1126
!
Burrin has developed a model of a ‘nébuleuse fascistoïde’, which places the various 
‘non-conformistes des années trente’ along concentric circles forming a magnetic field of 
fascism. According to this model, writers of ‘Jeune Droite’, technocrats of X-Crise, and 
dissidents of the Radical and Socialist parties were more prone to be drawn in than 
personalists, who formed the most remote circle around the fascist core.   However, this 1127
model is somewhat anachronistic. Why should all the political movements of the 1930s be set 
against the ‘measure’ of fascism? The magnetic field model suggests a posteriori that 
personalists were dependent upon fascism. But this is certainly not how personalists saw it at 
the time. In the early 1930s at least, personalists thought they had good chances in the 
competition with other third way movements, of which fascism was but an avatar. 
!
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!  Emmanuel Mounier, 'Des pseudo-valeurs spirituelles fascistes: Prise de position', Esprit, 16 (Jan. 1934), 535.1124
!  Here it is important to quote at length. This passage has often been truncated and only the full quote can give 1125
a faithful impression of Mounier’s position towards fascism: ‘Il faudrait que nos optimistes libéraux se le 
tiennent une fois pour dit : on ne combat pas une mystique avec une mystique de rang inférieur, on ne combat 
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d’un homme, d’attendre les mots d’ordre et d’y obéir aveuglément sous l’alcool des discours héroïques ! Mais 
tentation de grandeur aussi : le désordre en tout, le désordre partout – vivement de la propreté, de l’énergie, 
quelque hauteur, de l’ordre. Notre rôle n’est pas seulement de détourner de la facilité, mais de satisfaire cet âpre 
désir de grandeur qui va s’engouffrant dans des chemins mortels.’ Mounier, 'Des pseudo-valeurs spirituelles 
fascistes: Prise de position', 536.
!  Philippe Burrin, La Dérive fasciste, Doriot, Déat, Bergery: 1933-1945 (Paris, 1986), 88-90, 340-1, 466 (on 1126
Mounier). ‘Fascination’ does not mean ‘fascistization’ (the term indicates approximation of fascism), nor does it 
imply para-fascist authoritarianism. Aristotle Kallis, '"Fascism", "para-fascism" and "fascistization": on the 
similarities of three conceptual categories', European History Quarterly, XXXIII, 2 (Apr. 2003), 219-49.
!  Burrin, La Dérive fasciste, Doriot, Déat, Bergery: 1933-1945, 26.1127
There is a concrete example of the competition between the French third ways and 
Italian Fascism. In 1935, Robert Aron, Claude Chevalley and René Dupuis (from the ON), 
with Mounier, André Ullmann and Louis-Emile Galey (from Esprit), and the right-wingers 
Jean de Fabrègues, Thierry Maulnier, Georges Roditi, and Paul Marion, all responded 
positively to an invitation by Mussolini’s Fascist Institute for Culture to attend a congress on 
corporatism in Rome.   This example is also interesting because it shows the reality of the 1128
ambiguities (against arguments of the purely ‘theoretical’ character of the personalist 
closeness to an ‘imaginary’ fascism  ). The competitive logic goes a long way towards 1129
explaining the personalists’ trip to Rome. As historian of Fascism (sensu stricto) Philip 
Morgan has remarked, ‘corporatism was one of the ways through which Italian Fascism gave 
itself an international profile and meaning, as a “third way” solution to the crisis of capitalism 
and parliamentary democracy.’   Third ways, whether fascist or not, were in contact in the 1130
1930s and 1940s, and these contacts were established in terms of competition, be it emulation, 
collaboration, or contest to the death. 
!
Ni droite ni gauche: non-conformism or ideological zigzags?!
!
There was a ‘Sternhell controversy’ in the 1980s because Sternhell raised important 
historical questions.   One of them remains unanswered. Did the slogan ‘ni droite ni gauche’ 1131
have any meaning, any consistency? In other words, was there a possibility of a third way 
apart from fascism?  
!
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!  See Julliard, 'Sur un fascisme imaginaire, à propos d’un livre de Zeev Sternhell'; Winock, 'Fascisme à la 1129
française ou fascisme introuvable?'
!  Philip Morgan, 'Fascism in general and Fascism in particular', Contemporary European history, XII, 1 1130
(2003), 110. See also Philip Morgan, '"The Party is everywhere": the Italian Fascist Party in economic life, 
1926-1940', The English historical review, CXIV, 455 (1999).
!  Before Sternhell, Bernard-Henri Lévy had raised the question of the leftist origins of fascism in France, in 1131
L’idéologie française (Paris, 1981), but lack of historical evidence and misleading confusions had discouraged 
academic debate. Bernard-Henri Lévy misleadingly associated Denis de Rougemont with notorious fascists. 
Rougemont sued a reviewer of Lévy’s book for libel and won the trial, see Pierre Verdaguer, 'Denis de 
Rougemont et la nouvelle censure', The French review, LIX, 2 (Dec. 1985). Correspondence between Seth 
Wolitz and Pierre Verdaguer, The French review, LIX, 6 (May 1986), 958-9; and Ackermann, Denis de 
Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 493-5.
The ‘neither right not left’ slogan has been questioned in two ways. For Sternhell, the 
third way in 1930s Europe was fascist in essence, and so those who claimed to be ‘neither 
right nor left’ were covertly proto-fascists. This is not unlike the second line of argument, 
already submitted in the 1930s, that ‘neither right nor left’ was a slogan which actually hid a 
rallying to the right (rarely to the left). The third way is obviously a recurring theme in 
history. Why could it have no credibility in the 1930s? 
!
A first answer seems to lie in the ideological zigzags of many of those who claimed to 
be ‘neither right nor left’, but went from right to left, and left to right. These zigzags have 
been studied in Germany and in France: in both countries, the quest for a ‘third way’ lead 
many thinkers from one extreme to the other.   To mention French examples only, Nizan, 1132
Lamour, Borne, and Gandillac were initially close to Valois’s Faisceau or the Action 
Française, before becoming leftists (like Valois himself). Others, such as Déat, Bergery, 
Delaisi, and Luchaire crossed the floor of party politics in the opposite direction. In the 
protagonists’ terms, these ideological zigzags were justified by the claim that political 
cleavages were obsolete. In studying personal trajectories, it is important to ask whether there 
was continuity or rupture in the values defended.  
!
Then, one may ask why certain values should be classified on the right or on the left. 
Why, for instance, should patriotism be intrinsically right-wing? Or the defence of nature left-
wing? Jean Jacob, in his study of the ecological movement in France, has shown the 
continuity of personalist themes from the ‘non-conformisme des années trente’ (neither right 
nor left), through anti-communism (and therefore the right) in the postwar period, to the 
student revolt of May 1968 (and therefore the left), and finally some extreme fringes of the 
European right today.   1133
!
There is no reason why research should be directed by Alain’s saying: ‘Prétendre qu’il 
faut dépasser l’opposition droite gauche, refuser de se classer à droite ou à gauche, c’est être 
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!  Gilbert Merlio (ed.) Ni gauche, ni droite: les chassés-croisés idéologiques des intellectuels français et 1132
allemands dans l'entre-deux-guerres (Talence, 1995).
!  Jacob, Le retour de "L'Ordre Nouveau". See below for a critical assessment of his views on personalism.1133
de droite.’   This commonplace has been denounced by the former personalist Jacques 1134
Ellul.   To say ‘Qui dit ni droite, ni gauche est de droite’ presupposes that politics are 1135
inescapable: ‘La politique, c’est le Tout. Droite gauche, c’est en vérité la summa divisio entre 
les hommes : tous doivent y être inclus. Celui qui prétend y échapper ou nie cette vérité, c’est 
un ennemi.’   Admittedly, on a given question, one is always on the right of some, and on 1136
the left of others. Yet this contrast is between persons, on a particular topic, and it is relative in 
time. Any tendency to reify or artificially systematize the right left divide in politics detracts 
from understanding personalism in France in the 1930s. 
!
It is essential to remember the diversity of personal trajectories. We have seen that 
Esprit turned towards the left following the riots of February 1934.   It supported the 1137
Popular Front in 1936, and then several of Esprit’s contributors were collaborators at Vichy, 
while others resisted unto death.   We have seen that the ON group (considered collectively) 1138
claimed to keep a ‘neither right, nor left’ policy throughout the 1930s. Why should the 
historian decide that it was a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ choice? In any case, it was not binding. During 
the Second World War, some former ON members entered the Resistance as early as June 
1940 (chiefly Marc and Rougemont – although his case is special since he was in 
Switzerland), while others (Jardin, Loustau, and Gibrat) would play a key role in Vichy’s 
National Revolution. None of them had prophetic insights (contrary to what has sometimes 
been suggested).   The ambivalences, concessions, competitions, resistances and fights of 1139
those, among the ‘non-conformistes des années trente’, who stayed in France during the 
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Second World War have been unravelled by Michel Bergès.   Rougemont, who was in 1140
Switzerland and America in the 1940s, has not been studied by Bergès. We shall consider his 
case in the final section of this chapter. 
!
This section on ‘neither right, nor left’ and ‘ideological zigzags’ has sought to show 
that it is fruitful to lay aside the thinking in binary categories, in order to try to recover the 
past in its complexity. The competitive approach is one way out of the endless controversy on 
fascisme à la française. Unfolding the full consequences of the refusal to think in neat 
categories has led some historians to reject the whole idea of a generic fascism. This does not 
help to understand how the doctrine of personalism came about in the same Europe as the 
Nazi and fascist phenomena. For those who think that it remains useful to study generic 
fascism, if only to understand the broader context in which personalism developed as a 
movement and as a doctrine, the following guidelines for the analysis of personalism(s) vis-à-
vis fascism(s) may prove helpful. 
!
!
2. Guidelines for the analysis of personalism(s) vis-à-vis fascism(s)!
!
This section shows how French personalists competed with fascists in the same arena, 
as it were, situated somewhere outside parliamentary politics. Since anyone working on 
fascism should declare his favourite definition, I choose Payne’s ‘working definition’ at this 
point.   There can be no perfect generic definition, but Payne’s has the advantage of being 1141
broad and balanced. Payne is a representative of the ‘new genericist’ approach, which 
developed in the aftermath of the ‘Sternhell controversy’ and became established in the 
mid-1990s. Whereas previous attempts to define generic fascism were limited to a list of the 
so-called ‘antis’, the ‘new genericist’ approach acknowledges that fascism can also be 
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!  Michel Bergès, Vichy contre Mounier, Les non-conformistes face aux années 1940 (Paris, 1997), 313-71. Part 1140
III: ‘Le Non-conformisme des années 40’, Chapter 2: ‘L’Ambivalence du “non-conformisme”’ and Chapter 3: 
‘Non-conformisme et fascisme’. 
!  ‘Introduction. Fascism a Working definition’, in Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-45 (London, 1141
1995), 3-22.
characterised by common affirmations.   A list of ‘antis’ is not enough to make a political 1142
programme; it was through ‘affirmative’ elements that fascism became an ideology.   In 1143
what follows, I argue that personalism shared with fascism a series of resentments against the 
dominant societal forces of the twentieth century – what Stanley Payne calls ‘fascist 
negations’ – but at the same time opposed all the decisive fascist ‘affirmative’ goals and 




Payne identified common points in ideology and goals, the ‘fascist negations’, and 
also common features in style and organisation.   He suggested a ‘Typological description 1145
of fascism’ ‘for purposes of comparative analysis and definition’.   In the following 1146
typology, the text is Payne’s, but the dots (•) and arrows (➢) are mine. The arrows draw 
attention to the common traits between fascism and personalism as generic phenomena. The 
dots mark different, if not opposite, points of view. 
!
!  246
!  Robert Paxton, 'The five stages of fascism', Journal of Modern History, 70 (1998); Payne, A History of 1142
Fascism, 1914-45.
!  Orlow reviews various ‘“positive” sides to fascism. Positive not in the sense of laudable, but “as a distinctive 1143
set of ambitions” for transforming and moulding societal life.’ They include: celebration of the nation, racism 
(but not necessarily anti-semitism), Volksgemeinschaft, and a specific ‘style’ of politics. See Orlow, 'Fascists 
among themselves: some observations on West European politics in the 1930s', 252-5.
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Table 1. Typological description of fascism 
From S. G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-45 (London, 1995),7. 
(The dots and arrows are mine) !
!!
This typology emphasises the similarities between the personalist objects of attack and 
the fascist negations. The three fascist negations coincide with personalist negations. Payne 
has remarked that as ‘latecomers’ (in Juan Linz’s phrase), movements that emerged after the 
First World War had to open new political and ideological space for themselves, and therefore 
were hostile to all the main currents (left, right, and centre).   Personalists were in the 1147
position of ‘latecomers’ too. Like fascists, they built up a series of objections to the dominant 
societal forces of the time. In particular, Sternhell was right when he remarked that ‘anti-
Marxism, anti-capitalism were the common denominator of all these different variants of the 
revolt and were a fitting expression of their essence, namely, the rejection of 
“materialism”’.   Whether anti-materialism was (or is) the essence of fascism is another 1148
question. 
Ideology and goals 
• Espousal of an idealist, vitalist, and voluntaristic philosophy, normally involving the attempt to 
realize a new modern self-determined and secular culture 
• Creation of a new nationalist authoritarian state not based on traditional principles or models 
• Organisation of a new highly regulated, multiclass, integrated national economic structure, whether 
called national corporatist, national socialist, or national syndicalist 
• Positive evaluation and use of, or willingness to use, violence and war 
• The goal of empire, expansion, or a radical change in the nation’s relationship with other powers 
The Fascist negations 
• Antiliberalism 
• Anticommunism 
• Anticonservatism (though with the understanding that fascist groups were willing to undertake 
temporary alliances with other sectors, most commonly with the right)  
Style and organisation 
• Attempted mass mobilisation with militarization of political relationships and style and with the goal 
of a mass party militia 
• Emphasis on aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols, and political liturgy, stressing emotional and 
mystical aspects 
• Extreme stress on the masculine principle and male dominance, while espousing a strong organic 
view of society 
• Exaltation of youth above other phases of life, emphasising the conflict of generations, at least in 
effecting the initial transformation 
• Specific tendency toward an authoritarian, charismatic, personal style of command, whether or not 
the command is to some degree initially elective
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Anticonservatism (the last negation) brings up the problematic issue of modernity and 
modernisation. The debate on fascism’s relationship to modernity has been raging since the 
1960s, and it is not my ambition to resolve it here. There is a combination of the ‘old’ and the 
‘new’ both in fascist and personalist ideologies. One may suggest that personalism was a form 
of anticonservatism: it claimed to accomplish a ‘permanent revolution’. One could also argue 
that personalists were conservative: they celebrated the pre-modern past.   In fact, 1149
personalists wanted to have it both ways.   They wanted to modernise society, but at the 1150
same time insisted on the timeless needs of the human person. One may remark that Marc 
Simard does not clarify the debate when he presents ‘la révolte personnaliste’ as ‘une des 
formes prises par la grande révolte antimoderne de l’entre-deux-guerres’.   Simard defines 1151
‘l’antimodernisme’ as the ‘attitude ontologique de rejet de la société capitaliste-occidentale 
industrielle et de ses corollaires’.   Therefore, his argument that personalism was 1152
‘antimoderne’ simply means that personalism was a rejection of industrial capitalism and the 
market economy – a point that no one has ever questioned. 
!
Two additional similarities between fascism and personalism sensu lato must be 
pointed out. In the category of ideology, the organisation of a new integrated economic 
structure may evoke personalists’ plans for the economy (or part of the economy, according to 
the ON’s dichotomy). Sternhell has argued that there was a direct connection between planism 
(in particular revisionist socialism) and fascism. However, it is important to remember here 
that the idea of planned economy enjoyed an immense vogue in the 1930s. Philippe Burrin 
and Olivier Dard have a point when they argue that the ‘plan’ could convey all sorts of values, 
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and that these values were more significant than the ‘plan’, simply considered as a tool.  1153
Similarly, in the category of style and organisation, the exaltation of youth was never an 
exclusive property of fascism. It may be a common feature of ‘revolutionary’ movements at 
all times. Generational antagonism was widespread in the 1930s; many moderate republicans 
shared Rougemont’s idea that France was no longer ‘contemporaine’ with its young 
neighbours.   1154
!
It is interesting to note that, in order to describe personalism as ‘a kind of outer circle 
around the hard core of fascist thought’  , Sternhell had to limit his definition of fascism to 1155
the ‘fascist negations’, possibly associated with a stronger executive power (and a weaker 




Beyond similarities, there were irreducible differences between personalism and 
fascism. Personalism opposed the characteristics that Payne synthesised in his ‘positive’ 
definition:  ‘fascism may be defined as a form of revolutionary ultranationalism for national 
rebirth that is based on a primarily vitalist philosophy, is structured on extreme elitism, mass 
mobilisation and the Führerprinzip, positively values violence as end as well as means and 
tends to normatize war and/or the military virtues.’   ON was elitist in several ways; and yet 1157
personalists were against ultranationalism, vitalism, mass mobilisation and the cult of the 
leader. Personalists repeatedly condemned the fascists’ ‘style’ of politics, especially mass 
meetings which stressed mystical aspects and collective sentiment.   Esprit called for 1158
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Passmore has shown, in Passmore, 'The construction of crisis in interwar France’, 151-99.
!  Sternhell, Neither right, nor left: fascist ideology in France, 217.1155
!  See Sternhell, 'Sur le fascisme et sa variante française', 29-30.1156
!  Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-45, 14.1157
!  See below: section on Rougemont.1158
decolonisation as early as March 1933.   While anti-semitism is by no means a prerequisite 1159
for fascism, it is the pride of Esprit that from 1933 the journal denounced the persecution of 
the Jews in Nazi Germany.   In L’Ordre Nouveau an anti-semitic note – the only one, as far 1160
as I am aware – appears in an article by Daniel-Rops.   He expresses the xenophobia of 1161
many conservative Catholics at the time. And finally, Personalists called for a pluralistic state 
– unthinkable to any self-respecting fascist.    1162
!
Besides the guidelines of the typology above, it would be interesting to contrast the 
‘primacy of politics’ in the various fascisms with the personalist ‘primacy of the spiritual’. 
Admittedly, the fascist revolution was also directed at changing consciousness, but state 
power was deployed to change the economy and the class structure. By contrast, the 
personalist revolution could never come about by state intervention. In an unpublished note of 
1938, Rougemont contrasted personalism, as a way of life, with fascism, as a political 
ideology: ‘Le pers.[onnalisme] est une manière de vivre dont il découle, secondairement, mais 
nécessairement, les conclusions politiques. Tandis que le fascisme est une politique au nom de 
laquelle on prétend imposer une certaine manière de vivre au peuple, aux individus, à vous-
même.’   This is a significant difference.  1163
!
At ON, fascism was denounced as a ‘statolatry’, i.e. a form of political materialism 
under a thin spiritual veneer. As early as 1933, Marc and Dupuis expressed this view: ‘Le 
fascisme a prétendu libérer l’homme de l’esclavage du matérialisme, mais en faisant de l’Etat 
l’expression suprême de la vie matérielle et spirituelle de la nation, il réduit en fin de compte 
le spiritualisme qu’il prétendait incarner à un matérialisme détourné car la statolatrie, sous la 
forme absolue qu’il lui donne, n’est autre que la transposition politique du matérialisme.’  1164
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Idolatry of the state in fascism would justify Rougemont’s interpretation of it as a religious 
surrogate. 
!
In sum, personalists competed with fascists in the arena of antiparliamentarianism. 
They irreducibly opposed fascism on the question of the nationalism, on the state, and on the 
idea of central power. As Rougemont put it in 1938: 
Si nous sommes anti-parlementaires, nous ne souffrirons pas qu’une paresse d’esprit 
voisine de la mauvaise foi nous assimile pour autant à un « fascisme » contre lequel 
toute la doctrine et l’attitude personnaliste se dressent en une opposition irréductible, 
essentielle. […] Nous sommes contre la centralisation, contre l’étatisme, contre le 
nationalisme étatisé, contre toute espèce de fascisme imité de Mussolini, d’Hitler ou 
de Staline, mais aussi contre toute espèce de fascisme « à la française ».   1165!
In 1938, intellectual laziness, if not mauvaise foi, put in one and the same box 
personalism and fascism, whether imported or indigenous, on the grounds that both were anti-
parliamentarian. This classification detracted from the understanding of the stakes of the 
debate in the 1930s, as it does today.  
!
Although it is useful to emphasise the common negations of personalism and fascism 
to see that they fought in the same arena, the risk of oversimplification remains great in any 
genericist enterprise. Ultimately, it may not be possible to understand how personalism 
functioned against fascism without going into details about particular types of personalism, if 
not the personalism of one particular author, at a given period. The case of Denis de 
Rougemont is revealing. 
!
!
3. The case of Denis de Rougemont!
!
Denis de Rougemont’s position vis-à-vis fascism has been exposed to two different 
sets of questions, which were answered either sympathetically or disapprovingly. While 
Bruno Ackermann has presented Rougemont’s ideas as ‘la vraie défense contre l’esprit 
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totalitaire’,   Patrick Leuzinger has rejected Ackermann’s conclusions because of 1166
Rougemont’s ‘engagement anti-libéral’.   Conversely, François Saint-Ouen, a former partner 1167
of Rougemont at the Centre Européen de la Culture, has explored Rougemont’s ideas as the 
‘origins’ of post-1945 European federalism.   Similarly examining personalism as the 1168
‘origins’ of European federalism, Jean Jacob has reached opposite conclusions: he criticises 
Rougemont for his rejection of the nation-state, which he defines as ‘partie liée avec la 
modernité’.   I shall briefly review each point of view, showing how they partake of the 1169
debate on personalism as ‘anti-totalitarian’/‘anti-liberal’, before trying to overcome the 




In September 1933, Albert-Marie Schmidt (of the Hic et Nunc team), who worked as a 
French lector in Marburg an der Lahn, wrote to Rougemont on hearing that he was 
unemployed: ‘J’apprends que le lecteur français de Francfort, atteint par la limite d’âge, se 
retire. Pouvez-vous vous faire recommander au professeur Lommatzch le romaniste, par des 
conférenciers français qui aient fait des conférences à Francfort ?’   Eventually – after two 1170
years of unemployment, struggling in the French provinces –   Rougemont ended up as a 1171
French lector in Frankfurt. Bruno Ackermann has explored the various reasons why 
Rougemont agreed to spend an academic year in Nazi Germany (1935-6), an experience 
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which he recorded in his Journal d’Allemagne (1938).   Ackermann recalled the fact that 1172
Ionesco once suggested that his Rhinocéros (1959) had been inspired by Rougemont’s 
description of a Nazi meeting in Journal d’Allemagne, and thus, ‘le Journal d’Allemagne, 
comme Rhinocéros, vingt ans plus tard, sont des tentatives de démystification des idéologies 
totalitaires.’   I share Ackermann’s analysis of Rougemont’s attitude towards fascism, with 1173
two reservations. 
!
The first is more a nuance than a substantial criticism. Ackermann suggests that 
Rougemont displayed clear-sightedness throughout his Journal d’Allemagne: ‘ses 
observations décrivent avec une rare lucidité le climat de cette Allemagne nouvelle’;   and 1174
again: ‘l’observateur parfois sentimental qu’est Rougemont demeure lucide.’   This 1175
interpretation is too benevolent. For example, Rougemont was not clear-sighted as to racism. 
Rougemont reported the policy of different flats for ‘non-Aryans’ without a word of sympathy 
or revolt.   One page of his Journal d’Allemagne refuted the idea of ‘le Juif’ in general: 1176
there were different types – ‘ici-même, j’en distingue au moins trois espèces des plus 
diverses’ – a European-liberal type, a Marxist type, and a capitalist type.   Anti-semitism, to 1177
Rougemont, was a result of petit-bourgeois resentment of the success of Jewish capitalists. To 
quote the most ambiguous passage of his Journal d’Allemagne at length:  
Mais la plupart de ceux [les Juifs] que l’on voit encore dans un café de la place de 
l’Opéra paraissent, il faut l’avouer, justifier les slogans grossiers de la propagande 
hitlérienne. Bedonnants et bagués, le cigare au milieu de la bouche, ils représentent le 
type vulgarisé du capitaliste insolent. Goebbels et les Führers locaux n’ont pas eu de 
peine à concentrer sur eux la haine envieuse que vouent les petits aux gros à l’intérieur 
des classes bourgeoises. Nul besoin de recourir à des faux manifestes, tels que les 
Protocoles des Sages de Sion : il suffisait de montrer du doigt ces ventres, et de 
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rappeler aux parents humiliés que leurs enfants ne sont jamais les premiers dans une 
classe où se trouvent des Juifs…   1178!
Having interpreted anti-semitism as a form of petit-bourgeois jealousy in his Journal 
d’Allemagne, Rougemont dismissed it as secondary.   It was not that he approved of anti-1179
semitism – on the contrary – but he considered enthusiasm for the nation to be the greater 
threat.   The anti-semitism of Nazi Germany was simply not a major concern for 1180
Rougemont, as indeed for many of his contemporaries.  
!
By contrast, Rougemont showed concern for the Calvinist Church. He defended the 
Confessing Church (Bekenntniskirche), following pastors Niemöller and Barth.   So it is 1181
difficult to agree with Ackermann when he writes: ‘Denis de Rougemont adopte une 
apparente attitude de neutralité, qui est ici signe de lucidité et de discernement. L’on connaît 
son aversion, maintes fois dévoilée et sans retour, pour les régimes totalitaires. Pareille 
attitude de neutralité n’exclut toutefois pas, dans certaines pages, des appréciations toutes 
personnelles’.   Rougemont was neither neutral nor wholly discerning as to the culture of 1182
Nazi Germany. 
!
Regarding the imminent danger of an international conflagration however, Ackermann 
is right to call Rougemont clear-sighted. In 1935, in the first months of his stay in Nazi 
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Germany, Rougemont depicted the thirst for war as inherent to the Nazi mentality.   In 1183
January 1936, ‘A propos d’une conversation avec un S.A.’ corrects the judgement on Mein 
Kampf given in December 1935: ‘Ce n’est pas une « autobiographie » mais un ouvrage de 
combat, comme son nom l’indique, et sa doctrine.’   This suggests that Rougemont read 1184
Mein Kampf in December 1935: he was particularly well-informed for the time. 
!
The second point on which I would like to make reservations is Ackermann’s use of 
the concepts ‘totalitaire’ and ‘totalitarisme’. There is no point rehearsing the problems 
inherent in the notion of ‘totalitarianism’ in general.   It is Ackermann’s interpretation that: 1185
‘Bien que les conditions historiques et géopolitiques qui régissent les expériences russes et 
allemandes soient différentes, les rapports que les deux régimes entretiennent avec la culture 
sont identiques et permettent ainsi à Rougemont de disséquer le mécanisme fatal des régimes 
totalitaires.’   Even if one accepts Rougemont’s understanding of ‘culture’, his description 1186
of the ‘fatal’ mechanism of ‘totalitarian’ regimes is informed by dubious premises concerning 
decay in history.   I should like to recall two points here: how the concept of ‘totalitarian 1187
regimes’ in the 1930s was different from the understanding of ‘totalitarianism’ that developed 
during the Cold War; and  why Rougemont contrasted ‘totalitarian’ regimes with the 
personalist federation. This second point will lead us to Rougemont’s attack on the liberal 
nation-state.   
!
During the Cold War, attacks on ‘totalitarianism’ became necessarily ‘liberal-
democratic’.   In the 1930s, however, the concept of ‘totalitarianism’ was used with critical 1188
purposes by philosophers as diverse as the Marxist Karl Kautsky in Germany, José Ortega y 
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Gasset in Spain, Jacques Maritain and the group of Les Nouveaux Cahiers in France 
(including Rougemont, as the editor, and Boris Souvarine). A review of Rougemont’s Journal 
d’Allemagne by Boris Souvarine (probably written in 1939) convincingly illustrates ‘la 
proche parenté’ between the Nazi regime and the ‘soi-disant système soviétique’.   Yet, 1189
according to Rougemont, the kinship was not only between the Nazi and the Soviet regimes, 
but also with liberal thought. Thereafter, Rougemont argued: ‘la première tâche des 
intellectuels qui ont compris le péril totalitaire (de droite ou de gauche) ce n’est pas 
“d’adhérer” à quelque anti-fascisme, mais de s’attaquer à la forme de pensée d’où vont 
nécessairement sortir le fascisme et le stalinisme. Et c’est la pensée libérale.’   This 1190
identification of liberal thought with ‘totalitarian’ threats is unthinkable in Cold War terms.   1191
!
The idea that ‘totalitarian’ states – whether Communist, Fascist, or National-Socialist 
– have more similarities than differences was a leitmotiv of Rougemont’s writings from the 
early 1930s. In Penser avec les mains (1936), Rougemont condemned ‘l’Etat Totalitaire, 
qu’ils pourront baptiser soviétique ou fasciste, peu importe – ces noms sont insensés pour 
nous [personnalistes]’.   The reason for not making a distinction is explained in a footnote: 1192
‘Quand je dis que l’Etat totalitaire menace de provoquer le désastre humain le plus grandiose 
de l’histoire, c’est parce que, dans l’ensemble de ses ambitions concrètes, dans la frénésie 
unitaire qui préside à chacun de ses actes, je vois les symptômes cliniques d’une maladie de 
l’esprit et du cœur des citoyens, qui est mortelle.’   Thus the term ‘totalitaire’ expressed, for 1193
Rougemont, the limitless ambitions of the Soviet and fascist states, in particular their 
aspirations to unify all aspects of existence. 
!
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There was no doubt as to why it was indispensable to oppose ‘totalitarian’ regimes 
with a ‘violence nécessaire’ for Rougemont: ‘– Car notre force est personnelle, non collective. 
Elle réside dans les petits groupes, non dans l’Etat totalitaire. Elle a pour formule réelle – 
même là où l’on refuse encore ce nom – la FÉDÉRATION, non la masse ; et non la tyrannie 
d’un seul, et non le gigantisme national.’   Federalist personalism vs. the ‘totalitarian’ state 1194
– a principle spelled out clearly in 1936 – would become the basis of Rougemont’s wartime 
and post-war commitment.   It is important that he did not initially use the term in a Cold 1195
War context: Rougemont condemned ‘totalitarisme’ from 1937 onwards.   From 1938, he 1196
frequently repeated the motto: ‘Là où l’homme VEUT être total, l’Etat ne sera jamais 
totalitaire’.   Rougemont gave a moral interpretation of ‘totalitarianism’: it was the result of 1197
the people giving up their responsibility and freedom. 
!
Historical (over)interpretation came into play when Rougemont presented Jacobinism 
as the first attempt to set up a ‘totalitarian’ regime.   Incidentally, this makes Rougemont a 1198
champion of ‘origins’ studies of ‘prehistoric’ fascism. Rougemont explained the ‘origins’ of 
‘totalitarian’ regimes in relation with the nation-state. The nation-state, initiated by the 
Jacobins in France and brought to a climax in Nazi Germany, was ‘totalitarian’ in essence. Its 
main characteristics were: centralization of power, uniformization, and exaltation of the 
nation; its main purpose: warfare.   It is interesting to note that Rougemont’s interpretation 1199
of the ‘origins’ of ‘totalitarianism’ was diametrically opposed to Hannah Arendt’s The origins 
of totalitarianism. Arendt saw the decline of the nation-state as initiating the 
disenfranchisement of minorities and a forced ‘statelessness, the newest mass phenomenon in 
!  257
!  Rougemont, Penser avec les mains, 136. 1194
!  See in particular Bruno Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont. De la personne à l'Europe, Essai biographique 1195
(Lausanne, 2000); Bruno Ackermann, 'The spiritual foundations of the European thinking of Denis de 
Rougemont', in Jurgen Wiersma (ed.) Discernment and commitment (Kampen, 1993); Deering, Combats 
acharnés: Denis de Rougemont et les fondements de l'unité européenne; Jacob, Le retour de "L'Ordre Nouveau". 
See also Izard’s study: ‘Denis de Rougemont: du personnalisme au fédéralisme, 1930-1950’ in 'Du 
personnalisme au fédéralisme européen. En hommage à Denis de Rougemont', Paper presented at the 
Colloquium 21-23 Apr. 1989, Geneva, 1989.
!  e.g. ‘s’emparer de la liberté même des jeunes, voilà le totalitarisme’, in Rougemont, Journal d'Allemagne, 1196
27. 
!  Rougemont, 'La vraie défense contre l'esprit totalitaire', 425. The emphasis and capitals are his.1197
!  Especially in Rougemont, 'Les Jacobins en chemise brune'. Also in Rougemont, Journal d'Allemagne, 86-92.1198
!  See in particular Rougemont, Journal d'Allemagne, 17-18, 54-6, 73, 85-92.1199
history’, potentially having genocidal implications.   Rougemont’s and Arendt’s analyses in 1200
terms of the rise/decline of the nation-state are confusing. It has been argued that Arendt’s 
thesis was undermined by the fact that ‘totalitarian’ regimes ‘succeeded’ in countries were 
there had not been an established nation-state before.   The same also applies to 1201
Rougemont’s model (and to Ackermann’s presentation thereof). Nevertheless, one may 
suggest that the value of both Rougemont’s and Arendt’s analyses lies in their identification of 
personal/human with civic/political status.    1202
!
 Another interesting aspect in Rougemont’s approach to ‘totalitarianism’, which 
Ackermann has also noted, was Rougemont’s definition of humour as a weapon against 
‘totalitarian’ frenzy.   Lack of humour in ‘totalitarian’ politics was a feature Rougemont 1203
distinguished in 1938. Was it a specifically Swiss contribution to political science? Some of 
Rougemont’s articles would suggest so.   In his Journal d’Allemagne, he recalled that, as he 1204
stood in a crowd for more than three hours, waiting to hear Hitler: ‘Personne ne s’impatiente, 
ni ne plaisante.’   Rougemont’s critique of National Socialism may appear ambiguous at 1205
times because he used irony to discredit his adversaries. Yet bearing in mind the whole text 
and the context, his position is unequivocal. This is exceptional among third-way 
protagonists. 
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For instance, analysing the catalogue of a German publisher around Christmas 1937, 
and finding the word or the idea of ‘race’ in a quarter of the titles offered, he concluded: ‘Je 
vous laisse imaginer les rêves du lecteur allemand, heureux bénéficiaire de ces « cadeaux de 
Noël ».’   The article is an attack on insidious propaganda: ‘Il faut se rappeler que dans un 1206
état totalitaire, la question « à quoi pensent ?… » tend à se réduire à la question : « à quoi leur 
dit-on de penser ? » C’est à dire qu’on a remplacé la mode – maîtresse des goûts moyens en 
France – par la volonté de l’Etat (Hitler, Goebbels et Rosenberg).’   The Nazi aspirations to 1207
take responsibility for all areas of existence, including dreams and jokes, was part of 
Rougemont’s personalist critique of ‘totalitarian’ regimes. 
!
Irony went in hand with open debate for Rougemont. In 1939, he pleaded for an open 
discussion of the facts of the Soviet and Nazi regimes: ‘L’un massacre des hommes parce 
qu’ils ont une ascendance juive, l’autre parce qu’ils ont une ascendance koulak. Tous les deux 
persécutent les chrétiens. Tous les deux privent le citoyen de ses libertés, etc.’   He added : 1208
‘Refuser de discuter Hitler, c’est le « tabouer », le considérer comme l’adversaire sacré. Le 
sacré, c’est ce qu’on ne discute pas. Mais le sacré est toujours ambigu : l’horreur toujours liée 
à l’attirance. En discutant Hitler, je le profane. C’est beaucoup plus dangereux pour son mythe 
que les vociférations sacrées de quelques « antifascistes ».’   We shall come back to 1209
Rougemont’s opposition to the sacred in Hitlerism, as indeed in any political regime. 
!
That Rougemont’s irony and his belief in ‘le pouvoir des mots’ are susceptible to 
misreading is evident from Patrick Leuzinger’s recent thesis.   To counter what he saw as 1210
Ackermann’s ‘lecture non seulement acritique, mais hagiographique’, Leuzinger has insisted 
on Rougemont’s anti-liberalism in the 1930s.   In his attempt to balance Ackermann’s 1211
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interpretation of personalism as ‘anti-totalitarian’,   Leuzinger became one-sided and 1212
excessive. He saw personalism as paving the way for authoritarian ideology. His dissertation 
needs to be discussed here, not so much to correct its numerous mistakes, but to illustrate the 
inadequacy of current political criteria to evaluate the personalism of the 1930s. 
!
Leuzinger has applied to the 1930s a contemporary definition of ‘le libéralisme’, and 
then reified ‘anti-liberal’ discourse in the 1930s. In Leuzinger’s definition, ‘le liberalisme’ is 
‘un régime qui se réclame de la Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen (celle de 
1789), du parlementarisme bourgeois (inauguré par la constitution américaine de 1787) et du 
suffrage universel (acquis dans la deuxième moitié du XXe siècle… si l’on considère les 
femmes comme partie intégrante de l’humanité).’   The awkward conjunction ‘si’ in the last 1213
sentence notwithstanding, we can remark that this definition of liberalism does not apply to 
France in the first half of the twentieth century, when Rougemont was criticising the French 
regime. The bulk of Leuzinger’s dissertation is a selective compilation of Rougemont’s 
works, evaluated with the above definition of ‘le libéralisme’.    1214
!
Leuzinger’s definition of liberalism as a ‘parlementarisme bourgeois’ brings to mind a 
question, raised by Rougemont in an article translated into English in 1938: ‘is the 
“liberalism” of our democracies anything but the spontaneous conformity of our thought to 
the limitations of bourgeois society?’   Hindsight tells us how inopportune it was to reject 1215
the Third Republic in the late 1930s. But to Leuzinger, personalists challenged the 
parliamentary system of the Third Republic, which was the incarnation of democratic and 
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liberal values; hence personalists were proto-fascists whatever their discourses may have 
been. This is a caricature of Sternhell’s argument.    1216
!
Ironically, when Leuzinger quotes Rougemont without any comparison or contrast in 
the 1930s, he ends up making Rougemont a truly exceptional thinker.   Finally, his 1217
dissertation may only stand as a critique of Ackermann in the sense that, despite a close 
reading of Ackermann’s 1200-page work, Leuzinger completely misread Rougemont’s 
personalism. The last section of this chapter will attempt to contextualize and open up the 
documents more convincingly. Two other readings of Rougemont, by François Saint-Ouen 





François Saint-Ouen and Jean Jacob trace back the political trajectory of Rougemont 
across the twentieth century, in order to shed light on the significance of his political views 
today.   Saint-Ouen has summarized in clear and concise reviews the various works of 1218
Denis de Rougemont.   His works have the merit of presenting succinctly Rougemont’s 1219
political journey in its entirety. He fully endorses Ackermann’s thesis for the pre-1945 period, 
namely the argument that Rougemont was anti-fascist and anti-communist from the 
beginning.    1220
!
While Saint-Ouen is a supporter of European federalism, Jean Jacob is totally against 
the idea. His doctoral thesis, Le retour de “L’Ordre Nouveau” (2000), looks for the origins of 
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!  See in particular Saint-Ouen, 'Les personnalistes: Denis de Rougemont et Alexandre Marc’, 243-4.1220
the ecological movement in the 1930s.   Jacob pays particular attention to Denis de 1221
Rougemont because he founded ECOROPA, one of the main European ecologist associations, 
in the late 1970s. Jacob draws interesting parallels between the 1930s and 1970s. However, 
his study of personalism is not fully satisfactory on all historical counts. For example, Jacob 
presents Jean-Marie Pelt and Roger Garaudy as followers of Denis de Rougemont.   We can 1222
admit the link between Pelt and the Rougemont of the 1970s (who had changed since the 
1930s): Pelt is a militant of ECOROPA.   The link between Garaudy and Rougemont, by 1223
contrast, was but a brief event in Garaudy’s career.   One wonders why, in the introduction, 1224
Jacob mentions Garaudy in relation to Rougemont. Jacob was writing in the late 1990s, at a 
time when Garaudy was at the heart of a controversy about Holocaust revisionist views.  1225
He is misleading when he suggests that Garaudy’s trajectory could be a ‘precedent’ for 
personalism.   It is difficult to see how the zigzaggery of Garaudy – from Protestantism to 1226
Communism, through Stalinism back to Catholicism, then to Islam, and lastly as a Holocaust 
revisionist – could set a precedent. Jacob eventually contradicts himself (in the annex).    1227
!
Jacob’s thesis is a reassessment of personalism in terms of the right-left divide in 
politics. He insists on the continuity of Rougemont’s thought from the 1930s onwards 
(absolutely unlike Garaudy’s trajectory).   He dismisses Rougemont’s efforts to legislate as 1228
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to how his doctrine should be read; and adopts a Sternhellian view on the ‘non-conformistes 
des années trente’. Jacob gives this explanation:  
Or il n’est pas besoin d’être grand clerc pour se rendre compte que Denis de 
Rougemont n’a jamais admis la radicalité du processus révolutionnaire français. […] 
Ce qui est alors contesté, c’est la capacité de l’homme d’agir en tant que sujet libre, 
sans en référer à une quelconque tradition ou religion. Pourtant les thèses de Denis de 
Rougemont jouissent, en dépit de ce fond conservateur, d’une certaine popularité au 
sein des gauches alternatives. C’est que Denis de Rougemont a su habilement tirer 
profit de thèmes d’actualité pour réactualiser ses thèses conservatrices et leur conférer 
une couche gauchisante.    1229!
Acceptance of the radicality of the French Revolution defines our capacity to act as 
free subjects, according to Jacob. This is also the definition of the ‘left’ in France. Therefore, 
Rougemont, who was against Jacobinism, was against individual freedom, and against the 
left, at least until May 1968, when the nascent ecological movement provided ‘une nouvelle 
respectabilité à une thématique sinon sulfureuse du moins conservatrice.’   It is difficult to 1230
read this without thinking that Jacob has political purposes. 
!
If Jacob’s analysis of the past is unconvincing, Le retour de “L’Ordre Nouveau” 
remains interesting on how the ‘Nouvelle Droite’ has recuperated ‘nonconformist’ themes in 
recent years.   Jacob is also interesting on another count: he raises the question of the 1231
secular vs. religious approach to politics in France. The interpretative postulate that frames his 
book is that ‘religion’ and ‘tradition’ are conservative and right-wing. Jacob dismisses the 
personalist attempt to reconcile religion and revolution. This is not new: already in 1933, 
Pierre-Olivier Lapie – a former member of the ON – warned: ‘Révolutionnaires qui n’osez 
pas vous dire catholiques et vous aussi, catholiques qui vous dites révolutionnaires prenez 
garde. Par la révolution vous délaissez le Pape, par votre religion, vous appelez le Messie. 
Prenez garde, camarades, que votre Messie soit Hitler, et votre pape, à vous, un curé de plein 
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vent.’   What seems to disturb Jacob the most is Rougemont’s rejection of Jacobinism and a 1232
fortiori fascism as politico-religious phenomena. 
!
Rougemont vs. ‘political religions’!
!
The key to Rougemont’s unequivocal rejection of Marxism and fascism sensu lato, is 
that he saw them as surrogate religions, attempting to replace the ‘wholly Other’ (der ganz 
Andere in Barthian terms) with a state pseudo-mysticism. His writings on ‘totalitarian’ 
regimes (including fascisms) are based on an underlying opposition to political religion. 
Philippe Burrin has shown that analysis in terms of political religion was common in the 
interwar period.   From Franz Werfel’s description of fascisms as ‘Ersatzreligionen’ in 1932, 1233
to Raymon Aron’s study of ‘les religions séculières’ in 1942, through Religions politiques by 
Erich Voegelin (1938), the comparison of ‘totalitarian’ regimes with secular or political 
religions was widespread.    1234
!
Burrin has convincingly argued that, although ‘political religion’ did not have the same 
posterity as the alternative concept of ‘totalitarianism’, it remains an interesting analytical tool 
today.   Rather than repeating the analysis of Rougemont’s ‘anti-totalitarian’ texts, which 1235
Bruno Ackermann and Rémi Fabre have given us already,   I would like to suggest that the 1236
concept of ‘political religion’ is at least as relevant to characterise Rougemont’s perspective 
on the various fascisms and communism. 
!
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Interestingly, the term ‘political religion’ seems to have been used for the first time 
during the French Revolution, to describe the indoctrination of the French armies (Christoph 
Martin Wieland) or the ‘blind enthusiasm’ for the constitution that revolutionary education 
was supposed to compel in children’s minds (Condorcet).   In the early twentieth century, 1237
the concept was used by Russian thinkers, including some socialists, who argued that 
socialism was becoming a religious faith.   Nikolai Berdiaev famously developed this 1238
interpretation of ‘Socialism as religion’ in 1906.   This view was developed by various 1239
Russian religious thinkers in the following years.   In the 1930s, the comparison between 1240
Christianity (occasionally Islam) and communism or fascism entered Austrian, German and 
French scholarship. Analysis in terms of ‘political religion’ denounced a sacralization of the 
political community as a higher reality, whether a people, a class, a race, or the state.   The 1241
term ‘political religion’ raises issues as to the definition of religion itself. Without entering 
this debate, Rougemont identified ways in which Communism and National Socialism acted 
as if they sought to replace (the remnants of) Christianity. 
!
Through his contacts with ecumenical milieux and his commitments in the Protestant 
world, Rougemont was well informed about the persecutions of Christian Churches in Soviet 
Russia and Nazi Germany.   Nikolai Berdiaev and Karl Barth were instrumental in 1242
providing Rougemont with a theological understanding of the Communist and Nazi regimes 
as fundamentally anti-Christian. Both regimes were all the more perfidious as they were 
borrowing aspects of Russian Orthodox and Lutheran traditions respectively. It has been 
mentioned already that Berdiaev’s religious interpretation of communism was taken on board 
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by the personalists at Esprit, including Rougemont.   In his Le nouveau Moyen Age (1924), 1243
Berdiaev expressed the view that, in communism, social concerns constituted the ‘Truth’.  1244
Barth, for his part, asserted that communist and fascist ideologies corresponded to a form of 
religious longing, just as deceptive as that of other religions. Communism, Fascism, and 
National Socialism raised ‘la même question à laquelle les religions donnent leurs réponses 
incertaines, démoniaques, fausses, faisant ainsi le malheur des hommes.’   In Bathian terms, 1245
a ‘religious’ quest is necessarily misleading and deceptive: God decides whether, when and 
how He graciously makes himself known. 
!
From 1931, the theology of Karl Barth was decisive in making Protestant youth 
movements staunch opponents of communism, and, from 1933, resisters against Nazism.  1246
The Kirchenkampf in Germany, from 1933 onwards, made Barthian theology appear as a 
weapon with which to resist Nazism.   Barth left Germany in 1935, and returned to 1247
Switzerland. Between 1934 and 1945, whenever the French and French Swiss press 
mentioned Barth, it was to give his analysis of European politics.   It should be remembered 1248
that Rougemont was one of the most active Barthians at the Fédération française des 
associations chrétiennes d’étudiants (FFACE).    1249
!
In the Journal d’Allemagne (November 1938), Rougemont held that Nazism was a 
religious phenomenon,   which required a spiritual answer: ‘ceci définit Hitler : seul un 1250
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prophète peut lui répondre.’   Faith was to be the only efficient response to ‘le péril 1251
totalitaire’: ‘Retrouver une foi qui ne soit pas cette volonté anxieuse de croire à la 
Nation…’   And this faith was Christianity in its original force, stripped of the religiousness 1252
and sentimentality that Rougemont, like Barth, found in most established Churches.  1253
Rougemont analysed the way in which Nazism drew on Protestant liturgical culture to elevate 
politics to worship, thereby establishing political meetings as a liturgy and political aims as an 
absolute.    1254
!
Since the 1930s, political historians have studied the religious dimension of Nazism, 
and there would be no point dwelling upon it here.   Instead, I would like to focus on 1255
unpublished notes by Rougemont, which shed a new light on his reasons for holding 
personalism as the opposite of fascism. The first note was intended for an ‘Introduction 
générale ou conclusion de L’homme franc (Polit.[ique de la] Personne, tome II)’, which was 
never published. It bears the date ‘21 June 1936’, which means it was written at the end of 
Rougemont’s academic year as a lector in Nazi Germany. This note makes sense only in its 
entirety, hence the unusually long quotation: 
‘Opposition personnalisme (christianisme) fascisme (communisme) !
Pour le fasciste (ou communisme) la Vérité est sociale. (race, communauté 
nationale, classe). Pour le chrétien elle est personne. (Pour le libéral rationaliste elle 
était générale et individuelle. Elle ne se fondait  
1. ni sur la réalité humaine, qui est sociale et non générale 
2. ni sur la réalité divine, qui est personnelle, et non individuelle) 
Le chrétien (personnaliste) ne vit la Vérité concrète que lorsqu’il est en rapport 
unique et actif avec la source de toute activité et Vérité, Dieu en Christ. Vérité qui est 
d’avant et d’après tout. (avant et après toute société humaine ; éternelle). 
Le fasciste dit : Dieu (la Vérité) c’est le social. (Etat, Nation, 
Volksgemeinschaft, Classe) Il ne peut entrer en contact avec son Dieu, sa Vérité, que 
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lorsqu’il s’ordonne à la communauté terrestre. La Vérité lui vient de l’unanimité 
immanente. 
La vérité du chrétien est avant toute communauté. Voire le plus souvent : 
contre. Elle fonde la seule unanimité réelle et concrète, synthétique, qui est l’Eglise 
indivisible (Or l’Eglise visible n’est que l’espoir dans le péché.) 
Transcendance et immanence : tout le débat est là. Religion ou foi.  
Force ou vérité ? Non. (Mythe de droit) Mais force humaine (non-vraie) ou force de 
Dieu (incroyable et vraie).’   1256!!
The title in itself is interesting: Rougemont seems to equate personalism with 
Christianity, and fascism with communism. Rougemont sees (Christian) personalism as a 
means to reconcile both human and divine realities. The key to the debate is the 
Kierkegaardian alternative, given in conclusion: ‘Transcendance et immanence : tout le débat 
est là. Religion ou foi.’   This makes no sense outside Kierkegaard’s opposition between 1257
religion (idolatry) and faith (subjective self-commitment maintained in the face of intellectual 
uncertainty or paradox). 
!
The phrase ‘rapport unique et actif avec la source de toute activité et 
Vérité’ (Rougemont’s emphasis) suggests a dialogue between the believer and Christ. In 1934, 
Rougemont had already expressed this principle of dialogical philosophy, in theological and 
political terms.   He had particularly warned against the interruption of dialogue by fusion 1258
of the different persons into a single entity: ‘On voudrait nous faire croire aujourd’hui que le 
conflit fécond, la communion du tu et du je se résout pratiquement dans un nous […]. Cette 
opération magistrale porte un nom en politique. C’est le fascisme’   – and in 1936, 1259
Rougemont added – ‘ou le national-socialisme.’   Personalism by contrast, held that ‘le 1260
rapport véritable entre les hommes, c’est la communauté des personnes responsables. […] 
Elle a son centre en chacune des personnes qui la composent […]. Elle est le rayonnement 
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dans la durée de l’acte instantané qui unit un je et un tu par un lien de responsabilité.’   This 1261
statement requires further explanation. 
!
Rougemont was cautious not to place any community before the individual. As he put 
it in the manuscript quoted above: ‘La vérité du chrétien est avant toute communauté. Voire le 
plus souvent : contre.’    A Calvinist understanding of the Church motivates the parenthesis: 1262
‘(Or l’Eglise visible n’est que l’espoir dans le péché.)’   Rougemont condemned the 1263
defections of Christians and of Churches to the ‘désordre établi’ – the Third Republic, but also 
bourgeois, patriotic, and religious matters (as opposed to matters of faith).   1264
!
Rougemont was against all ‘Christian’ policies; ‘toutes ces formules d’« ordre 
chrétien » ont été plus ou moins réalisées, et constituent dans leur ensemble, du moyen âge à 
l’Amérique moderne, la grande Imposture dont nous avons à dénoncer l’origine permanente 
et les manifestations modernes.’   The origins of this imposture – the claim to found a 1265
‘Christian’ social order – was that ‘la « chrétienté » est sécularisée’.   Rougemont was 1266
against the idea (and institution) of an established religion, and he rejected both religion and 
secularisation as mundane ambitions. Most of the time, the mundane ambitions of the state 
were less harmful than the mundane ambitions of the Church, so long as they were not taken 
on a spiritual plane. But what the ‘totalitarians’ did was to turn society (whether the 
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‘Proletariat’, the ‘Race’, or the ‘State’) into an immanent ‘God’. Thus, ‘la vraie opposition est 
immanence – transcendance’.   To quote another important unpublished note: 1267
Si l’on reste dans l’immanent ou l’homogène, il semble bien que les totalitaires avaient 
raison : la personne ne peut que devenir à partir de l’ensemble, à partir du sommet de 
la Société. (Le Dieu de Durkheim). Car une partie est moins qu’un tout. C’est ce 
qu’avait vu Dandieu : il posait donc une transcendance (l’Acte) qui rétablissait 
formellement la personne comme élément premier par son rapport à la société, laquelle 
n’était plus le tout dont je suis une partie, mais l’émanation de toutes les personnes qui 
la bâtissent (donc un résultat). (Renversement).    1268!
Rougemont and Dandieu opposed a ‘utilitarian’ understanding of the human person 
because it could potentially justify oppression of individuals and minorities. At a quantitative 
level (purely immanent), the human being was dependent on society (a part being less than 
the whole). Durkheim established that society was not simply equivalent to the sum of its 
individual members; using a chemical metaphor, he viewed it as an organic compound 
endowed with qualities that surpassed the qualities of its constituting elements. That 
Durkheimian principle of solidarity (which Rougemont called ‘le Dieu de Durkheim’) 
maintained that society is the source of everything that makes us human. In this logic, the 
artificial person of society (whether body politic, class, race, state, nation or corporation) has 
every right to prevail over all the concrete persons that are part of it. By contrast, the notion of 
‘Acte’ allowed Dandieu to establish the primacy of the person over society, without referring 
to moral or theological reasons. By establishing that society was nothing but an end-result of 
free acts, personalists hoped to cancel the case for state intervention on behalf of the ‘common 
good’. 
!
Rougemont called on Dandieu’s ‘anti-utilitarian’ and anti-religious model to resist the 
state. At the same time, he also drew on explicitly theological motives: ‘Force ou vérité ? 
Non. (Mythe de droit) Mais force humaine (non-vraie) ou force de Dieu (incroyable et 
vraie).’   The alternative ‘Force ou vérité’ was the fascist vs. anti-fascist option. Rougemont 1269
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meant to transcend these oppositions by the ‘force de Dieu’. One may disagree on many 
counts. In particular, one may have strong reservations as to the suitability of drawing 
theology into political discourse. What is certain however is that Rougemont was fighting 
fascism with what he considered the strongest weapon. Chapter 7 will now show how 






Chapter 7. The person, love, and the Western world!!
!
!
L’Amour et l’Occident (1939), a minor classic translated into twelve languages, is well-known 
as an essay on the myth of courtly or romantic love, from its cultivation in twelfth-century 
Provence, down to its personal, artistic and political manifestations in the twentieth 
century.   However, I argue in this chapter that this essay is a historical work only in the 1270
sense that it illustrates the content of debate in the Paris of the late 1930s. Written in the Paris 
of the late 1930s, L’Amour et l’Occident was a personalist defence of the freedom to love and 
to ‘be oneself’ against collectivist oppression, in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia especially, 
and against ‘conformity’ in 1930s France.  
!
The literature on L’Amour et l’Occident is vast, from historical reviews to studies of 
literary criticism.   But it has never been recognised that L’Amour et l’Occident is the acme 1271
of Rougemont’s personalism. Bruno Ackermann has limited his account to a concise summary 
of L’Amour et l’Occident.   He did indicate that ‘L’Amour et l’Occident s’inscrit dans le 1272
prolongement de la philosophie personnaliste’.   It is the aim of this chapter to explain how. 1273
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!  Ackermann, Denis de Rougemont, une biographie intellectuelle, 1, 575-81.1272
!  When I first met Bruno Ackermann, he advised me to explore the issues raised by L’Amour et l’Occident or 1273
else to look at Rougemont’s theology, two aspects which he had left aside. Looking at other dimensions of 
Rougemont’s thought in the 1930s, I had come to face a theological question each time. Ackermann was right to 
think that the theological dimensions of L’Amour et l’Occident are the least known aspects of Rougemont’s 
personalism, and I wish to express my gratitude once again.
For reasons of length, as well as chronological limits, it focuses on the first edition of 
L’Amour et l’Occident.   1274
!
This chapter argues that L’Amour et l’Occident encompasses the various dimensions 
of personalism –  whether political, philosophical, anthropological, historical or theological – 
and brings them to a climax. The first section argues that Rougemont’s doctrine of L’Amour is 
the acme of his personalism proper. The critiques of personalists and other third-way 
protagonists in the Paris of the late 1930s underline the specificity of Rougemont’s approach. 
The second section considers the paradoxes of L’Occident and the Eurocentrism inherent in 
Rougemont’s approach. The personalism of L’Amour is intertwined with the Eurocentrism of 
L’Occident. For convenience’s sake, the one is considered before the other. 
!
!
1. The Personalism of L’Amour!
!
L’Amour et l’Occident constitutes the peak of Rougemont’s personalism, both 
chronologically and philosophically. In this first section, I examine Rougemont’s personalist 




The text of L’Amour et l’Occident is as instructive as the context in which it was 
published. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that the key chapters of L’Amour et l’Occident were 
first published in Esprit in 1938. Moreover, it is significant that the journal Esprit found it 
relevant to publish a polemic on L’Amour et l’Occident, as the war started. The debate in 
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Esprit, in September 1939, shows how L’Amour et l’Occident was the hight point of 
Rougemont’s personalism.   1275
!
The debate on love in the late 1930s 
!
L’Amour et l’Occident fit into a broader debate on love and politics. The question of 
‘Europe and love’ has received much attention recently, with a joint historical study directed 
by Luisa Passerini.  The claim that Europe was characterised by courtly or romantic love 
(together with war) dominated the self-representation of Europeans, from the late eighteenth 
to the late twentieth century.   In the 1930s, the question of ‘love and Europe’ was a 1276
contested field between fascists and anti-fascists. Nazi propaganda notoriously claimed that 
the type of love on which European civilisation was built could not be experienced by Jews 
and coloured people. These racist claims and the increasing international tensions, following 
the accession of Hitler to power in 1933, were the background of heated debates on what it 
meant to be European. Was Europe characterised by a unique type of love? Anti-fascists 
responded to Nazi claims by developing their own theories about Europe and love.  
!
Of course, the very question of ‘Europe and love’ is problematic from a historical 
point of view. Not only is it Eurocentric, but also, more significantly, who can tell people 
what kind of love should characterize them as Europeans? Rougemont did not hesitate to 
answer, and it is clear that, thereby, he claimed a certain moral authority. L’Amour et 
l’Occident was one of the most categorical anti-fascist love essays. Rougemont saw romantic 
love (in particular the idea that the one who loves is no longer responsible for his actions) as 
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Senarclens) for failing to take into consideration his essential texts on personalism, especially L’Amour et 
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Senarclens, Le Mouvement "Esprit", 1932-1941, Essai critique (Thèse pour l’obtention du grade de docteur ès 
sciences politiques, Université de Genève. vol. 264. Lausanne, 1974). 21R E 139, Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque 
Publique et Universitaire, Fonds Rougemont. 
 See special issue ‘Europe and love’, European Review of History, 11, 2 (Summer 2004), 171-302.
!  Luisa Passerini, 'Europe of Love: Re-centering Intercultural Affairs', European Review of History, 11, 2 1276
(Summer 2004), 172.
the root of the modern loss of responsibility, which led to resignation to ‘totalitarian’ 
oppression. Against fatality, Rougemont sought to affirm the freedom and responsibility of the 
person. 
!
L’Amour et l’Occident was not only shaped by the European situation, but also by the 
debates in late 1930s Paris. Scholars of literature have been right to contrast Rougemont’s 
essay with the surrealist praise of L’Amour fou (to quote André Breton’s famous book of 
1937),   and with the debate on Eros at the Collège de Sociologie, influenced by surrealism 1277
and Freud.   At the time that he wrote L’Amour et l’Occident, Rougemont was a regular 1278
attendant of discussions at the Collège de Sociologie, organised by Georges Bataille, Roger 
Caillois, Michel Leiris and Pierre Klossowski.    1279
!
Like many other third-way discourses of the 1930s, debates at the Collège de 
Sociologie were concerned with ‘the theorization of relations between literary practice, the 
sacred, performativity, and politics’.   To give an impression of this milieu, Alexander Irwin 1280
has drawn a suggestive parallel between Bataille (the Nietzschean philosopher known for his 
deeply provocative assertions) and Simone Weil (the philosopher and mystic, near convert to 
Catholicism and sometimes considered as a saint).   Rougemont was to give a paper on love 1281
at the Collège de Sociologie, but because of the war, this did not happen.   L’Amour et 1282
l’Occident shared with the Collège de Sociologie the ‘fertile, polemical synthesis of 
psychoanalysis and anthropology’.   As Geoffrey Wall pointed out, Rougemont rejected ‘the 1283
surrealist project, such as it became in the hands of Breton and Bataille, Klossowski, and 
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Leiris, with their celebration of Eros as sublime negativity.’   The reason why Rougemont 1284
rejected the surrealist project, I maintain, was his personalism. 
!
To my knowledge, only Thomas Keller has looked at L’Amour et l’Occident as an 
anti-fascist and personalist essay. In his latest book, Keller has offered a radical 
interpretation.   L’Amour et l’Occident was an essay à clef (that is a conversation in which 1285
actual persons are introduced under fictitious names); and Keller identified the following 
protagonists: Rougemont (for ON), Paul-Ludwig Landsberg and Emmanuel Mounier (the 
main philosophers of Esprit), as well as Georges Bataille and Pierre Klossowski (two 
founders of the Collège de Sociologie).   L’Amour et l’Occident was not just a personalist 1286
contribution to the struggle against National Socialism, but also, Keller claimed, a 
denunciation of the dangers of contemporary theories on personal sanctification (Landsberg) 
or self-divinisation (Bataille).   This argument may perplex the reader who is unfamiliar 1287
with the ‘spiritual’ character of European ‘third-way discourses’ of the 1930s. For one thing, it 
is impossible to prove scientifically that L’Amour et l’Occident was an essay à clef because 
nowhere did Rougemont state that he meant to respond to Landsberg, Mounier, Corbin, and 
Bataille when he wrote his book. However, we shall see that Keller’s argument is not as odd 
as it may at first seem. 
!
The question of a mystical revival 
!
Mixing politics and spirituality was a commonplace for third-way movements in the 
1930s. These movements had in common the opposition to fascism from non-communist and 
non-rationalist standpoints. Because they saw fascism as a surrogate religion, oozing a sort of 
mystical force, they were convinced that fascism could not be stopped by diplomatic and 
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military manoeuvres alone.   Thus, as the menace of a war grew, they started to think about 1288
a possible revival of political myths or mysticism which could give a spiritual energy to anti-
fascism. From 1937, a select group at the Collège de Sociologie worked on the question of 
self-divinisation, and the theme of personal sanctification was developed in Esprit. 
!
Rougemont was a participant to both the Collège de Sociologie and Esprit. Writing in 
Esprit in May 1937, Rougemont drew parallels between the research of the Collège de 
Sociologie and the doctrine of personalism. Both were anti-etatist, and thus radically anti-
fascist: ‘« Acéphale » est le signe de l’anti-étatisme radical, c’est-à-dire le seul anti-fascisme 
digne de ce nom. […] Cette société sans tête unique, c’est à peu près ce qu’en termes moins 
romantiques nous appelons fédération.’   In spite of the political convergence, Rougemont 1289
rejected the metaphysics of Acéphale. He opposed Bataille’s atheism, and his saying that 
‘« Dieu », la tête, l’unité, c’est l’état totalitaire, le fascisme ou le stalinisme.’   Rougemont 1290
also expressed strong reservations on an obscure project that Roger Caillois had launched, 
which ambiguously called for ‘un « ordre » aristocratique, ésotérique, mais « sévissant à 
travers la terre entière » et « portant la vie au comble de la volonté de puissance et de 
l’ironie »’.   Rougemont emphasised that Acéphale was incapable of positive action and 1291
potentially dangerous.   He implied that only personalism, and ON in particular, could give 1292
the adequate response to collectivism. 
!
Keller has established that the personalists, Rougemont and Landsberg in particular, 
rejected the Collège de Sociologie’s attempts to revive pagan rituals and seek self-divinisation 
through esoteric practices.   As early as the 1960s, Jean Wahl, the chief interpreter of 1293
Kierkegaard in France and a former participant in the discussions of the Collège de 
Sociologie, suggested a parallel between Bataille, Klossowski, and Rougemont, on the 
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question of sensual love and mystical union.   It is Keller’s great merit to have read the 1294
Journal d’Allemagne and L’Amour et l’Occident not only as anti-fascist essays – a common 
and unchallenged line of interpretation – but also as a response to the peculiar debate on 
mystical union and self-divinisation taking place in 1937-9, between the Collège de 
Sociologie and the personalists.   One may regret that Keller drew conclusions without 1295
always systematically quoting his sources, so that his demonstration sometimes seems 
confused. I shall now show how the question of mysticism was relevant to personalism. 
!
In most religions, the question of mystical theology can be summarised by the 
following alternative: either the union with God is necessarily an illusion and a heresy (God 
being totally other); or there is a possibility, no matter how inconceivable in rational terms, 
that God may unite Himself with His creature. This alternative matters in personalist 
philosophy, whether religious or agnostic: if the person is defined as the individual in relation 
to others, and if there is a God, then it becomes essential to know what kind of relation there 
may be between the human person and God. Mystical theology deals precisely with the 
quality of this relation. 
!
With the pretext of a book review on the Swedish mystic Emanuel Swedenborg, in 
Esprit in September 1937, Rougemont insisted on the ambivalence of seeking mystical 
experience, from his personal(ist) point of view.   He made a rather sweeping statement: 1296
‘l’idéal de « dépersonnalisation » ou d’anéantissement du moi […] est sans conteste celui de 
tous les mystiques, orientaux ou occidentaux, païens ou chrétiens, hétérodoxes ou 
orthodoxes.’   To annul the self could be interpreted in two ways, and only the second, as 1297
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we shall see, was compatible with personalism. In the first interpretation, the ‘anéantissement 
du moi’ meant ‘la suppression radicale de toute conscience personnelle et de toute 
responsabilité, identité, ou vocation distincte.’   This led to the total negation of the person – 1298
and of personalism.  
!
Rougemont perceived in ‘l’éthique collectiviste’ a tendency to give up responsibilities, 
in particular ‘chez les jeunes écrivains français et belges’.   When he attacked collectivism 1299
as a flight from personal responsibility, Rougemont echoed an interpretation put forth by the 
ON group. In April 1936, the ON (perhaps Rougemont) had introduced a study by ‘un de nos 
amis de province’ (Pierre Gardère), by challenging the view that ‘la fusion, l’évanouissement 
de l’individu dans le groupe demande à l’homme un effort de renoncement.’   It was easy to 1300
give in to the general movement, the ethics of the herd. By contrast, it was a constant struggle 
to be a free and responsible person.    1301
!
The struggle to stand free and responsible could involve self-denial, but of a particular 
kind, Rougemont emphasised: ‘un effort de l’homme pour se libérer de sa personnalité (ou de 
son individualité) […] telle qu’il la développait pour ses fins propres, individuelles, 
individualistes.’   To fight against individual egoism was the second interpretation of self-1302
denial, according to Rougemont. Properly understood, it could underpin ‘l’ascèse 
personnaliste’.   ‘Il s’agit […] de la lutte entre le vieil homme et le nouvel homme, entre 1303
l’individu et la vocation qu’il se reconnaît, […] entre la personnalité, naturelle ou factice (ou 
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!  We can surmise that he was referring to writers close to the personalists (otherwise he would not have 1299
refrained from mentioning their names), whom he disliked, such as Raymond de Becker, for example. Raymond 
de Becker was a Belgian Catholic youth leader, who called for an ideal community of saints in the 1930s, before 
finding his way to national-socialism. His post-war works explore both Eastern spiritualities and homoeroticism, 
in a further variant of the 1930s concern with mysticism and love.
!  (Introduction to) ‘Contributions à la psychologie du Jacobin’, L’Ordre Nouveau, 30 (15 Apr. 1936), 39.1300
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Jacobin’, L’Ordre Nouveau, 30 (15 Apr. 1936), 39.
!  Rougemont, 'Martin Lamm: Swedenborg', 787.1302
!  Rougemont, 'Martin Lamm: Swedenborg', 787-8.1303
« personnage ») et la personne.’   Whereas the first form of self-denial aimed at the 1304
annihilation of personal consciousness and led to the loss of a distinct vocation, the second 
form of self-denial helped achieve the personal vocation of each.  
!
With this contrast, Rougemont raised the question of the connection between 
personalist spirituality and asceticism. He thus started a debate on personalism and mysticism, 
‘qu’il faudra, évidemment, que nous traitions un jour en toute franchise, entre croyants de 
confessions différentes et incroyants personnalistes.’   This was not necessarily a Christian 1305
debate. One may note, for example, that the position of the Jewish personalist philosopher 
Martin Buber was strikingly similar to Rougemont’s.   1306
!
Paul-Ludwig Landsberg, the main philosopher at Esprit in the late 1930s and a 
specialist of Spanish Catholic mystics, continued the debate on the connection between 
personalism and mysticism in January 1938.   Originally a German Jew, expelled from Nazi 1307
Germany and then from Spain with the Civil War, Landsberg fought against nazism unto 
death (in the literal sense).   For this, he searched for an energy that he did not find in 1308
rationalist approaches. Thomas Keller has compared the political and theological positions of 
Rougemont and Landsberg, and I shall not belabour their opposition to fascist and Nazi 
ideologies here.   Keller has argued that mystical experiences appealed to Landsberg in a 1309
way that seemed dangerous to Rougemont, and he has interpreted this disagreement as an 
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instance of the divergence between the ON and Esprit.   However, I shall show that 1310
Rougemont’s reservations were his own. 
!
In his 1937 article on mysticism in Esprit, Rougemont regretted he could not ‘préciser 
mes propres réserves à l’endroit de la mystique’.   He would do so in 1938, writing 1311
L’Amour et l’Occident. Significantly, the conclusion to L’Amour et l’Occident – first 
published in Esprit in November 1938 – addressed the question of mystical love.  1312
Rougemont gave two concrete examples, Søren Kierkegaard and Saint John of the Cross, 
before stating his personal(ist) choice.  
!
First, Rougemont rejected all attempts to explain away Kierkegaard’s famous breakup 
with Regine Olsen in psychological or medical terms.   In Kierkegaard’s works, Rougemont 1313
had underlined the connection between Kierkegaard’s experience of unhappy human love, and 
how he imagined the sorrowful love of God.   Thereafter, he suggested that Kierkegaard’s 1314
‘secret’ might lie in the belief that ‘l’homme fini et pécheur ne saurait entretenir avec son 
Dieu – qui est l’Eternel et Saint – que des relations d’amour mortellement malheureux.’  1315
Yet Rougemont was cautious not to judge ‘la vocation vraiment unique du Solitaire’.   Nor 1316
did he condemn Saint John of the Cross, well-known in the Catholic tradition for his 
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descriptions of a mystical marriage with God.   Thus, Rougemont did not reject Catholic 1317
mysticism, contrary to what a hasty reading of Keller might lead one to think. He simply 
insisted on the fact that united persons were still different persons, so that even mystical union 
took place ‘dans la dualité, qui n’est plus qu’un dialogue de grâce et d’obéissance’.  1318
Rougemont stressed diversity in unity. This is of paramount importance for his personalism. 
!
His personal(ist) conclusion on passionate love was derived from his understanding of 
mystical union: ‘Dans l’analogie de la foi, l’on peut alors concevoir que la passion, née du 
mortel désir d’union mystique, ne saurait être dépassée et accomplie que par la rencontre d’un 
autre, par l’admission de sa vie étrangère, de sa personne à tout jamais distincte, mais qui 
offre une alliance sans fin, un dialogue vrai.’   The emphasis on the other, forever distinct, 1319
and the prominence of encounter and dialogue characterize the personalism proper to Denis 
de Rougemont. 
!
Two articles in Esprit!
!
L’Amour et l’Occident was published and publicized by the personalist network in 
France. At the end of June 1938, Rougemont sent the full draft of his L’Amour et l’Occident 
to Daniel-Rops, the editor of the ‘Présence’ series at Plon (which for instance published 
Charles de Gaulle’s La France et son armée and a translation of Aldous Huxley’s End and 
means).   Daniel-Rops, a member of the ON like Rougemont, had already solicited 1320
Rougemont’s contributions to the ‘Présence’ series in 1937.   Interviewed by Eugénie 1321
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!  This subject was especially well-known in France through the studies of Jean Baruzi, which Rougemont 1317
mentioned in his bibliography. They had inspired Emmanuel Mounier to contemplate writing a thesis on Spanish 
mysticism.
!  Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 256.1318
!  Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 256. The emphasis is his.1319
!  Daniel-Rops to Rougemont, 3 July 1938, Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, Rougemont 1320
Papers, ‘[Oeuvres:] L’Amour et l’Occident’, folder 5 (provisional classification).
!  Denis de Rougemont, 'Changer la vie ou changer l'homme?' Le Communisme et les Chrétiens (Paris, 1937), 1321
212-32; Rougemont, 'Vocation et destin d'Israël’, 143-61.
Hélisse (another personalist and one of the few women in the ON), Rougemont explained that 
his primary concern in L’Amour et l’Occident was the modern ‘crise du mariage’.   1322
!
In the following sections, we shall see how the historical argument for which L’Amour 
et l’Occident became famous was only secondary to Rougemont.   What was essential was 1323
his advocacy of personal love. It was through his reflection on marriage and fidelity that 
Rougemont was led to reconsider the myth of passionate or romantic love, as exemplified by 
Tristan and Iseult. The crisis of marriage in contemporary society was the subject of 
Rougemont’s last two chapters, first published as articles in Esprit, in September and 
November 1938.   These two articles aimed at a personalist answer to the question of 1324
infidelity in love and the increasing number of divorces in 1930s Europe.   1325
!
Freedom and myths 
!
Rougemont’s article ‘La passion contre le mariage’ started with a recapitulation of the 
historical argument that L’Amour et l’Occident developed.   We may in turn summarize 1326
Rougemont’s thesis in W.H. Auden’s words: 
At the root of the romantic conception of ideal sexual passion lies Manicheism, a 
dualistic heresy introduced into Europe from the East, which held matter to be the 
creation of the Evil One and therefore incapable of salvation. From this it follows that 
all human institutions like marriage are corrupt, and perfection can be reached only by 
death, in which the limitations of matter are finally transcended and the soul is merged 
into the infinite nothingness of the Logos.   1327!
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!  Interview of Denis de Rougemont by Eugénie Hélisse, ‘Du mythe de Tristan et Iseult à l’hitlérisme’, Tribune 1322
de France, 14 July 1939.
!  See the polemic in Esprit between Rougemont and Henri Marrou.1323
!  Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)'; Denis de Rougemont, 'La passion contre le mariage', 1324
Esprit, 72 (Sept. 1938). In the English edition: Denis de Rougemont, Passion and society (Translated by 
Montgomery Belgion. London, 1940), 283-335.
!  It may seem ironic that Rougemont would be unfaithful to his wife between 1943 and 1945, and end up 1325
divorcing her in 1951. See the comment of his father, Georges de Rougemont: ‘L’auteur de « L’Amour et 
l’Occident » divorçant, quelle douloureuse ironie !’, in his letter to Pierre Maury, 24 July 1946, copy of the letter 
in Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, Rougemont papers, ‘Correspondance’.
!  Rougemont, 'La passion contre le mariage', 652-3. This would be chapter VI of L’Amour et l’Occident.1326
!  W. H. Auden, The Nation, (28 June 1941), 756.1327
According to Rougemont, the European literature on love (that is most of European 
literature) bore traces of the Manichean myth, albeit in a distorted and secularised form. In 
1937-8, the question of the psychological role and power of myths was debated at the Collège 
de Sociologie: for instance, Roger Caillois wrote a book on myth and culture.   1328
!
Debates at the Collège de Sociologie showed that myth is not a collection of errors or a 
world of unchecked emotions, but a total way of thinking and symbolizing, which exists at the 
beginning of human culture, and subsequently remains as a symbolic form.   Myths, 1329
whether political or otherwise, were impervious to argument, even if philosophy can warn us 
of their existence and possible consequences. By denouncing literary myths, Rougemont 
sought to warn against them and possibly to liberate from them.   Tristan was the myth of 1330
the loss of freedom in passion. Loss of freedom was particularly topical in the Europe of 
1938, both in private and public realms. 
!
The article published in Esprit sought to assess the damage of the myth of passion-
love in contemporary society, and warn about the loss of personal freedom. Rougemont found 
two main consequences of the myth of passion-love. The first was the contemporary idea that 
passion is something morally noble, and that it raises the lover above social barriers.   This 1331
could be seen as a distant consequence of the ennoblement of low born troubadours who 
knew how to sing Love (that is, belonged to the Cathar faith, according to Rougemont’s 
theory), in twelfth-century Provence. The second consequence of the myth was that ‘l’homme 
de la passion attend de l’amour fatal quelque révélation, sur lui-même ou la vie en général : 
dernier relent de la mystique primitive.’   In reality, Rougemont remarked, passion led to 1332
servitude; ‘Je nommerai libre un homme qui se possède. Mais l’homme de la passion cherche 
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toutes les sympathies de l’esprit’, see his personal copy in Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, 
21R B158.
!  This bears comparison with Ernst Cassirer, The myth of the state (London, 1946).1329
!  In 1937, Rougemont had already applied this method to the myth of the lost shadow (cf. the story of Peter 1330
Schlemihl, by Adelbert von Chamisso), which he interpreted as the myth of the loss of creativity; see the reprint 
of Rougemont’s analysis in Denis de Rougemont, 'Chamisso ou le mythe de l'ombre perdue', in Albert Béguin 
(ed.) Le romantisme allemand, Cahiers du Sud (Paris, 1949), 276-84.
!  Rougemont, 'La passion contre le mariage', 660-1.1331
!  Rougemont, 'La passion contre le mariage', 660. Cf. Rougemont, Passion and society, 293.1332
au contraire à être possédé, dépossédé, jeté hors de soi, dans l’extase.’   Rougemont rejected 1333
passionate love because of the servitude it entailed. 
!
Lack of personal freedom was also obvious in the search for one’s type of woman 
(Rougemont wrote from an exclusively masculine point of view). He was aware that 
psychology and psychoanalysis could help explain one’s type of woman: the type would 
correspond to the mother image. He implicitly referred to Jung’s analysis of ‘archetypes’.  1334
His knowledge of Freudian and Jungian theories is striking for the time. Jung was starting to 
investigate what he saw as the deepening spiritual crisis of Western civilisation in 
psychological terms. Rougemont agreed with Jung that the search for one’s ‘type’ was no 
longer an individual problem, but marked a broader cultural crisis. 
!
Contemporary society was increasingly determined by sheep-like aesthetics: ‘le 
panurgisme esthétique atteint de nos jours une puissance inconnue, développée par tous les 
moyens techniques, et bientôt politiques, en sorte que le choix d’un type de femme échappe 
de plus en plus au mystère personnel’.   The mystery of each human person – that which is 1335
particular and therefore infinitely precious in each – seemed to be less significant than a 
standardized idea of beauty. Advertising and Hollywood had become the two judges of beauty 
in liberal countries. 
!
As for ‘totalitarian’ regimes, they strove for the utmost standardization. In Nazi 
Germany, the Ministry of Propaganda claimed to define scientifically the suitable type of 
woman.   More seriously still, Rougemont warned that in Stalinist Russia and Nazi 1336
Germany, marriage was promoted ‘sur des bases strictement utilitaires, collectivistes et 
eugéniques, et dans une atmosphère où les problèmes individuels tendaient à perdre toute 
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!  Rougemont, 'La passion contre le mariage', 660.1333
!  ‘Archetypes’ are, according to Jung, instinctual patterns of cognition and behaviour which are common 1334
throughout the human species and constitute an inherited ‘collective unconscious’. Jung gave a definition of his 
‘archetypes’ in Siehe, Psychological factors determining human behavior (Harvard, 1936), also in C. G. Jung, 
Psychologie und Religion (Zürich, 1940), 186. See Rougemont’s own copy in Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique 
et Universitaire, 21R C217.
!  Rougemont, 'La passion contre le mariage', 661.1335
!  Rougemont, 'La passion contre le mariage', 669.1336
espèce de dignité, de légitimité’.   Against standardisation, utilitarianism and eugenics, 1337
Rougemont called on a personalist approach to marriage. This was the subject of the 
following chapter/article, ‘L’amour action ou de la fidélité’, published in Esprit in November 
1938.   1338
!
Faith and fidelity 
!
 ‘L’amour action ou de la fidélité’ offered a ‘parti-pris tout personnel’, what one could 
call an ‘existential’ choice, following from Rougemont’s idea of personal(ist) commitment.  1339
Rougemont’s parti-pris was that of fidelity in marriage. Rougemont had spent his youth 
dreaming about romantic love and he had experienced passion. But after marrying Simone 
Vion, in the summer of 1933, he rejected romantic passion – at least at the time when he was 
writing L’Amour et l’Occident.   And it was his personal decision that he offered to the 1340
reader: ‘Je ne pouvais écrire un livre entier sur la passion sans achever ma description par ce 
trait qui enfin la situe, non dans l’abstrait où la passion ne peut exister […] mais dans le choix 
qui détermine une existence.’   To reject passion could only be a personal choice of 1341
existence. 
!
Thus, L’Amour et l’Occident was the result of an ‘existential’ choice, rejecting 
passion-love as evil. Rougemont’s main source of inspiration, like most philosophers of 
existence in the twentieth century, was Kierkegaard. He offered a personalist and Protestant 
interpretation of Kierkegaard, which remains largely unknown to date. It is surprising that 
Kierkegaard’s influence, which can be traced on practically every page of L’Amour et 
l’Occident, has never been commented upon.  
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!  Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 231-56.1338
!  Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 233.1339
!  For details (some real, some imagined) about Rougemont’s romantic life, see Campiche, Denis de 1340
Rougemont, Le séducteur de l'Occident; Christian Campiche, Le Nègre de la Rose, De Rougemont, Consuelo, 
Saint-Exupéry (Grolley, 2004). Ironically, in these romanticized biographies, Rougemont is the victim of his 
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!  Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 233. The emphasis is his.1341
!
Following Kierkegaard (who explained that it is impossible to study evil from the 
outside, as an object), Rougemont asked: ‘Mais peut-on décrire la passion ? On ne décrit pas 
une forme d’existence sans y participer, fût-ce même par une révolte contre la décision dont 
elle est née.’   Rougemont had decided to defend marriage. He was aware, when he referred 1342
to Kierkegaard in defence of marriage, that Kierkegaard had given us one of the most 
vigorous denials of marriage, with his rupture with Regina Olsen.   He explained the 1343
contradiction through ‘la vocation vraiment unique du Solitaire.’   Furthermore, one can add 1344
that philosophical justification has not always gone in hand with biographical exemplarity.   1345
!
In the concluding chapter of L’Amour et l’Occident, Rougemont paid tribute to 
Kierkegaard, both explicitly and implicitly.   He quoted a French translation of 1346
Kierkegaard’s Fear and trembling, written under the pseudonym of Johannes de Silentio, 
which is a reflection upon faith, and the presumptuousness of wanting to go further beyond 
faith.   Rougemont’s argument on marriage and fidelity, bears a striking similarity to 1347
Kierkegaard’s study of faith in Fear and trembling. I argue that the message of L’Amour et 
l’Occident on fidelity restates Kierkegaard’s message on faith. Kierkegaard asks: 
Where will it all end when in our age, as declared in so many ways, one does not want 
to stop with love? In worldly shrewdness, in petty calculation, in paltriness and 
meanness, in everything that can make man’s divine origin doubtful. Would it not be 
best to remain standing at faith and for him who stands to see to it that he does not fall, 
for the movement of faith must continually be made by virtue of the absurd, but yet in 
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!  See the passage starting with ‘Et Kierkegaard a raison plus qu’eux tous’ until ‘Et comment réfuter ce 1343
furieux ?’, which shows the deference of Rougemont for Kierkegaard. Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la 
fidélité (II)', 234. See also Rougemont, L'Amour et l'Occident, 200.
!  Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 255.1344
!  Rougemont would illustrate the saying ‘do what I say, not what I do’ when he had a famous affair with 1345
Consuelo de Saint Exupéry (and, apparently, his wife with another married man). On the Consuelo affair, see the 
correspondence between Claude Chevalley, Simone and Denis de Rougemont (6 letters, 1945-50), in Claude 
Chevalley’s private papers (Royan), copies of which were kindly forwarded by Christian Roy.
!  To mention but one implicit reference to Kierkegaard, see the interpretation of Abraham as a prototype of the 1346
movement to faith in Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 241. 
!  Rougemont had a copy of Sören Kierkegaard, Crainte et Tremblement (Translated by P.-H. Tisseau, 1347
Philosophie de l'Esprit. Paris, 1935). (Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire de Neuchâtel, 21R C58).
such a way, please note, that one does not lose the finite but gains it whole and 
intact.   1348!
This passage from the preface of Fear and trembling encapsulates Rougemont’s 
philosophical message in L’Amour et l’Occident. There have been many analyses of 
Rougemont’s defence of fidelity,   but none has noticed that Rougemont took Kierkegaard’s 1349
message on faith and adapted it to fidelity in marriage. Playing with the etymology, 
Rougemont equated faith and fidelity. The conclusion to L’Amour et l’Occident could be 
paraphrased thus: through the movement of faith (fidelity in marriage) continually made by 
virtue of the absurd, one does not lose the finite (love for the other person) but gains it whole 
and intact.    1350
!
Rougemont argued that the modern crisis of marriage largely came from people’s need 
for rational motivations for marriage – this was petty calculation.   To think that one could 1351
remain faithful throughout life changes was absurd, so marriage ought to be the subject of a 
bet ‘en vertu de l’absurde’.   In Kierkegaard’s terms, ‘by virtue of the absurd’ meant ‘a leap 1352
of faith’.   By emphasising the movement of faith made continually by virtue of the absurd, 1353
Kierkegaard provided Rougemont with a dynamic understanding of fidelity. Far from being a 
stubborn attitude – whereby the spouses had to stick to a decision once made and never move 
on, fidelity was dynamic, active, positive, and creative.    1354
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(Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Kierkegaard's Writings. vol. VI. Princeton, 1983), 88.
!  For a contemporary appraisal of Rougemont’s message, albeit weak in its theological argument, see Michel 1349
Feher, 'L'amour conjugal chez Denis de Rougemont, ou la gracieuse absurdité du mariage', Esprit, 8-9 (Aug.-
Sept. 1997), 33-51.
!  I have put in parenthesis Rougemont’s interpretation, as it appears from Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de 1350
la fidélité (II)', esp. 254-5.
!  Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 236-7.1351
!  There can be no doubt that the phrase is taken from Kierkegaard: at the end of his article, Rougemont quotes 1352
‘Crainte et Tremblement, traduit d’après la version allemande de E. Geismar et R. Marx’, see Rougemont, 
'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 255.
!  Rougemont spelled out the meaning of ‘en vertu de l’absurde’ in his conclusion, stating that Kierkegaard 1353
(considered as a ‘Chevalier de la foi’) ‘a tout renoncé dans une infinie résignation, et s’il a tout ressaisi par la 
suite, c’est en vertu de l’absurde (c’est-à-dire de la foi).’ Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 255. 
This is a reference to Kierkegaard, Fear and trembling, 91.
!  In Rougemont’s words, ‘se contenter de ne pas tromper sa femme serait une preuve d’indigence et non 1354
d’amour. La fidélité veut bien plus : elle veut le bien de l’être aimé, et lorsqu’elle agit pour ce bien, elle crée 
devant elle le prochain.’ Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 243. 
!
Because Rougemont’s defence of fidelity affirmed the freedom and responsibility of 
the human person, it was eminently personalist. Paradoxically, Rougemont stated that fidelity 
in marriage had become ‘le plus profond non-conformisme’.   In Esprit, ‘non-conformisme’ 1355
would have been read as a reference to personalism.   Rougemont linked explicitly fidelity, 1356
creating an oeuvre, and becoming a person: 
Une telle fidélité fonde la personne. Car la personne se manifeste comme une œuvre 
au sens le plus large du terme. Elle s’édifie à la manière d’une œuvre, à la faveur 
d’une œuvre, et aux mêmes conditions, dont la première est la fidélité à quelque chose 
qui n’était pas, mais que l’on crée. Personne, œuvre, et fidélité : les trois mots ne sont 
point séparables ou concevables isolément. Et tous les trois supposent un parti-pris, 
une attitude fondamentale de créateur.   1357!
In a typically personalist line of reasoning, Rougemont contrasted ‘l’individu et son 
naturel égoïsme’ with the edification of ‘la personne’, understood as the altruistic potential in 
each human being.   The person developed not as an isolated monad, but in relation. What 1358
better relation could there be beyond faithful love? Rougemont suggested that the person who 
loves freely and faithfully, freely affirms his being, by means of relating to the other person. 
‘Ainsi la personne des époux est une mutuelle création, elle est le double aboutissement de 
« l’amour-action ».’    1359
!
The opposition between passion-love (a Stendhalian expression) and action-love (his 
own expression) is the central theme of L’Amour et l’Occident.   Only action-love was free 1360
from myths, from blind and passionate exaltation. It was the relation through which each 
person could freely affirm his being, his identity. Rougemont’s opposition to romantic love 
could be called pragmatic; it was primarily personalist, for the objective was to take the 
persons as they are. In contrast with the tendency to make love divine in much of European 
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!  See the self-presentation of personalists as ‘non-conformistes des années trente’, in Loubet del Bayle, Les 1356
non-conformistes des années trente.
!  Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 240-1. See also Rougemont, L'Amour et l'Occident, 308.1357
!  Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 243.1358
!  Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 243.1359
!  Rougemont developped this opposition by playing on the etymology of passion (suffering and passivity), see 1360
Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)'.
literature since the Middle Ages, Rougemont’s pragmatic and personalist approach assured the 
success of L’Amour et l’Occident.    1361
!
The polemic in Esprit!
!
Within personalists circles, however, Rougemont’s essay was fiercely challenged. The 
publication of a review of L’Amour et l’Occident, in Esprit in April 1939, initiated an 
‘amicale mais violente polémique’ between Denis de Rougemont and Henri-Irénée Marrou, a 
medievalist and a personalist.   Since 1934, whilst writing his doctorate on Augustine, Henri 1362
Marrou contributed to Esprit under the pseudonym of Henri Davenson, which was derived 
from his Occitan ancestry.   Rougemont answered Marrou’s review in writing, and Marrou 1363
replied in a letter of 24 April 1939.   Both letters, slightly modified, were published in 1364
Esprit the following September.   Thus, Esprit began the ‘phoney war’ with a debate about 1365
love and European history.   (To some extent, this polemic continued during the war,   and 1366 1367
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in Fascist Italy between 1932 and 1937. Riché, Henri Irénée Marrou, historien engagé, 18, 50-6. 
!  See Henri Marrou to Rougemont, 24 April 1939, Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, 1364
Rougemont Papers, ‘Correspondance’. 
!  Henri Davenson, 'Autour de "L'Amour et l'Occident"', Esprit, 84 (Sept. 1939), 765-8; Denis de Rougemont, 1365
'Autour de "L'Amour et l'Occident"', Esprit, 84 (Sept. 1939), 760-5.
!  Winock, "Esprit". Des intellectuels dans la cité, 1930-1950, 158-9.1366
!  In 1945, Henri-Irénée Marrou continued the debate on mystical love in Esprit, discussing the various books 1367
that had been published on the question during the war, see Henri Irénée Marrou, 'Histoires d'amour', Esprit, 113 
(Dec. 1945), 899-916.
until the mid-1950s, the debate on mysticism was still vibrant among third-way movements in 
France.)   1368
!
It is essential to look at the polemic on L’Amour et l’Occident in Esprit in 1939 
because it shows that, at the time, personalists did not fail to take L’Amour et l’Occident for 
what it was: a personalist and Protestant book (ab)using European history to compose a 
defence of personal freedom. The polemic began with the question of historical method, but 
this was only the prelude. 
!
Historical method and psychography 
!
Marrou started his review of L’Amour et l’Occident by emphasising that Rougemont 
was a personalist, like him, yet he specified: ‘son personnalisme reste bien à lui, 
essentiellement chrétien d’abord, puis protestant, d’un certain protestantisme enfin qu’il 
faudrait situer dans une certaine zone d’influence barthienne, mais cela commence à échapper 
à mon ressort.’   Unsurprisingly, since Marrou was the most promising historian on the 1369
editorial board of Esprit, his objections to L’Amour et l’Occident were of a historical nature. I 
shall not belabour Rougemont’s mistakes and approximations, especially since his sources 
have become outdated by seventy years of historiography.   The question of method is still 1370
relevant, in so far as it brings to light the limitations inherent in Rougemont’s work. 
!
Historical method was a burning issue in the France of the late 1930s. French 
academia was hit by the crisis of historicism with nearly twenty years delay compared to 
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!  Rougemont based his historical developments on two main books, outdated today, Johan Huizinga, Le 1370
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German philosophy. In 1938, Raymond Aron published his thesis, Introduction à la 
philosophie de l’histoire, essai sur les limites de l’objectivité historique, questioning positivist 
truth in history.   There is a direct connection between Marrou’s assessment of L’Amour et 1371
l’Occident and the crisis of historicism in France: in the same issue of Esprit where he 
reviewed L’Amour et l’Occident, Marrou discussed Aron’s thesis.   He reflected upon the 1372
limitations of historical knowledge: since history is based on people’s testimonies, it depends 
on trust and belief, and this is why historiography is but a series of questionings and 
demolitions.   And yet Marrou was adamant that historical knowledge is still valid, despite 1373
the subjectivity essential to the historian’s work.   The problem with L’Amour et l’Occident 1374
was simple: ‘Votre livre est un livre d’histoire et vous n’êtes pas un historien.’    1375
!
Responding to Marrou’s attacks on his methodology, or lack thereof, Rougemont made 
clear his contempt for history as an academic discipline:  
Vous parlez de l’histoire comme quelqu’un qui y croit encore, et qui escompte que le 
lecteur y croit. Or moi je n’y crois pas du tout. Je ne crois pas aux « faits objectifs » 
dont l’historien prétend communément partir. Je crois qu’il y a un matériel hétéroclite 
de textes, de dates, de noms de personnes et de lieux, de chiffres, de relations de gestes 
et de paroles, matériel avec l’aide duquel l’historien compose des faits, comme le 
poète une poésie.    1376!
Since the historian was playing with the past as the poet with rhymes and metre, 
history was just a piece of creative writing within certain rhetorical constraints.   The 1377
dangers of considering history as a piece of literary composition are obvious. Marrou warned 
against them in a private letter to Rougemont, published with nuances in Esprit in September 
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1939.   The historian may not work directly on facts, as Rougemont pointed out, but 1378
documents remain, and one cannot neglect evidence when it is available.   And again, the 1379
problem with L’Amour et l’Occident was that the documents available made Rougemont’s 
historical arguments ‘infiniment improbables’.    1380
!
Rougemont dismissed this critique with an assurance that will need to be further 
explained below. His own historical approach was not so much the result of ignorance, but 
primarily the conviction that history was a creative composition. With reference to his 
bibliography, listing nearly 200 references in French, German and English,   it is possible to 1381
say that Rougemont read enormously to prepare L’Amour et l’Occident, contrary to what he 
asserted in his preface of 1939.   He rejected academic historical research on purpose. 1382
!
Marrou and Rougemont agreed that history was to help us understand our personal 
existence here and now. Both Rougemont and Marrou declared that they began writing history 
from a personalist point of view or bias.   And yet, for all their common personalist interest, 1383
they could not disagree more on historical research. For Marrou, history was motivated by the 
!  293
!  Henri Marrou to Rougemont, 24 April 1939, Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, Rougemont 1378
Papers, ‘Correspondance’. 
!  ‘Des documents, ou il y en a ou il n’y en a pas (assez) ; dans le second cas, l’historien n’a qu’à se taire, et à 1379
passer la main, – au poète. Mais alors que celui-ci précise qu’il ne fait que rêver sur un passé possible, et ne 
prétend à rien de plus. S’il y a des documents, leur élaboration scientifique (relative encore sans doute à pas mal 
de postulats, mais qu’on peut expliciter chemin faisant) permet d’endiguer l’imagination, de situer par avance les 
solutions possibles. Je ne prétends pas qu’elle arrive à la certitude, mais du moins, à la limite, à des jugements 
infiniment probables.’, in Henri Marrou to Rougemont, 24 April 1939, Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et 
Universitaire, Rougemont Papers, ‘Correspondance’. The letter in Esprit repeats the same argument, with minor 
nuances, see Davenson, 'Autour de "L'Amour et l'Occident"', 766-7.
!  Henri Marrou to Rougemont, 24 April 1939, Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, Rougemont 1380
Papers, ‘Correspondance’.
!  Rougemont, L'Amour et l'Occident, 343-51. One can also refer to the manuscript eight pages of bibliography, 1381
in a small handwriting and with most references crossed, in Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, 
Rougemont Papers, ‘[Oeuvres:] L’Amour et l’Occident’.
!  It may be interesting to note a change in the manuscript of L’Amour et l’Occident. At the end of his 1382
foreword, Rougemont declared: ‘J’ai vécu ce livre pendant les dix années de mon adolescence et de ma jeunesse. 
Je l’ai conçu sous forme d’œuvre écrite et nourri de lectures multiples pendant deux ans. Enfin je l’ai écrit en 
deux [‘quatre’] mois.’ In the final version, Rougemont wrote ‘quelques lectures’ instead of ‘lectures multiples’, 
see Ms., Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, Rougemont Papers, ‘[Oeuvres:] L’Amour et 
l’Occident’, folder 4 (provisional classification).
!  Marrou congratulated Aron for having ‘si nettement dégagé le personnalisme fondamental de la 1383
connaissance historique’ and praised Aron’s ‘théorie existentielle de l’histoire […] reposant sur une philosophie 
de l’engagement et de la vocation’, which constituted a ‘perspective strictement personnaliste’. See Davenson, 
'Tristesse de l'historien', 21, 41.
desire to enrich our image of humanity,   and he criticized Rougemont for doing just the 1384
contrary, for simplifying hastily and unfairly. With his ambition to draw a great historical 
fresco and motivate personal commitment hic et nunc, Rougemont overlooked the actual 
people involved. Marrou remarked: ‘A chaque tournant vous vous heurtez à des noms qui sont 
des personnes, pourtant. Mais vous n’avez pas le temps, et d’un diagnostic sommaire, vous les 
étendez raides en vos casiers.’   Marrou suggested forcefully that the historian’s role was 1385
less to judge than to recover, as far as possible, a sense of ‘l’incertitude fondamentale, si 
vivement ressentie par l’homme d’action’.   He was more consistent than Rougemont as a 1386
personalist historian. 
!
Beyond the question of method, Marrou regretted the lack of psychological insight in 
Rougemont’s interpretation of life histories: ‘Au fond, ce qui nous oppose, c’est bien notre 
psychographie.’   Rougemont’s historical depiction lacked psychological depth. It was a 1387
pseudo-history of ideas overlooking the individuals who upheld these ideas, the circumstances 
in which they lived, and their actual feelings. ‘L’amour est-il une hérésie ? demande la bande 
de votre livre. Et vous répondez tranquillement : l’amour (courtois) est une hérésie 
manichéenne. Cela ne vous fais rien, à vous ; ces soupirs, cette éloquence passionnée, cette 
beauté intérieure, vous l’affectez du signe moins et vous passez outre.’   Rougemont judged 1388
that courtly love was a heresy, and condemned all the literature and feelings related to it as 
negative, harmful, altogether evil. The history of L’Amour et l’Occident was written in black 
and white. 
!
For all the contention between Marrou and Rougemont, history as such was a minor 
aspect of their polemic. They both admitted that their fundamental disagreement lay 
elsewhere.   Following criticism of various historians in France, notably Marrou in Esprit, 1389
Rougemont warned the English reader in the preface to the English edition of 1940: ‘It has 
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been asserted and repeated that the core of my book is the claim that the poetry of the 
troubadours is connected with the Albigensian heresy. Possibly this theory is the feature that 
will most forcibly strike any one who reads me hastily. But the real meaning of what I have to 
say lies elsewhere.’   He provided English readers with an introduction that he had not 1390
given in French: ‘Let me say that my real subject is religious, not historical. It is concerned 
with the opposition between the passion that is expressed in Tristan and the Christian notion 
of love.’   Rougemont presented the myth of Tristan and Iseult as a dangerous force with 1391
mystical origins, and aimed at expounding the concealed content of the myth, in order to 
break its charm. He interpreted history as one interprets literary myths. 
!
Dialectical theology and history 
!
Rougemont presented himself as an ‘interprète et théologien de l’histoire’.   Had 1392
L’Amour et l’Occident had a genre, Rougemont would have wanted it to be ‘un livre de 
théologie morale’.   Moral theology did not refer to Kant (whom Rougemont disliked), but 1393
to the aims of L’Amour et l’Occident. Although this essay is virtually never presented as a 
book of moral theology, it is clear upon closer examination that this was the intention of the 
author. 
!
When Rougemont situated the origins of passion-love in twelfth-century Provence, he 
oversimplified a complex history, with a view to illustrating moral decisions in the present 
day: ‘l’histoire n’a pour moi d’autre sens que d’illustrer certaines décisions actuelles.’   He 1394
must have been aware of the ‘obvious danger in attributing the origins of romantic love to a 
particular state of mind prevailing at a particular moment in time’, as a reviewer put it in the 
Times Literary Supplement in 1940.   Yet he tried to excuse his overemphasis on a particular 1395
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moment by referring to his Protestant theological background: ‘Ma formation théologique 
protestante m’incite à rechercher, en chaque domaine, non point le général comme les 
classiques, ou l’Idée comme certains romantiques, mais bien plutôt le moment décisif.’  1396
There are good reasons to think that Rougemont was referring to the Kierkegaardian concept 
of ‘decisive moment’. It was in view of the ‘decisive moment’ that Rougemont oversimplified 
history in L’Amour et l’Occident (as in his later works on European cultural history).   1397
!
It may be worth explaining the concept of ‘decisive moment’, to understand how 
Rougemont could dismiss historical criticisms by referring to his theological background. 
This concept was drawn from the Philosophical fragments, which Rougemont had contributed 
to getting translated into French in 1937.   The Philosophical fragments, written under the 1398
pseudonym of Johannes Climacus, addresses the Socratic question: ‘Can the truth be 
learned?’ The concept of ‘decisive moment’ is coined as a tool to go ‘beyond Socrates’.  1399
The Philosophical fragments combined a critique of the metaphysical tradition inherited from 
the Greeks with a desire to return to the Bible. 
!
The ‘decisive moment’ is the moment when the learner, who is initially defined as 
being ‘outside the truth’, learns the truth.   Kierkegaard, under the pseudonym of Climacus, 1400
concludes that one goes beyond the Platonic-Socratic mode in positing what the hypothesis 
requires: a ‘new organ’, which is ‘faith; and a new presupposition: the consciousness of sin; 
and a new decision: the moment; and a new teacher: the god in time.’   Thus, Philosophical 1401
fragments, from the religious point of view which interested Rougemont, may be summarized 
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in the following proposition: if humans are sinners, then they must be born again at a 
‘decisive moment’ and be given the truth by God himself.  
!
The concept of ‘decisive moment’ – understood rightly or wrongly– was used by 
Rougemont to make the question of truth (including historical truth) rely on an ‘existential’ 
decision.   Therefore, all the objections of professional historians could not make him 1402
change the decision he took in writing L’Amour et l’Occident the way he did. Rougemont 
drew his contempt for academic history from a certain understanding of theology. As we have 
seen, Rougemont was close to dialectical theologians. Like them, he was appalled by the fact 
that nineteenth-century theology began seeking to understand the historical context in which 
Jesus lived and ended up making him a historical figure. Barth reacted against this by 
attempting to return to the Word of God only.   Barth acknowledged his indebtedness to 1403
Kierkegaard, who emphasised the infinite qualitative difference between time and eternity.  1404
History could not teach about God and was impotent in matters of faith.  
!
A paradox remained, as Henry Corbin (one of Rougemont’s closest friends as noted 
already) explained in a seminal article in 1933-4.   Dialectical theology uncovered the 1405
following question: how is it that God, whose transcendence is forever outside history, reveals 
Himself as a concrete relation to concrete human beings?   Corbin assessed the meaning of 1406
history according to the premises of dialectical theology and to Heidegger’s early works, both 
of which originated in Kierkegaard (Corbin admittedly drew on Kierkegaard more than on 
Barth).   This article was decisive in making dialectical theology known in philosophical 1407
and academic circles in France.  
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Having read Corbin,   Marrou was horrified by ‘la trahison plus grave encore de la 1408
pensée barthienne [avec] sa méta-histoire qui, pour retrouver Dieu, perd l’homme en 
chemin’.   The infinite qualitative difference between time and eternity, emphasised by 1409
Kierkegaard and Barth, obviously implied the infinite qualitative difference between the 
creature and the Creator. Thus many in Europe at the time (mis)understood Barth’s 
theological enterprise as positing some abstract and distant Deity.    1410
!
In his ‘Tristesse de l’historien’, Marrou showed deep concern for the historical 
implications of ‘la « théologie dialectique »  – cette pensée si totalement hétérogène à 
l’histoire : pour elle il y a la Parole de Dieu, éternelle, donc toujours présente ; au moment où 
l’âme l’entend, réalise sa dépendance à son égard, elle s’arrête et bondit hors du temps 
empirique, désormais contemporaine, simultanée, gleichzeitig du Christ éternel. Il n’y a plus 
d’Histoire, mais seulement à chaque époque des âmes solitaires qui monologuent avec 
Dieu…’   Marrou rejected dialectical theology not only as a historian, challenged in his 1411
profession; but also, and primarily, because he could not see the human being as a solitary 
soul. He suspected (with reason) that the historical approximations in L’Amour et l’Occident 
had been influenced by the meta-historical approach to dialectical theology. 
!
It is worth noting, however, that the conclusions of L’Amour et l’Occident were 
Rougemont’s, and not by any means those of Barth or Corbin. After reading L’Amour et 
l’Occident, Corbin wrote to Rougemont: ‘Je me réjouis du malheur des « histôriens », et ce ne 
sont pas tes démonstrations historiques qui à leur tour me gênent. Seulement, c’est très net. Je 
suis alors un Cathare, un manichéen etc… Quant à Tristan, mon vieux, non ! Je n’ai jamais 
douté de lui, et quant à en rapprocher tous vos agités, nerveux et faux passionnés, non 
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plus !’   I shall come back to Corbin in the second section of this chapter. Suffice it to say 1412
here that Corbin disagreed with Rougemont’s interpretation of passionate love and of Cathar 
and Manichaen faiths. 
!
In an unpublished note of April 1939, Rougemont remarked that he was faced two 
main charges concerning L’Amour et l’Occident: ‘1. de soutenir une thèse historique 
insuffisamment démontrée; 2. d’être dogmatique.’   Both criticisms were justified. 1413
Rougemont dismissed them, and planned to write a book on the Reformation and Revolution, 
in which he thought to demystify history as an academic discipline: ‘je me propose de monter 
incidemment la vanité totale des thèses historiques dites sérieuses (toutes contradictoires) ; et 
la cause générale de cette vanité : c’est qu’elles passent à côté du dogme fondamental (pour le 
phén[omène] qu’elles prétendent étudier) et malgré toute leur science, s’égarent dans la 
science.’   There is a nearly completed draft of this book in Rougemont’s archives.   To be 1414 1415
dogmatic, for Rougemont, was a compliment. 
!
Christian dogmas and anthropology 
!
There was only one point in L’Amour et l’Occident which Rougemont was ready to 
discuss: ‘mes conclusions religieuses et morales, ma décision, non telle ou telle hypothèse 
« historique » que je suis tout prêt à réviser s’il y a lieu. Voilà le point. Voilà le terrain de ma 
défense et aussi de ma contre-attaque.’   Rougemont defended L’Amour et l’Occident 1416
according to certain moral and religious beliefs, or as he put it openly ‘une certaine 
compréhension des dogmes essentiels du christianisme’.   His understanding of Christian 1417
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dogmas has never been examined, for it has always been assumed that Rougemont was a 
Calvinist and a Barthian. A closer look reveals a more complex picture than previously 
thought, and explains the particularity of Rougemont’s personalism. 
!
In keeping with standard Protestant views at the time, Rougemont held a pessimistic 
understanding of human nature since the Fall of Adam. He explained to Marrou: ‘Je considère 
que le chrétien, c’est un homme qui choisit sans retour, et qui décide de renoncer, comme 
malgré lui, à ce qu’il y a de corrompu, de « trop humain », de sous-humain dirai-je plutôt, 
dans tout ce que l’on appelle l’Humain, et qui ne l’est plus depuis la Chute d’Adam.’  1418
Rougemont emphasised sinfulness, the incapacity of humans to gain truth on their own, and 
the necessity of historical revelation as the foundation of faith.   His pessimism was 1419
alleviated by the Christian belief in Salvation and miracles; and yet, for the time being, 
Rougemont stressed that ‘nous sommes dans le monde concret de la chute’.   In this fallen 1420
world, there could be nothing good in the creature, save in Christ and by grace (the free gift of 
God).   Rougemont spelled out the central thesis of L’Amour et l’Occident thus: the only 1421
love that is good for a Christian is a free gift from God. 
Le seul amour qui tende vers Dieu et qui l’atteigne à travers la vraie créature, c’est 
l’amour qui est venu de Dieu, rendu aux hommes par le Christ, cette Agape qui seule 
sauvera l’Eros et qui, loin de le sublimer, lui redonnera sa juste place dans l’humain. 
Ma thèse centrale présentée de la sorte – n’est-ce pas assez clair dans mon livre ? – me 
direz-vous encore que vous êtes « plutôt contre » ?   1422!
The distinction opposition between Eros and Agape was made à la mode by a book by 
the Lutheran theologian Anders Nygren.   We shall come back to this in section 2.  1423
!
Rougemont’s conclusion was simple: there is no point seeking sublime revelations and 
exalting oneself (as passionate lovers and mystics tend to do) because ‘cette exaltation ne tend 
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pas vers le vrai Dieu, ni vers la créature telle qu’elle est, mais vers le moi rêvé de celui qui 
s’exalte. C’est une espèce de narcissisme.’   This sort of narcissism was the opposite of 1424
personalism, which was (ideally) open to others and loving other persons as they were. 
!
It is clear by now that behind the polemic on history between Marrou and Rougemont 
lay a contrast in anthropology and theology. In his article on ‘La théologie dialectique et 
l’histoire’, Henry Corbin had put the contrast starkly – although not without prejudice: ‘Chez 
Luther et chez Kierkegaard éclate le conflit latent imposé au christianisme par l’introduction 
de l’anthropologie naturaliste grecque dans l’anthropologie biblique ou judéo-chrétienne, et 
qui fut portée jusqu’à l’intenable synthèse de la scolastique.’   Like Corbin in 1933-4, and 1425
following Kierkegaard, Rougemont supported a dehellenized Christianity. He wrote to 
Marrou: ‘Voilà toute notre opposition : catholique et platonisant, vous insistez sur la nécessité 
d’englober toute réalité dans une synthèse transcendante, de tout sauver. Protestant, j’insiste 
d’abord sur la nécessité de distinguer l’élément décisif, ce qui sauve.’    1426
!
Marrou made a sensible response to Rougemont: the important point for the 
personalist debate was not, absurdly, that Marrou is Catholic, and Rougemont Protestant. As 
Marrou wrote: ‘l’option, hairesis, qui nous sépare vient de plus loin que l’opposition de nos 
origines catholique et protestante ; nous appartenons à des familles spirituelles irréductibles 
l’une à l’autre et, je le crois, également essentielles au christianisme.’   Their opposition 1427
resulted from a difference in anthropology and in spirituality, a difference in their 
understanding of the human person. 
!
Thus, when Rougemont attacked Marrou for wanting to take unto himself all of 
humanity – this aim was ‘solidarité dans le Péché’ to Rougemont   – he was the inheritor of 1428
a certain religious tradition, which emphasised the dark side of human nature.   Marrou 1429
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belonged to another tradition; ‘ainsi je me nourris pour l’instant de Grégoire de Nysse, De 
hominis opificio : l’homme, dit-il, a été créé à la fois de la Terre et de Dieu, et pour jouir de 
Dieu, par sa substance divine, et pour jouir des créatures, par sa substance terrestre.’  1430
Marrou raised the question of participation in the divine life carefully.   His was an 1431
optimistic view – ‘l’optimisme que je reçois des Pères Grecs, et spécialement des Pères du 
Désert’ – implying a positive appraisal of the relation between the person and God.    1432
!
In sum, the disagreement between Rougemont and Marrou illustrates a difference 
between two types of personalism, according to two diverging worldviews and spiritual 
traditions. On the one hand, a certain pessimism and emphasis on sinfulness led to a warning 
against the dangers of seeking mystical union between the human person and the All 
Other.   Rougemont best illustrated this tradition. His pessimistic view of the human person 1433
was alleviated by the constant call for action ‘by virtue of the absurd’. Hence his motto of 
‘pessimisme actif’.   On the other hand, an optimistic view of human nature, despite the 1434
Fall, maintains the possibility of deification of the human person through grace. The 
personalists who followed this optimistic view, like Marrou, emphasised that the person was 
created in the image of God, in order to become like Him. Such bold aims did not ignore the 
tragic situation of the world, and this tension has been called ‘optimisme tragique’.   Thus, 1435
personalism accommodated diverging spiritual traditions, and allowed all nuances in 
approach from ‘pessimisme actif’ to ‘optimisme tragique’. 
!
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Henry Corbin, ‘Philosophes’, Ibid., 20.
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85-92).
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!
2. The Eurocentrism of L’Occident!
!
The personalism of Marrou reclaimed continuity with both Eastern and Western 
Christian love traditions.   Rougemont, by contrast, appropriated the West only. For him, 1436
personalism was to be the answer to a particular political, social, and spiritual situation in 
Western Europe. As he started to write L’Amour et l’Occident, in January 1938, Rougemont 
asserted: ‘Le mouvement personnaliste ne n’est constitué comme tel, et n’a pris ce nom, que 
parce que dans l’Europe actuelle se déchaînent des puissances de mort, spirituelles et 
matérielles, radicalement contraires au génie de l’Occident.’   L’Amour et l’Occident set out 1437
on the task to analyse the mechanism of this Western genius, as I proceed to show in this 
section. 
!
Eurocentrism was inherent in Rougemont’s personalism. Rougemont assumed that 
Western Europe was characterised by a unique appraisal of the human person, in respect of 
diversity, creativity, and personal freedom, both in the private and the public sphere. 
Obviously, ‘l’Occident’ was not a geographical notion, but an ‘attitude’, which Rougemont 
defended – ‘mon Occident’, as he put it honestly. And this attitude was said to be pluralist: 
‘elle suppose l’acceptation du différent, et donc de l’incomplet, la prise sur le concret dans ses 
limitations.’   But paradoxically, to defend the concrete and the diverse, Rougemont 1438
undertook to divide the world into two categories, which he defined in religious terms. Before 
the examining Rougemont’s ‘paradoxes de l’Occident’, it is necessary to look at the 
contradictions inherent in his definition of the ‘Orient’. 
!
Contradictions of the ‘Orient’!
!
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L’Amour et l’Occident sought to defend diversity, in personal as in political relations, 
against the reduction to uniformity, undertaken in totalitarian regimes especially. It is ironic 
that, in order to defend the diverse, Rougemont imagined a single category, which he called 
the ‘Orient’, defined as ‘la négation du divers’.   The ‘Orient’ was not a geographical term; 1439
it was ‘une tendance de l’esprit humain’, which aspired to ‘l’absorption de tous en Un’, and 
aimed at ‘la fusion totale avec le dieu, ou s’il n’y a pas de dieu, comme dans le bouddhisme, 
avec l’Etre-Un universel’.   One cannot complete a study of L’Amour et l’Occident without 1440
mentioning the inextricable contradictions that Rougemont’s conception of the ‘Orient’ 
entailed.  
!
To keep the debate within reasonable limits, I shall focus on two aspects overlooked in 
the historiography. On the one hand, it is little known that Rougemont drew on a Protestant 
school of comparative religious studies, which was unusually comprehensive and innovative 
for the time. On the other hand, Rougemont’s religious description of the ‘Orient’ remained 
untenable even in terms of the information available the 1930s, as reference to the classical 
and patristic Greek traditions shows. 
!
Comparative religious studies 
!
That Rougemont wrote an entire book to warn against the possible dangers of 
mysticism and of passionate love should be enough to revise the common representation of 
Rougemont as a disciple of Karl Barth. In the Kirchliche Dogmatik, Barth made clear that the 
only basis for theologising was faith in the scriptural revelation. Typically, a strict Barthian 
would focus exclusively on the Bible. Rougemont, by contrast, was interested in all kinds of 
literature. He drew on Barth’s dialectical theology when it suited him. Bernard Reymond once 
remarked that Rougemont took personalism too seriously, and dialectic too lightly, to be a 
faithful Barthian.   This is especially true of the late 1930s. Rougemont had become 1441
increasingly critical of dialectical theology. From the mid-1930s onwards, he rejected Barth’s 
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view that Revelation was impossible in other religions.   The bibliography of L’Amour et 1442
l’Occident reveals an eclectic attention to many forms of spirituality around the world. In 
particular, Rougemont referred to Henry Corbin and Rudolf Otto for an innovative 
perspective on world spiritual traditions.  
!
Henry Corbin (who had split with Barth before Rougemont) brought his friend to 
reflect upon Manichaeism and Islam. Corbin had been working on the question of mystical 
love since 1932, with particular interest in Islam and the school of ishraq or Illumination, 
founded by Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi.   The influence of Heidegger, whom he translated 1443
into French, was patent in Corbin’s introduction to a new translation of Manichean hymns, 
which Rougemont used in L’Amour et l’Occident. Corbin saw Manichaeism as a ‘dialogue du 
Moi à lui-même, c’est-à-dire du Noûs à l’âme, elle-même captive des Ténèbres : de l’angoisse 
et de la mort’.   To Corbin, this dialogue, expressed in hymns and psalms, constituted the 1444
effective ‘vérité’ of Manichaeism. To Rougemont, there could be no truth in Manichaean 
heresy. Thus, Corbin and Rougemont disagreed fundamentally on ‘l’orthodoxie chrétienne’, 
despite being the closest of friends.  
!
For Rougemont, in the 1930s at least, the ultimate criterion was Christian orthodoxy 
(as he understood it). For Corbin, by contrast, there was no question of orthodoxy or heresy, 
but simply the question of human existence before God. While Corbin was interested in 
Manichaeism from an existential point of view, Rougemont remained primarily concerned 
with Christian dogma. Roger Jézéquel (another friend of Rougemont and Corbin, who had 
been ordained since the years of Hic et Nunc) praised L’Amour et l’Occident in the following 
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terms, in January 1939: ‘Cette fois tu t’es effacé devant le dogme, et l’Evangile est vraiment à 
l’origine comme à la fin de ton entreprise.’   The difference between Rougemont and 1445
Corbin explains Rougemont’s presentation of Corbin as a heretic, in an ‘homage’ paid to his 
friend in 1981.   1446
!
In L’Amour et l’Occident, Rougemont drew less on Barth and Corbin than on Rudolf 
Otto, another influential Protestant theologian, and the founder of comparative religious 
studies.   Rougemont cites passages from Otto’s main work, West-östliche Mystik, which 1447
contrasted the Plotinian Eros with the Agape of Meister Eckhart.   Following Otto, 1448
Rougemont opposed the East to the West in terms of their attitude to mysticism. Then, he 
linked the East with the Cathar faith and the West with Christian love: ‘L’Orient (c’est-à-dire 
Sankara, Platon, Plotin) et l’Occident (ici figuré par Eckhart) s’opposeraient dans les termes 
mêmes par lesquels nous avons tenté de distinguer la mystique des Cathares et la doctrine 
chrétienne de l’amour.’   These strange associations of ideas were characteristic of 1449
Rougemont’s method. He was aware of an important contradiction: Eckhart (presented by 
Rougemont as the symbol of the West) was condemned as a heretic in the Christian West. For 
Rougemont, this was only an apparent contradiction, considering the ambivalence of mystical 
union.   Eckhart could be interpreted either way: ‘Si l’âme peut s’unir essentiellement à 1450
Dieu, l’amour de l’âme pour Dieu est un amour heureux. […] A l’inverse, si l’âme ne peut 
s’unir essentiellement à Dieu, comme le soutient l’orthodoxie chrétienne, il en résulte que 
l’amour de l’âme pour Dieu est, dans ce sens précis, un amour réciproque malheureux.’  1451
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Thus, Rougemont reached a rather laboured conclusion after a series of oversweeping 
arguments. He seems to suggest that the (Kierkegaardian) emphasis on the infinite qualitative 
difference between the human person and God made mystical love reciprocally unhappy.  
!
An interpretation of classical and patristic Greek traditions 
!
In 1939, the inextricable contradictions in which Rougemont was caught were put 
clearly by Myrrha Lot-Borodine. She wrote three letters to Rougemont (in the vain hope he 
would publish her criticism in Les Nouveaux Cahiers, which he edited)   and a review of 1452
L’Amour et l’Occident in a specialist journal.   A pupil of Etienne Gilson, like Marrou, Lot-1453
Borodine was a Russian Orthodox. She assessed L’Amour et l’Occident in the light of her 
interpretation of the classical and patristic Greek traditions. I have chosen to quote Lot-
Borodine at length in order to evaluate Rougemont’s Eurocentric worldview without 
anachronistic judgement. Lot-Borodine shows how restrictive Rougemont’s views of love and 
the Western world were, even in the 1930s and within a Christian tradition. 
!
Lot-Borodine started her private correspondence with Rougemont with a 
methodological point: ‘Une synthèse n’est pas identique au syncrétisme’...   Then came the 1454
more substantial remarks. What Rougemont called the ‘Orient’ was an imagined category – he 
admitted so – and a caricature of the Ancient Greek ‘Eros’.   ‘Sans parler de l’impossibilité 1455
d’insérer dans le lit de Procuste d’un dogme sentimental tout l’Orient (et la Chine, et le Japon 
et surtout l’Egypte ?), comment ne voyez-vous pas que dans votre Orient, – celui de l’Eros 
qui en fait n’a jamais dominé que l’âme grecque – l’union totale est impossible étant donné la 
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douloureuse insatisfaction qui serait l’essence même de cette Weltanschauung ?’   Whereas 1456
Rougemont rejected the Greek inheritance and its appropriation by Christianity, Myrrha Lot-
Borodine praised the Greek patristic tradition and mystical theology.  
!
She explained how, following Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, the nuptial song 
(epithalamium) could be a symbol for ‘union mystère. Car la transcendance de Dieu, 
particulièrement forte précisément chez les PP. Grecs, héritiers du néo-platonisme, n’exclut 
pas son immanence chez aucun spirituel, occidental ou oriental. – C’est là le mystère de la 
« coincidentia oppositorum ».’   How the absolute transcendence of God could, at the same 1457
time, allow the immanence of the divine in the human person, was to remain a mystery.   1458
!
Myrrha Lot-Borodine went on to define mysticism – whether ancient, medieval, or 
modern – as the belief that the Creator gave the purpose of deification to the intelligent 
creature.   She admitted the Christian appropriation of Plato, and explained the goal of 1459
deification on the basis of the biblical concept of ‘image and likeness’.   Rougemont knew 1460
this all too well. His opposition between Christianity and Hellenism, developed in L’Amour et 
l’Occident, was not the result of ignorance. Lot-Borodine continued: ‘L’antinomie Eros - 
Agapè (empruntée à Nygren, cité seulement d[an]s la Bibliographie), d’origine protestante, est 
un contre-sens historique que les textes patristiques ne justifient pas. De même en ce qui 
concerne l’antithèse Lumière-ténèbre qui a un sens parfaitement orthodoxe ainsi que le 
prouve l’expérience des spirituels de tous les âges.’   It is possible to imagine how 1461
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insignificant the arguments of historical misconception of patristic texts and of spiritual 
experience must have seemed to Rougemont.  
!
Following Rougemont’s answer – ironically showing his ‘parfaite courtoisie (oserais-
je employer dans le bon sens ce mot honni ?)’ – Lot-Borodine recognised that their 
disagreement was irreducible, and she attempted to bring the debate to a technical issue: 
Nous sommes aux deux pôles dans toutes nos conceptions sur le Moyen Age, la 
théologie orthodoxe ou hétérodoxe, sur l’amour sacré et profane… Je vous crois dans 
l’erreur du point de vue historique, toute métaphysique à part […]. Par exemple, là où 
vous voyez les choses à travers le prisme néo-calviniste de Karl Barth (hétéronomie 
absolue du Créateur et de la créature), je reste fidèle à la tradition patristique et à la 
double expérience des spiritualités latine et grecque. Méthode plus adaptée à l’objet de 
nos recherches avant la Réforme.   1462!
Lot-Borodine continued making several historical points,   all of which she 1463
developed in a book review for the specialist journal Humanisme et Renaissance.  1464
Subsequent historiography has made the controversy somewhat redundant, but her review 
nevertheless conveys a sense of the complexity of the debate on ancient and medieval 
mystics, which Rougemont simply dismissed as heretical.   1465
!
‘Les paradoxes de l’Occident’!
!
L’Amour et l’Occident was deliberately polemical and paradoxical. Significantly, one 
of the sections, first published in Esprit in November 1938,   was entitled ‘Les paradoxes de 1466
l’Occident’.   This section said ‘exactement l’essentiel’ in the view of Rougemont’s 1467
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personalist publisher, Daniel-Rops.   The opposition between East (‘Orient’) and West 1468
(‘Occident’), which directed the argumentation, was ambivalent – partly religious, partly 
political. I suggest that the interplay between religious and political motives underpins the 
paradoxes of L’Amour et l’Occident, as well as, more generally, personalism. The politics of 




Rougemont’s paradoxes of ‘l’Occident’ fitted into an existing debate on the decadence 
of Western Europe in the interwar period, on the one hand, and expressed the ‘neither right 
nor left’ principle of personalist politics, on the other hand.  
!
It may be useful to recall the fact that ‘l’Occident’ was the object of much polemic in 
interwar France. ‘Europe’, by contrast, was a more geographical, if vague, concept. From the 
early 1920s, ‘la défense de l’Occident’ became a crucial political issue within the French 
literary field, following prophecies of decadence in European literature by writers such as 
Spengler, Keyserling, and Hermann Hesse.   In France, it was chiefly the 1469
‘neopacifist’ (right-wing) writers who claimed to embody ‘la défense de l’Occident’. In 
reaction, left-wing intellectuals created an Association Internationale des Écrivains pour la 
Défense de la Culture in 1935. The opposition between the right-wing ‘défense de l’Occident’ 
and the left-wing ‘défense de la Culture’ has been used by way of mapping out writers in the 
literary field, although it is clear that the reality was a lot more complex than such a schema 
allows.   For instance, from 1936, anti-fascist intellectuals claimed to be the authentic 1470
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defenders of ‘l’Occident’ through ‘Culture’.   It is important to remember that the debate on 1471
‘l’Occident’ and ‘Culture’ was often contradictory: this was the background of Rougemont’s 
statements on ‘les paradoxes de l’Occident’.   His position vis-à-vis ‘l’Occident’ was all the 1472
more complicated as he wanted to be ‘neither right nor left’: he was, as we have seen, both 
anti-fascist and anti-communist. 
!
One of the paradoxes of ‘l’Occident’, according to Rougemont, was that an oriental 
anti-Christian force had brought Western Europe on the verge of war. This awkward argument 
was contrary to the popular thesis in the 1930s that nationalism and technical warfare (which 
led to the First World War and – it was increasingly clear – prepared for a Second) were 
Western European inventions, and therefore consequences of a Christian culture.  
!
Rougemont devoted a whole chapter to linking the exaltation of warfare with Western 
European culture (especially courtly love).   He maintained, however, that the Western 1473
passion for war was not Christian, and in fact did not come from Western Europe originally: 
‘ce n’est pas le christianisme qui a fait naître la passion, mais c’est une hérésie d’origine 
orientale’.   Western Europe was split between two competing ideologies: 1474
Il se peut que l’Occident succombe à ce destin qu’il s’est forgé. Mais il est clair que ce 
n’est pas le christianisme – comme le répètent tant de publicistes – qui est responsable 
de la catastrophe. L’esprit catastrophique de l’Occident n’est pas chrétien. Il est tout au 
contraire manichéen. C’est ce qu’ignorent communément ceux qui assimilent le 
christianisme et l’Occident, comme si tout l’Occident était chrétien. Si donc l’Europe 
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linking passion-love with European warfare remained ‘plutôt fantasque’. See Montgomery Belgion to 
Rougemont, 9 Feb. 1939, Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, Rougemont Papers, BPUN, 
‘[Oeuvres] L’Amour et l’Occident, 1939’.
!  See his Chapter V: ‘L’Amour et la Guerre’, based on J. Huizinga’s Herfsttij der Middeleeuwen (1919 – The 1473
Waning of the Middle Ages), see his annotations in Neuchâtel, Bibliothèque Publique et Universitaire, 21R K199: 
Huizinga, Le Déclin du Moyen Age. 
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succombe à son mauvais génie, ce sera pour avoir trop longtemps cultivé la religion 
anti-chrétienne de la passion.   1475!
Thus, there was the Christian Europe that Rougemont defended, on the one hand; and 
all the rest (whether it be the ‘Orient’, Manichaeism, dualism, or the catastrophic spirit), on 
the other. The attempt to fit all the non-Christian spiritual traditions into one single category 
(the ‘Orient’) makes no sense for those who do not share Rougemont’s conception of what is 




In writing an essay about Europe and love, Rougemont’s aims were twofold: to 
denounce the religious decadence of Western Europe first, and then to find ways of 
overcoming it. To measure decadence, one had to find reference criteria. The most tangible 
criterion, according to Rougemont, was the increasing number of divorces and of ‘délire 
passionnel’; thus ‘la crise moderne du mariage est le signe le moins trompeur d’une 
décadence occidentale’ both public and private.   Rougemont found other signs of the 1476
decadence of Western civilisation, from ‘le culte du nombre’ (whether mass demonstrations or 
parliamentary democracy) to ‘l’envahissement de la culture par les passions nationalistes : 
tout ce qui tend à ruiner la personne.’   He suggested: ‘il se peut que l’Europe, après une 1477
crise totalitaire (et supposé qu’elle n’y succombe point), retrouve le sens d’une fidélité gagée 
au moins sur des institutions solides à la mesure de la personne.’   These institutions were to 1478
promote the European ethos: free and pluralist. 
!
And here lies the irony: Rougemont sought to promote acceptance of differences with 
a dualist argument: the Christian West (as Rougemont defined it) vs. the Manichean East (an 
all-encompassing category). Rougemont claimed to have identified Manichaeism as the 
heresy of the whole Orient, but the nature and structure of his argument points to 
!  312
!  Rougemont, 'L'amour action, ou de la fidélité (II)', 251.1475
!  Rougemont, L'Amour et l'Occident, 322.1476
!  Rougemont, L'Amour et l'Occident, 322.1477
!  Rougemont, L'Amour et l'Occident, 322-3.1478
Manichaeism. Rougemont described a struggle between the good West and the evil Orient. In 
other words, it seems that he had fallen prey to the very error which he called heretical and 
‘totalitarian’. 
!
That Rougemont’s ‘Occident’ was primarily defined in religious terms is clear from 
the following passage: 
Et j’appellerai « occidentale » une conception religieuse qui à vrai dire nous est venue 
du Proche-Orient, mais qui n’a triomphé qu’en Occident : celle qui pose qu’entre Dieu 
et l’homme, il existe un abîme essentiel, ou comme le dira Kierkegaard « une 
différence qualitative infinie ». Donc point de fusion possible, ni d’union substantielle. 
Mais seulement une communion dont le modèle est le mariage de l’Eglise et de son 
Seigneur.    1479!
Considering the importance of Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the ‘infinite qualitative 
difference’ between God and the creature, it is astonishing that no commentator has stressed 
the influence of Kierkegaard on Rougemont’s definition of ‘l’Occident’.   This ‘conception 1480
religieuse’ would require long theological discussion.   In particular, Rougemont’s 1481
distinction between communion and union may seem specious, unless it was a device to 
express reservations on the ambivalence of mystical union, as Thomas Keller has 
suggested.    1482
!
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Rougemont equated passion-love with Eros (defined as pagan love – not to be 
confused with sexual love) and action-love with Agape (defined as Christian love). Following 
Anders Nygren’s dual representation of love, Rougemont claimed that his ‘remarques sur la 
passion et le mariage mettent en lumière l’opposition fondamentale de l’Eros et de l’Agapè, 
c’est-à-dire des deux religions qui se disputent notre Occident.’   The interpretation of 1483
‘totalitarian’ systems as surrogate religions, which  Chapter 6 has studied, underpins his 
argument. In keeping with the ‘anti-totalitarian’ aims – which inspired a bipolar worldview – 
Rougemont himself drew a dualist scheme opposing ‘Paganism’ to ‘Christianity’.  1484
Expanding on it, I propose the following schema to summarize the thesis of L’Amour et 
l’Occident: 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It is not to diminish Rougemont’s argument to put it like this (Rougemont remarked, 
on several instances, that he was fully aware of schematising and simplifying);   nor is it to 1485
devalue his talent as a popular essayist, as twofold arguments have undeniable pedagogical 
advantages. Incidentally, this may help explain the popularity of L’Amour et l’Occident, and 
this leads us to conclude on why Stuart Woolf has been misguided to dismiss Rougemont’s 





We have seen that L’Amour et l’Occident is neither a history of love in Europe, nor a 
political polemic about the crisis of Western civilisation. It is a book of moral theology. There 
are at least three layers of meaning. First, L’Amour et l’Occident was a call to personal and 
political freedom, through liberation from the myth of passion-love and nationalism, in the 
historical context of Europe in 1939. For personalist thinkers, as for members of the Collège 
de Sociologie, the questions of myth and mysticism were burning issues. Rougemont rejected 
the idea that one had to create a new mystical force to combat the myths of the state, of the 
‘Orient’ ‘Occident’
Religion Greek philosophers, 
Shankara, pagans, 
heretics, etc.
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nation, and – he added – of passionate love. L’Amour et l’Occident was a warning, 
particularly directed to Catholic theologians and advocates of a spiritual third way, that the 
quest of mystical love may lead to delusions. 
!
Second, L’Amour et l’Occident remains a précis of Rougemont’s personalist thought. 
The themes of love and relationship allowed Rougemont to express his own views on 
personhood. The polemic with the personalist historian Henri-Irénée Marrou in Esprit 
explains why, once again, it might be better to speak of personalisms in the plural. Alliance 
and dialogue between persons forever distinct provided Rougemont’s personalism with its 
particular character. 
!
Third, L’Amour et l’Occident is an ‘existential’ essay, presenting a non-rational 
apology for fidelity, through interpretation and appropriation of Kierkegaard’s concept of 
‘decision by virtue of the absurd’. As Rougemont defined it: ‘La fidélité : c’est l’acceptation 
décisive d’un être en soi, limité et réel, que l’on choisit non comme prétexte à s’exalter, ou 
comme « objet de contemplation », mais comme une existence incomparable et autonome à 
son côté, une exigence d’amour actif.’    Rougemont put forward personal engagement, as 1487
the only free and responsible attitude, both in private and public matters.  
!
Given the fact that Rougemont’s personal and ‘existential’ choice was based upon a 
dogmatic approach to faith, one might be surprised that L’Amour et l’Occident has become a 
minor classic. Indeed, L’Amour et l’Occident is still taken quite seriously nowadays, despite 
being based on a historical account that has been proved to be false since 1939. What makes 
its thesis enduring if historically wrong and contradictory? I submit that, for all his dogmatic 
statements and contradictions, Rougemont articulated a view of love with which many readers 
could identify. Since Denis de Rougemont was spending much time with the Saint-Exupérys 
in New York at the time when Antoine wrote Le Petit Prince (and with Consuelo after 
Antoine’s disappearance), we may draw a parallel between L’Amour et l’Occident and the 
Petit Prince’s idea that outside the relation of love, the person presents no uniqueness, it is a 
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being like other beings, a thing without a name, without a face.   The idea, still alive today, 1488
is that the free person loves freely, and thus affirms his or her identity, his or her being, by 
relation to others. While not exempt from Eurocentrism and contradictions, L’Amour et 




!  Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, Le Petit Prince (New York, 1943). One could draw further parallels between 1488






It is now possible to define the personalism that developed in France at the turn of the 1930s. 
It was both a social movement and a philosophy of existence, which sought to realize a 
society in which personal freedom, creativity and responsibility would contribute to the good 
of all, and in which each element, each institution, would be oriented towards the fullfilment 
of each human person. There was to be no higher goal than the person, understood as the 
individual in relation to others. The distinction between ‘personne’ and ‘individu’ was the 
crucial tenet defining this particular personalism. Personalism is perhaps best understood as 
an oxymoron: its emphasis on the concrete person opposed the ‘–ism’ of systems; and yet 
personalism involved a crucial point in public debate at the time. It allowed the expression of 
concern for a comprehensive approach to human questions, without having the contradictory 
connotations of humanism, and without depending on faith and religious profession. 
!
In 1930s Europe, personalism competed with other loosely structured ‘–isms’, such as 
individualism, humanism, materialism, collectivism, communism, and fascism. To the 
objection that personalism seemed less elaborated conceptually than some other ‘–isms’, one 
may respond that the interest of the notion of person lay in its imperfection. The person 
exceeds categorisation, and stands for diversity. Personalist thinkers contributed to the 
reflection on the subject and on existence in the twentieth century. 
!
The emergence of personalism in France cannot be understood as the product of 
French developments alone. As cultural-transfer historians Christian Roy and Thomas Keller 
have argued, personalist thinkers in France selectively appropriated, used and modified 
Russian and German understandings of the person and of personalism. Personalism was not 
invented by a young generation of Catholic thinkers in France at the turn of the 1930s, and it 
was not primarily the Catholic and leftist ideology of Emmanuel Mounier and the journal 
Esprit.  In France, it was first the doctrine of ON, a non-confessional third-way movement. 
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To recapitulate the stages of the development of personalism(s) in France. The concept 
of ‘personnalisme’ was first formulated by Alexandre Marc. From 1931 onwards, personalism 
– which had hitherto remained a philosophical term, in Germany in particular – was 
developed by ON to become a social and political movement. The editorial board of Esprit 
distrusted the ON personalist revolution from the very beginning. Nonetheless, Emmanuel 
Mounier started borrowing personalism from ON after March 1933. At Esprit, personalism 
came to be a usefull rallying-cry for a revolutionary movement based on Christian values. 
Mounier officially broke with ON in 1934, following Esprit’s shift towards the left and his 
decision to develop Esprit’s personalism with a strong emphasis on the community. However, 
even after the official break, the doctrines of ON and Esprit remained interrelated. Thereafter, 
and in short, one could distinguish two main types of personalism(s), and two lesser-known 
types in 1930s France: the federalist personalism of ON; the communitarian personalism of 
Esprit; the right-wing personalism of Jean de Fabrègues; and the ecological personalism of 
the South-West Esprit and ON groups. 
!
Denis de Rougemont is the key to understanding the various personalist movements in 
1930s France and Switzerland. Although he worked most obviously for ON, he remained the 
most active figure in building bridges between the various personalist groups. He thought that 
the doctrinal precision of ON ought to be combined with the ambiance and activities of the 
Esprit groups. The motivations for his mediation were many. His contacts in the literary field, 
and the fact that he was not of the highest calibre as a philosopher, form one set of 
explanations. It has been suggested, in Chapters 2 and 4, that Rougemont’s Swiss and 
Protestant identity made his mediation easier in 1930s France – a society highly polarised by 
struggles between the Catholic Church and the secular state. But Rougemont was also 
commonsensical: to be convincing about the necessity of promoting better relationships 
between persons, and if they were to federate European states, they had to start by 
overcoming their personal divisions, and by federating themselves.  
!
In social terms, Esprit had a larger impact than ON, although (or because) Esprit was 
less precise (or rigid) in terms of doctrine and more welcoming as a movement. Emmanuel 
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Mounier worked hard to make sure that Esprit would be more than a French Catholic journal. 
His unpublished letters to Rougemont illustrate this. The success of Esprit owed much to 
Mounier’s ability to remain open: he managed to avoid the social discrimination of the 
Maurrassians, the theological exclusiveness of the Neo-Thomists, and the doctrinal rigidity of 
ON. Its personalism has played a leading role in French cultural life which, until the 1960s, 
was based on the triptych communism-existentialism-personalism; it has durably influenced 
Catholic thinkers, notably Karol Wojtyla, Pope John-Paul II;   and is one of the few journals 1489
of the 1930s to have survived until now. Thus, Esprit proved relatively successful both as a 
journal and as a movement. By keeping its personalism relatively vague, it managed to gather 
various sensibilities under one banner. 
!
The personalism of the ON group remains the initial and the most creative personalism 
in France. A full chapter has been devoted to its political, economic, and spiritual dimensions. 
Politically, ON personalists departed from contemporary political theory by rejecting class 
struggle, national sovereignty, and international relations. ON sought to make politics serve a 
generous economic vision, whereby poverty and the proletarian condition would be abolished, 
whilst maintaining freedom and initiative as the basis of the economy. Both politics and 
economics were contingent upon spiritual concerns. ON personalists made earnest attempts to 
conceive the human person in non-confessional terms, without referring to Judeo-Christian 
faith. The non-confessional approach to spirituality was a difficult position in 1930s France, 
and it was undermined by affirmations to the contrary of some ON members. Rougemont is a 
fine example. He kept bringing up Christian values in what he recognised as a post-Christian 
society. 
!
The personalist criticism of all European politics was very sharp, especially in L’Ordre 
Nouveau. But it is always easier to diagnose than to cure. For all their claims to be anti-
nationalists, ON members continued to accept the idea that France had a universal mission to 
fulfil. Federalist personalism would have a second chance in the European federalist 
movement, which Denis de Rougemont, Alexandre Marc and Bernard Voyenne had already 
started to organise in 1937, as it became painfully obvious that the ‘common front’ strategy of 
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European third ways had failed. They did influence the ‘technocratic’ reforms of the late 
1930s and, as some have argued, may have contributed to the demise of French democracy in 
1940. This study of the personalism of Denis de Rougemont, however, leads to different 
conclusions. 
!
Personalism lies at the centre of what remains highly controversial in the study of 
French fascism today. I have suggested that it is more fruitful to look at personalism as 
competing with fascism, rather than trying to decide whether the personalist third way was 
proto-fascist or anti-fascist. The examples of ON and of Esprit show that personalists fought 
in the same arena as fascists. This arena was situated outside the parliament and, in 1930s 
France, outside party politics. Personalists and fascists shared common negations, in 
particular anti-liberalism and anti-communism. However, the only affirmative claim they had 
in common was to represent European revolutionary youth. Some personalists became 
fascists, but most resisted, and a few fought fascism unto death. Denis de Rougemont’s 
example shows that the personalist weapons against fascism were not primarily rational or 
political; they were ‘existential’ and theological. Rougemont’s fight against fascism was a 
question of existence and faith. To attempt to reduce this to political categories (the fascism 
vs. anti-fascism debate, with a middle category: proto-fascism) is to give a deceptive, because 
one-dimensional, image of personalism and of fascism. 
!
The results of Rougemont’s efforts to federate personalist movements were mixed. On 
the one hand, he failed to achieve a great and united personalist revolutionary movement, and 
he failed to develop personalism as a credible political third way in 1930s Europe. On the 
other hand, his efforts were not intellectually fruitless. On the eve of the Second World War, 
Rougemont gave a positive meaning to Swiss neutrality and helped foster Swiss federal 
identity. Thus, contrary to what Raymond Aron has suggested in his memoirs, personalism did 
matter outside the dining circles of the Parisian intelligentsia.   When the Nazis invaded 1490
Paris in June 1940, Rougemont, called back to serve in the Swiss army, published his famous 
defence of Paris and the world: 
!  321
!  Raymond Aron, Mémoires, 50 ans de réflexion politique (Paris, 1983), 101-4, 707.1490
A cette heure où Paris exsangue voile sa face d’un nuage et se tait, que son deuil soit le 
deuil du monde! Nous sentons bien que nous sommes tous atteints. Quelqu’un disait : 
« Si Paris est détruit, j’en perdrai le goût d’être un Européen. » La Ville Lumière n’est 
pas détruite : elle s’est éteinte. […] Je songe au chef de guerre qui traverse aujourd’hui 
ces rues les plus émouvantes du monde : il ne verra que d’aveugles façades. Il s’est 
privé à tout jamais de quelque chose d’irremplaçable, de quelque chose qu’on peut 
tuer, mais qu’on ne peut conquérir par la force, et qui vaut plus, insondablement plus 
que tout ce que peuvent rafler dans le monde entier les servants des Panzerdivisionen. 
Quelque chose d’indéfinissable et que nous appelions Paris.   1491!
Rougemont thus gave one of the finest defences of this indefinable European culture, 
and of Paris in particular. As a personalist, he managed to promote a sense of pride in one’s 
country that was neither parochial nor nationalist, and he encouraged personal and political 
freedom. These were his finest achievements as a personalist writer. 
!
My final chapter has expanded on the depth and width of Denis de Rougemont’s 
personalism proper. The literature on L’Amour et l’Occident (1939) usually discusses this 
minor classic as a history of love and Europe, at best as a piece of anti-fascist literature. I have 
shown that L’Amour et l’Occident was not a history book, but an essay about moral theology. 
Rougemont warned his contemporaries against the dangers associated with mystical love, in 
literature, religion, politics, as in personal relationships. His thesis was based on a certain 
Protestant theology, interpreting Calvin, Kierkegaard, Karl Barth, and Rudolf Otto. L’Amour 
et l’Occident was a précis of Rougemont’s own personalism. A particular understanding of 
Christian love, as the affirmation of personal freedom and responsibility vis-à-vis other 
persons, is the closest illustration of what lies at the heart of the personalism of Denis de 
Rougemont.  
!
This raises the problem of the intrusion of theology into politics. Rougemont’s use of 
theology as a weapon against ‘totalitarian’ regimes provided him with an energy that he did 
not find in rationalist approaches. But his definition of the person as vocation, in a strict 
Protestant sense, remained largely meaningless for the unbeliever. It was also problematic for 
the non-Calvinist, since it implied a theology of the Fall that most confessions would reject. 
Of course the same cannot be said of all personalisms. Indeed, we have seen that the original 
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personalism avoided reference to the Judeo-Christian faith. In this respect, Rougemont, who 
was happy to be called dogmatic, was definitely not a mediating figure.  
!
Does this undermine the whole argument of Part I: Rougemont as a mediator between 
personalist movements? Quite the reverse. The personalism of Denis de Rougemont rested on 
an internal tension between the non-confessional policy of ON, on the one hand, and on his 
personal interpretation of Protestant dogmas, on the other hand. This tension illustrates the 
broader conflict between secularist and religious worldviews in 1930s Europe. Personalists 
sought to make this conflict fruitful, through a non-confessional (but not secular) approach to 
spirituality (and not established religions). Personalism was not only a ‘neither right nor left’ 
movement, but also a ‘neither secularist nor religious’ third way. It should no longer be 
possible to write the history of European third-way movements without considering how, in 
the 1930s, they sought to overcome both the ‘neither right nor left’ summa divisio in politics 
and the secularist vs. religious polarity. 
!
In total, this study of the personalism of Denis de Rougemont has addressed three 
great themes. Firstly, personalism looked at the individual in relation to society. Although not 
a totalising philosophical system, personalism was a comprehensive political philosophy: 
each element, each institution was oriented towards the achievement of the person in relation 
to others. Secondly, personalism sought to justify and defend the dignity, freedom and 
creativity inherent in all human persons, from a non-confessional ‘neither secular nor 
religious’ point of view. And thirdly, personalism was a reflection on the place of spirituality, 
culture, and politics, in relation to one another. 
!
It is now possible to answer the question implicit in this study: why did personalism 
develop as a revolutionary spiritual movement in the particular context of 1930s Europe? It 
was because small groups of intellectuals believed that the ‘decadence’ of European 
civilisation was driving the world into inhumanity. The most dangerous feature of the ‘crisis 
of civilisation’ was not, as Emmanuel Mounier had first thought, the rational onslaught on 
Christianity. It was rather, as Denis de Rougemont came to see it, the religious pretence of 
political regimes – ‘totalitarian’ regimes in particular, and nationalist regimes in general.  
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This explains the strong and partly irrational motivations behind the personalist 
opposition to parliamentary democracy, market economy, and ‘totalitarian’ regimes. With 
personalism, Rougemont sought to counter the worship of the state, the nation, the masses, 
and productivity – perceived in Fascism, National Socialism, Communism, and Capitalism 
respectively. In the final analysis, Rougemont aimed at a demystification of politics from a 
theological point of view. The idea – which was not original – was to limit the realm of 
Caesar to second best (or indeed third best after the economy). 
!
There have been few political movements as thorough and ambitious as ON in 
twentieth-century European history. Much of its doctrinal precision was motivated by the idea 
that their revolution would not go wrong if carefully prepared. To think that ON could work 
everything out in advance was a strange idea for personalists, who claimed to oppose all 
systems. Moreover, one may think that since the spiritual revolution was to come from the 
people and outside party politics, perhaps ON would have been better advised to assume an 
evolutionary, rather than revolutionary approach. These two remarks are historically 
embedded, however. Today, one has become more aware of the dangers of trying to start 
society all over again, with a blank slate. But in the 1930s, revolution was a general password.  
!
Federalist personalism was embedded in the particular setting of 1930s Paris, seen as 
the centre of Europe. This should prevent political groups from thinking that federalist 
personalism could be taken as a blueprint for a federal Europe today. To give but two recent 
examples in the academic world. Nicolas Tenzer has argued, strangely enough, that La 
Révolution nécessaire was premature when it was first published in 1933, but has become 
topical since 1968.   And introducing the reprint of L’Ordre Nouveau by the Fondation 1492
Emile Chanoux and the Centre International de Formation Européenne (C.I.F.E.), founded by 
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Alexandre Marc, Marc Heim has claimed that it is not only topical to implement the ideas of 
ON, but also urgent.   This is clearly not what this study would conclude.  1493
!
For one thing, personalism remains important today as a work of reflection, which 
allows us to think about the limits of existing regimes, and the ways in which all aspects of 
society interact with one another. Today, it has become rare to consider the fundamental 
principles of political theory on the basis of a comprehensive worldview. One may draw from 
personalism a sense of the interconnection between the local and the global, private and 
public, anthropology and sociology, economics and politics, and so on. For another, one may 
rightly wonder if it is possible to found a shared political community upon an experience as 
divisive as spirituality. 
!
Being indebted to the Western philosophical tradition, one may share with personalists 
the idea that personhood is indeed essential, and that institutions ought to protect and promote 
each human person as infinitely precious. The idea of placing each person as the ultimate goal 
of society is perhaps still alive. However, the doctrine of federalist personalism, which was 
shaped in and for the Europe of the 1930s, cannot help further. If there is a lesson to be learnt 
from Denis de Rougemont, it is to turn to contemporary society, and to think and act therein. 
For the historian, Henri Irénée Marrou may be a better example to follow: he teaches us that 
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